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largely devoted to the further strengthening of relations between the two countries It was also announced that preparations would begin for changing the basic treaty on good-neighborliness and cooperation, as well as the agreement on cooperation between the special services of the two countries.
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Today, when Russia is trying to prevent the growing influence of the United States in Central Asia, and China is increasing its presence in the region, the Central Asian countries face the task of determining their main foreign-policy orientations. The principal factors of the rapprochement of Central Asia and the Russian Federation are their close territorial proximity, common security problems, and complementarity of their national economies.
"Rossiya i noviye gosudarstva Evrazii," Moscow, 2013, No III (XX), pp 5-14.
Dina Malysheva,
D. Sc. (Politics)
CHALLENGES TO SECURITY IN CENTRAL ASIA
All countries on our planet meet with challenges to their security. They include not only terrorism, extremism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking, etc. There is also the deterioration of the environment, as well as global warming, destruction of forests, etc. Shortage of water is also a serious danger. All these global challenges and threats exist in Central Asia, too. Unfortunately, its countries are unable to find an adequate answer to these vital and endogenous challenges.
Among them are internal political and socio-economic instability, including interethnic and inter-clan tension, confrontation between the elites in these countries, impoverishment of the population, widening gap in the population's incomes and growing social disproportions, high level of unemployment, especially among young people, corruption, and inefficiency of state and government bodies.
There is also the threat of radical Islamism which is ready to develop rapidly in case of any political destabilization and use social problems for denouncing and destroying secular ruling regimes.
The drug mafia, apart from distributing poisonous death-dealing substances, is lavishly financing religious extremism.
There is also the problem of succession of supreme political power, inasmuch as there are no clearly defined rules of such succession.
Central Asia is also distinguished by conflictogenic interstate contradictions. Tension has been created by the plans of building the Rogun hydropower plant in Tajikistan and the Kambaratin hydropower plant in Kyrgyzstan on the trans border Amudarya and Syrdarya rivers. These plans cause deep concern of Uzbekistan, which is afraid of a reduction of water runoff in the rivers as a result of this construction.
Then there are unresolved border disputes which become a serious challenge to security. These disputes touch most republics of the region, especially Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, where ethnic overlapping and the absence of generally recognized borders are aggravated by a shortage of land and water, lending a pronounced socio-economic tint to these conflicts. Relations between these three Central Asian republics, which have exacerbated in the past years, do not exclude the emergence of new ethnic-territorial conflicts which are also due to the continuing growth of the population and difficult socioeconomic situation.
Interstate conflicts are also provoked by nationalities and ideological problems, as well as territorial claims to neighboring states or to regional leadership (the latter is the case of Uzbekistan).
Along with the growing critical mass of internal problems, a serious challenge to security in Central Asia is presented by outside threats. Among them are trans-border criminal activity, terrorism and drug trafficking.
But the most serious external challenge to Central Asia in the near future is presented by the Afghan factor. If the Taliban returns to power in Afghanistan, it will become the center of radical Islamism.
The year 2014 may be the last for the U.S. - NATO military operation, which had the aim of destroying the Taliban movement, as well as the al Qaeda and other terrorist groupings.
The Central Asian countries, which are Russia's strategic partners by the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), as well as the Eurasian alliance under formation, are concerned over their future: will Central Asia become a region of storms and disturbances after the withdrawal of the international coalition forces from Afghanistan, or will it have an accepted stability level? They are deeply interested in such questions as to whether the U.S.A./NATO preserve the existing parameters of their military-political presence in post-Soviet Central Asia, reduce, or, on the contrary, increase it. Will there be interaction with the security services working under the aegis of Russia and/or China, and what forms and mechanisms of their participation, as well as other regional players (India, Iran, Pakistan) can there be in energy, transport and military-political projects?
Russia is striving for alleviating tension in Afghanistan and improving the situation there by 2014 in order to exclude the possibility of a repetition of the situation of the 1990s when the separatists and
terrorists in religious disguise in the North Caucasus received generous help from an Afghan-Pakistani source. Our country is interested in having the Kabul regime neither radically Islamist nor puppet-pro-American. All this calls for painstakingly watching the developments in Afghanistan, which are complex and unpredictable.
