CC BY
19
Dina Malysheva,
D. Sc. (Political sciences), Institute for Oriental Studies RAS SECURE DEVELOPMENT OF CENTRAL ASIA AND THE AFGHAN FACTOR
In the fist half of the 1990s, soon after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. many people predicted that Central Asia would become one of the most unstable regions of the world. Has this prediction come true? At first glance, it has not. It should be admitted that during the years of independent development the Central Asian states, except Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, have been lucky to escape fratricidal civil wars. Nevertheless, Central Asian realities show that peace and stability in this part of the post-Soviet area are fragile and shaky. In the view of the well-known American political analysts Boris Rumer, "the developments of September 11, 2001, have made Central Asia the epicenter of geopolitical shock at a global level."
Having been drawn in a complex geopolitical balancing due to the shift of many global processes from Europe to Asia, the post-Soviet states of Central Asia tried to avoid association with any one world or regional center. They have taken a course to maintaining good relations with all participants in the competitive struggle in the region, which is determined by the two main factors; the rich natural resources of Central Asia, and the fact that it has turned into the "basic springboard" for access to Afghanistan, where the forces of the international coalition headed by the United States have been trying, since 2001, to restore law and order and get rid of international terrorists, who have entrenched themselves there.
In 2014 the international operation in the Afghan-Pakistani zone of military operations should end, which can be followed by increasing domestic and foreign risks, threats and challenges to security in Central
Asia, including the possible radicalization of Islam and stepping up of religious-extremist movements and organizations in the region.
Threats to Security and Challenges
to Development
The withdrawal of the U.S. and coalition forces from Afghanistan planned for 2014 will be crucial for Central Asia, which may face growing threats of destabilization in the region.
The possible future outside risks and threats to Central Asia after the withdrawal of the international coalition forces from Afghanistan are as follows:
Resumption of a large-scale civil war, escalation of violence in the northern districts of the country, and spreading of military hostilities to the territory of Central Asian states, primarily Tajikistan;
Return of militants (ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks) from Afghanistan and Pakistan to their Motherland, which can prompt participants in the local religious-political movements in Central Asia to uniting with them and starting a sort of a guerilla warfare like the one in Tajikistan in the first half of the 1990s;
Increase of drug production and trafficking, because "harvests" of drug plants in Afghanistan have become 40 times greater during the past few years, and more than 50 percent of Afghan heroine is shipped through Central Asian countries to Russia and further on to Europe;
Growth of trans-border crime and terrorism
All this may aggravate the difficult situation in the sphere of security in the Central Asian region, where militant Islamism is always ready to step up its activity and use any political destabilization and social problems to discredit and undermine the secular ruling regimes.
The growing influence of drug mafia is closely connected with religious extremism. No wonder that the threat of the radicalization of Islam is regarded the principal one by all Central Asian leaders.
The President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov said in his statement on the results of the Russian-Uzbek negotiations in Moscow on April 15, 2013, that religious fanaticism is especially dangerous in Central Asia. A possible destabilization in the region with the help of the "Islamic weapon" has real grounds connected with certain recent events in Central Asian countries and the experience of their interaction with the troublesome southern neighbor - Afghanistan.
We mean, first of all, the temporary disintegration of Tajikistan in the 1990s as a result of the civil war, which was an outcome of taking power in Dushanbe by an Islamic-democratic coalition of different political forces. Secondly, it was the "Batken events" of 1999 and 2000 in Batken region of Kyrgyzstan, when the military forces of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and the fighters of the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan (IDU), which tried to break through to Uzbekistan through Gorny Badakhshan (Tajikistan), clashed with each other. Thirdly, it was the Islamic "Mojahed" project realized in Afghanistan in the 1990s, which resulted in the radicalization of the Central Asian umma and the stepping up of Islamic radical movements in Central Asia, which established close ties with transnational terrorist organizations stationed in Afghanistan. The biggest and most influential of them was "al Qaeda," whose units were either liquidated or marginalized, or squeezed out from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Africa and the Middle East and other countries. However, this has not removed the grave danger of growing religious-extremist movements in the Afghan-Pakistani zone. It is possible that these movements, as well as other internal forces may begin an armed struggle for power in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the international coalition forces
from there in 2014. Then, due to close proximity of Central Asian countries and unreliable and badly guarded borders between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, violence and disturbances may switch over to the territory of Central Asian republics.
