CC BY
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M. Laumulin,
Senior research associate at the Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies under the President of Kazakhstan THE U.S. AND EUROPEAN UNION'S POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA (Comparative analysis)
On November 6, 2012, the incumbent President from the Democratic party, Barack Obama, won the elections and gained the right to the second term of office.
During the next few years Central Asia will be of interest for the United States as a transit region for withdrawing manpower and military hardware and equipment from Afghanistan (and also as potential customers for purchasing or leasing American military equipment from Afghanistan). In case of an exacerbation of political and strategic relations between the United States and China the value of Central Asia as the place of access to China's rear will sharply increase.
President Obama's policy toward Central Asia up to 2017 can be influenced by the following factors (apart from the Afghan and Chinese): the strengthening of Islamic radicalism and terrorism, a large-scale and prolonged conflict with Iran, greater rapprochement with Russia within the framework of Putin's course aimed at reintegration of the post-Soviet area, and unpredicted change of power in certain Central Asian states.
Principles, Methods and Tasks of Obama's Central Asian Policy
In the traditional approach of the United States to Central Asia there are three aspects worth mentioning: "balanced strengthening," "democracy above all" and "security above all."1
The principle of "balanced strengthening" is undoubtedly supported by the present administration. It boils down to the need of the U.S.A. to adhere to a course aimed at balanced realization of all its strategic aims (policy, democracy and energy resources) and use a multidimensional approach to solving the problems of security and democracy, and ensuring economic interests.
The "democracy above all" principle conforms to official assertions that the war against terrorism and democracy are not mutually exclusive aims. Adherents to this principle criticize the Central Asian policy of Washington for the fact that its words are at variance with deeds: it loads democracy and at the same time sacrifices it to security interests. The supporters of the "democracy above all" principle believe that the emphasis of the American administration on such security problems as the war against terrorism sends a wrong signal to the leaders of the Central Asian countries and gives them grounds to consider that the White House's moderation in its support of political and economic reforms in these countries is a reward for their support of the U.S. war against terrorism. Thus, these countries' leaders may regard the American support of the cause of democracy and human rights a matter of a far-off future.
The supporters of the "security above all" principle disagree with the "democracy above all" principle. They recognize a great significance of democratic reforms for stability in Central Asia and the implementation of American interests in the region. But they do not believe that at present the United States should concentrate its main efforts and resources on establishing democracy in Central Asian countries. On the contrary, they maintain that Washington should diminish its rhetoric about democracy, and try to better understand the complex situation in countries of the region, and cooperate with them in the fight against terrorism for the sake of the national interests and
long-term strategic aims of the United States. Due to a special position of Central Asia, it is a hub of intercrossing interests of big powers, which seriously complicates the situation in the region. In these circumstances the United States should be very cautious in its support of democracy in Central Asia.
As to the U.S. policy in Central Asia in the sphere of political and economic liberalization, and protection of human rights, it will hardly be changed. An annual report of the U.S. Department of State published on March 11, 2010, on observance of human, economic and political rights defines Uzbekistan as a country with the gravest situation concerning human rights, (the report specially notes the use of child labor, strict control over the mass media, and further strengthening of authoritarianism).
Managing political risks connected with hydrocarbons' supply, as well as distribution of direct investments abroad has always been considered a priority of American foreign policy, and has been part of the U.S. foreign economic strategy. At the jubilee summit of NATO in Strasburg in 2009, its members decided that "energy security" was one of NATO priorities. This has led to the creation of the rapid-reaction forces in the Caspian region.
The persons in charge of working out the U.S. Central Asian policy in the Obama administration believe that it is necessary to overcome internal structural contradictions of their policy and solve three crucial problems. The first is to dispel apprehensions and distrust of the Central Asian countries toward U.S. efforts to establish democracy in the countries of the region. In this connection it seems that prior to the implementation of its Central Asian policy the White House should strengthen its contacts with the governments of regional countries in order to improve its image there. Another challenge to the
United States is Russia, which does not agree with the U.S. policy and will obstruct it. And the third is Afghanistan.2
On the whole, American experts are skeptical concerning the implementation prospects of the concept of "Greater Central Asia" which the administration of President George Bush Jr. left to Barack Obama to deal with. Nevertheless, this concept is listed as an aim of the foreign policy of the present administration.
As to the interconnection of the projects "Greater Middle East" and "Greater Central Asia," their realization depends on how successfully Washington will pursuit its policy in the Middle East, as well as on the development of the situation in Afghanistan. Taking into consideration the latest events in the Middle East, one can say that that United States has not given up their attempts to implement these "megaprojects." Thus, the integration of Central Asia as a united region in the Euro-Atlantic area remains on the agenda of the U.S. long-term strategy.
On the whole, the "Greater Central Asia" project is but part of Washington's strategic planning aimed at the transformation of entire Eurasia into a vast geo-economic area, which will include the Caspian region, Central Asia, Middle East and South Asia. Thus, the United States can theoretically lay the foundations for creating a "sanitary cordon" in the South along the perimeter of the borders of Russia and China, and the geopolitical field of the participants in regional rivalry has been broadened in the interests of the White House.
The principal amendments of the U.S. policy in the region include:
- Reinstatement of a number of posts and units in the administration and the setting up of the Department of South and Central Asia;
- Attempt to integrate Central and South Asia with an emphasis on the role of Afghanistan, with a view to forming "Greater Central Asia";
- Plans concerning the "North - South" transport corridor for diversifying the export of energy resources from Central Asia;
- Use of different approach (from strategic point of view) to different countries of the region with a view to turning Kazakhstan into a "corridor of reforms" and "regional leader";
- Greater emphasis on the role of education and nongovernmental organizations in the promotion o democracy in Central Asia with a view to removing fears caused by the development of democracy in the region.
American analysts maintain that opposite factors act in the Central Asian regions: each country is striving to overcome its own internal difficulties - the United States attempts to increase its influence, while Russia restricts its attempts. Certain states of Central Asia can simply be bought, while others decided to wait for Moscow's permission to sign a deal with the United States. No matter what agreements Washington might sign - whether on transit through the Caspian Sea or directly via Russian territory, access to Afghanistan from the North is not possible without agreement with at least one Central Asian country.
The previous American administration has not stated so far that its policy toward Central Asian countries needs serious amendments or revision. However, recognition of the errors made requires this. American experts single out three serious errors in the U.S. policy in Central Asia: in solving problems of regional countries the United States has not even tried to coordinate the positions of its various government offices; Washington has not properly understood the specific features of the countries and peoples of Central Asia and
the region as a whole; the United States has not even tried to coordinate its efforts with actions of other outside actors.
After coming to power the Obama administration was expected to revise thoroughly its strategy in Central Asia, particularly, it was hoped that it would renounce its "Greater Central Asia" concept. All the more so, since the war in Afghanistan made it necessary to use the transport routes passing through Central Asia.
To keep its grouping in Afghanistan Washington needed reliable route through the territory of CIS countries, inasmuch as cargo transit in connection with political instability in Pakistan and difficult relations between Islamabad and Delhi becomes practically unfeasible from the point of view of security. To date, in connection with the spectacular plans of the Obama administration to broaden the American military presence in Central Asian countries, the latter will play a vital role in supporting military operations in Afghanistan.