On the one hand, certain achievements have been reached in Afghanistan: new political institutions, the army and special services have been created which can ensure security independently. On the other, the main aim, that is, the destruction of the material-technical base of the Taliban, elimination of its leaders and isolation of commanders, has been achieved but partly. According to certain data, the Talibs control a considerable part of Afghanistan and put forward their own conditions in negotiations with the Karzai government. The radicalization of Pakistan has not been stopped either. The main forces of the Afghan armed resistance "Taliban", its headquarters, the Islamic party of Afghanistan headed by G. Khekmatyar are stationed in Pakistan and closely connected with the influential Pakistani InterServices Intelligence, ISI. True, there have been signs of increasing opposition on the part of Pashtuns to the political and military actions of the Taliban and attempts to put forward a new political project of national consolidation of Pashtuns on the eve of the forthcoming withdrawal of the U.S.A. - NATO forces from Afghanistan.
Negotiations with representatives of the Taliban carried on by the United States against this complex background concerning the future structure of Afghanistan will inevitably be accompanied with active armed actions. Due to the unceasing attacks of terrorists and militants on the servicemen of the international coalition these actions will be given pride of place throughout the entire transition period.
As to the defeat of international terrorists, which is another crucial task of the military operation in Afghanistan, it can not be
considered completely realized. The al Qaeda terrorist groupings have left Afghanistan and Pakistan, in the main, but they are now stationed in a number of countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Moreover, the Libyan venture of NATO in 2011 has given al Qaeda a possibility to develop its infrastructure in that North African country and spread it to secular Syria, where al Qaida militants are fighting against B. Asad's regime, actually along with western countries headed by the United States, the moderate Islamist Turkish regime, and the conservative Arab monarchies. Al Qaeda, which changed its place of residence, preserves its strongest anti-American and anti-Western spirit. It brings religious and ethnic intolerance, chaos, bloodshed and individual terror to the countries of the region, which is practically the only method of solving political tasks for the organization. This threatens the stability not only of the Middle East countries, but also the secular regimes of Central Asia, as well as the interests of the United States and the entire civilized world.
Having signed an agreement on strategic partnership with Afghanistan in May 2012, the United States has given that country the status of "chief ally-not NATO member" and promised assistance for a period of ten years after the withdrawal of the international coalition troops (that is up to 2024), with a view to making the Afghan security force, formed with the help of the United States and NATO, responsible for maintaining security. Thus, the U.S. and NATO military presence in Afghanistan will remain in Afghanistan after 2014, but "it will not have a combat character," according to an official version. It is not clear so far what the numerical strength and structure of such international contingent be, and whether it will be deployed (temporarily or permanently) in Afghanistan proper or also in the neighboring Central Asian countries.
The Pentagon intends to retain big military bases in Afghanistan -in Bagram (north of Kabul), Shindan (near the border with Iran) and in Kandagar (not far from the border with Pakistan). This shows that the functions of American - NATO servicemen will hardly be reduced to the officially declared aims. And so it can be supposed that there are plans, which the United States does not speak of openly, to use the logistic and military advantages in this strategically important Asian "Heartland" gained since 2001 for monitoring the situation and observing the behavior and actions of the American strategic rivals -Russia and China - and containing them if need be.
Relations with other regional players - India, Pakistan and Iran -will be viewed by the American administration not only in the light of ensuring regional security or maintaining stability in Afghanistan, but also in the context of the "agenda for the future of the U.S.A." proclaimed by Obama in November 2011, according to which the Asia-Pacific region is considered the high priority of American policy. It is evident that this strategic message is addressed primarily to China, whose growing influence in Asia is threatening American interests, according to views current in the U.S.A.
