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point of view on young people, but in understanding the need for a change in the way of thinking and developing positive interests in our society's life. Analyzing the place and role of the North Caucasian region in world politics and in the political strategy of Russia, it should be regarded as a single whole, irrespective of internal administrative, ethno-national or other boundaries dividing it. Such approach is objectively determined by the presence of close many-century economic, political, cultural, and other ties, similar historical destinies, forms and standards of behavior, and features of mentality. The North Caucasus is an inalienable part of Russian statehood not only strategically and geopolitically, but also in terms of mutual cultural penetration and the development of good-neighborly relations between peoples. In the process of the struggle against terrorism and the growing radicalization of the population of Dagestan, which is now the main political and administrative problem in this part of the Russian Federation, it is necessary to take into account the world experience in fighting extremism and terrorism and also use the enormous resource potential accumulated over the centuries of peaceful coexistence of our peoples within the single uniform state.
"Kaspiisky region: Politika, ekonomika, kultura, " Astrakhan, 2012, No 2, pp. 307-311.
Arkadi Dubnov,
Observer ("Moskovskie Novosti") TASHKENT GOES, PROBLEMS STAY
The decision of Uzbekistan to suspend membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) gave occasion for another round of discussion on efficiency of this structure. Evidently, it is high time to gain an understanding of the situation of the post-Soviet
space for the third decade after disintegration of the Union State. Apart of accumulated geo-political problems, much is connected with personal relations among leaders of the countries emerged on the territory of the former USSR.
A year ago in time of the official photo session of the participants of the jubilee summit of the Shanghai Organization of Cooperation in Astana the president of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov changed his place for the place of the president of Kyrgyzstan Rosa Otunbayeva only to avoid being close to the Tajik colleague Emomali Rakhmon. Karimov did not come to the CIS summit in Dushanbe in September 2011, timed to the 20th anniversary of the Community, having ignored a month beforehand the informal summit of CSTO in Astana. Aleksandr Lukashenko, who was the chairman at that time of the Organization, felt more insulted than the host of the meeting Nursultan Nazarbayev. He burst into tirade against Tashkent saying that it is high time to exclude the countries, which do not wish to cooperate fully within the framework of the treaty. The last accident occurred in December at the official summit of CSTO in Moscow. Karimov responded with emotion to the reproaches of Lukashenko and Nazarbayev that he was at variance with almost all partners.
The return to the Kremlin of Vladimir Putin seemed that Islam Karimov had a chance to restore confidential relations at least with Russia to some extent lost for the years of Dmitri Medvedev's presidency. At any rate, such supposition became quite probable following the glorification of Putin on the part of the Uzbek leader during their meeting in Moscow a week after inauguration of the Russian president. "Putin is just the man, who may be the companion for a reconnaissance ", Karimov said and recalled his appeal to Putin in 2008 to take part in elections in 2008 for the third term, despite the constitutional limitation. Islam Karimov put his signature to support the
common declaration for commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the Treaty for Collective Security and the 10th anniversary of creation of the Organization. In this document the presidents re-affirmed their "adherence to aims and principles of the Treaty of Collective Security, their readiness further to develop and consolidate the multilateral union relations".
However, two weeks later at the summit of ShOS in Beijing the significant discords again emerged between Uzbekistan and its partners in CSTO, which are members of ShOS (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan). In this case the occasion was the concession for Afghanistan of the status of observer at the Shanghai organization. For the last years, Tashkent expressed its particular point of view and insisted on the bilateral relations with Kabul striving to avoid its active involvement in the orbit of ShOS. Probably, the Uzbek leadership having never felt a sympathy for the Afghan president Hamid Karzai does not favor consolidation of its position owing to closer relations of Kabul with Moscow and, mainly, with Beijing.
Karimov did not venture to veto this decision but mildly shared his dissatisfaction with it. A week further Tashkent informed the Secretariat of CSTO on suspension of its membership. Two weeks later the public declaration was made on this matter.
In Moscow some high officials considered it as a slap in the face, since the ink had hardly dried of Karimov's signature of the Moscow declaration, where he confirmed his loyalty to the allied relations. Russian diplomats preferred to keep silence: the situation is subject to study. There is no legal norm in the statute documents providing for the unilateral suspension of membership in CSTO. Adilbek Jaksybekov, the minister of defense Of Kazakhstan reminded that according to the order of suspension of participation of a member-state in activities of CSTO organs or its exclusion from the Organization, adopted in Astana
on 18 June 2004, the request of the Uzbek party would be discussed at the session of the Council of collective security in Moscow in December 2012. The decision shall be adopted by consensus.