This prospect is quite realistic, inasmuch as Islamism is coming to the fore in world politics. An example of it is provided by the tumultuous processes going on in the Middle East and North Africa, which are interpreted by their participants as "revolution," "uprising," "awakening," etc. but which are better known as the "Arab spring" outside the boundaries of the Arab world. Having begun under the slogans of social and political changes, democratization of social life, and the change of ruling regimes, these events have resulted in other developments, namely, the coming to power of members of Islamic organizations in a number of countries (Egypt, Tunisia, Libya), replacement of the secular paradigm of development with a religious one, wide penetration of Islamic terrorist groupings ("al Qaeda," "al Qaeda in Iraq," "al Qaeda in Maghreb" (AQM), "al Qaeda on Arabian Peninsula," and others) in the social life of these countries. They undermined territorial integrity and stability of a number of countries, provoked civil wars in Libya, Syria, Iraq, and, possibly, in Lebanon and Jordan, and exacerbated old national-ethnic disputes and religious contradictions (primarily Sunnite - Shi'ite). Close connections between the Islamist movements and terrorist organizations operating in the Arab East with the radical elements based in Europe, in the Gulf region, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Caucasus have now become quite visible. It is only natural that the secular states of Central Asia view very cautiously the prospect of the possible import of liberal sentiments borne of the "Arab spring," but tinted in religious shades of political violence, chaos of social life, and terrorist wars.
Nevertheless, the "Arab spring" scenario in Central Asia will hardly be implemented in real life because the strictly centralized power in all states of the region has created a system of harsh control over the special forces of security, the opposition, and the printed and electronic mass media. The clan structure and authoritarian methods of rule create a formidable barrier in the way of actions by the supporters of the "Islamic alternative." Apart from that, Central Asia has weak ties with the Middle East and its Muslim organizations (except, perhaps, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), there are no traditions of mass public protests or mechanisms to mobilize society to protest actions, which exist in the Arab East. Countries with rather high incomes from the oil-and-gas export (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan) can use the opportunities to play down the population's discontent by adopting social programs, raising pensions, unemployment bonuses, etc. Finally, there are no external forces (at least up to 2014, when it is planned to complete the withdrawal of the international coalition forces from Afghanistan) interested in destabilizing the situation in Central Asia. The United States and NATO, which are largely dependent on Central Asian countries and their transit and transport possibilities, are trying to create an important strategic corridor in the region for delivering military cargoes to and from Afghanistan, and also for pumping oil and gas to Europe.
Potential external threats to regional political stability are aggravated by a great number of domestic problems, mostly of political and socio-economic character. Instability is manifested in many forms: interethnic tension, confrontation between regional elites and clans, impoverishment of the population and wider gaps in people's incomes and hence, growing social disproportions and high unemployment level, corruption, and low efficiency of government bodies.
Among the serious problems complicating the safe development of Central Asian countries are relative instability of their legitimate authorities, and also consequences and processes which can be provoked by the weakness or rapid changes of the highest officials due to natural causes (death or illness) or political violence (coup d'etat, revolutions, etc.).
Contradictions between states still exist in the Central Asian region. First of all, there is rivalry for the water and energy resources. We have in mind tension caused by the plans to build the Rogun hydropower plant in Tajikistan and the Kambaratin hydropower plant in Kyrgyzstan on the trans-border rivers Amudarya and Syrdarya. These projects cause special concern in Uzbekistan, which has already resulted in growing tension between these three Central Asian states, and also problems in Russian-Uzbek relations due to the fact that Russian companies take part in both these projects. Nevertheless, Moscow prefers to agree with all countries of the region on these projects so that the struggle for the imaginable energy sovereignty of some states (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) should not bring harm to other states, primarily Uzbekistan, which is an important economic and strategic partner of Russia in Central Asia.