In this connection the United States exerts every effort to lend proper significance to its main strategic partner - India (including through increased sale of arms and joint military exercises), which, as it is believed in Washington, can balance the growing military might of China. Interested as it is in American military technologies and sharing U.S. apprehension concerning China, India will also try to restrict Pakistan's growing influence in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the international coalition forces from there. Pakistan itself, without whose participation any negotiations on the Afghan problem will be fruitless, will closely be watching the preservation of its special role as the key player in resolving the Afghan conflict.
Despite its complex relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iran could also become a positive participant in Afghan solution, taking into account its long-term interest in the formation in Afghanistan "after 2014" of a moderate government, which would not be hostile toward non-Pashtun Afghans (and Shiites). The negative position of the United States toward Iran, which will hardly change due to Washington's nonacceptance of the Tehran regime, which proved relatively stable, lowers the chances to reach regional consensus on the problem of ensuring Afghanistan's security. This does not remove the fact that all regional powers, despite rather complex mutual relations and those with the United States, are objectively interested in a stable and predictable Afghanistan.
In a short-term prospect, that is, up to 2014, the U.S.A. / NATO will try to use as much as possible transit and transport facilities of Central Asian countries. First, it is due to insufficient reliability of the southern supply route for the international coalition forces - via Pakistan, whose relations with the United States have noticeably deteriorated in recent years. Secondly, it is connected with an enormous amount of cargoes removed from Afghanistan. By the end of 2014, NATO will have to transport about 100,000 containers full of goods and equipment and 50,000 vehicles, one-third of which will have to go through the territory of Central Asia.
The United States is also interested in using the infrastructural possibilities of Central Asian countries in its strategy in Afghanistan. They were offered to become economic and energy donors of Afghanistan within the framework of major projects promoted by the U.S. administration in recent years (Greater Central Asia, New Silk Route), and energy projects (TAPI, called by the first letters of the names of the participating countries - Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India). The aim of these projects is to change the geopolitical format of
Central and South Asia within the framework of a new macroregion where there will be no place for Russia, China or Iran, and where international political processes, the security sphere and the energy-transport system will be under the U.S.A. / NATO control.
In view of the forthcoming completion of the Afghan campaign the United States and NATO open new opportunities for expanding military cooperation with Central Asian countries. In all, they were granted $1.69 billion from the U.S. budget by the beginning of 2012. Given a total reduction of the U.S. military budget in 2012, the financing of program of military cooperation and security in Central Asia was increased by 74 percent. The Pentagon program to combat drug production and trafficking received $109.5 million. Besides, the United States suggests that Central Asian countries should get part of arms, hardware and equipment removed from Afghanistan. Instead, the United States hopes to receive preferences in agreeing conditions of commodity transit along the northern route and further stay of its armed forces at military objects in Central Asian countries. It can be assumed that following the gift of machines and equipment to countries of the region they will play host to NATO and American military experts. A noticeable increase of western arms on the Central Asian market will entail requirement for training specialists, spare parts, modernization, etc., and as a result it can lead to Moscow's partners in CSTO getting used to arms and equipment from overseas. There is also a danger of these western arms and equipment falling into the hands of radical groupings, criminal elements, or drug barons.
According to a multipurpose Central Asian scenario, the main role in the Northern distribution network for transit of American-NATO cargoes from Afghanistan in 2012 is given to Uzbekistan. In anticipation of this decision the U.S. Congress lifted restrictions on military aid to it imposed in 2004. Its territory is regarded by the United
States as the most convenient for creating big transport hubs of regional importance and military bases functioning permanently. In this connection Uzbekistan's decision to suspend its membership in the CSTO at the end of June 2012 was not accidental. It was due to several reasons: the organization forbids its member-states to deploy foreign military bases on their territory without consent of other member-states; Uzbekistan hopes to receive guarantees of its security after the withdrawal of the coalition forces from Afghanistan; Uzbekistan was promised to be given a considerable amount of the coalition's arms, ammunition, military equipment, etc. which would be taken out from Afghanistan.