Some analytics talked about the inevitable disintegration of CSTO as a result of withdrawal of Uzbekistan. Most likely, for the nearest future it will not occur, as the Community of Independent States did not disintegrate. Both structures are rather the images than the actually functioning organizations, and each of them in its way for a certain time will demonstrate the attempts made by Moscow to keep the post-Soviet space within the framework of a historic, mental and economic community. According to a Russian official in charge of relations with the near abroad, there is no alternative to CSTO for consolidation of CIS states round Russia. The countries, which do not want to have anything common with Moscow, will break, like Georgia, institutional ties with CIS and Moscow. Tbilisi defined the possibilities of the principally another format of relations with Russia of a former Soviet outlying region, but, despite radical political discord, economic life of Georgia as usual depends very much on its northern neighbor.
The Georgian way will hardly be acceptable for Uzbekistan. It is worth recalling the fact that several million Uzbek labor migrants earn for the living in Russia and transfer not less than $ 4 billion ($ 4.9 billion in 2011) to their households. When in 2011, in time of conflict due to arrest of the Russian airplane and its crew in Tajikistan, Moscow let understand that it would start deportation of Tajik labor migrants from Russia, and Dushanbe went back on its word soon.
V. Putin tried to muffle the scandalous repercussions of the demarche made by Tashkent. In beginning of August speaking in Ulyanovsk with the servicemen of the brigade of VDV paratroopers-members of the emergency forces of CSTO, he qualified it as an "important organization". V. Putin said that this organization was the
definite guarantor of Russian reciprocal action with partners and allies primarily in the so called post-Soviet space, the mechanism to be efficiently and quickly used in case of emergence of threats, particularly external threats. The accuracy of the formulation used by V. Putin - "definite guarantor" - is a significant detail. Up to present, the reciprocal action within the framework of CSTO was evident only in the course of numerous military maneuvers with participation of Russian detachments. However, it would be difficult to recall of participation in them of Uzbek and more so of Tajik servicemen.
Long ago the open animosity between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan became the talk of town, while formal allied relations of two countries cause painful smiles on both sides of the Uzbek-Tajik boundary. It is difficult to imagine a greater discredit of CSTO itself than dozens of mined parts of this boundary. Recently, Dushanbe officially for the first time recalled "a clumsy assistance of the good neighbor", when due to it Tajikistan allegedly turned out to be the sole Soviet republic, which after disintegration of the USSR was unable to nationalize its militarytechnical objects. As was asserted in the computerized data of the Tajik embassy in Moscow, for the beginning of the 1990s this fact augmented the forces of radical Islamists, which started civil war in Tajikistan. But construction of Rogun hydroelectric station in Tajikistan remains the deepest clinch, which worsens relations between Tashkent and Dushanbe. The Uzbek leadership regards it as a threat to its national security, while the Tajik opposite party, on the contrary, considers counteraction of Tashkent to construction of the hydroelectric station as an external threat to sovereignty of Tajikistan.
The same situation exists also on the border between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, where recently an armed incident took place and the border guards of both sides became its victims. The catastrophic level of distrust and inter-ethnic animosity between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz
aggravated as a result of bloody events in June 2010 in the south of Kyrgyzstan demonstrated the extraordinary vulnerability of the collective security system in Central Asia. Actually, it demonstrated its lack.
Not a very friendly atmosphere exists on the boundary between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. In July 2011, the Uzbek border guards for almost two weeks did not inform about 12 Kazakh alpinists, including teenagers, detained in the mountain region in Tyan-Shan. In June of this year the Uzbek authorities refused to go through its territory to Tajikistan a group of servicemen and military equipment of Kazakhstan to take part in military trainings of ShOS "Peaceful Mission - 2012". Uzbekistan as a member of ShOS did not participate in this venture.
The mentioned facts describe cooperation of Uzbekistan with three member-states of CSTO. Is it possible to expect a reliable and confidential reciprocal action of the forceful structures of four Central Asian member-states of CSTO in case of emergence of external threats? It is a rhetoric question. Instead of the reply it is possible to recall the invitation to Dushanbe last year of a platoon of the Iranian army to take part in commemoration of the 20th anniversary of Tajikistan. Minister of defense Sherali Khairullayev proudly declared at that time about probable arrival in two hours of Iranian brothers in case of need to render assistance to Tajikistan. But due to lack of coordination Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan did not allow delivery of "brothers" via their air space. Americans rendered assistance and ensured the flight of Iranian servicemen through the Afghan air space. It is a rare case of the U.S.A. assistance rendered to Tehran.
