CC BY
16
M. Konarovsky,
Ph. D. (Hist.), leading research associate at Center
of Study of East Asia and SCO, MGIMO,
Ambassador of Russia to Afghanistan in 2002-2004
AFGHANISTAN AND NEW UNCERTAINTY.
CHALLENGES TO RUSSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA
The presidential elections in Afghanistan and the withdrawal of the military contingents of the United States and NATO in 2014 will hardly have a positive effect on the situation in that country. The new President of Afghanistan Ashraf Ghani in his inauguration speech singled out the key problems facing his country: security, continuation of peace process, effective struggle against terrorism and narcotic drug production, economic crisis. He also proclaimed an ambitious reform of state power and government bodies.
Fragile National Unity
The effectiveness of the government of national unity will largely be determined by a balanced regrouping of the forces within the Afghan elites and their ability to answer properly the present-day realities. Political consensus in power bodies and their internal consolidation determine the firmness and stability of the positions of central power and the efficiency of their efforts aimed at achieving national reconciliation and negotiations with armed opponents. The fact that the inauguration of the President became possible not only (and not so much) due to general national elections, but also as a result of prolonged political bargaining (with the participation of Washington, UN and certain neighboring countries) only confirms the assumption about difficulties of the government, whose initial structure seemed rather weak. Will the new coalition be firm, will it be efficient enough despite the differences between its main participants, primarily, the
President and the Prime minister - only time will show. National consensus on the future of Afghanistan will require not only energetic and vast work with representatives of the national-ethnic political elites, but also elaboration of slogans capable to consolidate society for effective resistance to the Taliban. In any case, to solve domestic economic and political problems when it is also necessary to fight the armed opposition is extremely difficult for Kabul. The tandem of Ashraf Ghani - Abdullah Abdullah is weak, and the country may become fragmented by the ethnic factor, primarily, along the "North -South" line (Pashtuns - Non-Pashtuns). Apart from the general Pashtun-Tajik confrontation between the supporters and opponents of the two leaders there are views on the possible intra-Pashtun tension (between tribal groups). In eastern regions of Afghanistan the cause of growing tension may be infringement of the political add financial-economic rights of Abdullah's supporters due to the growing influence of Ghani's supporters. Certain observers believe that interference of Kabul's foreign partners may be required in order to avoid another impasse of local power. All the more so, since the coalition agreement does not provide for mechanisms of resolving disputes.
A destructive outside factor capable to aggravate the situation is not only repercussions of the "Arab spring" in the Middle East, but also the activity of the ISIL. The ideology and methods of reaching their aims, tactic of practical actions, fanaticism, aggressiveness and cruelty of functionaries and militants of ISIL resemble the Taliban movement in the latter half of the 1990s. This creates a foundation for coordination of actions not only in Afghanistan, but also in adjacent regions of Central and South Asia, North-East China, in the Caucasus, and elsewhere. Many experts maintain that up to ten percent of the ISIL militants are men of Caucasian origin, some of them came from Khanty-Mansi district, Novosibirsk and the Volga area. So far there has
been no open penetration of ISIL in Afghan territory. However, in a number of enclaves, including in the North of the country, their religious-propaganda literature can be found, and the Pakistan wing of the Taliban has openly proclaimed itself an ally of the ISIL.
The general situation in Afghanistan continues to remain tense, although recently the activity of the Taliban has become somewhat weaker. This makes it possible for the government to consolidate its bodies in order to step up opposition to the Taliban and its supporters.
At the same time there is no cohesion and proper coordination in the ranks of the national armed forces and the security units. Combat ability of the Afghan armed forces suffers from lack of discipline and professionalism. Desertion and the recruitment of servicemen by the Talibs are one of the most serious problems of the Afghan army. Besides, their agents penetrate the army and police, and it harms the efficiency of the Afghan armed forces. Difficulties of combat training are also conditioned by the low level of literacy and interethnic tension. Such state of affairs suites the armed opposition.