This step of Uzbekistan will hardly weaken the military capability of the CSTO, inasmuch as that republic has not participated in military cooperation in the organization's format, and in 2009 President Islam Karimov even refused to sign an agreement on the Collective rapid reaction forces of the organization. However, this decision of Uzbekistan, which borders not only on Afghanistan, but on all four Central Asian republics may impede the struggle with drug trafficking.
Attention paid by American-NATO politicians and military men to Tajikistan recently is conditioned not only by its geographical proximity to Afghanistan, but also a possibility to have a ramified military infrastructure created on its territory. Evidently, the Russian military presence in Tajikistan is an obstacle to this. (There are the Russian military base No 201 and "Nurek" in the Pamirs). The Tajik side signed an agreement on the conditions of the deployment of a Russian military base on its territory during the official visit of President Putin in October 2012. According to it, the Russian military base will remain in the republic until 2024. In exchange Russia
promised to re-equip the republican armed forces and train military personnel for them.
The third "front-line" state is Turkmenistan. Referring to its neutral status, it was the only country in the region which has not signed with the United States and NATO the agreements on transit from Afghanistan. Turkmenistan interests the leading global players by its great gas potential and major projects in the energy and transport spheres. Among them the TAPI (Turkmenistan - Afghanistan -Pakistan - India) project, which, if realized, might lead to big geopolitical shifts in the region of Central and South Asia. Evidently, the problems of democracy and human rights in Turkmenistan will not become a subject of any great concern (up to 2014) of the United States.
Kyrgyzstan remains in the zone of attention of the United States / NATO because there is the military base "Gansi" functioning there and renamed the Center of transit transportations in 2009. On the territory of this military object formally used for supplying the campaign in Afghanistan with military cargoes there is a big technical radar station for reconnaissance operation in the entire Central Asia and, what is especially important, in China. The numerical strength of the American military contingent there is 1,500 men and officers. Payment for the use of the center was $151 million in 2011. No wonder that Kyrgyzstan favors the idea of using this object after 2014 under a new sign - Civil Center of transit transportations.
Kyrgyzstan supported the idea of using this object after 2014. This was announced by the President of the republic A. Atambayev in early 2012, thus crossing out his own promise given at the presidential elections in 2011 to have this American base withdrawn from Kyrgyzstan's territory.
However, subsequently, the Kyrgyz leader said that he would like to turn the airbase into a civil airport. During the Russian-Kyrgyz high-level negotiations which took place in Bishkek in September 2012, documents were signed confirming the Russian military presence in the republic. A Russian military base is planned to be opened on the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic in 2017; it will include four military objects: a test site of underwater arms in Karakol, a military communication center in Kara-Balt, a seismic laboratory in Mailuu-Suu, and an airbase in Kant.
As to Kazakhstan, which held a priority place in the U.S., Central Asian strategy up to 2012, it will interest the United States / NATO in the transition period (up to 2014) as an exporter of energy raw materials due to its entry in the Customs Union and the Eurasian economic area, along with Russia and Belarus. This does not exclude attempts in the future to bring pressure to bear on Kazakhstan's leadership, via its western-minded elite, with a view to reorienting the republic from postSoviet integration projects to programs lobbied and financed by the West.
If the American-NATO presence, both military and economic, expands in Central Asia, and the presently functioning Northern network is transformed into a transcontinental network, it will completely cover the territory of the former U.S.S.R. and will contribute to the implementation of broad strategic aims of the Unite States and its allies. The aim of such military-strategic undertaking will be containment of China, control over Afghanistan, elimination of Russia's "export monopoly," and reorientation of the security structures of the Central Asian and post-Soviet countries to the NATO structures.
The American military objects where they already exist (Kyrgyzstan) and where they may appear (Tajikistan) may lend certain confidence to these countries' governments. But the United States will
hardly be ready to take risks upon itself in case of an exacerbation of the internal political situation in these countries, or assume obligations to give long-term guarantees of security to its old/new strategic partners. The idea current in Central Asia at present that western military structures will be more effective for protection from external and internal threats than those of the CIS or CSTO may prove an illusion. There are also limits of using Russia as a factor allowing these countries to blackmail the American partners softly: such many-vector tactics may turn against those who took it up.