Secondly, unresolved border disputes become a serious challenge to security in the region. They touch most republics in the region, especially Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, where ethnic overlapping and the absence of generally recognized borders are aggravated by a shortage of land and water resources, which gives these conflicts a pronounced socio-economic tint.
Thirdly, the complex unfinished processes of national construction and the formation of state ideologies going on in Central Asian countries often boil down to territorial claims to neighbors, or
claims to regional leadership, which is a typical case of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
On the whole, the main challenges to security in Central Asia are conditioned by internal socio-economic and political problems. There is no direct connection between the development of states in the region (except Tajikistan) and the domestic processes going on in Afghanistan (struggle for power, interethnic and inter-religious conflicts, etc.). All ethnic groups in Afghanistan are interested in strengthening their positions primarily inside the country, but not outside it, and the local Uzbeks and Tajiks, for example, will hardly look for support from among their kindred people in Central Asia. Likewise, it is difficult to suppose that the Talibs, who are mainly Pashtun nationalists, will spread the zone of their influence on to neighboring Central Asian republics, whose population is alien to them and where they can hardly find understanding and support. The "al Qaeda" cells based in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and other terrorist organizations, including the Uzbek IDU terrorists, present a more real threat to the countries of the region. After the withdrawal of the main military contingents of the international coalition forces from Afghanistan, these groupings may become more active and transfer their destructive influence on to Central Asia.
The combination of potential external challenges from Afghanistan with the really growing internal political risks and a possible merger of the social and religious factors are especially dangerous, when in the conditions of instability and war between different clans, the Islamists receiving fabulous profits from drug trafficking and outside financial support from their brethren in faith become an element of a total disorder and chaos. To oppose such variant of developments the states of the region should have, apart from a strong army and specially trained rapid reaction forces, strategic
answers to internal and external challenges and risks, both collectively evolved and national. It is not clear so far how the existing security structure will be able to correspond to this difficult task, because it is still weak and unfinished.
Two-level Structure of Security
in Central Asia
At the regional level security in Central Asia is ensured by such military-political and military organizations as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which has all Central Asian countries as members (except Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan); affiliated security structures - Collective rapid deployment forces of the Central Asian region and Collective rapid reaction forces; the Shanghai Cooperation Organization SCO). The functions and tasks of these organizations are different.
The CSTO singles out Afghanistan among the problems connected with collective reaction to emergency situation within the zone of its responsibility. It characterizes the situation in that country as unstable and almost completely unpredictable. Taking into consideration the fact that the terrorist activity of the irreconcilable armed opposition is not weakening, moreover, it is even increasing in some districts of the country, there is no progress in the fight against drug production and drug trafficking, the level of corruption is very high, and the national armed forces and law-enforcement agencies are virtually unable to control the situation and ensure the country's security, the Collective Security Council of the CSTO adopted a number of decisions to oppose the growing threats from Afghanistan at its session in Moscow on December 19, 2012. It envisaged, among other things, to take measures in order to diminish the negative influence of extremist and terrorist organizations on the situation in the
CSTO member-states after the withdrawal of the main part of the international coalition forces from Afghanistan in 2014.
The CSTO also intends to use specialized structures of the organization more actively to fulfill the tasks facing it. The collective rapid reaction forces are an important element of the CSTO and they are faced with the task to rebuff military aggression, carry on special operations in the struggle against international terrorism and transnational armed organized criminal activity, drug-trafficking, and also liquidate consequences of emergency situations. The military component of these forces consists of units in constant combat readiness capable for operations in any point of the zone of the CSTO responsibility. At the same time these forces are subordinated to the national commands of their countries.