In his inaugural speech President Ashraf Ghani called on his opponents, and especially the Talibs and the Islamic party to start political negotiations, excluding Mullah Omar. However, it is not clear yet what the general strategy of Kabul will be like. In any case, the recipes of the previous administration of Karzai, when the "peaceful Talibs" who gave up armed struggle were granted certain privileges, proved ineffective. There was no adequate reaction on the part of the enemies of the present regime in the country, who refused to engage in any dialogue while the foreign troops remained there.
The first pressure test of the new rule will be parliamentary elections in 2015. Future deputies will reflect the renovated alignment of forces as a result of the activity of the coalition government. The
parliament will, probably, be influenced by the present armed opposition.
Foreign-policy Priorities
A new stage of foreign-policy maneuvering of Kabul seems quite important, because at the concluding phase of the withdrawal of foreign troops Afghanistan enters a period of uncertainty. In order to solve the tasks facing the country's government it is necessary to evolve and pursue a well-thought-out and balanced foreign policy, which would ensure all-round support from outside. Of the five foreign-policy priorities the main one is the development of relations with the neighboring and Muslim countries. Then there are countries in the West and Asia, primarily China, India and the monarchies of the Persian Gulf. The list ends with international bodies. Russia is not mentioned, the new authorities of Afghanistan do not regard it as a priority.
At first glance it seems strange that Washington is not singled out as a special category (despite the bilateral agreement on cooperation in the sphere of security signed on September 30). However, it may show Kabul's desire to try to distance itself from the odious past in Afghan-American relations. On the one hand, the Afghan authorities continue to depend on the United States a great deal, and on the other, they realize full well that they better display activity in other directions, too.
After Washington has decided to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan and made public its doctrine of greater military-political attention to East Asia, American interest in that country has diminished. Nevertheless, the influence of the United States and NATO countries is still quite great. It is quite probable that the present course is aimed at reducing expenditures and responsibility for the situation after 2014. The new liabilities of the Obama administration include the granting to Kabul of not only definite military support, but also financial
assistance, and an agreement on cooperation in the sphere of security becomes the main document for the near future. It determines the status of a small contingent of American troops in Afghanistan, along with several bases and logistics hubs, which can be used to support the Afghan government with force.
The document envisages the training and supply of the Afghan security forces, as well as financial aid to government bodies and the state budget. However, American experts predict a considerable reduction of the U.S. economic presence in Afghanistan. The preservation of a U.S. military contingent not only gives Washington the levers of influence on Kabul, but also allows it to monitor the general situation in the region.
These opportunities are bolstered up by an agreement with NATO signed by Kabul envisaging additional deployment of up to four thousand servicemen. At the NATO summit in September 2014 Afghanistan was promised $5.1 billion dollars in 2015. Within the framework of a new mission called "Resolute Support" to be started next year material and financial assistance will be rendered to the armed forces of Afghanistan, as well as other forms of "political and practical cooperation" will be carried on. Germany and Italy have already announced their readiness to dispatch their servicemen to Afghanistan.
Realizing that the new agreement with Washington may cause circumspection among certain neighbors of Afghanistan, particularly, China, Iran and Russia, the Afghan leadership emphasizes that the foreign military presence will "positively influence the situation in the region and will not harm security of any country." Yet, in order to minimize apprehension of its neighbors Kabul should watch closely the actions of the United States on its territory and pursue an active, but
cautious and balanced policy in the region. This is important, inasmuch as Afghanistan itself is still suspicious of the foreign military presence.
Kabul intends to develop its eastern policy and this is why it should take into account sentiments not only of its own population, but also those of its important regional partners. There have already been political contacts with India and Pakistan which have always influenced the domestic situation in Afghanistan: Islamabad politically and New Delhi economically. Iran also expects certain intensification of relations with Afghanistan. Certain analysts think that a definite vacuum of power after the withdrawal of the U.S. and NATO contingent from Afghanistan can have a negative influence not only on that country, but also on Pakistan. Taking into account a special significance of relations with the latter for the domestic situation in Afghanistan, Islamabad was visited by President Ashraf Ghani in mid-October (right after his visit to Beijing).
