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Notes
G. Lapidus. Asimmetrichny federalism i gosudarstvennoye stroitelstvo v Rossii // Federalism v Rossii. - Kazan, Institute of History, Tatarstan Academy of Sciences. 2001, pp. 288-289.
A. Smirnyagin. Aktualna li problema asimmetrii v sovremennoi Rossii? // Federalism i etnicheskoye raznoobraziye v Rossii. Moscow. Rossiiskaya politicheskaya entsiklopediya. 2010, pp. 53-54.
V. Tishkov. Pro et Contra etnicheskogo federalizma v Rossii // Federalism v Rossii. Kazan, Institute of History, Tatarstan Academy of Sciences, 2001, p. 30. Ibid. - P. 31.
M. Belousov. Etnicheskiye elity Severnogo Kavkaza: Opyt sotsiologicheskogo analiza. Volgograd, 2001, p. 54.
V. Degoyev, R. Ibragimov. Severny Kavkaz: Postsovetskiye itogi kak rukovdstvo k deistviyu ili povestka dnya na vchera. Moscow, Imperium-XXI vek, 2006, p. 14. M. Astvatsaturova. Expertnoye intervyu // Etnokratii na Yuge Rossii v ekspertnom izmerenii. Rostov-on-Don, 2007, p. 133.
V. Bobrovnikov. Musulmane Severnogo Kavkaza: Obychai, pravo, nasiliye: Ocherki po instorii i etnografii prava Nagornogo Dagestana. - Moscow, 2002, p. 106.
"Elitologiya Rossii: Sovremennoye sostoyaniye i perspektivy razvitiya," Rostov-on-don, 2013, vol. 1, pp. 401-417.
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Alexander Knyazev,
Political analyst
CENTRAL ASIA AFTER MAIDAN
The Crimean-Ukrainian crisis has ended the transition period in the global system of international relations and marked the beginning of a new epoch, whose distinguishing feature is the multipolar structure of the modern world. Experts are now convinced of the Ukrainian events having an extraordinary influence on Central Asia and Kazakhstan in the not-so-distant future.
Projections of the crisis, whose catalyst was Ukraine's signing an agreement on association with the European Union instead of its joining the Customs Union headed by Russia, are different. Accordingly, the models of behavior of the states and nongovernmental actors in Central Asia are also different.
Nazarbayev's Eurasian Choice
The main blow at the anti-Russian and anti-integration front is dealt at Kazakhstan, which is actively drawn in the Eurasian project. The most vivid example of the manifestation of Russophobia in Kazakhstan could be found in the April issue of the magazine "Zhuldyzdar otbasy Atsyz adam," which was devoted to the 125th birth anniversary of Adolph Hitler and attempted to rehabilitate the former German fuehrer in the eyes of Kazakhs. "In his certain actions Putin seems to outdo Hitler," the journal wrote.
The Communications and Information Agency of Kazakhstan immediately reacted to this publication, having stated that the editorial office of the magazine violated Article 164 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Kazakhstan dealing with fanning social, national, race or religious enmity. The maximal penalty for this crime is prison term up to twelve years. It is indicative that the subjects of Nazism and nationalism, integration and relations with Russia have been raised at the highest state level. Within the framework of the XXI session of the Assembly of the peoples of Kazakhstan, President Nursultan Nazarbayev stated that interethnic relations are not the field for political games. "These are human destinies. They should not be postponed, all the more so, ignored, especially when they are cynically used by any political group as an argument in the struggle for power. This is dangerous for the state, for the people, for each person. Everybody
should realize that chauvinism or nationalism is separated from open neo-Nazism by a very thin margin, which can easily be crossed." The head of state called on Kazakhstan's people always to remember "the great sacrifices which the peoples of the entire CIS had made during the Great Patriotic war for victory over the "brown plague."