U.S. plans on Afghanistan have increased hopes in Certain Central Asian countries for greater American assistance and more investments. Yet, fears remained concerning Washington's use of antiterrorist operations for entrenching its military grouping in Central Asia, just as it did in 2001-2002.
Another problem of American policy in the region, which needs amendments on the part of the Obama administration, is the U.S. attitude toward CSTO. The White House believes that this organization is controlled by Russia and to establish relations with it would mean to recognize it as a legitimate member of the international community. Thus Washington will have, at least at a minimal level, to maintain contacts with the Russian Federation on the most crucial problems emerging in Central Asian countries. This would speed up the development of relations with the countries of the region and give
Moscow to understand that in actual fact Washington is not striving to pursue its interests, disregarding other states.
Moscow holds the view that the problems involving the deployment and functioning of Russian military objects in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are created by certain pro-American politicians in these countries. In Kyrgyzstan among such politicians are Roza Otunbayeva, and in Tajikistan - H. Zarifi.
It could be imagined how Obama's policy toward the region will develop. Evidently, an attempt should be made to eliminate previous drawbacks in Washington's Central Asian policy. Primarily, this concerns better coordination of the work of the Department of State and the Pentagon.
On the whole, the Obama administration has inherited a powerful enough base from its predecessors for exerting a profound and regular influence from the position of "soft power." We mean various foundations and their branches, information and cultural centers, American "corners" and councils, etc. In all, there are many such resource centers of the United States in the region: in Kazakhstan - 22, in Kyrgyzstan - 15, in Tajikistan - 9, in Turkmenistan - 5, and in Uzbekistan - 1. (Besides, the "Voice of America" radio has daily broadcasts in the Uzbek language).3
However, as is known, the Obama administration did not have a clear-cut concept of its policy in the region. All interests of the United States in Central Asia are concentrated on the military operation in Afghanistan. The significance of the region for the U.S. administration stems from the possibility to arrange and protect the transit of military cargoes for the coalition forces of the U.S. and NATO in Afghanistan. In April 2010 Obama's attention was drawn to the region in connection with the developments in Kyrgyzstan. The White House took a position which presupposed responsibility of Russia (leader of CSTO) and
Kazakhstan (chairman of OSCE) for stability in that republic and the region as a whole.
Cooperation between the United States (jointly with the European Union) and Central Asian countries in the sphere of energy remains a priority task for the White House. Emphasis will be laid on the further "Americanization" of the Caspian region and reorientation of the flows of Caspian oil-and-gas resources to Europe. The United States, along with its partners in the European Union, will continue to exert efforts to lay out trunk oil and gas pipelines from this region to European markets, bypassing Russian territory.
In March 2011 a highly-placed official at the U.S. Department of State said that American policy in Central Asia also includes annual consultations with each country of the region. One of the aspects to be discussed is the freedom of the mass media, conscience, and political gatherings. Washington is out to persuade the authorities of these countries in that they need to create economic and political opportunities for young people (with due account of the developments in the Middle East).
The United States would not like to come to the point where it will have to choose between the present-day leaders or the forces of revolution overthrowing governments. The United States will come out against the Central Asian authorities' attempts "to crack down on people and restrict freedoms."4
Apart from that, in its Central Asian strategy the United States has to consider the Chinese factor. In March 2011 the deputy Secretary of State Robert Blake in charge of relations with Central Asia, visited China. The two countries discussed the aims of the United States and Beijing in the region. Central Asia is an important market for Chinese goods, and three Central Asian states border on China. Washington studies the possibilities of cooperation with China in the region. On the
other hand, the United States would like China to take a more active part in Afghanistan's rehabilitation.
Although due to the financial crisis and a drop of the world prices of energy-carriers one can expect a curtailment of a number of energy projects in the Caspian basin lobbied by the United States, this region, including Central Asia, will inevitably remain an arena of rivalry with Russia for the spheres of influence.
Nevertheless, there is a certain coincidence of interests of the United States and Russia in the region. Political destabilization will have negative consequences for the United States in its global strategy. For the Russian Federation as a regional power a tangible threat will emerge of a destabilization of its southern borders.
According to certain experts, the United States will soon have to choose between the following alternatives: pipelines from Kazakhstan bypassing Russia; transport routes of delivering hydrocarbons bypassing Iran; transportation projects of energy resources which will limit China's access to resources of Central Asia.
Evidently, it is impossible to follow all three alternatives at once. In medium-term perspective, the United States will be able to rely on Russian transportation projects.
In its relations with Russia concerning Central Asia the United States could use the following method: to persuade Moscow that regionalization is the only alternative to "Islamization" or to the Central Asian region getting into the sphere of Chinese influence.
Central Asia and the European Union
After the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. Central Asia, just as the entire post-Soviet area, has virtually become part of "political Europe," that is, a region in the sphere of the geopolitical interests of the European Union.
In the first half of 2007 Germany took the post of the Chairman of the EU Council. One of the major tasks on its agenda at the time was the revision of the European Union's policy in Central Asia.5 In June 2007 the EU Council adopted a new Strategic document on Central Asia prepared mainly by Germany. It reflected shortcomings and positive aspects of European policy in the region. According to the document prepared on May 31, 2007, which was entitled "The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for New Partnership" and covered a period between 2007 and 2013, the aims of the EU in the region were as follows: to ensure stability and security of its member-countries; contribute to reducing poverty and raising the living standards; assist in every way possible regional cooperation between the states of Central Asia and between them and the EU, especially in the sphere of energy, transport, higher education, and environmental protection.
The strategic aims of the European Union and practical tasks of reaching them were formulated in the following way:
- The threat of Islamic radicalism should be taken very seriously and the states of the region, especially Uzbekistan, should be given all assistance possible in strengthening their law-enforcement agencies and implementing radical reforms of the entire security system;
- Afghanistan should be given more attention, especially its role in the economy and security of Central Asian republics, whereas transcontinental trade should be developed in all directions, not only toward Russia and Europe;
- Turkey might be a important connecting link through which Europe might get an opportunity to exert its influence on processes going on in Central Asia, and cooperation with Ankara on these issues should broaden;
- Cooperation with the reformist forces in the governments and parliaments of Central Asian countries should be strengthened.
At present European experts have come to the conclusion that the Central Asian strategy of the European Union may prove ineffective. True, it is too early to assess the effectiveness of this strategy.
It is indicative that European politicians sincerely believe that the establishment of stable democratic and secular regimes in countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus will make it possible to create a sort of "security belt," which will separate Europe from the unstable regions of the Islamic world. On the whole, there is no concerted opinion among European analysts whether Central Asia is really very important to the European Union. Of course, the EU countries actively support participation of their companies, above all, energy ones, in developing the resources of the region in order to ensure the uninterrupted supply of oil and gas from Central Asian countries.