In 2006 the author of this text was an eye-witness of the meeting in Sochi of V. Putin and I. Karimov, and after this meting the president of Uzbekistan declared that the country will return to CSTO. This event was expected. In this way Tashkent thanked Moscow for the support of
the forceful suppression of disturbances in Andijan in May 2005, which resulted in a deep isolation of the Uzbek leadership in the world. One of the high Russian officials noted with bitterness that together with Uzbekistan we would obligatory "drag in CSTO" all its problems in relations with its neighbors. It occurred like that, although Uzbekistan finally did not enter CSTO. Tashkent did not ratify about 15 agreements and protocols concluded within the framework of the Organization.
Nobody would really rely on the readiness of the Uzbek leadership to cooperate closely with allies in CSTO, given the fact that Tashkent had been drawn by force to the Organization. And not a real sensation became the declassified by Wikileaks dispatches of American diplomats with information that in 2009 Islam Karimov in talks with W. Berns, First Deputy State Secretary of the U.S.A. accused Moscow of imperial ambitions and the urge towards creation of "anti-NATO" for the sake of domination in the post-Soviet space. It is even strange that only three years afterwards the Uzbek president decided to get rid of ambiguity of his position among the partners in CSTO.
According to article 3 of CSTO, its aim, in particular, is the protection on the collective basis of independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the member-states. Probably, the step taken by Tashkent may honestly give the reply to the question whether there exist at present the conditions for collective actions for ensuring security in the part of the post-Soviet space, which is still ready to regard Russia as a main guarantor. And on the whole, how to interpret the notion security for the member-states of CSTO?
In 2011, N. Bordyuja, General Secretary of CSTO held a round-table of experts and political analysts and proposed to arrange the brainstorm for the search of new ideas to perfect activities of the Organization. The attempt to find out an ideology, which would unite
its member-states on the basis of imitation of liberal values of western democracy for the member-states of NATO, resulted in embarrassing position. They found out with difficulty one such value - stability. This stability is comprehended in the West to be the conservation of the authoritarian regimes, and CSTO was created just to insure it, mentioned T. Parkhalina, the director of the center for European security of the ISISC of the RAS. And nobody questioned the obvious fact: the main threats of instability are just within each of the states and not outside them.
Can in such situation CSTO be useful, since article 5 of its statute prescribes non-interference in the affairs within national jurisdiction of member-states? For the last years, the answer to this question had to be given. The above mentioned Osh events in Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 and the short-term military operation of Tajik government forces in the Mountain-Badahshan autonomous region in July 2012 should be cited. CSTO did not interfere in both events although in June 2010 the question was discussed, since R. Otunbayeva, the head of the provisional government asked for the help. The General Secretary of CSTO N. Bordyuja had to admit that the mechanisms of reaction to the inter-ethnic clashes, like in the south of Kyrgyzstan, did not exist. The working game was arranged to elaborate such mechanisms, and it revealed many practical problems, delicately noted Bordyuja.
In this case these problems were conditioned by the definite veto expressed by the leadership of Uzbekistan relating to interference of CSTO in the Osh events. Tashkent objected to appearance near the Borders of Uzbekistan of Russian servicemen, but just they might compose the main part of peacemaking forces.
It may be mentioned that the position of Uzbekistan was not caused by conjuncture's considerations, but it was quite consecutive.
In 1999, one of the reasons of refusal expressed by Tashkent to sign the protocol on prolongation of its participation in the system of the Treaty of Collective Security were the planned intensions of Moscow to create in Tajikistan a military base with participation of the N 201 motorized infantry division located since the Soviet time there. (At present, they call it the first exit of Uzbekistan from CSTO, although it became an international organization only in 2002.) At that time I. Karimov sincerely told the author about his claims to the Russian leadership and mentioned a propos his dissatisfaction with large deliveries of Russian arms to Armenia (the Uzbek leader did not keep silent his solidarity with Azerbaijan) and his dissent with striving of Russia to keep its military presence in the Trans-Dnestr territory.
The refusal of Tashkent to let forces of CSTO put out the Osh "fire" in 2010 may give evidence of the main and most painful problem, which prevents confidential military cooperation within the framework of the Organization. The authoritarian ruling regimes in countries of Central Asia are not sure that Moscow sending its commandos to render assistance to them will not simultaneously give the opposite orders. One should see the degree of anti-Russian phobia among many representatives of national elites in this region. The fear of allegedly prepared Russian conspiracies is a significant factor of the political atmosphere of these countries.