The SCO, although it is not a military organization or a platform (like the Regional ASEAN forum) on which security problems are regularly discussed, includes the struggle against terrorism, separatism, extremism and drug trafficking in its priorities. Thus, by decision of the Council of the heads of state of the SCO member-countries adopted on June 15, 2011, it endorsed the Antidrug strategy of the SCO member-states for 2011-2016; earlier, on the initiative of China, a three-level mechanism of antidrug cooperation was formed.
Along with Russia and China, all Central Asian countries (except Turkmenistan which has a status of a country invited to the SCO summit meetings, and observer-countries (Afghanistan, India, Iran, Mongolia and Pakistan), and partners on a dialogue (Belarus, Turkey and Sri Lanka) are represented in the SCO. Such potential of the SCO enables it to be a powerful mechanism for solving complex problems of regional security, including those related to the situation in Central Asia and the Afghanistan - Pakistan zone.
The elements of the global level of security are connected with the membership of the states of the region in the UN and OSCE, interaction with NATO and participation in certain programs of this organization. Thus, within the framework of its many-vector foreign policy the Central Asian countries accept the military guarantees of security given them not only by Russia and CSTO, but also by NATO, the latter often becoming a rival of the CSTO and SCO in Central Asia.
In view of the forthcoming completion of the Afghan campaign new opportunities have opened for the United States and NATO to broaden military cooperation with the countries of the region, which includes granting permission to the coalition forces operating in Afghanistan to fly over the territory of Central Asian countries, and leasing their military objects to some of them; including the U.S. military base functioning in the "Manas" airport in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) since 2001, the base of French military units in Dushanbe (Tajikistan), a military airport in the city of Termez (Uzbekistan) used by Germany, and the airport in Chimkent (Kazakhstan) given to France on January 16, 2013, to withdraw troops and equipment from Afghanistan.
National security strategies of Central Asian countries differ. Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, along with elements of military-political cooperation with the United States and NATO, mainly connect their policy in this sphere with participation in the CSTO and the strengthening of their allied ties with Russia. Uzbekistan, which suspended its membership in the CSTO in the summer of 2012, does not refuse from broadening its military cooperation with the United States and NATO; Turkmenistan maintains neutrality in the internal affairs of the region and in the sphere of security, taking no part in regional or global structures responsible for it.
It seems that the regional structures of security in Central Asia may require additional efforts - military-political, diplomatic and economic - to preclude destabilization in the region after 2014. Neither China, nor non-regional political forces (the United States, NATO, the European Union) will assume responsibility for maintaining an acceptable security level there. For the United States, after termination of the war in Afghanistan (or, at least, its participation in it), which is geographically distant from the region, Central Asia will, most probably, lose a considerable part of its military importance, although it may retain, if indirectly, its significance as a place of rivalry with Russia for resources and influence in the region. Definitely, the United States will not be interested in Russia's returning to Afghanistan, all the more so in the strengthening of the Russian military and economic presence in Central Asia. Thus, new realities and opportunities emerging in the region in connection with the Afghan situation will be determined primarily by the position of Russia itself.
Russian Interests in Central Asia
Central Asia retains its priority significance for the Russian Federation, and the geographic factor plays a no small role there: the point is that a greater part of our country's territory lies on the Asian continent, and only one-fifth of it is in Europe. Central Asia is also valuable for Russia in the geopolitical and economic aspect, inasmuch as the region is an important communication bridge leading to South Asia, and a major source of fuel and energy resources. In general, the geopolitical potential of Central Asia can be used by Russia for tackling practical and status tasks as a world and regional power.