China looked favorably on Afghan-Pakistani rapprochement. The visit to Islamabad of the Afghan President was preceded by agreements on increasing mutual trade from $2.5 billion to $5 billion, and also a stay in Kabul of the commander-in-chief of the Pakistani army Rakhil Sharif. Permanent contacts with the United States were supplemented with brief visits to Kabul by the Premier of Britain, President of Turkey, and Minister of economic cooperation of Germany.
Negotiations have begun with members of the Organization of Islamic cooperation on financing number of energy projects, including regional and transit transportation through Afghanistan. The biggest of them - CASA 1000 - deals with transportation of electric energy from Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is to be finished by 2017.The idea of a considerable increase of electric energy supplies from Turkmenistan to northern districts of Afghanistan (up to 33.5 billion kW/h by 2030) has again received a political impetus.
Agreements have been reached on a consortium of interested states for financing the construction of a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (TAPI), which was discussed from the latter half of the 1990s and which became a hostage of the geopolitical games of the United States in the Caspian Basin and Central Asia.
Proliferation Risks
The prospects of Afghanistan concern its Central Asian neighbors. There can be no stability and security in this volatile region, without a solution of the Afghan problem. Too many old problems complicate the life of people there, among them the use of water resources, territorial disputes, and complex ethno-national situation. The further destabilization of Afghanistan will inevitable be felt in Russia through Central Asia. The growing number of migrants from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan serve as a nutrient medium for pressure brought to bear on our country. Already now more and more cases become known of recruiting mercenaries and setting up illegal centers of the distribution of extremist ideas on Russian territory. There is information about the emergence of ISIL cells in various regions of Russia and its recruiting centers. Afghanistan's neighbors fear that the activity of transnational terrorist groupings there, along with the growing drug production and trafficking will threaten the neighboring states. The concentration of terrorist and criminal organizations in some northern and north-western provinces of Afghanistan is another cause of concern.
The Tajik-Kyrgyz direction is considered the most vulnerable. According to certain experts, terrorist groupings in Kyrgyzstan merge with criminal elements and special services. This exerts destructive influence on the adjacent Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The complex situation in Kyrgyzstan and the lack of proper control over the situation
in parts of Tajikistan create additional opportunities for growing instability and greater threats to other Central Asian states and to Russia. Recently, Turkmenistan has also expressed concern over the situation in Afghanistan. In certain border districts of that country, groupings of Afghan Turkmen of pro-Taliban orientation have become more active, and their programs include claims of parts of the territory of South Turkmenistan.
Russia and its Central Asian partners in the CSTO adopt additional measures for strengthening their southern borders and create plans of joint actions in case of emergency. They should act in the interests of the multilateral structure of this organization and departure from predominantly bilateral military-political and military-technical relations of Russia with other member-countries of the CSTO. A serious problem is suspension by Uzbekistan of its membership in the organization, and in order to fill the vacuum it is necessary to step-up military cooperation with it of individual member-states.
One of the specific features of the foreign policy of the postSoviet states of Central Asia is their desire to gain profit even from minimal compromises. Mutual circumspection of historical roots, national egoism, and different interests in Afghanistan prevent the elaboration of common approaches to the Afghan problem. Exaggerated perception in the countries of the region of the great powers' role in resolving local problems lead to temptation to shift responsibility for the state of affairs on to the outside forces. Unwillingness to pursue an independent policy of security, and excessive concentration on solution of domestic problems will lower the strategic importance of this region for Afghanistan (in contrast to such neighbors as China, Pakistan and Iran).
Another serious obstacle in the way of coordinating policy within the framework of the CSTO and directly toward Afghanistan is the
aggravation of Moscow' relations with the West, which promises to last long. Russia's course has evoked an ambiguous reaction among its Central Asian partners, which was the most pronounced in Astana (Kazakhstan) and Tashkent (Uzbekistan). They fear the growing "imperial ambitions" of Moscow which may move them toward greater tactical interaction with Washington, which the latter can use in Afghanistan. Such maneuvering of partners will inevitably worry Russia, which will lower the effectiveness of interaction in the Afghan affairs.