CSTO did not interfere also in the situation in Tajikistan, when in the end of July of this year the expedition of the government's detachment of three thousand servicemen made an attempt to liquidate an armed group of opposition located in the Mountain-Badakhshan region. According to N. Bordyuja, this action concerns the internal life of Tajikistan and does not demand interference of collective forces, and the law enforcement structures of Tajikistan are able to solve self-dependently the problems in Mountain-Badakhshtan region.
Bordyuja said it in response to declaration of A. Lukashenko that Tajikistan was a member of the Organization and the appeal of the president should be taken into account. But actually, E. Rakhmon did not ask for assistance. The request could not be made because the Russian ally was under suspicion of Dushanbe. As characteristic evidence of it became the rumors which were afloat that, according to "informed sources", an attempt was being prepared upon the life of the president of Tajikistan in the course of his trip to the Mountain-Badakhshan region for the festivities related to the 80th anniversary of foundation of the autonomous region in the end of August. According to these "sources", "Uzbek or Russian traces" were seen in the arrangement of the probable attempt.
It is difficult not agreeing with A. Arbatov, the head of the Center for International Security of the RAS, who said in his interview to "New Izvestia" that CSTO as a military union did not exist and rather signifies the presence of military relations between Russia and other members of CSTO. He stressed that the Organization lacked the main feature, which made it a military union: the common perception of external threats and rules, which determine the military interference in case of internal and trans-border threats. According to Arbatov, CSTO does not resemble a military-political union, although it claims to be such union. The political analyst alluded to the lack of political support of the actions of Russia in the course of the August war in the Caucasus in 2008 by the allies of CSTO. Up to present, none of them recognized independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
And what is more, the August war threatened fairly some capitals of CIS. Their ruling elites felt the resoluteness of Moscow to realize its interests in the post-Soviet space by forceful means. For instance, the leadership of Turkmenistan, which possesses the neutral status and is not a member of CSTO, arranged in the western region of the country,
in the Caspian region the extraordinary exercises. It is quite possible to suppose that it was the demonstration of readiness to take responsive measures, if Moscow would take forceful actions relating to Turkmenistan. A number of economic and humanitarian problems, which complicate Russian-Turkmen relations, are well known, and the attitude of the Russian leadership to them could make Ashghabad become nervous once more.
It seems that suspicion dominates relations among neighbors in "communal apartment" of the former USSR. The disintegration of the Soviet power has not terminated at any rate at the mental level, and the divorce proceedings are going on, although CIS was created just for this sake. At the same time they suspect not only of Moscow, and others are under suspicion of Moscow. The initially declared by Tashkent exit from CSTO raised the certitude of the Russian expert community and the political elite in the intention of Tashkent to remove obstacles for return to the country of the U.S.A. military base, which was ousted from the country in 2005 in response to denouncement by Washington of suppression of disturbances in Andijan. The withdrawal of the allied military contingent from Afghanistan by 2014, the intention of the United States to keep a great part of military equipment in bordering with Afghanistan countries of Central Asia, first of all, in Uzbekistan, provided every reason to make this conclusion.
Having understood it, president Karimov known for political pragmatism (which was qualified by his many partners at best "double-dealing") decided to play ahead of schedule trying to refute such reproaches. In the beginning of August a project of the conception of foreign policy activities of Uzbekistan was submitted by him to the parliament for its approval. For the first time in the period of more than twenty years this document raised to the level of law the principles of
foreign policy. Having read this law one can see the reason of this action only this time.
The essence of the conception is a theoretical foundation of the exit of Uzbekistan (the final exit, according to Tashkent) out of CSTO. I. Karimov formulated the principles of state neutrality, which his country should confine itself to. However, for some case, probably, this term was omitted in the text, which is as follows: Uzbekistan does not takes part in military-political blocks, has the right for exit from any inter-state formation in case of its transformation in a military-political block, does not provides its territory for location of foreign military bases and objects, takes political, economic and other measures to prevent its involvement in military conflicts and hotbeds of tension in adjacent countries.
Thus, there will be no military bases in Uzbekistan. But it is evident that the law is not retroactive, otherwise what would be done relating to the base of German air-force located in Termez near the Afghanistan border. It had been given initially a less defiant status. In case of need nothing will hinder to do the same relating to any military infrastructure for use of foreigners. The same permanent and mutually satisfying device was resorted since 2009 concerning former military base "Manas" in Kyrgyzstan, called now the international center of Transit Transportation. After its exit from CSTO, Tashkent will not be obliged to coordinate its actions with "sworn allies" like Tajikistan.
