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consciousness and culture that can prevent the dissemination of religious fundamentalism and extremism in Tajik society.
"Islam v SNG", Moscow-Nizhni Novgorod, 2012, No 2 (7), pp. 28-35.
Murat Laumulin,
D. Sc. (Political Sciences), Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies VIRTUAL SECURITY OF CENTRAL ASIA
The forthcoming withdrawal of western coalition troops from Afghanistan and the possible deployment of arms and operational bases of the United States on the territory of certain states in Central Asia create a new situation in the region. One should consider the decision of Uzbekistan to suspend membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) taken at the end of June 2012 in this context. The Charter of the organization prohibits the deployment of military bases of the third countries on the territory of the Organization's member-countries. Non-participation will allow Uzbekistan, on a legal basis, to receive any military-technical means, including arms, from NATO, which the latter deems necessary to leave on the way out from Afghanistan.
True, official claims and complaints of Uzbekistan to the Organization boil down to the fact that the latter remains symbolic, even virtual. When things go as far as to the need to rebuff the real threats to security and stability, as was the case of the invasion of Islamic militants in 1999 and 2000, or the Osh massacre of 2010, the Organization did not play any role at all. Are these complaints well-substantiated?
The sum total of the problems connected with the security and stability in Central Asia can conditionally be divided into two groups. On the one hand, some of them stem from the international position of the Central Asian regions and the geopolitical risks caused by the diplomatic and strategic activity of the outside players - the great powers (the United States, China and Russia) and regional states (Turkey, Iran and Pakistan). On the other hand, there are threats, risks and challenges of an intraregional character. True, it is difficult to draw the dividing line between the problems of the first and second type.
First, the growth of political extremism in Kyrgyzstan connected with the unpredictable economic and socio-political situation of the country is causing serious apprehensions. Neither its neighbors in the region, nor Russia, nor outside players (China, the United States, the European Union), nor even international organizations are in a hurry to assume responsibility for the present situation.
Secondly, the development of the situation in Tajikistan is not too calm and simple and begins to resemble the one in Kyrgyzstan.
Thirdly, demarcation of societies by the ethnic and clan features proceeds rather rapidly, and today latent ethnic conflicts turn into open hostility.
Fourthly, the forthcoming change of political elites and the uncertain vector of political development turn the mechanism of transition of power from existing presidents to their successors into a secret which is hard to solve.
Fifthly, the growing influence of political Islam in practically all countries of Central Asia force their ruling regimes to tolerate, in one way or another, the activity of organizations propagating the ideas of fundamentalist Islam, despite the official ban; moreover, they become more active not only in rural areas, but also in cities.
Finally, Afghanistan is not only an external factor, but also an internal one. It has turned into a source of constant instability largely due to the ill-conceived actions of the global actors. The legal ability and efficiency of Hamid Karzai's government are very doubtful. After the withdrawal of the United States and NATO countries from Afghanistan, the countries of the region and Russia will have to look for answers to the entire range of problems connected with the situation themselves, just as was the case at the beginning and in the middle of the 1990s. The main one of them is the prospect of a new wave of Islamic radicalism and the renewed activity of the Islamists.
The extremist religious-political movements born in Central Asia, such as "Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan," "Akramiya," "Tabligi Jamaat," "Islamic Party of East Turkestan," "Jamaat of Mojaheds of Central Asia," "Hizb-ut-Tahrir-al-Islami," have found refuge on the territory of Afghanistan. The growing activity of these movements connected with transfer of military actions to the north of Afghanistan and the worsening of the general situation in certain countries can create a real threat to the secular political regimes.
There is another threat, namely, turning Afghanistan into the world center of narcotic drug production, and drawing "agents" from among the organized crime barons in Central Asian countries into drug trafficking. It should be admitted that among these "agents" are many representatives of special services and government officials called upon to fight the drug business. But the gravest threat is the rapid growth of drug addicts in the countries of Central Asia and neighboring Russia. Unfortunately, quite a few high officials in Central Asia, especially in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, underestimate the significance of this terrible circumstance.
The activity of the western forces in Afghanistan (including in the fight against drug production and trafficking), as well as various
geopolitical projects (for instance, "Greater Central Asia") which regard this part of Eurasia as a zone of "vital importance for the U.S. interests" evoke many questions. The interests of the regional states, and Russia, too, are not taken into account. So far, most experts assess the situation as stalemate - the coalition cannot stay in Afghanistan, but it cannot leave it completely without big losses.