Actually, the European Union has not achieved a single one of its strategic aims set in the 1990s: poverty still exists, just as resistance to reforms; the situation with human rights and the level of democracy are unsatisfactory; the energy interests of the EU are still unprotected. In the sphere of security the European Union is still marking time. Europe should be more self-confident and display more realism in its policy in the sphere of human rights and democracy.6 Besides, the EU could better coordinate its strategy with other international actors, particularly NATO and OSCE.
Speaking of the strategy of Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries with regard to the European Union, one should proceed from understanding the nature of Europe's interest in cooperation with countries of the Central Asian region and community of interests of the EU and CA. Naturally, Central Asia is of interest to the European Union primarily as a stable source of natural resources. On the other hand, European countries as NATO members play a no small role in the struggle against the threats emanating from Afghanistan. Besides,
the EU does not welcome the dominant role of the United States in Eurasia and intends to consider the role of Russia in the region. Experts have now been saying that it is precisely the European Union that can play the role of counterbalance (inasmuch as Russia keeps aloof) to the growing domination of China in Central Asia. All these factors should be taken into account in forming the position of Central Asian countries toward the European Union.7
Evidently, the relations of the European Union and Central Asia in the near future will be influenced by geopolitical factors and the geo-economic situation. Among these factors are the new strategy of the United States in Central Asia, unclear development prospects of the military-strategic situation in Afghanistan, relations between Russia and the West, the world economic crisis, and the growing importance of energy resources and food security. These factors can exert both positive and negative influence on the development of relations between Europe and Central Asia. Much will depend on the political will of the actors in this complex geopolitical situation themselves. But there can be no doubt that both Europe and central Asia are interested in each other.
Revision of Central Asian Eurostrategy
The leading European experts on Central Asia have submitted two types of recommendations for the European Union: general strategic and narrower technical recommendations.8
They admit that security problems are especially timely for both Central Asia and the European Union: they include their own energy security, the necessity of diversification of energy supplies, and the Afghan problem.
Cooperation between the European Union and Kazakhstan merits special attention. The Republic of Kazakhstan is the key country in the
region, which is interested in broadening its ties with the European Union, which has been expressed in its strategic program "Road to Europe." Kazakhstan's chairmanship in OSCE in 2010 opened opportunities for a more active foreign and political policy, for one, greater political convergence with the EU.
The European Union emphasizes that it expects serious political decisions and changes from Kazakhstan. This can exert a positive influence on the entire Central Asian region, become a great strategic achievement, and contribute to a breakthrough in relations between the EU and Uzbekistan.
The concept of regional cooperation used by the EU in Central Asia should be revised. The EU should devote greater attention to the opportunities opened by the cooperation of Central Asian countries with their neighbors outside the region (East Europe, Russia, China and South Asia), where the EU has special geopolitical interests (for instance, in the sphere of energy, transport and security). In actual fact the EU already uses the concept of more open regionalism, mainly through projects connecting Central Asia and the initiative ("Eastern Partnership.")
Assessing the reasons for the failure of EU policy in Central Asia, European analysts come to a conclusion that the problem lies in the fact that strategic interests are too broad, this is why the main aim is out of focus, and the instruments of activity are a varied and vast set of normative aims and technical means. The European Union does not have a potential for implementing a strict security policy, and this is why it bases its foreign policy on contributing to the development of a normative world order with a special emphasis on human rights, international law, regional cooperation, and international bodies.
European strategists believe that Central Asia is the only place in the world in which all big powers of the planet - Russia in the North,
China in the East, South Asia in the South, and Europe in the West -display great interest; of course, the United States is politically present there, too.
Differentiated Approach to Central Asian Countries
U.S. and EU relations with Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan (as the chairman of OSCE) had the most active contacts with the United States in 2010. Although Central Asia is important for the United States, primarily from the point of view of supporting and implementing the operation in Afghanistan by coalition forces, and also because of supplies of energy resources to the world markets, Kazakhstan is for Washington an ambitious, influential, and in contrast to some of its neighbors, predictable political player not only in Central Asia, but in the entire post-Soviet area.9
In crisis time the interest of American companies has increased in developing the promising markets, Kazakhstan being one of them. Thanks to the introduction of industrial-innovative strategy by the government of Kazakhstan, investment companies and banks of the United States have intensified their activities. The United States holds the view that Kazakhstan's entry in the Customs Union should not have a negative effect on its possibility to join the World Trade Organization.
At present, American agro-industrial companies, as well as firms dealing with medical equipment plus educational institutions from the Untied States would like to invest in projects on Kazakhstan's territory. However, it would seem that the existing percent ratio of investments in the oil complex and other branches of Kazakhstan's economy will not change. Sixty-five percent of American investments in the republic will
be channeled in oil and gas branches and accompanying transport infrastructure.
During the years of the development of bilateral economic relations the United States has invested in Kazakhstan's economy $14.3 billion (from 1993), mainly in the oil-and-gas industry and accompanying services. However, at present export from the United States in Kazakhstan has dropped to the level of 2005 and amounted to $600 million for 2009, although there was a time, when it reached $ 1 billion. Of this sum 40 percent was spent on equipment for the oil-and-gas branch, 25 percent - to transport machines and equipment, and the rest - on computers, communications, electronics, and chemical industry.10
Kazakhstan is regarded by American analysts as the most important, influential and biggest state in the region. Its territory is too vast to be controlled by a small population. Moreover, Kazakhstan has a long border with Russia and depends on it in terms of transit of oil and natural gas to the West. Perhaps, this situation will change when infrastructural projects begin to work. Kazakhstan is anxious to find export alternatives for its rich energy resources, including via the Caspian Sea and to China.
When the United States and NATO succeeded to agree with practically all key states bordering on Afghanistan on transit of military cargoes for the coalition forces, the question arose about inviting new countries and military contingents to this operation. Kazakhstan was regarded for this role already at the beginning of 2008.
On November 13, 2010, Kazakhstan and the United States signed an additional agreement on air transit through its territory for goods delivery to Afghanistan. On December 3, 2010, Kazakhstan adopted a decision to send its military instructors and engineers to the International forces of assistance to security in Afghanistan. This was
said by Hillary Clinton who made a trip to several Central Asian countries at the time.
Evidently, the United States is an important partner of Kazakhstan in the sphere of investments (the total sum of American investments in Kazakhstan's economy has exceeded $15 billion), in the fuel-and-energy complex and high-tech.
It is of principal importance for the United States that Kazakhstan is not only the key link in foreign policy of Central Asian countries, but also a major partner. Washington highly assesses the friendly policy pursued by Kazakhstan toward the United States.
At present unique opportunities open for broadening and deepening economic relations between the European Union and Kazakhstan with a view to ensuring a more active participation of Kazakhstan in the progressive system of international relations.
In the view of European experts, the system of power of the Republic of Kazakhstan is a complex structure consisting of different groups with different priorities. Nevertheless, the country's authorities aim at the modernization of their state and its many-vector foreign policy includes the European direction. Besides, it is evident that Kazakhstan is trying to reduce its dependence on the powerful neighbors - Russia and China.11
The "Road to Europe" program adopted at the beginning of 2009, as well as its chairmanship of OSCE in 2010, are indications of Kazakhstan's interest in cooperation with Europe.