The following provisions of the conception are very significant from the point of view of Tashkent: Uzbekistan takes political, economic and other measures for averting its involvement in military conflicts and breeding grounds in adjacent states...the problems of Central Asia should be solved by the states of the region without interference of external forces. integration should not be imposed from outside, it is unacceptable if it infringes upon freedom,
independent and territorial integrity of the country or is dictated by ideological obligations.
Each of these points may easily be illustrated by specific situations, which have taken place in the region and have been grounds for expression of "special opinion" of Uzbekistan actually in each discussion at the summits of CSTO and CIS. One may read here appropriate references to various initiatives of Moscow (integration should not be imposed from outside) and to the opportunity of participation of Russian military forces, including the forces within CSTO, in regional conflicts (problems of Central Asia should be solved without interference of external forces).
At the same time, the system of views of the head of the Uzbek state relating to the place of the country in the world expressed in the form of conception and adopted by legislation is also the non-codified message to Moscow: "If we are not with you, it does not mean that we are against you". Karimov gave a kind of reply: what for do we need CSTO, let us be on friendly terms and cooperate directly.
The way the question is put reveals the unhealthy problem of relations among member-countries, and if one takes into account that they, with little exception, are the states with authoritarian regimes, it shows the problematic type of relations among the leaders. If the highest echelon of the president of Uzbekistan is excluded from this system of communications, probably, it will increase sustainability of the structure of CSTO. However, there is a "but": unlike other countries of the Central Asian region, where public discussion on expediency of membership in CSTO is going on, no news on similar discussion in Uzbekistan does exist. It is impossible to make a prognosis about the prevailing position on this question following the approaching change of the ruling elites in Tashkent.
On the other part, the present Uzbek demarche forces to deliberate about a much more general question - the artificial feature of the whole structure of military-political security concentrated round Russia. In essence CSTO at present represents a mechanical connection of three systems of security, each of them based on Russian participation: Central Asian, Southern and Western. Russian military base N 102 in Armenia is a self-evident guarantor of stability in the South Caucasus. But soldiers of Christian Armenia will never turn out to be within the services of CSTO taking part in any forceful actions in Central Asia populated primarily by Muslims. And, vice versa, even in the most audacious suppositions one may imagine that a Kazakh or Kyrgyz special service would be sent to render assistance to Armenians in the Karabakh battle-front to fight against co-religionists from Azerbaijan.
Exactly as well it is very difficult to imagine that fighters from Belarus would take part in military operations in the Caucasus or Central Asia despite agitated reaction of A. Lukashenko to events in these fronts of long distance. The president of Belarus is concerned more about the need to work out the joint peacemaking activities in format United Nations-CSTO, initiated by him last year, when he was the Chairman of CSTO. In its turn, the Central Asian and Armenian allies of Minsk in CSTO have not become uneasy because of discovered holes in the sky protected by Belarus air-defense in the western boundaries of the Organization as a result of the flight of a Swedish light aircraft, which penetrated into the territory of collective security and threw about toys-plush bears. From their point of view, this was the problem of Moscow, which has the common air defense with Minsk and not CSTO.
The ending of the prolonged parting of Tashkent with CSTO poses more acutely the question of autonomous functioning of each of
three composing organizations. This problem is the most urgent for Central Asia: the time is quite short before the exit of NATO contingent from Afghanistan, and it is high time for the staff officers of the allied countries to work out finally the plans of specific actions in case of escalation of tension in the region. The Uzbek Fronde will not hinder them any more, and one may express thanks to Tashkent for it. But if they fail in talks and if the agreement is not be concluded, it will not be possible to make Uzbekistan answer for it.
"Rossiya v globalnoi politike", M, 2012, t. 10, N 4, pp. 70-80.
E. Denisov,
Political analyst
CENTRAL ASIA AS A REGION OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan) on the eve of XXI century attracted greater attention of the world economic and political centers. The summit of five states of the region, held in Tashkent in January 1993, introduced the term "Central Asia" in political usage. Beforehand, this territory was named "Middle Asia and Kazakhstan" in national publications. However, from the point of view of the geographic science, Central Asia is a bigger region, which besides Middle Asia and Kazakhstan includes also Mongolia and the western part of China; UNESCO holds this point of view. As the members of the Central Asian-Caspian region it is possible to regard also Azerbaijan and bordering territories of Russia near Kazakhstan - from Astrakhan region in the west and up to Altai krai in the east This trend is conditioned as follows: by the rising competition among big regional and global powers striving for getting