Certain experts believe that in ensuring security of Central Asia, in the context of "post-Nato" Afghanistan, the key role should be played not by the Collective Security Treaty Organization, but by another body - the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes all countries of the region, except Turkmenistan. This organization can contribute already now to the formation of a foreign political surrounding favorable to Afghanistan, maximally block the export of narcotic drugs form there, cut financial aid to the Afghan opposition, render economic assistance to Kabul, and finally, create conditions for limiting dissemination of radical Islamist ideas. For this purpose no special agreement with the Afghan government is needed and, what is more important, with the command of the western coalition forces. There should only be the political will of the SCO member-states.
In the new conditions the Collective Security Treaty Organization is faced with greater responsibility, and the effectiveness of this military-political alliance becomes urgent necessity. In the view of experts from Russia and the CIS countries, CSTO should have clear-cut ideology based on the idea of stability in the region in order to raise its role in the international arena. Various proposals have been prepared and put forward by the Institute of modern development (Russ. abbreviation INSOR) in 2011 for the transformation of the Organization.
First of all, it was suggested that the system of adopting decisions in the Organization should be reformed. So far all questions have been solved by consensus. INSOR suggested that the principle of adopting decisions should be changed, and the Charter of the Organization should have the premise that decisions be adopted by a simple majority of votes. True, after the withdrawal of Uzbekistan from the Organization this point has lost significance, inasmuch as it was only Uzbekistan that took a special stand on almost each question. Further, INSOR suggested that the model of the Organization's relations with NATO be changed, correlating its new strategic documents with the strategic concept of NATO approved in 2010, and ensuring, at least partially, tactical compatibility with its contingents.
Finally, the Organization should be turned into the main peacekeeping force of Central Asia and adjacent regions. On agreement with the UN the bloc could take part in peacekeeping operations even beyond the boundaries of the zone of its direct responsibility. It was also proposed to introduce an institution of special representatives of the Organization (like special representatives of NATO on various questions).
It cannot be said that Russia's efforts proved fruitless. By the end of 2011 the allies agreed on a list of foreign-policy problems on which they would have similar views, like it is the case of NATO and the European Union. At the end of 2011 there was a summit meeting of the Organization at which the presidents of its member-countries signed an agreement on military bases (the principal decision on this matter was adopted at the summit in Astana in August). According to this document, foreign military presence in the Organization's member-states was only possible with the support of and on agreement with all its members. In recent years it was the only agreed political decision.
(Most probably, it was the decisive argument for Uzbekistan to withdraw from the Organization).
However, there are loopholes in the document which can allow its signatories to circumvent certain premises. The term "military base" definitely requires broader interpretation. For example, the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has discussed with representatives of Kazakhstan the possibility of jointly using the logistic center of the Aktau sea port. The "Navoi" airport in Uzbekistan is also an international logistic junction serving the U.S. armed forces in Afghanistan. In Kyrgyzstan, apart from the well-known "Manas" logistic center (which used to be a military base prior to 2009), an antiterrorist training center has been set up in the town of Tokmak, where a big group of American servicemen is constantly deployed. Similar situation exists in Tajikistan. All these objects are foreign military bases, or can become such bases within a short time.
At the end of 2011 chairmanship in the Organization was given over to Kazakhstan. The latter considers it necessary to protect the information area of the Organization, which is especially important after the "Arab spring" events. Another important task is, in the view of Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan's President, to strengthen further the Collective Rapid Reaction Forces. The third task is the preventive protection of the airspace of Central Asia. Kazakhstan also intends to concentrate efforts on the strengthening of the fight against drug production and trafficking and the evolvement of an antidrug strategy.
Striving to overcome the pernicious tendency toward geopolitical rivalry in Central Eurasia, Kazakhstan put forward the idea of strengthening the collective security system at the Astana summit in December 2010. It presupposed active interaction of all institutions of security operating in Central Asia - NATO, CSTO, OSCE and SCO (possibly, the Conference on Interaction and Measures of Trust in Asia,
which was put forward on Kazakhstan's initiative in 1994, an Asian analogue of OSCE). In general, as the chairman of OSCE in 2010 Kazakhstan exerted great efforts to resolve the problem of international recognition of CSTO. It achieved this, partly, having stated in the Astana Declaration that the zone of OSCE responsibility in the sphere of security is not Euro-Atlantic, but Eurasian now.