An improvement of the situation in Afghanistan by 2014 answers the interests of Russia, inasmuch as it will allow it to exclude any repetition of the scenario of the 1990s, when religious extremists and
separatists acting in the North Caucasus received support from the Afghan-Pakistani source. In this connection the hypothetical "Islamic alternative" for Central Asian countries seems absolutely undesirable to Russia. It is important for our country that the regime in Kabul, which will rule Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the greater part of foreign troops, should neither be Islamist nor puppet pro-American and that Afghanistan should acquire the status of an independent neutral state and its territory should be free from foreign presence. Finally, Russia is interested in stopping drug trafficking going through Central Asia from Afghanistan. It should be admitted that the hopes on cooperation with NATO in the struggle against Afghan drug trafficking are unrealizable. The United States and the North Atlantic Alliance have clearly defined their position on this problem: the struggle against drug production and drug trafficking is not a priority task for then, all the more so since their main efforts at present are concentrated on the maximally safe and smooth withdrawal of the international coalition troops from Afghanistan.
In the light of the above-said, and also in view of the worsening situation in the region, Russia and the military-political structures it patronizes face a difficult task, namely, to step up their efforts to ensure their own security. An agreement with Kyrgyzstan reached in the autumn of 2012 that the Russian military would remain in the country for at least twenty years, and the military base in Kant would receive Russian long-range planes seems quite important. Similar long-term agreement was signed with Tajikistan during an official visit by the Russian President Putin to that country in early October 2012 (a large military base with some seven thousand men and officers is stationed there). Under the agreement the Russian military base will stay in the republic until 2024 with possible prolongation for five-year periods. Besides, the servicemen at the base and their family members are equal
in their status to the administrative personnel of the Russian Embassy. (This is also true of the Russian servicemen at the "Manas" base in Kyrgyzstan).
Undoubtedly, a more significant role in the future could be played by the SCO and its specialized structures for stabilization in Afghanistan. For this purpose Russia will have to develop the organization and bring it to the level of an efficiently functioning international organization working in a multiform format as a mechanism of successful regional interaction.
As to the CSTO, with due account of the Afghan factor, its primary task will be work on the southern borders: improvement of control along the border between Central Asian countries and Afghanistan with a view to putting up barriers to trans-border organized crime and illegal migration; greater coordination of the operation of the special services of the Central Asian countries and Russia; better interaction with the SCO for preventing political threats and risks in Central Asia. Thus, the joint actions of Russia and the Central Asian CSTO member-states can be directed toward creating a new reality, which would allow them to minimize many risks and threats, including those coming from Afghanistan. This is not going to be an "alliance against," but common work of good neighbors against the real threats. This means that CSTO is for Russia not only an important instrument in regional politics, but also an organization aimed primarily at joint work against threats from religious extremism, terrorism and drug trafficking.
Russia could offer the Central Asian countries a strategy of answering internal and external challenges and risks, because it is vitally interested itself in the liquidation of potential in Central Asia, including the Islamist threat. A reasonable alternative could be a profound economic integration initiated by Russia, which would
contribute to the preservation of a secular character of the political systems of the states in the region.
Development of Central Asian States
during Transition Period (up to 2014)
According to a report of the International Monetary Fund, there were positive prospects of economic growth in the region in 2013. On the whole, Central Asia has succeeded so far to avoid major political cataclysms, despite the presence of difficult problems retarding development in every state.
Tajikistan is still the most vulnerable state from the point of view of security, because it has the longest and poorly guarded border with Afghanistan passing though a very difficult mountain terrain. After 2014 a flow of refugees of ethnic Uzbek and Tajik origin from Afghanistan may begin, which will be driven by a civil war, if it starts. Besides, Tajikistan, more than any other country, may suffer from attacks by such radical religious organizations as IDU and "al Qaeda."
To prevent the development of such negative scenario of events the Tajik authorities tried in recent years to strengthen their military-political positions with the help of non-regional forces. For one, to strengthen the country's outside border with Afghanistan they turned to the European Union, especially to its "Border Management Program in Central Asia" (BOMCA). However, due to the fact that the attention of the European countries was turned to the struggle with their own economic and financial crisis, Tajikistan has not received any tangible assistance. Its hopes that international financial institutions (World Bank and International Monetary Fund) will help it cope with the crisis phenomena in its economy and social sphere proved futile. True, the United States and NATO did render certain help to Tajikistan in strengthening its defenses: they created the national center of combat
training, laid out new communications lines and built bridges over the River Pyandzh. Tajikistan did not refuse from western assistance and at the same time developed military cooperation with Russia.