The possibility to realize its long-term plans in Central Asia for the United States depends on many factors: the world economic and political situation, ability to cope with the negative consequences of the economic crisis, and the image losses after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The great geographical distance of the United States from the region and the unstable internal situation in its countries may become obstacles for a more active American involvement in Central Asian affairs "after Afghanistan." European countries, too, may show greater interest in the energy resources of the region. In any case, the activity of all forces interested in Central Asia can be limited by the unpredictable and unfinished processes in the Middle East, which began with the coming of the "Arab spring." Besides, an aggravation of relations with the two main powers in the Central Asian region - Russia and the People's Republic of China - may be unprofitable and even harmful for the United States; these two countries may oppose any plans of the broadening of the military-political presence of the U.S.A. / NATO in the region, which will try to preserve stability there relying on the regional "collective security" structures.
In connection with the withdrawal of military troops from Afghanistan, the following possible scenarios of the developing situation in that country may be forecast:
A pessimistic scenario will show the further exacerbation of civil and interethnic confrontation in Afghanistan, right up to the outbreak of an armed struggle. One of its undesirable results may be the coming to power of the intransigent Talibs and the emergence of a situation like the one in the 1996-2001 period when Afghanistan became a haven for al Qaeda and other forces of international terrorism threatening Central Asia, Russia and the entire world. Such developments will definitely be a serious challenge to the countries around Afghanistan, primarily the Central Asian states. The most probable risk will be the spreading of military hostilities of a civil war to the territory of near-to-border Central Asian countries - and first and foremost Tajikistan. This will be accompanied with the mass flow of refugees from the territory of Afghanistan, which Tajikistan experienced in 1996-1997.
According to an optimistic scenario, after a certain aggravation of an armed struggle in Afghanistan and the departure of President Karzai from the residential post along with the withdrawal of the western coalition forces in 2014, a program of national reconciliation and reintegration will be implemented. A coalition government will be created on the basis of the Iraqi model and a consensus reached between the main political forces of the country. It will represent the interests of all people and forces of the country, both Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns.
The people of Afghanistan are tired of wars and hostilities. The Taliban has lost popular support because it gave shelter to terrorists from all over the world, thus bringing misery and misfortune to millions and death of thousands of people.
The regional and international medium now largely differs from what it was when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979.
The international community does not intend to abandon the Afghan people face to face with their domestic problems and will look for ways to finance the development of Afghanistan.
According to the negative scenario, the events in Afghanistan can lead to a chain of revolts, coups and civil wars in Central Asia and may require interference of allies by CSTO and SCO, which will definitely lead to greater economic and social tension in all their member-states.
In the event of the development of the situation in Afghanistan according to the optimistic scenario ("peaceful Afghanistan"), the Talibs, who are mainly Pashtun nationalists, will not spread the zone of their influence to the adjacent Central Asian republics, whose people are alien to them and will not support them. Even if the Talibs return to power in Afghanistan, their plans hardly envisage any breakthrough to Central Asia with a view to seizing its territories or establishing a caliphate in that region.
The main challenges to security in Central Asia will be due to its domestic socio-economic problems. There will be no direct connection between Central Asian states (except, perhaps, Tajikistan) with the processes going on inside Afghanistan - struggle for power, interethnic and interreligious conflicts, etc. All ethnic groups in Afghanistan are interested in strengthening their own positions within their own country, but not outside it. Another matter is if a threat to security in the region may be created by the militant Islamists based in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as the "intransigent" elements from among the Islamic movement in Uzbekistan, and other such groupings.
Nevertheless, the Central Asian states should ensure themselves from threats from the Afghan direction - the growing drug trafficking and dissemination of radical religious trends. A combination of potential external challenges from Afghanistan with the really growing domestic political risks are especially dangerous for Central Asian
countries, because they can greatly destabilize the existing situation. A possible combination of the social and religious factors is also very dangerous. Islamic revolution hardly threatens any republic of the region, even despite the fact that the role of political Islam is very high in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. But Islamists getting considerable financial support from drug trafficking and from their "brethren in faith" abroad can create a general chaos in the region. To oppose such variant of developments the Central Asian states need, apart from a strong army and special rapid reaction forces, a strategy of response to challenges and risks from the outside, which can hardly be evolved without foreign assistance.
