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In these conditions the possibility of creating an alliance of Central Asian states seems rather problematic. Nevertheless, integration is possible, even necessary. It could be hoped that the removal of all customs barriers within the framework of the tripartite alliance -Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus might serve as an effective impetus for other Central Asian states. The meeting of the heads of government of the eight CIS members in St. Petersburg in November 2011 worked out their integration plans. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine held their own views on the principal questions and did not sign certain documents.
It can be forecast that if closer economic cooperation with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan is not established, serious practical steps should be taken for the reliable presence of Russia in the region.
With the present alignment of forces and the present leaders of these countries it would be difficult to imagine the possibility of mutual concessions, and consequently, there are hardly any prospects for the creation of a firm alliance of Central Asian states on the basis of active integration processes.
"Rossiya i mirovoi politichesky protsess", Moscow, 2012, pp. 66-71.
Valentin Bogatyrev,
Coordinator at the analytical consortium "Perspektiva" (Bishkek) THE LEAST OF ALL EVILS
Despite ten years of Kyrgyzstan's membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the country still has little experience of relations with it. If not for regular meetings of officials
and certain technical and personnel assistance (its volume cannot be compared with the aid rendered by NATO countries), the ties with CSTO are distinguished by two main aspects.
Not Relations with Russia,
but Attitude to Russia
One of the aspects is connected with the Russian airbase in the town of Kant, some twenty kilometers from Bishkek. It appeared in 2003 as a simple answer to the setting up of a base of the anti-terror collation in the "Manas" airport. Whereas the need for the latter was quite concrete, namely, transporting forces and cargoes, and refueling the aircraft operating in Afghanistan, the Russian base was created as an aviation component of the Central Asian grouping of the CSTO forces. However, several Russian airplanes which have landed in Kant do not allow us to talk of the presence of any regional aviation group. It was clear to all that the Russian airbase was set up in reply to the creation of the base of the anti-terror coalition. By that time there have been no Russian men and officers on the territory of Kyrgyzstan, except a couple of objects of the Russian defense infrastructure, and Manas became a good pretext for returning to the country.
The Kyrgyz national security concept, which was pursued by the then President of the republic Askar Akayev was oriented to a many-vector character and "umbrella cover" of ensuring security, and it allowed the country to have several bases of different military blocs on its territory. By that time Kyrgyzstan was not only a member of CSTO, but it also actively interacted with NATO within the framework of the "Partnership for Peace" program. Moreover, there were many supporters of closer interaction with and even entry in NATO. For one, this idea was actively advocated by the outstanding Kyrgyz writer Chinghiz Aitmatov who was the republic's Ambassador to the Benelux
countries at the time. These views could be explained not only by American and European assistance in the strengthening of the country's defense potential, but also by Moscow's neglect with regard to the former Soviet republic during the first post-Soviet decade. Orientation to rapprochement with the West obviously dominated at the time. This was why the decision to agree on the deployment of the Russian base in Kant as a component of the Central Asian grouping of the CSTO forces was adopted by Bishkek due to its orientation to a many-vector policy.
Another aspect is more important. During its membership in CSTO Kyrgyzstan has asked for assistance only once. It was in June 2010 when the interethnic conflict in the south of the republic carried away hundreds of lives every day. The answer to the plea of the head of the provisional government of Kyrgyzstan Rosa Otunbayeva given by the then President of Russia D. Medvedev at the Tashkent summit of SCO, some 300 kilometers from the place of the tragedy, boiled down to outright refusal, because, as he pointed out, such actions were not envisaged either by the Charter of the organization or any other agreements.
Today the General Secretary of CSTO Nikolai Bordyuzha says that the organization actively participated in neutralizing the conflict. However, people in Kyrgyzstan remember quite well that it took a very long time just to make a list of what should and could be done by CSTO and the first aid to arrive to the country. Besides, all of it arrived long after the conflict was put down by Bishkek itself. These events have confirmed the views of the Kyrgyz authorities and public that they cannot expect any assistance from CSTO, and that the organization is unable to ensure the country's security.
There are two reasons why Kyrgyzstan remains in the organization. The first is that any other force is even less trustworthy. Due to a number of reasons Kyrgyzstan's relations with its neighbors
can hardly be called friendly or secure. Not to speak of Uzbekistan, the border with which is practically closed, and relations with which are on the brink of a conflict. Even Kazakhstan with which the then president Bakiyev signed a treaty on alliance constantly undertakes actions spoiling the atmosphere between the two countries. The border question with Tajikistan and the use of border pasture lands and water reserves also aggravate bilateral relations between the two neighbors. However, Kyrgyz-Chinese relations are the most stable and secure. But the age-old stereotypes do not allow Kyrgyzstan to regard its great neighbor as a guarantor of security. Despite the constantly proclaimed and pursued policy of non-interference and respect of Kyrgyzstan's sovereignty, the fear of a threat emanating from China is constantly present. And there can hardly be any official or army officer in Kyrgyzstan who could rely on Beijing in terms of ensuring military security. Although the assistance from the great neighbor, including one for strengthening Kyrgyzstan's defense potential, is gladly accepted.