The European Union and Kazakhstan wish to broaden their policy of good-neighborliness and eastern partnership, and the EU treaty signed in Morocco, as well as an agreement with Ukraine demonstrate similar intentions.12
The new agreements can include all functions of the European Union, as well as the spheres of foreign policy, security, judicial and
legal system, and internal affairs. Prospects in the sphere of trade are limited at the present stage in connection with the fact that Kazakhstan has entered into the Customs Union with Russia and Belarus. In this case a treaty on free trade between the European Union and Kazakhstan becomes possible only in case of its being signed by all three members of the Union.
The European Union also has to examine the possibility of drawing Kazakhstan more comprehensively in "Eastern partnership."
On the whole, the EU should actively encourage Kazakhstan in its efforts to develop relations with the Council of Europe and participate in the work of the Parliamentary Assembly in an observer status, including full-fledged membership in the Council of Europe based on serious political reforms and better observance of human rights. The European Commission should contribute to a more active participation of European institutions in the work of the new technical University in Astana.
Relations of the United States and European Union with Kyrgyzstan. From the point of view of rivalry between the United States and the Russian Federation in the post-Soviet area and other Eurasian regions, the measures for possible curtailment of the constant presence of the U.S.A. in Kyrgyzstan seem quite logical, inasmuch as they reflect deep contradictions between the two sides.
Prior to the events in April 2010, which led to the overthrow of K. Bakiyev, the then president of Kyrgyzstan, the American side worked on the problem of opening another military object on Kyrgyz territory - a training center in Batken region of Kyrgyzstan. Its cost was estimated at $5.5 million. Earlier the American side earmarked several million dollars for the construction of training centers for the Kyrgyz special forces.
In May 2010 the assistant of the U.S. Secretary of State J. Croll, in charge of relations with Central Asia, visited the region. He had consultations with representatives of the new Kyrgyz leadership, as well as Moscow. That visit showed Washington's concern over the development of the situation in the country, which could create a threat to stability in the region and U.S. interests there. As to economic assistance to Kyrgyzstan, the United States intended to work jointly with international organizations: UN, OSCE, IMF, and the World Bank. At the same time the United States continued to work on the programs which they implemented in Kyrgyzstan prior to the revolution there, supporting the development of democracy, economy, and the free independent mass media. The United States rendered technical assistance to holding a referendum and subsequent elections.
It is indicative that in June 2010 the Pentagon temporarily suspended the refueling of its military planes, which helped carry on military operations in Afghanistan. In June of that year Kyrgyzstan was visited by the NATO representative for Central Asia and the Caucasus R. Simmons. As a result, in the summer of 2010 the then President of the country Roza Otunbayeva, without parliamentary and government approval, prolonged the term of deployment of the U.S. base at Manas airport.
According to certain information, Roza Otunbayeva has secretly reduced the rent for leasing the Manas airforce base for the American side from $150 million to $60 million. Moreover, she assured Hillary Clinton, the Department of State Secretary, in December 2010 that the new Kyrgyz leadership would do everything to ensure the smooth functioning of the American center in Kyrgyzstan.
In March 2011, Roza Otunbayeva visited Washington and asked the United States administration for economic assistance. It could be in the form of investments by American companies, or purchases of
Kyrgyz commodities for the needs of military operations in Afghanistan. During her visit to the United States Roza Otunbayeva also said that Kyrgyzstan was ready to open an American training center in the south of the country.
In the elections of December 2011, Almazbek Atambayev became President of Kyrgyzstan. Political games around Manas continued. At its first news conference A. Atambayev declared his firm intentions to fight corruption, close down the airbase of the United States, and raise the living standards of the Kyrgyz population. After coming to power President A. Atambayev officially stated that he intended to curtail the operations of the U.S. Center of transit transportation at Manas airport by 2014.
In March 2012, the U.S. Secretary of defense Leon Panetta arrived in Bishkek. The main subject of his negotiations with the Kyrgyz leadership was the fate of the Manas base. It was quite important for the coalition forces operating in Afghanistan since the transit routes via Pakistan were closed.
Bishkek informed Washington that after 2014 there should not be a military base of the United States in the country, and the airport in the capital should become a civil enterprise. It is quite probable that the ultimate fate of the U.S. military object in Kyrgyzstan will be solved in a broader context of Russian-American relations.
European experts, while assessing the situation in Kyrgyzstan, maintain that the country's economy is weak, and the main active economic life is concentrated in its capital - Bishkek. Negative consequences for the export of goods have arisen for Kyrgyzstan after Kazakhstan and Russia joined the Customs Union. The country has a sufficient hydropower potential, in which big investments have been made. But this sector also has considerable difficulties.
Since 2005, after the revolution which has brought to power another clan instead of the previous one, the scope and opportunities for political freedoms has constantly been reduced.
Within the framework of the program of dialogues on human rights in Kazakhstan, the European Union intends to demand that Kyrgyzstan fulfill the following conditions: stop persecution of the opposition members; liberalize the legislation on freedom of assembly; cease the practice of persecution of human rights activists and human rights organizations; investigate cases of torture in prisons; cease persecution of journalists and guarantee their safety; stop intimidation of non-governmental organizations by the authorities.
Relations of the United States and European Union with Uzbekistan. The situation is different in relations between the United States and Uzbekistan. The latter has long been an important link in the entire Central Asian security scheme of the United States. However, Washington has not been trusting Tashkent for quite some time. Empty phrases about the common fight against international terrorism and assistance in carrying out operations by the coalition forces in Afghanistan cannot conceal considerable circumspection which the U.S. leadership feels with regard to Tashkent's policy.13
Uzbekistan is regarded by Washington as the central and very important player in the Central Asian region. This state has regional hegemonic aspirations and is capable to throw a challenge to Moscow. There are big Uzbek diasporas in all neighboring countries, which gives Tashkent a possibility to interfere in the policy of each of these states. Besides, Uzbekistan is self-sufficient in terms of food and energy, in contrast to other post-Soviet countries of the region, except Kazakhstan. In contrast to the latter, Uzbekistan does not border on Russia, but on Afghanistan.
In actual fact, it is the most important potential partner for the United States. Uzbekistan not only has highway and railway connections with Afghanistan, but there is also a Soviet military base deployed on its territory, which has already been used by Americans. To boot, Uzbekistan has demonstrated quite convincingly that it does not fear Russia. This fact deserves special attention, in the view of American analysts.
Uzbekistan's significance for the United States is grater in connection with the fact that at the present stage it is possible to deliver many NATO and American cargoes by the shortest and most reliable routes via Uzbek territory.
However, personal contacts between the U.S. leadership and the President of Uzbekistan leave much to be desired. There has been no stable and reliable dialogue between Washington and Tashkent so far. Besides, Washington is also aware of the fact that President Islam Karimov is a slightly "enigmatic" figure for other leading world players in this region - Russia, China, and the European Union countries. This is why Washington will continue to develop its relations with Tashkent as much as possible.
Inasmuch as the United States has decided to use the "Northern corridor" in its Afghan transit, which is on the territory of Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, it was Uzbekistan that became the key link for the NATO operation. The Manas base in Kyrgyzstan will be replaced by the Navoi airfield in Uzbekistan, which will be reconstructed and modernized by South Korea.