Nazarbayev gave to understand quite clearly that he regarded the choice made by Kazakhstan correct. "I maintain that the integration choice made by any country is a question of people's welfare. It is only integration that is based not on the current political situation, but on pragmatic interests which creates conditions for employment and business. It is to integration of this type that Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus are striving for within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union. It is planned to sign a historic treaty on the creation of such integration association in Astana. These three countries are integrated in order to withstand global competition. And there is no doubt that it will be tough.
Nazarbayev's position is quite clear: the head of state wants to protect Kazakhstan from the threat of destabilization, which will proceed according to a tested scenario. The West, primarily the United States, has a negative attitude to Kazakhstan's desire to take part in Russian integration projects. There is no doubt that attempts to shatter the situation in Kazakhstan, and also in Belarus, will be made in the nearest future.
Contrary to outside ideas, anti-Russian sentiments in Kazakhstan aren't widespread. The section of the "creative class" (from extreme nationalists to radical ecologists and intelligent liberals sponsored and financed by western foundations) does not exert any noticeable influence on public opinion in the country. The absence of the protest potential in the country was demonstrated, among other things, by the attitude of Kazakh people to the unrest in Zhanaozen in December
2011. The use of force against people taking part in anti-government manifestations was received calmly enough outside the region where they took place, and the incident has now been forgotten.
Soon after the President of Kazakhstan has defined the main development vector of the country, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Nisha D. Biswal arrived in Astana, the capital of the country. The official aim of her visit, according to information, was to discuss research problems of Kazakhstan's mountains and glaciers with the help of sputniks, as well as the results of the negotiations between President Obama and President Nazarbayev at the Hague. (It is indicative that Ms Biswal has not been received by anyone from the country's leadership, except the Foreign Minister Erlan Idrisov.)
The real purpose of her visit was to draw Kazakhstan in Afghan projects and the project of transporting oil to India. The United States is interested in the maximal reorientation of commodity and financial flows from the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China to the South. Actually, the idea is to revive the old concept of "Greater Central Asia," which is now called "The New Silk Road." This project can be part of broader plans of the United States to reduce, or altogether stop, the export of energy resources from Kazakhstan (and Turkmenistan) to China. In the words of Nisha D. Biswal, Washington would like to see Central Asia tied more closely with South Asia via Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The Kazakhstan leadership displayed a restrained attitude to American proposals. Commenting on the results of her visit to Kazakhstan, Nisha Biswal did not conceal her disappointment. She said that the United States would like Kazakhstan to have favorable, positive and mutually beneficial relations with Russia, but they should
not be exclusive. However, nobody in Kazakhstan's capital is going to follow this advice.
Kazakhstan's domestic policy is often a continuation of its foreign policy. Its pro-Russian positions turn the country into the main object of U.S. activity in the region. However, the weakness of the pro-American lobby in Kazakhstan's capital and the absence of a real opposition make any internal destabilization of the situation hardly possible. This is why Washington is eyeing up neighboring countries which could be used as springboards - Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan.
Formation of Geopolitical Axis
Moscow - Tashkent - Astana
Rethinking of foreign policy is taking place in Uzbekistan, too. Early last March Uzbekistan's Foreign Ministry issued a statement, in connection with the events in Ukraine, on impermissibility of foreign interference in internal affairs of states. This message was addressed not only to Russia. Besides, Uzbekistan does not consider a possibility of its participation in the Customs and Eurasian unions and it suspended its membership in the CSTO, but this does not mean that Tashkent distances itself from Moscow, Astana and Minsk. Uzbekistan is striving to become the key actor in the region for which it has all grounds.
The history of all post-Soviet integration projects in Central Asia shows that talks of common history, culture and unity of regional powers is, unfortunately, nothing but a myth. Central Asian countries have united within the framework of uniform state formations only by force from the outside, be it Genghiz Khan, Tamerlane, the Russian Empire, or the USSR.