The economy of Kyrgyzstan remains the most open in the region, and this republic (along with Tajikistan) is one of the world's biggest recipients of money transfers from abroad (29 percent of the GDP; in Tajikistan - 47 percent). This money is sent back mainly from Russia. The latter also renders the bulk of economic aid. Thanks to this the political situation in Kyrgyzstan gradually becomes stabilized. Besides, the population is tired of "revolutions," which shattered the country during the past few years, and resulted in a slump in production, inflation, mass migration of people in search for jobs, and politically -in deformation of the state institutions and loss of their prestige.
Kyrgyzstan is distinguished by permanent instability and unresolved problems (especially in the south of the country). Any upheavals, no matter where and when, can trigger off a new political or interethnic conflict. The possible stepping-up of extremist and terrorist movements in the republic can be regarded as a serious challenge to security. This explains the interest of the republican leadership in outside help to rebuff potential threats and challenges. This is why Kyrgyzstan maintains cooperation with the United States and NATO, and also with Russia and CSTO at a sufficiently high level.
In turn, the United States, although it intended to curtail a greater part of its operations in Afghanistan by 2013, does not refuse from keeping its base of Manas in the Kyrgyz capital after 2014.
However, in the autumn of 2012 the Kyrgyz leadership made a certain shift toward greater cooperation with Russia in the military-political sphere. There are plans to turn "Manas" into a joint Kyrgyz-Russian logistics center.
The plans to transform the American base into a civil hub show the country's reorientation to Russian projects in the sphere of security. It is confirmed by the results of the Russian-Kyrgyz summit negotiations in Bishkek on September 20, 2012, when documents were signed on the Russian military presence in the country. The Russian-Kyrgyz agreement fixed the status and conditions of the Russian military base on the territory of Kyrgyzstan which will enter into force on January 29, 2017, and will be valid for 15 years, with possible 5-year prolongation.
The Russian military base will include four objects: a base for underwater weapon tests in Karakol, a center of military communications in Kara-Balt, a radio seismic laboratory in Mailuu-Suu, and an airbase in Kant. Russia has written off a many-million debt of Kyrgyzstan, given a large sum to support its budget, and become a big investor in its energy branch, which shows that Russia has stepped up its foreign-policy activity in Kyrgyzstan.
The political development of such big Central Asian state as Uzbekistan has long demonstrated tendencies to isolationism and reliance on its own resources to ensure its security. However, in recent years this course has been combined with certain expansion of its military cooperation with the United States and some NATO countries. A great role has been played by the fact that Uzbekistan has been assigned the main role in the "Northern distribution network" created for transit of American-NATO cargoes from Afghanistan. The United States regards the territory of Uzbekistan as a convenient platform for creating big transport hubs of regional importance and temporary military bases. It is not accidental that Uzbekistan decided in June 2012 to suspend its membership in CSTO. Among the reasons for taking this step was the hope to receive U.S. guarantees of security after the withdrawal of the international coalition forces from Afghanistan, as
well as the promise to be given a great part of hardware, arms and ammunition shipped from that country.
On August 30, 2012, Uzbekistan's parliament adopted a law prohibiting the deployment of foreign military bases and objects on its territory. There are certain indications that the republican elites will be able to reach consensus on the problem of succession of power and thus avoid serious political upheavals in the future. However, up to 2014 Uzbekistan's leadership will actively develop military-political cooperation with the United States in order to diminish internal threats and block possible efforts to destabilize the domestic political situation from without.
There is a danger that a rather unstable situation concerning succession of power in Uzbekistan, just as in certain neighboring Central Asian states, can be used by the radical Islamist circles. Carrying on anti-government propaganda among the socially active part of the population, primarily young people, they may try to use the existing protest potential to undermine the secular foundations of the state. Realizing this danger and regarding radicalization of Islam as one of the gravest dangers to the country's security, the ruling elite of Uzbekistan is striving to enlist Russia's support.