Relations between the United States and Uzbekistan slightly warmed in 2009, and in the following year the former offered Tashkent cooperation in programs of supplying the American troops in Afghanistan. Tashkent gave Washington an opportunity to supply its forces via the Navoi airport. Tashkent's orientation to the United States
and the West may change the structure of influence in Central Asia, weaken Russia's influence there, and give an incentive to Uzbekistan to fight for regional leadership. However, experts believe that these processes cannot be regarded as a change in Tashkent's geopolitical orientation. They are rather a tactical ruse of Islam Karimov, who sees closer cooperation with the United States and the European Union more advantageous to Uzbekistan.
At the end of January 2010 President Karimov signed a Plan of cooperation with the United States. This document was based on the results of the first round of Uzbek-American political consultations. Washington relies on interaction with Uzbekistan in the political, economic and social spheres, as well as in the problems of security. The point dealing with the sphere of security envisages training and upgrading Uzbek officers at leading U.S. military educational establishments.
Within the framework of cooperation in ensuring peace in Afghanistan the United States and Uzbekistan will exchange information about threats to peace and measures to prevent them connected with the transit of non-military cargoes through the North distribution network to Afghanistan, including within the framework of the implementation of the construction project of a railway line between Hairaton and Mazari Sharif. Uzbek companies have already built eleven bridges along the Mazari Sharif - Kabul route and are about to complete a 275-mile-long high-voltage transmission line from Termez to Kabul. The cooperation plan also includes various agricultural, industrial and energy projects. Uzbekistan's initiatives in the sphere of regional security and the creation of a Contact group "6+3" on Afghanistan under the UN aegis are also envisaged by the plan.
In the economic sphere the United States intends to broaden assistance to Uzbekistan in modernizing its irrigation systems, restoring degraded lands, and drawing new technologies to raise agricultural crop yields.
The project of a Trans-Afghan corridor through which Uzbekistan will get an access to ports on the Indian Ocean serves as the basic argument in the present foreign-policy rapprochement between Karimov's government and Obama's administration. Uzbekistan emphasizes its key role in a peaceful settlement of the situation in Afghanistan. But, while doing this, Uzbekistan does not intend to turn into a docile "customer" of the United States in Central Asia. Uzbek officials ably prod American representatives to cooperation, at the same time keeping them at a reasonable distance.
After the events in Kyrgyzstan Washington is, evidently, afraid of Tashkent's interference in the situation in that republic in case of the continuing ethnic conflict in South Kyrgyzstan, with a view to helping fellow-countrymen living there and preventing the "export of revolution" to Uzbekistan. At the same time, in an event of a large-scale destabilization of the region, the United States does not exclude a more active role of Tashkent as the most influential military force in the Ferghana Valley.
In 2012 President Karimov made a decision to withdraw from alliances with Russia, such as EurAsEC and CSTO. European experts believe that the lifting of sanctions against Uzbekistan in 2009 (ban on arms sales) introduced after the Andizhan events in 2005 was a controversial decision. The European Union hoped that this step would be an incentive to the implementation of reforms. Human rights activists adhere to diametrically opposite views, maintaining that the lifting of sanctions gives a wrong signal to Uzbekistan's regime. In any case, refusal from sanctions showed the readiness of the European
Union to work with Uzbekistan and the need to make cooperation effective. The next logical step should be the opening of a mission of the European Union (work has been going on in this direction), which will include a section of public information. Uzbekistan with its secret service inside the country and strong borders between regions is an extremely difficult partner for the European Union. Nevertheless, Tashkent has claims to leadership in the region and works for improving its image abroad. It is explained, among other things, by its central position in the region and the biggest population. However, these claims can be satisfied only if it becomes more open for the outer world and liberalizes commercial activity and agriculture inside the country. In its political dialogues with Tashkent the European Union can actively lobby such changes, and also try to persuade the Uzbek regime to adopt more tolerant stand toward regional cooperation, especially in the matter of water resources. Uzbekistan has blocked or refused to take part in a whole number of projects to manage water resources carried on by the European Union.
Within the framework of the program of dialogues on human rights in Uzbekistan the European Union intends to demand that Tashkent fulfill the following conditions: release from prison human rights activists and prisoners of conscience; liberalize the accreditation process and work of non-governmental organizations in the country; guarantee freedom of speech and independent mass media; adopt conventions banning child labor; bring electoral laws in line with the requirements of OSCE; cooperate with the UN on human rights issues; lift restrictions for coming in and going out of the country; stop the practice of arrests of religious leaders on the basis of frame-up charges of terrorist activity; conduct independent investigation of reports about torture in prisons and punish those responsible; adopt a law allowing people to engage in free economic activity in any spheres (political,
economic and cultural); liberalize cooperation between the civil sector and international organizations; adopt legislation regulating the work of law-enforcement agencies' activities.
Relations of the United States and European Union with
Turkmenistan. As western observers note, recently a new area has emerged for rivalry between Russia and the United States -Turkmenistan.14 The point is the construction of a new trunk gas pipeline (Nabucco, or Caspian pipeline). Besides, competition is going on for the training of military personnel and supplies of military hardware and equipment. Russia continues its attempts to draw Turkmenistan in military cooperation, for example, to take part in the Unified anti-aircraft defense system of the CIS. Meanwhile, the United States continues to show interest in deploying its air bases on the territory of Turkmenistan.
Turkmenistan takes an important place in the transport-transit corridor for the United States due to the continuing operation of the coalition forces in Afghanistan. It is also important for the United States to broaden cooperation with Turkmenistan not so much for its own needs as for insuring energy security of Europe. American companies intend to increase their participation in developing Turkmen deposits. Contacts between Turkmenistan and American companies have intensified after an international business-forum on the problems of hydrocarbons extraction held in Ashkhabad in March 2011.
If supply routes to Afghanistan should bypass Russia, Turkmenistan will play a significant role in these American plans. However, Turkmenistan is not too eager to come closer to the United States. The situation may change if personal contacts between President Obama and President Berdymukhamedov are established. The new President of Turkmenistan has shown himself an active player in the international arena: he has visited for the first time the NATO
headquarters in Brussels where the two sides agreed to broaden their ties in several key spheres.
The Pentagon hopes to develop cooperation with Ashkhabad. In June 2008, two high-ranking U.S. Navy commanders visited Ashkhabad and conducted negotiations with Turkmenistan's Minster for defense and also the head of the border-guard service. However, the country's leadership, fearing for its power, behaves cautiously and does not take open steps to establish military cooperation with the United States.
The latter, along with the EU, hopes that Ashkhabad under the new leader will become more "pro-western-oriented." The main task for the West is, as before, to reorient gas flows from Turkmenistan to Europe and lower gas dependence of that republic on the pipelines passing through Russian territory. A representative of the U.S. Department of State regularly arrives in Ashkhabad and each time tries to persuade the Turkmen President that partnership with Washington in the energy sphere, above all, is very important.