Recently, Beijing has become concerned over the development of the situation in Afghanistan after 2014, and its possible destructive influence on the North-Western districts of China. This is confirmed by more frequent anti-government demonstrations in the Xinjiang-Uighur autonomous district of the PRC, above all, growing separatism and the activity of the "Islamic movement of East Turkestan." From the economic point of view, Afghanistan is interesting to China primarily as a supplier of raw materials. Beijing has undertaken no small efforts to entrench itself in the oil-bearing districts in the North of Afghanistan and in the development of one of the world's biggest copper ore deposits. However, the implementation of the project was retarded by the general instability in Afghanistan and its transfer to the districts bordering on China. This contributed to growing turbulence in the Muslim enclaves of the PRC, including due to the activity of the "Islamic movement of East Turkestan," as well as illegal penetration of Afghan narcotic drugs to China. All this predetermines Beijing's greater attention to the political aspects of the Afghan problem and, accordingly, its growing interest in Afghanistan, which is positively viewed in the West.
The key aspect of the October meetings of President Asraf Ghani in China was, naturally, the problems of security, including the joint
struggle against terrorism and drug trafficking. The Chinese side was assured of Afghanistan's readiness to strengthen interaction in the struggle against Uighur separatism and extremism. In turn, Kabul was interested in support and assistance in its dialogue with Islamabad, taking into account rather close relations between China and Pakistan. The PRC supported the intention of the Afghan authorities to set up the negotiation process with the armed opposition. Adhering to a cautious position toward the Taliban Beijing has always considered them a "real political force which would be present for a long time on the Afghan political scene." On October 31, 2014 the Chinese side planned to initiate the setting up of a committee to support the Afghan authorities in holding negotiations with the armed opposition. However, having a cool reaction of some participants in the Istanbul process, Beijing took off its proposal.
Russia and Various Formats
The main task for the near future is to ensure peace in Afghanistan, prevent the proliferation of instability, terrorism and narcotic drugs from its territory and help it in economic development (the recent conference of donors in London has shown unfeasibility of foreign financial donations to that country). In this matter Russia's interests coincide with those of China and Central Asian countries, which provide broad opportunities for their active interaction. Washington's desire to use its presence in Afghanistan and, accordingly, in Central Asia after 2014 for ensuring its geopolitical interests in the "soft underbelly" of Russia and China gives an impetus to the coordination of their policy in the region, including for counteraction to the disproportionate presence of the United States there.
At the same time Washington can take a course to strengthening interaction with Central Asian countries and China to the detriment of
Russian interests. In any case, the West approved cooperation in the U.S.A. - China - Afghanistan triangle.
In view of the fact that all Central Asian countries (except Turkmenistan) are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), challenges from the South inevitably predetermine the greater activity of SCO and the need to pay closer attention to the elaboration of a concerted political course in the Afghan affairs by the SCO member-countries. This was proved by the latest summit of the organization in Dushanbe in mid-September, where the problems of Afghanistan took pride of place on the agenda. The SCO has no institutional military possibilities for ensuring regional stability and security. In this context, it would be expedient to step up in every way possible the political component of SCO functioning in the Afghan direction. Later on, when joint economic activity is discussed, the economic component could be added to the political one. The present chairmanship of Russia in the SCO contributes not only to its further strengthening and expansion (due to Pakistan and India joining it) and its higher regional and world status, but also to greater attention to the problems of Afghanistan.
"Rossiya v globalnoi politike," Moscow, 2014, No 4, pp. 116-124.
K. Syroyezhkin,
D. Sc. (Political sciences), Kazakhstan
BEHIND THE SCO SUMMIT IN DUSHANBE
The summit of the heads of state of the SCO member-countries held in Dushanbe on September 11-12, 2014, has not justified all hopes of experts. However, it has moved forward the SCO project overburdened as it is with numerous obstacles.