The President of Turkmenistan G. Berdimuhamedov, reelected on February 12, 2012, for a new term of office, continues to pursue a policy of positive neutrality. It is supported by the UN, its structures, and the leading global payers, which is largely due to their interest in the richest gas potential of the country and its major projects in the energy and transport spheres. One such project is TAPI (Turkmenistan - Afghanistan - Pakistan - India) - a gas pipeline which will be able, if realized, to change the entire geopolitical picture of South and Central Asia.
Turkmenistan is the only country which has not signed agreements with the United States and NATO on transit from Afghanistan. Turkmenistan hopes to keep the previous level of relations with the ruling regime of Afghanistan, irrespective of what forces will come to power there after 2014. All the more so since that country will long depend on Turkmen fuel which is now supplied to its several provinces in the form of petrol and liquefied gas, as well as electric energy. Turkmenistan is also one of the main routes of transit for Afghan cargoes to Europe.
For Kazakhstan, due to its great geographical distance from Afghanistan, the level of threats and risks from a possible civil war there is much lower than in any other Central Asian country. Nevertheless, exacerbation of the situation in Afghanistan and unpredictability of its political future after the withdrawal of the main part of the international coalition forces and transfer of responsibility for maintaining security in the country to the Afghan national forces can have a negative influence on Kazakhstan whose southern districts are closely connected with the rest of Central Asia. Any destabilization in the states of the region bordering on Afghanistan may directly or indirectly touch on the interests of Kazakhstan. In case of a direct military threat on the part of Afghanistan, which is hardly possible, one can suppose that Russia will take part in defending its ally in one form or another.
Kazakhstan, which has been considered an island of stability in Central Asia, has come across problems of ensuring internal security in recent years. On May 17, 2011, a terrorist act was committed in the town of Aktobe. It was followed by acts of terror in Atyrau, Astana, Almaty and Taraz. From January 1 to September 21, 2012, five antiterrorist operations were carried out in the republic. Responsibility for terrorist acts were taken by the previously unknown Islamist grouping
"Soldiers of Caliphate" ("Jund al Khalifah"), which had close ties with "al Qaeda." Islamist attacks have become more frequent after Kazakhstan has established closer ties with Russia, joined the Customs Union, and began to build a Uniform economic area with Moscow.
In the southern districts of Kazakhstan with a big Uzbek population, which is growing due to the constant inflow of illegal labor immigrants from Uzbekistan, there is a threat of radicalization of Islam. Kazakhstan's special services have found traces of the activity of the banned Islamic organization "Khizb-ut Tahrir," and anti-government leaflets have been distributed for quite some time. In other words, Kazakhstan is unable to stay aside from the processes of Islamization, including in the form of religious extremism.
Up to 2012 Kazakhstan took a priority place in the Central Asian strategy of the United States. However, after joining the Customs Union and Eurasian economic area, along with Russia and Belarus, it will interest the United States and NATO primarily as an exporter of fuel and energy resources.
In the event of Uzbekistan's withdrawal from CSTO, the border of Kazakhstan will become its southern boundary, and economic integration within the Customs Union and Eurasian economic area may
be strengthened by a military-political component.
* * *
In view of the fact that Russia and Kazakhstan bear greater responsibility for maintaining stability in the Central Asian region, it is necessary to carry on a profound bilateral dialogue. Its aim is to discuss ways to oppose the destructive global and regional tendencies, strengthen the existing security structures, and turn them into effectively working mechanisms.
Evidently, such strategy can hardly be evolved and carried on by the Central Asian countries without Russia, which is fully aware of its responsibility and is ready to use various instruments for the purpose -the CSTO, the Customs Union, the Unified economic area, and the Eurasian Alliance.
" Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta.
Mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya i mirovaya politika," Series 25, Moscow, 2013, No 2, pp. 105-123.