There are many more people who believe that the country's security can be better ensured by NATO. Several political parties hold similar views, and should they come to power, many changes would have been possible. The attitude to the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the need to participate in it is rather cool, especially among young people, who have received education in Turkey, Europe or the United States. However, along with an improvement and expansion of Kyrgyz-Russian relations the number of supporters of proWestern orientation decreases. All the more so since the negative attitude to the United States and NATO is actively promoted by the Islamic circles. There is a widespread opinion about the danger for the country stemming from the existence of the American base on its territory which may well be a target of possible attacks by Islamists.
But the main force keeping Kyrgyzstan within CSTO is not so much its relations with Russia as its attitude to Russia. Despite the almost total oblivion by Moscow during the first post-Soviet decade and the sobering pragmatism of the present Russian leadership, the overwhelming part of the country's population has very warm feelings for Russia. True, there are few people who would wish the presence of the Russian military personnel, just as any other foreign military personnel, for that matter, in the country, but everybody realizes that it is the Russian army which will be the first to come to defend Kyrgyzstan if need be. This circumstance is the key reason why Kyrgyzstan is still a member of CSTO.
Not to Scare, but Help
We should not accept the stereotype that the withdrawal of the coalition forces from Afghanistan would lead to serious negative consequences for Central Asia.
First, nobody talks of the complete withdrawal, and there will be enough resources and mechanisms from the outside to control the situation in Afghanistan even if state power changes there. American experts and diplomats do not conceal the fact that participation in the Afghan affairs will continue for an indefinite period, although in different forms.
Secondly, the subject of the export of Islamic terrorism will no longer be the determining one for the Central Asian countries, but the problem of control over the northern territories, including the one of their status. This is not only an internal Afghan problem, but a problem of the relations of Central Asian states between themselves. We see that the situation in Afghanistan engenders serious, even dangerous consequences outside its territory, including in Central Asia.
We do not wish to discuss ghost stories actively circulated in the Russian mass media and quasi-expert community concerning American intentions to destabilize the situation in Central Asia as one of the reasons for staying in the region and not allowing Russia to be there. There are more weighty grounds and reasons to believe that the United States will agree with China on this score, which does not wish destabilization in Central Asia. Russia is not a welcome guest in Central Asia for the United States and this is why the latter may delegate regional leadership to Beijing.
Lastly, there is a well-founded suspicion that certain experts and analysts, by intimidating the public with post-Afghan consequences, are trying to conceal other purposes, which are closer geographically to Russia. We mean military-political control over Central Asia at the geopolitical level, and also as a means to gain competitive advantages in access to natural and other resources.
In any case, new realities and possibilities for CSTO arising in connection with the forthcoming withdrawal of the forces of the antiterrorist coalition from Afghanistan, and also the position of Uzbekistan which suspended its membership in CSTO, will be determined by the position and actions of the organization itself, and above all, of Moscow.
Progress in the questions of the existence of the Russian military base and Russian participation in the development of the energy potential of Kyrgyzstan, and writing-off its state debt, changes Kyrgyzstan's attitude to CSTO and creates prospects for its participation in the work of this military-political organization at a new level. Few people understood why the country needs the Russian military base on its territory with almost complete absence of Russian investments in the country and its stubborn unwillingness to write off Kyrgyzstan's debt to Russia, paltry yet very heavy for the country as it
is. Hence, the reaction of the Kyrgyz side - its attempts to raise the cost for the deployment of the base, demands for compensation for conflicts with representatives of the Russian special forces, and some other recent actions of Bishkek. Now there is a sort of comeback of Russian friendly relations with Kyrgyzstan.
The decision of the Russian leadership to transfer arms, hardware and equipment to Kyrgyzstan worth of $1.1 billion is a step in this direction. Its army really needs to be rearmed. Everything made in this sphere up to now was due to NATO. Large deliveries of Russian arms and military equipment to Kyrgyzstan will make the country's army almost entirely dependent on Russia. Besides, it will entail the need to train Kyrgyz military officers only with the help of Russia. Thus, CSTO will have an indisputable advantage in the competition of military standards inasmuch as it mainly works in the Russian format.
Will this choice be attractive for Bishkek, will it receive from Russia second-grade stuff what Russia itself does not need any longer -these questions are to be answered some time later.
"Rossiya v globalnoi politike", Moscow, Vol. 10, No 6, November-December, 2012.
Ekaterina Borisova,
Sergei Panarin,
Scholars of Oriental Studies
(Institute for Oriental Studies RAS)
SECURITY CONTRADICTIONS ON THE EXAMPLE
OF WATER AND ENERGY PROBLEMS
OF CENTRAL ASIA
Water and energy produced by the fuel-and-energy complex (an important branch of the economy of any country) are a life-giving force