However, the problem of its legitimization has not been solved so far. The United States and NATO consider CSTO a virtual structure devoid of any practical meaning and political substance. This is shown, among other things, by a cable from the diplomatic archive of Wikileaks. In it the U.S. representative in NATO said on September 10, 2009, that it would be counterproductive for the alliance to establish ties with CSTO, an organization created on Moscow's initiative for opposing the potential influence of NATO and the United States in the post-Soviet area. CSTO has shown its ineffectiveness in most spheres of its activity and has gone through political split. NATO ties with CSTO could lend greater legitimacy to this "fading" organization.
The West does not believe in any reformation of CSTO, and prefers to solve all problems with members of the Organization on a bilateral level. (It should be admitted that Russia, too, often relies on bilateral military-political relations with countries in the region). The return of Vladimir Putin to the Kremlin could be an event which would influence Russian policy in the Organization and its attitude to international cooperation. As is known, improved relations with the West, including along the CSTO - NATO line, is not an end in itself for Putin, in contrast to his predecessor D. Medvedev, who placed stake on "resetting." Given any development trends, the role of CSTO should objectively be growing after 2014. If the new/old Russian leadership tackles integration in the military-political sphere as enthusiastically as in organizing the Customs union, the Eurasian economic area and the
Eurasian Union, hopes for progress in the transformation of the Organization might materialize.
Uzbekistan's withdrawal from CSTO has caused a new wave of discussions about the prospects of the Organization. Tashkent's foreign policy can be compared with the movement of a pendulum: once every two or three years Uzbekistan turned away from Russia and its CIS partners and drew closer to the West, and vice versa. But in 2005, after events in Andizhan, Tashkent's relations with the West deteriorated so much that Uzbekistan was about to be declared an international pariah. At the time Moscow and Beijing rendered support to Tashkent (Kazakhstan soon joined them).
During that period of semi-isolation Uzbekistan's foreign policy changed considerably from the geopolitical and geo-economic points of view: Tashkent began to orient itself to Asian countries to a greater extent. Its views on the problems of security, relations with Russia, policy towards the CIS countries, regional integration in Central Asia, etc. also changed. But in 2009 serious changes were noticed in Uzbekistan's international situation. The pendulum was again set into motion. At the end of January 2010 President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan signed a Plan of cooperation with the United States. That document was based on the results of the first round of Uzbek-American consultations. Washington placed stake on interaction with Uzbekistan in the political, social and economic spheres, and also in the problems of security. The dialogue between the governments of the two countries was initiated by the Assistant Secretary of State of the United States Robert Blake who visited Tashkent shortly before that.
The premise concerning cooperation in the sphere of security envisaged training and retraining of Uzbek army officers at the leading U.S. military academies and schools, including within the framework of International Military Education Program.
In early February 2009 the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton signed a document allowing the United States to resume technical aid to Uzbekistan in the form of deliveries of non-lethal weapons and equipment to that country.
Tashkent's strategy toward Russia is based on balancing between Moscow and Washington in the strategic sphere and Beijing in the economic sphere in order to force Russia to cooperation on conditions acceptable to Uzbekistan. Russia's policy is of a passive, inertial character and based on the conviction that by domestic political and foreign political reasons Uzbekistan will, sooner or later, return to the integration structures under the Russian aegis.
The Uzbek leader Islam Karimov has repeatedly voiced the view that Moscow tried to force its security strategy on the post-Soviet area through CSTO, pursuing its neo-imperial ambitions. Tashkent is categorically against the expansion of the military-tactical and strategic competence of CSTO on the basis of the Corps of Rapid Reaction Forces. Uzbekistan is convinced of the fact that all integration activities of Russia are aimed at creating a new "mini-U.S.S.R."
After establishing contacts with the new administration of the White House President Karimov began to think of withdrawing from all alliances with Russia - EurAsEC and CSTO, which indeed took place in 2010-2012. Tashkent believes that Russia and Central Asia should solve the problems of national security independently. In the view of Uzbek experts, the Russian Federation should contribute to the strengthening of the independent states situated around it not by drawing them closer to its territory, on the pattern of EurAsEC and CSTO, but on the basis of their independent regionalization.