In the view of the leadership of Uzbekistan, Russia is unable to play the role of the unifier of Central Asian countries so far. Tashkent can hardly give any other assessment of Russia's role in Central Asia. 34
It has not supported Russian initiatives up to now, because from the 1990s Uzbekistan has mainly relied on bilateral relations. Without Uzbekistan, the region is broken and deficient. If it is not possible to set up an integration alliance, it would be expedient to form an axis of countries capable to ensure regional security. The Ukrainian crisis could become a catalyst for the creation of the geopolitical axis Moscow - Tashkent - Astana, which is objectively necessary for the region. Such construction would strengthen and consolidate the regional geopolitical and geo-economic area and would allow it to evolve a common effective strategy of Central Asia toward the United States and the West, as well as the People's Republic of China.
The development of relations with Russia is of principal importance for Uzbekistan. Suspension of its membership in the CSTO does not mean much actually. Considerable experience has been accumulated over many years in daily exchange of information between the special services and other special agencies of the two countries. There is a fundamental legal basis of Russian-Uzbek relations - the Treaty on strategic partnership of June 16, 2004, and also the Treaty on allied relations between Uzbekistan and Russia of November 14, 2005. Tashkent hopes that soon Moscow will define more precisely its positions in the region, which will enable Central Asian countries to define their foreign policies more precisely.
Bilateral interaction of Uzbekistan and Russia, in contrast to multilateral formats (particularly, the CSTO) makes it possible to solve the arising problems more rapidly and effectively. This is why the country's leadership has a cautious attitude toward multilateral formats. Tashkent is convinced of Belarus and especially Kazakhstan's participation in the Customs Union having a host of negative consequences. Hence, integration projects may lead to social tension and growing nationalism in the country.
The possibility of destabilization scenarios of the "Arab spring" or "Ukrainian Maidan" type is negligible in Uzbekistan. The events in Andizhan in 2005 showed the reaction of Uzbekistan's authorities to such attempts. There are less well-known, but no less characteristic examples. But the threat of outside interference is quite real for all countries of the region. Tashkent watches closely how the process of merging the extremist and terrorist groupings with organized criminal groups and state bodies, including special services, in Kyrgyzstan, is going on. Uzbekistan is situated in the center of the region and its stability directly depends on developments in the neighboring countries.
Afghan Project:
Chaotization of Central Asia
Afghanistan, definitely, presents a serious challenge to the Central Asian countries. The developments in that country and neighboring states should be viewed through the prism of the well-known project named by Washington "Greater Middle East." The events of the "Arab spring," and now the "Russian spring" prove correctness of such approach. World history, at least in its key regions, has finally become based and dependent on projects. Not a single revolution in any country of the world, beginning from 1789, has been a consequence of a sudden social protest. The events which bring about the change of power practically always include an external factor. Special technologies are evolved, which have become quite intricate and sophisticated by the beginning of the 21st century.
Afghanistan is also a project with its own special history, traditions, etc. In the early 2000s this project changed its structure and acquired new dynamics.
Unfounded fears connected with the forthcoming withdrawal of the U.S. and NATO troops from Afghanistan have nothing to do with
the real tendencies existing in the Afghan direction. The most probable development scenarios of Afghanistan for the foreseeable future is a split of the country into ethnopolitical enclaves which will be in a state of confrontation, and even war, with one another. After presidential elections in that country experts predict a sharp deterioration of the ethnopolitical situation. The point is that growing political self-consciousness of ethnic minorities, primarily, the Tajiks, enters into irreconcilable contradiction with the desire of the Pashtun elite to preserve and strengthen its dominant positions in the country. The forthcoming fragmentation of Afghanistan is of dual importance for the Central Asian republics.