Tajikistan is the most vulnerable country from the point of view of security, for it has a long common border with Afghanistan passing through hardly accessible mountains, which is difficult to guard. After 2014, refugees and militants from among the Uzbek and Tajik population of Afghanistan may penetrate Tajikistan due to a civil war which may break out in that country. To be prepared for such turn of events the Tajik authorities should fortify their border with Afghanistan. The European Union could really help in this respect within the framework of its Border Management Program in Central Asia. However, since it is busy combating the economic and financial crisis whose outcome is not yet clear for the Union and the Eurozone, Tajikistan, just as other Central Asian countries, can hardly rely on its assistance. Neither can they hope for help on the part of international financial institutions (World Bank and International Monetary Fund). First, they also center attention on the crisis in Europe. Secondly, their activity to a great extent depends on the international situation. It is known that as soon as the United States began to regard Uzbekistan as its main strategic partner in Central Asia the World Bank told Tajikistan to suspend the construction of the Rogun hydropower plant
(Uzbekistan was against it). Five-and-a-half thousand Tajik workers have lost jobs as a result of it.
Tajikistan has suffered more than other Central Asian republics from attacks of members of transnational radical religious organizations, like IDU and al Qaeda. It should be noted that extremist armed actions in Tajikistan were quite frequent in 2010-2012, and they were mostly connected with domestic problems.
The popularity of the Party of Islamic Revival is growing in the republic. At present its membership comes to 42,000, women comprising more than fifty percent. This party has already drawn attention of the United States, which does not exclude a possibility of a dialogue with "moderate Islamists in Afghanistan and in the Middle East.
As to Kyrgyzstan with its permanent internal political instability and unresolved problems in the south of the country, any shocks, irrespective of their source, can trigger off a new political or interethnic conflict. The situation in the sphere of security can be aggravated by the military hardware and equipment from Afghanistan which the United States promised to leave in Kyrgyzstan after the withdrawal of its troops from that country.
The change of the format of the presence of the American-NATO troops in Afghanistan after 2014 will hardly tell on the internal political situation in Uzbekistan, where parliament adopted a law forbidding the deployment of foreign military bases and other objects on the territory of the country. It can be hoped that the republic will avoid serious political upheavals in the future. Until 2014 it will actively develop military-political cooperation with the United States for the purpose of thwarting internal threats and blocking possible efforts to destabilize the domestic political situation from without.
Neutral and closed Turkmenistan will be able to preserve the previous level of relations with the ruling regime of Afghanistan, irrespective of who is in power there. The construction of a gas pipeline for transporting Turkmenian gas and Central Asian energy resources to Pakistan via Afghanistan will contribute to the stable relations of Turkmenistan with Afghanistan. Turkmenistan will remain one of the most important transit routes for transporting Afghan cargoes, and Afghanistan will depend on Turkmenian fuel and electricity for a long time.
As to Kazakhstan, the level of threats and risks due to the possible outbreak of a civil war in Afghanistan is much lower due to its greater geographical distance from it. Nevertheless, any exacerbation of the situation in Afghanistan and unpredictability of its political future after the withdrawal of the U.S./NATO forces from there can negatively influence Kazakhstan whose southern part is closely connected with the rest of Central Asia. Destabilization in the Central Asian states bordering on Afghanistan can directly or indirectly touch on Kazakhstan's interests. In case of any direct military threat from Afghanistan, which is hardly possible, it can be assumed that Russia may take part in rebuffing it.