The American side gives Turkmenistan to understand that the more actively it cooperates with American companies, the more actively Washington will develop its political and military ties with Ashkhabad. The Afghan operation of the western coalition forces and the indirect participation of Turkmenistan in it (transit and supply services) make it possible for the latter to expand business and investment partnership with the United States and the European Union.
Turkmenistan's leadership has suggested to the European Union that it consider the variant of gas supply from Turkmenistan to Europe via Iran (using the recently built gas pipeline from Davletobad with a capacity of 12 billion cubic meters of gas a year), bypassing Azerbaijani territory. But the United States was against the idea. At the
same time it favors the construction project TAPI from Turkmenistan to India via Afghanistan and Pakistan.
European experts note that the new president of Turkmenistan has undertaken a number of cautious steps aimed at improving the situation in the country15. Among other things, its population now has the right to travel around the country quite freely. The decrees of the previous leader on curtailing school and university education have been repealed.
Nevertheless, Turkmenistan remains an extremely authoritarian state in which there are no political opposition and freedom of expression, and the activity of non-governmental organizations engaged in political problems and human rights issues is banned. Many experts write that the local population is well aware of the rules of relations with the authorities, and there are no prerequisites for the emergence of any political dialogue or opposition movements.
On the whole, Turkmenistan has entered the 21st century completely isolated from the surrounding world, having spent an enormous amount of resources on spectacular construction projects in its capital Ashkhabad. In these circumstances the broadening of relations between the European Union and Turkmenistan seems a very difficult task, despite the fact that a temporary trade agreement has come into force, and dialogues on human rights issues with the country's authorities have been going on.16 The first step along the way to improving and strengthening the image of the European Union is the opening of a mission without diplomatic status and the "House of Europe" in Turkmenistan.
In 2009 the government of Turkmenistan adopted new discriminatory measures banning Turkmen students to go abroad for studies. The students who were studying abroad had to return home
because the Turkmen special services subjected their families to pressure and intimidation. Upon return they were blacklisted.
The European Union could offer to buy Turkmen gas which could be delivered to Baku via the Caspian Sea. Turkmenistan displays a growing interest in pursuing a many-vector policy in the sphere of gas export.
The European Union intends to demand that Ashkhabad fulfill the following conditions within the framework of the program of dialogues on human rights issues; stop the practice of collective punishment; release members of the families of the arrested persons from prison; ban forced labor of prison inmates in health-hazardous conditions; create favorable medium for the development of culture and traditions of national minorities; create favorable conditions for the work of the independent mass media and ban censorship; guarantee the formation and activity of public organizations; change the legislation on non-governmental organizations; stop persecutions of dissidents and public figures; allow citizens to travel abroad freely, especially students; establish economic transparency standards in the sphere of using incomes from gas export.
Relations of the United States and European Union with Tajikistan. Tajikistan whose border with Afghanistan stretches for 1,200 kilometers was required for pursuing the antiterrorist operation "Indomitable Freedom." In early 2002 the Republic of Tajikistan opened an air corridor for flights of NATO military-transport aircraft.
Washington preferred not to deploy its military bases close to the barracks of the Russian division No 201. Although American experts called on the White House for deploying operational units in Tajikistan in order to increase control over drug sales and trafficking and support U.S. troops in Afghanistan in case of the strengthening of the Taliban movement. The deployment of the U.S. military forces should have
been used as the first step in spreading American influence on India, as a measure which would have laid the foundation of security relations between New Delhi and Washington.
In 2003 Tajikistan became the last country of Central Asia which joined the "Partnership for Peace" program. The broadening of cooperation with the United States was also expressed in the fact that Tajikistan did not prolong a treaty with Russia on guarding the state border, and in reply Washington offered Dushanbe to modernize its border guard units, ensure joint border protection, and set up Tajik-American border posts. However, the United States has done nothing to guard the Tajik border, and it has not taken part in modernizing the border-guard service of the republic.
The United States has long stopped to criticize E. Rahmon for his domestic policy, for it has mainly been watching the developments in Afghanistan, namely, the events around the Afghan mission of the coalition forces. At the present stage Tajikistan is important for the United States not as an object of advantageous economic investments, but as a strategic springboard in the Afghan direction. The United States renders a considerable economic assistance to Tajikistan: it has built two bridges across the Pyandzh River, connecting Afghanistan and Tajikistan. This is very important for the latter, because it may have an access to the shores of the Indian Ocean through Afghanistan some time in the future.
The present situation concerning cooperation between the United States and Tajikistan is changing radically, inasmuch as the Afghan operation is foreign-policy priority for the Obama administration. The Americans could offer Tajikistan broader cooperation, including the deployment of its military bases on its territory. In turn, Tajikistan has a variant to condition its assistance to the United States on
Afghanistan by a number of economic projects profitable for that Central Asian country.
In February 2009 E. Rahmon visited the NATO headquarters in Brussels, where he stated that NATO was one of the major components in ensuring security in Afghanistan, and it should more actively cooperate with such neighboring states as Iran and especially Tajikistan, because it has a lengthy border with Afghanistan. Tajikistan gave its consent to use the country's railways and highways for transit of non-military cargoes to Afghanistan.
The United States has offered the Tajik leadership various assistance, including credits exceeding $1 billion (which could be increased in the future).
In early February 2010 bilateral political consultations between Tajikistan and the United States took place in Washington. Among the subjects discussed were the political and economic situation in the region, the implementation of water, energy and transport projects and the situation in Afghanistan. In experts' view, Tajikistan is gradually turning in the direction of the United States, since it has long been waiting vainly for assistance from Moscow.
The United States gives grants to Tajikistan for the development of institutions of civil society, implementation of reforms of local self-government bodies, state border protection, and fight against drug trafficking. On the whole, Washington welcomes Tajikistan's turn away from Moscow's influence, however, it expresses growing concern over Tajikistan's rapprochement with Iran, and greater influence and economic presence of China in that country. But the special strategic value of Tajikistan for the United States is its close proximity to Afghanistan.
Besides, the United States has not put aside the question of a possible military operation against Iran. Due to this it may offer
Tajikistan either the exclusive leasing of the Aini airport, or its joint use with the Tajik military. In exchange the United States could agree on some fixed payment for leasing, as well as financing a whole number of economic projects in Tajikistan in the sphere of energy, transport and road and tunnel building.
According to certain sources, there is an American lobby among President E. Rahmon's entourage. As long as the Americans stay in Afghanistan, they will increase their presence in Tajikistan.
In the view of certain experts in Brussels and contrary to the opinion of certain independent experts, Tajikistan is a weak, rather than an insolvent, state. That country suffers from abject poverty and deficit of electric energy, especially in winter time, despite its great hydro-energy potential. Besides, there is a constant threat of destabilization, inasmuch as Tajikistan borders on Afghanistan whose population consists of 35 percent of ethnic Tajiks.
European assistance to Tajikistan is provided mainly by the European Commission, as well as the German government. Assistance is rendered mainly in the budget and social spheres.
There are possibilities for work of organizations of civil society, which makes possible dialogues on human rights carried on by the European Union. At the same time, there is evidence that human rights are infringed in the country. This is why one of the EU projects could be support of establishing political dialogues with representatives of the Islamist movement.