Actually, Uzbekistan's foreign policy is of a multi-vector character, just as Kazakhstan's, but there are certain complications. This policy bears a certain forced, sometimes contradictory, character.
As Uzbek analysts admit themselves, as a member of international organizations Uzbekistan has been unable to detach national interests from international and supranational. Its foreign policy has passed three stages. At the first stage it was oriented to Russia, which could be explained by post-Soviet inertia. At the second stage it turned toward the West, particularly the United States, which could be assessed as the "approbation of independence." The present stage is, in essence, a modification of the first two "courses," which could be called global adaptation.
Washington regards Uzbekistan as the principal and more influential player in Central Asia. This state has regional hegemonic ambitions and can throw a challenge to Moscow, in contrast to its Central Asian neighbors. There are big Uzbek diasporas in these neighboring states, which enables Tashkent to interfere with their policy. It also has advantages as being self-sufficient in terms of food products and fuel and energy (except Kazakhstan). Uzbekistan borders on Afghanistan, but not Russia. It has to be admitted that the main vector of the "multi-vector" policy of Uzbekistan is anti-Russian (in contrast to Kazakhstan), and this engenders a good many problems facing Tashkent.
In this connection mention should be made of Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan relations. Uzbek policy toward Kazakhstan has never been based on clear-cut concepts or long-term strategy. On the contrary, it was often influenced by fluctuations and subjective emotions of the leadership, and it suffered from negative or stereotyped ideas. It was demonstrated, among other things, by Uzbekistan's negative attitude to Kazakhstan's integration initiatives.
The Uzbek political elite harbors the idea that stability of Central Asia depends on Uzbekistan and its relations with the neighboring
countries, and that Islam Karimov has the decisive say on all important regional problems. However, it is far from reality.
As the deadline of the withdrawal of the coalition forces from Afghanistan draws closer, the prospect of long-term military presence of the United States in Central Asia looks more realistic. Washington has announced plans of creating special objects, for instance, the Foundation of the U.S. Central Command for fighting drug production and drag trafficking has declared its intention to allocate means to set up military training centers in Osh (Kyrgyzstan) and Karatag (Tajikistan), as well as a cynological center and a helicopter base near Alma Ata.
Washington made public data about the volume of assistance which it intended to give to the countries of the post-Soviet area in 2013. Military aid to Uzbekistan will comprise $1.5 million. Similar sums will be given to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Kazakhstan will get $1.8 million and Turkmenistan -- $685,000. After the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan, American military hardware and equipment can remain in Central Asian countries. The Pentagon has been holding negotiations on the subject with Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.. Part of military equipment and machines will be given gratis. Afghanistan's neighbors may also receive medical equipment, means of communication, fire-fighting machines and equipment, and also mobile training centers. Tajikistan would like to get military equipment for border-guards and for operations in the mountains. Kyrgyzstan would wish to have drones.
Washington's decision to transfer military equipment will strengthen its position and influence in Central Asia. The presence of American and NATO hardware and equipment in some countries of Central Asia will entail the need to train specialists, supply spare parts and modernize their armies according to patterns of the United
States and NATO countries. As a result, it may lead to greater cooperation of the CSTO countries with the West and their breakaway from Moscow.
The United States prefers to discuss all these questions within the framework of bilateral relations, without drawing regional organizations, such as CSTO. The implementation of this plan will allow the United States to broaden military cooperation with the CSTO member-states behind the back of Moscow. True, Moscow will not be isolated from these processes, for if the question of the logistic center in Ulyanovsk is resolved, western hardware and equipment, as well as military personnel will have to pass from Central Asia through Russian territory.
In June 2012 it became known about the signing of new treaties by NATO with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan on transit of cargoes and military equipment from Afghanistan. The former agreements dealt with air transportation, whereas the new ones opened new routes on land. New agreements will give NATO more opportunities and flexible transport network for withdrawing their troops, hardware and equipment from Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
The new documents signed show that the parties have agreed on the price of "backward transit" from Afghanistan along the Northern route, as well as on economic, political and military preferences which the countries of the region will get in the process of withdrawing troops from Afghanistan, and after it. The Pentagon regards the use of military bases in Central Asia as an ideal variant.
"Rossiya v globalnoi politike,"Moscow, 2012, N 4, July-August, pp. 86-94.