Irrespective of the final results of Afghan elections, an agreement on cooperation between Kabul and Washington is a question of time only. According to this agreement, there will be nine complete military bases of the United States remaining in the country: in Kabul, Bagram, Mazari-Sharif, Gerat, Kandagar, Shurab (Gilment), Gardez, Jelalabad and Shindand. Apart from that, the United States will have the right to use the international airport of Kabul and Great for military purposes, and also the right for military presence in land border posts Torham and Spinbuldak (border with Pakistan), Turgundi (border with Turkmenistan), Hairaton (border with Uzbekistan), and Sharhan-Bandar (border with Tajikistan).
Under this agreement the United States will not be responsible for ensuring security in the country, shifting it on to the Afghan national forces (ANDSF). However, as stated in the draft agreement, the parties recognize that American military operations may be carried on in Afghanistan against "Al Qaeda" and organizations affiliated with it, if the interests of the anti-terrorist struggle call for it. In essence, the United States will have the right to wage military actions as it thinks fit.
It is easy to imagine the development of the situation in Afghanistan after the ANDSF begin to maintain law and order. Different national affiliation of servicemen, forced mobilization (in some cases), low level of military training and discipline, corruption in the officer corps - is a far from complete list of problems making the ANSDF almost completely ineffective. But, perhaps, the most serious challenge, will be mass desertion (up to 50,000 men refuse to serve in the Afghan army and special services annually). Quite often men are recruited by the enemy - the Taliban.
The training of high-ranking officers is a difficult task, which is due to a low educational level of Afghan society. The security forces are unable to handle intricate equipment, take charge of logistics, or plan military operations. Remaining without serious support of the United States, they will disperse, some will join the Taliban, others may enter paramilitary units of provincial feudal lords (there are still quite a few such people).
It is not clear how situation will develop in the North-West of Afghanistan and what role the recognized leader of Afghan Uzbeks, General Abdul Rashid Dustum will play. Some experts believe that in an event of a split of Afghanistan into warring enclaves, the zone controlled by Dustum may become a buffer for Central Asia. However, according to rumors, General Dustum is paralyzed and is now staying in Turkey or prolonged medical treatment.
The situation in the North-West of Afghanistan may be destabilized by Turkmen ethnic groupings. One of them called "Taqfir" is directly connected with the Pashtun Talibs. Turkmen units are constantly fighting for power, and the situation along the border with Turkmenistan is considered the most dangerous.
Besides, Kazakhstan, Russia, the CSTO and SCO have no systemic ties with government bodies in Ashkhabad, capital of
Turkmenistan. The behavior of the latter is unpredictable and causes great concern. An additional problem is the ideology of pan-Turkism which is widespread among Turkmen and Uzbeks. To boot, Saudi emissaries working in conjunction with local mullahs and imams in a vast area from Gerat to Mazari-Sharif are engaged in active propaganda of Wahhabi ideas.
Thus, Central Asian rulers should be very cautious and vigilant and thoroughly watch the situation in Afghanistan, doing everything possible to prevent centrifugal tendencies being transferred to the territory of the former Soviet republics.
Effect of the "Afghan Domino":
Weak Links of Regional Security
Outwardly stable Turkmenistan may show the effect of the "Afghan domino." For many decades already the bodies of power in the republic have been dominated by representatives of one and the same tribe (Teke, or Akhal-Teke), which is causing growing discontent of other tribes (Iomuds, for example). They inhabit western parts of Turkmenistan, where quite a few gas deposits are situated. Inasmuch as gas extraction is the main sector of the economy in the republic, separatist sentiments in Western Turkmenistan are quite strong. The situation is aggravated by the fact that there are big Turkmen diasporas in neighboring countries. In the border districts of Afghanistan live about one million Turkmen of the Iomud tribe, and border areas of Iran are inhabited by about 1,300,000 Turkmen, who are not members of the Teke tribe. The total figure of Turkmenistan's population is about five million.