Within the framework of the program of dialogues on human rights in Tajikistan the European Union intends to demand that Dushanbe fulfill the following conditions: provide access to people representing civil society and Red Cross kept in Tajik prisons at present; ratify the optional protocols to the Convention against torture; ratify the Convention on discrimination of women; ban the use of child
labor in cotton-picking; introduce an article banning torture in the Criminal Code; reform the system of access of poor people to lawyers' service; compensate forced resettlement of people in connection with the state needs.
The State and Prospects of U.S.
Policy in Central Asia
Thus, U.S. policy in Central Asia has a largely inertial character. The Obama administration continues the policy pursued by its predecessors, although with amendments in accordance with sharp changes in the current situation. The main components of this strategy include due consideration of the Afghan problem, moderate support of non-governmental organizations, symbolic rhetoric on human rights, support of pipeline projects bypassing Russia and Iran, broader cooperation with regional countries in the military sphere, and emphasis on cooperation with Kazakhstan outside bilateral frameworks.
In the foreseeable future one may expect greater concern of Washington over the strengthening of the positions of China and Iran in the region. Possibly, this factor may contribute to the positions of the United States and Russia in the region drawing closer.
If the Taliban establishes control over entire Afghanistan, the situation in Central Asia may develop according to an unpredictable scenario. Taking into account the fact that there are quite a few foreign fighters in the ranks of the Taliban, it is not excluded that they may try to turn Afghanistan into a big training base for the "terrorist international," which will be striving to destabilize the situation in adjacent regions.
This may mean that Central Asian countries will be on the "front line" of defense of Central Eurasia. Inasmuch as the border of the region with Afghanistan is quite lengthy and passes mainly in almost 62
inaccessible mountain area, it will be very difficult to make it impenetrable. Proceeding from this, it is in the interests of Central Asian countries to support the operations of the United States and NATO in Afghanistan.
At present American experts call for establishing cooperation with Moscow in Central Asia for the implementation of Washington's strategic interests and renouncing the former U.S. strategy aimed at isolating and ousting Russia from the region. They support the idea of the Central Asian "round table," that is, a high-level dialogue between the states of the region and their neighbors - China, Russia, Turkey and Iran. In the sphere of energy policy the United States should not concentrate exclusively on the well-known routes of the transportation of oil and gas, in the view of experts, and should support Russian and international projects, including those which can connect the region with East Asia.
Thus, American long-term strategic interests in Central Asia are as follows: to contribute to stabilization of the region by its democratization and drawing in globalization processes; to prevent any state (primarily Russia and China) to gain exclusive political influence in the region.
The U.S. policy in Central Asia should preserve continuity. Accordingly, this approach should also be applied to Kazakhstan. Barack Obama and his administration are bent on continuing the course aimed at preserving the achievements of "reset" in relations with Russia. As to China, the United States pursues an extremely cautious policy toward it.
However, there is a number of factors which can sharply activate the U.S. policy in Central Asia. These factors include:
- Unpredicted worsening of the situation in Afghanistan and unexpected change of the schedule of the withdrawal of American and coalition forces from that country;
- Large-scale and prolonged conflict with Iran which will inevitably touch the countries of Central Asia, the Caspian basin and the Caucasus;
- The U.S. transfer to containment strategy of China and its encirclement by a ring of strategic bases, including in Central Asia;
- Greater worry of Washington caused by the excessive integration of post-Soviet states with Russia within the framework of the Customs Union, Eurasian economic partnership and the Eurasian Union;
- Development of the situation by an unpredicted scenario, which will be unacceptable to Washington, of transferring power in certain republics of the region.
In these conditions Kazakhstan will have to be guided in its relations with the United States for the foreseeable future and a long-term period by definite principles. They include support of western initiatives aimed at stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan (especially after 2014). It would also be expedient to support all anti-nuclear initiatives of President Obama in the international arena.
Kazakhstan is capable to render technical and logistical support to the withdrawal of American military units and equipment from Afghanistan, and also to take part in adaptation of the already used American and NATO military equipment within the framework of the military-technical exchange of CSTO.
Kazakhstan may assure Washington through diplomatic channels and at official level, if necessary, of its integration with Russia bearing an exclusively economic character. It seems that in the interests of national security and stability of Central Asia it is necessary to monitor
American-Chinese relations thoroughly. And in case of a hypothetical conflict between the West and Iran Kazakhstan should distance itself from the conflicting parties and take serious measures to strengthen its security within the framework of CSTO and SCO.
At the same time, the United States will hardly become the only dominant force in Central Asia. The real goals: energy security, proximity to the main seat of terrorism (Afghanistan and Pakistan), fight against the sale and trafficking of arms and drugs, drive for transparency of socio-economic development - all this requires firm obligations and their strict fulfillment. Besides, the worsened Russian-American relations may block American policy in this region, at least for a short-term period.
The State and Prospects
of EU Policy in Central Asia
The EU strategy has made considerable amendments to the concept of regionalism, which the EU used in Central Asia. The main distinction was the practice of regional summits, which discuss political issues and security problems, as well as meetings at various levels for discussing specific subjects: education, ecological and legal issues, etc. The European Union invariably comes out in favor of regional cooperation.
Nevertheless, regionalism in Central Asia has narrow bounds. Regional cooperation can have positive prospects only if it is part of a broader economic openness. Such crucial aspects of cooperation in Central Asia as border-guarding, transport corridors, water resources, etc. are not confined to this region, but go beyond the boundaries of Central Asia and acquire transcontinental scope. Border protection envisages, primarily, the fight against drug trafficking in Central Asia,
which is in essence a transshipment point on the way from Afghanistan to Russia, Europe and China.
Brussels believes that it would be expedient to turn to political priorities of Central Asian states themselves. In the process of its modernization Kazakhstan develops ties with the West and introduces the "Road to Europe" program. Turkmenistan, while remaining a closed repressive regime, intends to expand its gas export in all directions: to the North in Russia, to the East in China and to the South in Iran, and if the EU decides to make a serious offer to Ashkhabad, it may also export its gas to the West in Europe. Kyrgyzstan's economy directly depends on the flows of Chinese goods via its territory to Kazakhstan and Russia. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are interested in developing relations with southern countries via transport corridors passing through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.
The European Union should turn greater attention to new geopolitical players: Russia, the PRC, India, and Central Asian countries. The latter occupies a unique position as a vast region without an access to the Sea and squeezed by four geopolitical giants: Russia in the North, China in the East, India in the South, and EU in the West.
The main meaning of the EU strategy toward Central Asia is a search for opportunities to include Central Asia in the global concept of European foreign policy. The European Union has a well-tested system of relations with most regions of the world: Tropical Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America, Central Asia, the nearest neighbors of united Europe, and also with such big countries as China, India and Russia. Brussels is looking for ways to unite all these parts in a single vector and find a place for Central Asia in this system.
European strategists are well aware of the fact that globally Central Asia is an underpopulated region. Nevertheless, its geographical position at the crossroads of the interests of all global
political players in the epoch of a change of the world order determines its great geopolitical importance.