Kazakhstan, which has been considered an island of stability in Central Asia during the past several years, is now facing a host of problems. On May 17, 2011, a terrorist act took place in the town of Aktobe for the first time in the country's recent history. After that such acts were registered in several other towns and cities. From the beginning of 2012 there have been five anti-terrorist operations in Kazakhstan. Responsibility for the acts of terror was assumed by the previously unknown Islamist grouping called "Soldiers of Caliphate" ("Jund al Khalifah") which had ties with al Qaeda. According to certain sources in Afghanistan and Pakistan, ethnic Kazakhs have been sent to
Kazakhstan from these countries with a view to recruiting new members of terrorist groups and bringing pressure to bear on the local authorities. Terrorist acts have become more frequent after Kazakhstan has drawn closer to Russia, entered into the Customs Union, and began to build a uniform Eurasian area together with Russia.
Kazakhstan's authorities do not exclude the possibility of the use of the republic's territory for the illegal transit of arms and drugs, including with the help of Islamist organizations. Radicalization of Islam proceeds rapidly enough in southern districts of Kazakhstan where there is a numerous Uzbek diaspora. There is the danger of Islamists using social discontent for their purpose of radicalization of Islam.
Taking into account Uzbekistan's withdrawal from CSTO, Kazakhstan's border may become the southern boundary of CSTO, and economic integration within the Customs Union and uniform economic area can be strengthened by a military-political component. Theoretically, economic and political integration on the basis of the common economic area created by Russia and Kazakhstan can receive a new impetus in case of the emergence of new threats to security requiring mobilization and coordination of efforts in combating that threat.
In view of the fact that it is Russia and Kazakhstan that bear main responsibility for maintaining stability in the Central Asian region, it is necessary to start immediately a thorough dialogue to discuss ways and means to oppose the destructive global and regional tendencies and step up the activity of the security bodies.
There are inevitable difficulties along this road. They are partly due to the fact that the Central Asian countries are in no hurry to connect the problem of regional security with CSTO and SCO. Secondly, it may be explained by the still existing phobias of part of the
regional political elites which are harping on the subject of Russia's imperial schemes. Thirdly, it is connected with China's passive attitude to potential military threats to the region and its desire to reduce its activity in Central Asia exclusively to the sphere of energy, economy and trade. To this should be added contradictions on the water and territorial problems still existing in Central Asia and preventing the elaboration of a consolidated agenda on the vital interests of the states of the region.
On the whole, the effectiveness of the existing security structures operating in Central Asia within the CSTO and SCO framework leaves much to be desired. Yet, the system is working somehow. It allows its members not only to reach a consensus on rather difficult international problems, but also to solve practically the timely questions of regional security. If the countries of the region wish to preserve real sovereignty in the conditions of globalization, they should speed up integration processes. This also concerns Russia.
A serious obstacle for the formation of an effective security system in Central Asia is presented by selfish interests of individual countries or elitist groups, as well as ambitions of certain political figures and their unwillingness to recognize the fact that only collective actions can minimize the existing and potential threats and prevent confrontation bringing harm to the nations of the region. So far there is a serious lack of political will on the part of the leaders of Central Asian countries.
Russia has found its position on its own international priorities, and its actions are directed at creating a new reality in the post-Soviet area, which will allow it to minimize many risks and threats, including those coming from Afghanistan. This new Russian strategy covers Central Asia, too. In the military-political aspect Moscow does not
offer its Central Asian partners anything like "alliances against," but calls for working together to oppose real threats.
Russia is vitally interested in maintaining stability in the region and neutralizing the Islamist threat. A reasonable alternative can be a deep economic integration initiated by Russia, which will contribute to the preservation of the secular character of the political systems of the states of the region.
The forthcoming withdrawal of military units from Afghanistan and transfer of responsibility for security in that country to the government in Kabul put Russia and the security structures it patronizes -CSTO and SCO - in the face of serious challenges. They will have to play more important role in Afghan stabilization. It will definitely be a subject not only of discussion but activity of SCO and its specialized bodies. This is why Russia is facing the task today to raise the role of SCO to the level of an effectively working international organization for fruitful regional interaction.
"Voprosy bezopasnosti v Tsentralnoi Azii," Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 2013, pp. 5-18.