The development of conflict processes in South-western Afghanistan and a possibility of their moving to the territory of Turkmenistan make it possible to forecast the formation of a crisis axis Afghanistan - Turkmenistan with possible transfer to the Caspian
regions of Kazakhstan and subsequent development in the direction of the Russian Caucasus, and the Volga and Ural areas. The countries included in this axis could tackle the problems of security of the region and properly react to the growing Chinese presence in the Caspian basin and in Central Asia, as well as to the attempts to prevent it on the part of the global rivals of the PRC.
In contrast to Turkmenistan, simple "Afghanization" or "chaotization" is not threatening Uzbekistan. But a split of Afghanistan will inevitably entail serious risks requiring asymmetrical answers, -drug production and drug trafficking, as well as the training of terrorist groupings for actions outside the boundaries of Afghan territory.
The notorious Islamic movement of Uzbekistan is based precisely in Afghanistan; it has long become an international terrorist grouping and can easily turn its "bayonets" against Tashkent. As to drug trafficking, about 80 percent of narcotic drugs get to the republic not directly across the Afghan border (which is thoroughly controlled now), but from the territory of Tajikistan, and especially Kyrgyzstan, whose borders are relatively open.
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are the weakest links of regional security. The leadership of Tajikistan does not comment on the situation in Ukraine and tries to ignore the sentiments of society which supports the unification of the Crimea with Russia. The authorities increase their pressure on the remnants of the opposition, which should show that the former have learnt the Ukrainian lessons. Due to the geographic isolation of Tajikistan, integration processes in the post-Soviet area are not too important for the republican leadership, and it still has enough time to adopt a necessary decision. Nevertheless, Dushanbe depends a great deal on Moscow in a whole number of vital spheres: from protection of security to the position of Tajik labor migrants. No wonder, the Tajik authorities do not take part in anti-
Russian rhetoric, all the more so, they are simply unable to commit any anti-Russian acts.
On the other hand, official Dushanbe cannot support Russia's position directly. The interests of Tajikistan are intertwined with the interests of the United States, other western countries, and Ukraine. Tajikistan has time and again declared its adherence to many-vector policy. A no small role in Dushanbe's policy has been played by the question connected with the construction of the Rogun hydropower plant. The point is that the turbines for it have been ordered at several industrial enterprises of Ukraine. This is why Tajikistan is closely following the developments in Ukraine's South-East.
As to the effect of the "Afghan domino," Tajik experts close to President Rahmon discuss plans of foreign forces on the creation of an Ismailian state in the Pamirs and an Islamic state in the Ferghana Valley. The ruling regime can establish law and order only with the help of special military operations, as was the case of the Gorno-Badakhshan autonomous region in 2012. Although victory in the presidential elections in the autumn of 2013 was scored by Emomali Rahmon, which showed the ability of the local political elite to mobilize itself and its supporters, Tajikistan should evolve a more precise and clear-cut position on the question of its participation in the integration projects initiated by Russia.
The Trojan Horse of Central Asia
In Kyrgyzstan the positions of power are very weak. President Almazbek Atambayev practically does not control the situation in the country. Main decisions are adopted by several groups of influence in the presidential apparatus, the government, certain ministries, and partly in parliament. The questions of foreign policy are tackled
and promoted by lobbyists of western interests, among them Sapar Isakov (head of the foreign policy department of the presidential apparatus), Erlan Abdyldayev (Minister for foreign affairs), and Farid Niyazov (adviser of the President).
It is indicative that a visit to Bishkek of Nisha D. Biswal, the Assistant U.S. Secretary of State on South and Central Asia, coincided with the appointment of Djoomart Otorbayev to the post of Premier. Some time ago he worked as a senior counselor at the European Reconstruction and Development Bank and a member of the supervisory council of the American University in Central Asia and President of the Rotary Club. Dj. Otorbayev is considered a politician of clearly pro-western orientation, and his appointment increases prowestern trends and sentiments in the Kyrgyz political establishment. Hence, it can be predicted that the difficult process of Kyrgyzstan's entry into the Customs Union will be retarded, and Russian-Kyrgyz relations will gradually become cooler.