Brussels is sure that Central Asia does not pose a direct threat to the security of the European Union. However, there are three indirect factors which could have influence on the European Union. The first is instability of energy supplies. The second is "Al Qaeda" and "Talibanization." And the third is drug smuggling.
The concept of regionalism applied by the European Union to Central Asia can acquire more "extravert" forms, when the region is regarded in a broader geographical context.
In the view of European analysts, there are at least three opportunities for joint work of the European Union, Central Asian states, and such interested countries as Russia, China, the United States, India, and others.
First, it is cooperation in averting threats from Pakistan and Afghanistan, particularly, the export of drugs and radical extremism. Secondly, it is the problem of water resources, which could be resolved with the help of an international consortium, in which all big players would take part. Thirdly, it is optimization of transcontinental transport trade routes.
The European Union could get an observer status in the SCO upon a proper invitation. As an alternative, the format of regional meetings of the European Union with Central Asian countries could be broadened by including representatives of Afghanistan, Pakistan and India in it. Finally, European strategists believe that inasmuch as the EU now has evolved Central Asian strategy, it should become a component part of the world view of the European Union.
Notes
See: Guan Tian R. Ot vnutrennego k vneshnemu: ugrozy dlya politiki SShA v gosudarstvakh Tsentralnoi Azii [From the Internal to the External: Threats to U.S. Policy in Central Asian Countries] // "Tsentralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz." 2009, No 2, pp. 103-117.
Faizullayev D. SShA - Tsentralnaya Aziya: perevalochny punkt ili platsdarm? [The U.S.A. - Central Asia: Transshipment Center or Springboard?] // "Aziya i Afrika segodnya." 2010, No 1, pp. 9-14.
A. Fominykh. Proetsirovaniye "myagkoi sily": publichnaya diplomatiya SShA i Rossii v postsovetskoi Tsentralnoi Azii [Projection of "Soft Power": Public Diplomacy of the U.S.A. and Russia in Post-Soviet Central Asia] // "Tsentralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz." 2010, No 3, pp 73-86.
Bohr A. Central Asia: Responding to the Multi-Vectoring Game // America and a Changed World; A Question of Leadership. - London:RIIA, 2010, pp. 109-124. Tyakbayeva A. Politika Germanii v Tesntralnoi Azii [Policy of Germany in Central Asia] Almaty: KazNU, 2009, 137 pp. (in the Kazakh Language). Akiner Sh. Partnership Not Membership: Re-appraising the Relationship Between the EU and the Central Asian States // The China and Eurasian Forum Quarterly (ISDP, Stockholm) 2010. Vol. 8, No 4, pp. 17-40. Pedro Nicolas de. The EU in Central Asia: Incentives and Constraints for Greater Engagement // Great Powers and Regional Integration in Central Asia: a Local Perspective. Madrid: Exlibris Ediciones, 2009, pp. 113-135.
Laumulin M. The EU and Central Asia: the View from Central Asia // Central Asia's Affairs (Almaty, KazISS). 2009, No 4, pp. 20-24. Laumulin M. Central Asia in the Foreign Policy Strategy of the European Union // New Europe (Brussels). Special Report: Kazakhstan. 2010, No 878, pp. 20-21.
Emerson M., Boonstra J., Hasanova N., Laruelle M., Peyrouse S. Into Eurasia: Monitoring the EU's Central Asia Strategy. Report of the EUCAM Project -Brussels: CEPS, Madrid: FRIDE. 2010. - III+143 pp.
See; Laumulin M. Kazakhstan i SShA: istoriya neprostykh otnoshenii // Tsentralnaya Aziya: vneshny vzglyad. Mezhdunarodnaya politika s tsentralnoaziatskoi tochki zreniya [Kazakhstan and the U.S.A.: History of Difficult Relations // Central Asia: View from Outside. International Politics from Central Asian Point of View]. - Berlin F. Ebert Foundation, 2008, pp. 151-174; Strategicheskoye partnerstvo SShA i Kazakhstana v XXI veke: sostoyaniye, problemy, perspektivy [Strategic Partnership of the U.S.A. and Kazakhstan in the 21st Century: State, Problems, Prospects] - Almaty, IMEP, 2008, p. 76. Erzhanov T. Kazakhstansko-amerikanskoye sotrudnichestvo v sfere yadernoi energetiki [Kazakh-American Cooperation in the Sphere of Nuclear Power] //
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Analytic (KISI). 2010, No 2, pp. 18-22; Sultanov B. Kazakhstansko-amerikanskoye sotrudnichestvo v ekonomicheskoi sfere [Kazakh-American Cooperation in Economic Sphere in the 21st Century: State, Problems, Prospects]. - Almaty, IMEP. 2008, pp. 35-39.
11 Le Kazakhstan: Partnaire Strategique de l'Europe // Diplomatie. Affaires Strategiques et Relations Internationales - Paris: AREION, 2009, p. 16.
12 Isaev K. Cooperation between Kazakhstan and the European Unon // Central Asia's Affairs (Almaty, KazISS), 2010. No 1, pp. 8-11; Laumulin M. EU-Strategie in Zentralasien und die Interessen Kasachstans // EU-Strategie fur Zentralasien. Drei Jahre danach. - Almaty: FES, 2010, pp. 164-178.
13 Tolipov F. Strategicheskoye partnerstvo Uzbekistana i SShA: byt ili ne byt? // Tsentralnaya Aziya: vneshny vzglyad. Mezhdunarodnaya politika s tsentralnoaziatsoi tochki zreniya [Strategic Partnership of Uzbekistan and the U.S.A.: "To Be or Not to Be?" // Central Asia: View from Outside. International Politics from Central Asian Point of View] - Berlin: F. Ebert Foundation, 2008, pp. 547-584; Heathershaw J. Worlds Apart: the Making and Remaking of Geopolitical Space in the U.S.-Uzbekistani Strategic Partnership // Central Asian Survey (Oxford, 2007, Vol. 26, issue 1, pp 123-140); Spechler D, Spechler M. The Foreign Policy of Uzbekistan: Sources, Objectives and Outcomes: 1991-2009 // Central Asian Survey (Oxford), 2010, vol. 29, issue 2, pp. 159-170.
14 Anceschi L. Analyzing Turkmen Foreign Policy in the Berdymukhamedov Era // The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly (ISDP, Stockholm), 2008, vol. 6, No 4, pp. 35-48; Denison M. Turkmenistan's Foreign Policy: Positive Neutrality and the Consolidation of the Turkmen Regime // Central Asian Survey (Oxford), 2009, vol. 28, issue 4, pp 429-431; Horak S., Sir J. Dismantling Totalitarianism? Turkmenistan under Berdymukhamedov. - Washington, D.C. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program. 2009, 97 pp.
15 Horak S., Sir J. Ibid.
16 Anceschi L. External Conditionality, Domestic Insulation and Energy Security: The International Politics of Post-Niyazov Turkmenistan // The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly (ISDP, Stockholm), 2010, vol. 8, No 3 (Special issue: Turkmenistan), pp. 93-114.
"Vyzovy bezopasnosti v Tsentralnoi Azii," IWEIR RAS, Moscow, 2013, pp. 106-131.