The United States has a powerful instrument of bringing pressure to bear on President Atambayev, if he tries to draw closer to Moscow, namely, a non-system (non-parliamentary) opposition, whose backbone is the grouping of Ravshan Zheenbekov - National opposition movement. Zheenbekov is an outspoken pro-American politician. His movement includes many Kyrgyz politicians who are not in power at present. Among them the former mayor of the city of Osh Melis Myrzakmatov, the former head of the "Ata Zhurt" party Kamchibek Tashiyev, and the former attorney general Azimbek Beknazarov.
Besides, there are quite a few non-governmental organizations of pro-western orientation. The questions of Kyrgyzstan's entry into the Customs Union, sale of "Kyrgyzgaz" to "Gazprom", and possible purchase of the controlling block of shares of the "Manas" airport -these are the main irritants for pro-western activists. To boot, the socio-
economic situation in the country is deteriorating, which means that pressure on Atambayev becomes more real, and we may soon hear demands for his resignation.
It is indicative that the pro-government mass media in Kyrgyzstan connect Nisha Biswal's visit to Bishkek with the stepping up of anti-government activities. Although there were no indications of any contacts between her and the opposition, many experts and analysts believe that after her visit there can be changes in the U.S. policy toward Kyrgyzstan.
Kyrgyzstan has long become a place where various opposition forces designed to destabilize the situation in the neighboring countries are based. It was in the Kyrgyz city of Osh that fighters were trained in 2005, who staged an uprising in Andizhan in Uzbekistan. After its suppression they fled to western countries via Jalalabad region in Kyrgyzstan. In resort townships on the shore of Issyk-Kul Lake representatives of American and European non-governmental organizations regularly hold conferences, seminars and training sessions for representatives of the opposition from all Central Asian states.
True, in recent time the activity of the United States Agency for international development, Conrad Adenauer Foundation, George Soros Foundation, and other international organizations has moved to the south of the republic, farther away from the Bishkek authorities, despite the fact that the latter turned a blind eye to their activities. Even local non-governmental organizations receive 70 percent of their means from the budget of foreign countries, 20 percent - from the budget of transnational commercial companies, and only 10-15 percent - from donations of private persons. These organizations often violate the existing international standards, for instance, they launder criminal incomes used to finance extremist and sometimes terrorist activities in other countries.
The Russian Pole and Collapse of "Many-vector Policy"
A general analysis of the situation in Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan makes it possible to conclude that these three countries will soon turn into one conflict zone in the near future. This suggestion is corroborated by the low level of state border protection between Afghanistan and Tajikistan, and between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Doubtless, a negative development of the situation in the region will make an impact on Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. It is not excluded that Russia and Kazakhstan may take part in the military mission of the CSTO, which can only add fuel to the flames of conflicts. As a result, Central Asia may really become part of the "Greater Middle East," which is in a state of permanent armed confrontation. In this connection, regular exacerbations of Tajik-Uzbek, Tajik-Kyrgyz and Uzbek-Turkmen relations can hardly be called accidental. According to experts, if resumption of an interethnic conflict in the south of Kyrgyzstan coincides with tension along the Tajik-Uzbek border, this may lead to the destabilization of the entire region.
As to the attitude to Russia and to Eurasian integration, it differs in different Central Asian countries. Nevertheless, certain common features can be singled out. Speaking at the conference on security in Munich in February 2007, President Putin expressed his view on the role of Russia in the area of the former U.S.S.R. and in international politics as a whole. At the Munich conference the President of Russia reproached the West for the first time and outlined problems and conditions on which Russia was ready to cooperate with the United States and Europe.
For the CIS countries, including those in Central Asia, it meant that the time of balancing within the framework of many-vector policy is coming to a close, and soon they would be asked to finally determine 44
their foreign-policy priorities. There were few people who received this signal correctly, just as the next signal, namely the war with Georgia in August 2008 and recognition of independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The Ukrainian crisis has finally crossed the "T's" and dotted the "I's," although it creates a certain discomfort for the ruling Central Asian elites. Tension between Russia and NATO countries grows, the CSTO states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan) and their allies (Uzbekistan) will have to decide rapidly whether it is worthwhile to continue cooperation with the alliance. All the more so, since the developments in Ukraine have clearly shown that despite bellicose rhetoric, neither the United States nor NATO are prepared to interfere in conflicts in the post-Soviet area.
The existence of the spheres of influence of the great powers and satellite-countries has always been a feature of international affairs. Russia's actions in the Caucasus in August 2008, annexation of the Crimea and subsequent actions in Ukraine force the post-Soviet elites to abandon the many-vector policy. The new realities of the rapidly changing system of international relations narrow down the field for maneuvering. Regional actors will be forced to act in the situation of conflict between global actors.
In order to work out a reasonable foreign-policy strategy the countries should realize what aims each of the foreign actors pursues. The following fact should be taken into consideration: we live in the epoch of degradation of international law and international institutions, some of which have been drawn in the realization of political plans of certain powers (UN), or which have become instruments of interference in the affairs of sovereign states (OSCE).
It should be recognized that events of the past years -dismemberment of Yugoslavia, recognition of the independence of
Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and a split of Ukraine taking place now show that international law is not able to play the role of a legal regulator of international relations any longer. All the more so, since we mean the law which incorporates two opposing principles: territorial integrity and self-determination of peoples. And there are no guarantees that such precedents presupposing a change of borders and recognition of different separatist projects would not be repeated in any region of the world, including in Central Asia.
The present global financial crisis means at the same time the aggravation of the crisis of classical liberal democracy. Globalization led to the final devaluation of all universalist projects of the modern epoch -liberal-democratic, socialist, and others. New realities are a world in which leading actors compete with one another in a bitter struggle with the systemic crises of capitalism. And each global crisis, as a rule, ends with a global war for the redivision of the world, access to the sources of fuel and energy, communications, and other strategic resources.
An analysis of modern international processes requires not only a geopolitical, but also geo-economic approach. The new level of ties and communications makes traditional means and instruments of implementing the interests of the state and capital useless. The geo-economic paradigm puts to doubt the doctrine of national interests formulated in the epoch of geopolitics. Today, the national states should largely take into account regional and world processes.
All this demonstrates the need for radical changes in foreign-policy concepts of developing countries and semi-industrial countries which definitely include the states of the Central Asian region. These changes should be connected with the guarantee of the rights of ethnic minorities, and problems of territorial integrity and national security.
The Central Asian countries should determine which foreign center of force they will rely on. Russia and China could become the
geo-economic pole for them. Everything depends on whether a country is capable to submit other actors to its external and internal interests. Russia demonstrates now that it is capable to do this. Perhaps, it will be able to complete the gathering together of lands, including all former Soviet republics of Central Asia in the European project.
"Odnako, " Moscow, 2014, June-July, No 174, pp. 138-149.
Ivan Kochedykov,
Political analyst, Moscow State Linguistic University SPECIFIC FEATURES OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN CENTRAL ASIA ON EXAMPLES OF UZBEKISTAN AND KAZAKHSTAN
The role of political leaders becomes more decisive in the modern political process. Actually, politics has now become personified. The phenomenon of political leadership connected with the mechanisms of managerial functions used by concrete subjects of power should be studied more thoroughly. The functioning of different social structures and society as a whole depends on the effectiveness of managerial actions of political leaders.
The political leader today is a man who constantly talks about values and promotes them. These values cause emotions among people and create mental cards. That is, the point is not formal leadership, but actual one. If there is not such communication, then it is only a nominal leader, or simply political manager.
In the 21st century the political leader is a collectively created product. Image is created by political strategists, and a decision is worked out by experts. The leader has the decisive chance to take
