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L. Khoperskaya,
D. Sc. (Political sciences), Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan EURASIAN INTEGRATION PROJECT: POSITION OF CENTRAL ASIAN ELITES
In the article by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin entitled "New Integration Project for Eurasia - the Future Born Today" it is said, among other things, that along with the strengthening of the integration project itself the number of participants in the Customs Union and European economic partnership will be growing.1 For example, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan will join this open project.
The Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus has been functioning since July 1, 2010. The further development of integration, its rates and forms are directly connected with the position of the political and intellectual elites of the states involved.
The economic and political effectiveness of integration processes in the post-Soviet area is reflected in many political and analytical documents. At the same time the risks involved due to the inevitable change of the elites in Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, as well as in the potential participants in the Eurasian project - Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and also political instability in all states participating in the Customs Union and their borders practically open for all and sundry terrorists and religious extremists are the subjects thoroughly investigated by their authorities.
The pros and contras of Eurasian integration are viewed within the framework of arguments submitted mainly by Russian politicians, economists and experts. But discussions of acceptable and advantageous integration models are going on quite actively in other post-Soviet countries.
First of all let us dwell on definitions and comparisons used by representatives of the political, administrative and intellectual elites and
the mass media of Central Asian countries in analyzing the integration initiatives of Russia: aggressive integration, integration as businesstakeover, integration as return to the imperial essence of the Russian state, integration as corporate raiding on the part of Russia, integration as a one-way road, friendly intervention, etc.
S. Mambetalin, an expert from Kazakhstan, explains his view of the Eurasian project: "Having set up the Customs Union and the Eurasian Alliance, Russia will be able to dictate its conditions to the satellite-countries - Belarus and Kazakhstan - in order to be free from a possible anti-Russian policy of the future elites in these countries... Integration for the Russian Federation is business takeover, insurance against future political risks and return to the imperial essence of the Russian state. As a long-term perspective Russia would like to colonize its neighbors and enlarge the zone of its influence."2 Expert E. Abdullayev from Uzbekistan believes that "cooperation with Russia should not be interpreted in terms of integration. There will be no former union or an analogue of the European Union in the postSoviet area in the near future.3
Experts V. Paramonov and A. Strokov, also from Uzbekistan, gave their own, rather interesting view: "The main institutions of integration in the post-Soviet area - EurAsEC and CSTO face the prospect of becoming sort of legal successors of the CIS to ensure the final stage of the 'civilized divorce,' and also actors in the death of integration in the post-Soviet area. In turn, the SCO will, most likely, play the role of one of the instruments to promote China's interests in Central Asia and Russia. China should be especially interested in a monopoly access to the region."4
In Kyrgyzstan there are both supporters and opponents of the Eurasian project. For instance, Assistant professor of the Kyrgyz-Russian Slav University M. Suyunbayev believes that "Kyrgyzstan well
realizes the importance of the integration project at least because about one million of labor migrants from this republic work in Russia and Kazakhstan. Integration can give Kyrgyzstan such concrete benefits as free movement of commodities and services, lower influence of Chinese expansion, and greater energy security."5
Journalist A. Gladilov emphasizes that for Russia Kyrgyzstan is not only a traditional sphere of influence, but one of the major elements of its own security system, taking into account the transparence of borders, visa-free regime, and simple procedure of getting Russian citizenship by people from Kyrgyzstan. To boot, there are broad economic ties, favorable regime of supplying fuel-and-energy carriers, and hundreds of thousands of guest workers who are freely remitting to Kyrgyzstan millions of dollars earned by them annually.6
Their opponent, the head of the Foundation of economic research A. Beshimov maintains that the Customs Union is "a political product with weak economic argumentation." In his words, "if Kyrgyzstan joining this organization is viewed as another political unit and a possibility of Tajikistan joining it (which has no common borders with the Customs Union member-countries), then the economic component will not be taken into account".7
Kyrgyzstan should observe the general rules of macro-economic regulation, which went into force in the Customs Union in 2013; budget deficit should not exceed three percent of the GDP, state debt -50 percent of the GDP, inflation should not be higher than the lowest index among all countries by five percent.8
Probably, taking into account all these difficulties, the vice premier of the government of Kazakhstan K. Kelimbetov in an interview to the "Interfax-Kazakhstan" News Agency supposed that Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan would not be able to join the Customs Union
so far. They are still at the initial stage of negotiations on entry into the
,,9
organization.
The discussion of the subject of the Customs Union inevitably entails a wider problem of participation of Central Asian countries in integration projects offered by different international actors. It should be noted that there is an objective need for regional integration conditioned by territorial community, closeness of communication lines, basic and leading branches of the economy, and the need for joint exploitation of water and energy objects. During the post-Soviet period Central Asia has turned into a virtual region (there are no economic ties between states, different political systems and opposite foreign-policy vectors have been formed, water and energy conflicts between neighboring countries do not stop, mass outflow of population continues, etc.).
The virtual character of the Central Asian community is also shown by the fact that from 1994 there have been repeated attempts to introduce intraregional integration; a number of functioning integration structures have been formed, namely, the Central Asian Union, Central Asian Economic Community, and finally Central Asian Cooperation Organization, but all of them proved abortive.
In the view of expert H. Inomzhonov, "the main reason for failures in the institutionalization of regional cooperation lay in that the post-Soviet states of Central Asia were unable to integrate interstate institutionalized cooperation in the formation process of their own statehood."10
The struggle for regional leadership between the rulers of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan has become an independent factor preventing the implementation of a coordinated course to integration. "Competition between foreign-policy initiatives and rivalry between the
ruling political circles of these countries also create considerable obstacles in the way to developing regional integration."11
From our point of view, these attempts have proved the unfeasibility of regional Central Asian integration without resorting to a "third force," whose role is played by the Islamic Conference countries, the European Union, the United States, China and Russia. Accordingly, each of them offers its own integration model: the Islamist one offered by the Islamic Conference countries presupposes the complete political Islamization of the region; resource model in which the European Union countries are interested; transit model satisfying the interests of the Asia-Pacific regional countries, above all China; strategic model complying with the interests of the United States; and traditional model based on multilateral historical ties with Russia.
The interests of all these actors in Central Asia are known well enough, but integration preferences of the Central Asian elites require special analysis.
One of the latest non-Russian integration initiatives was the setting up of the Council of cooperation of Turkic-language states in October 2011, a new association, analogue of the "Turkic-language" European Union, which included Azerbaijan, Turkey, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The preamble to the Declaration of the Council declares that "it will develop relations and strengthen solidarity of the Turkic-language states on the basis of common history, the language, original features and culture, and its main aim is to strengthen regional and international cooperation in the Eurasian region on the basis of the solidarity of the Turkic-language states." It should be noted that the "Turkic world (as an alternative to the "Russian world") is defined as a historical and interstate association based on a common language and culture and ideas of blood relation. It is this community that is actively promoted by representatives of anti-Russian elites.
Tajikistan is not related to the Turkic-language countries, but Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan declined to join this association. Why? An answer to this question can be provided on the basis of an analysis of political documents and basic legislative acts determining the most important spheres of international cooperation and permissible limits of the presence of international actors.
In the conditions of competition between integration models the President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov said: "We are fully aware of the fact that along with the further development of globalization integration processes acquire great importance, for they remove border and customs barriers along the way of trade-economic and investments ties of states...But despite the evidence of these processes, they may go beyond the boundaries of the economy and acquire a political tint and essence.Proceeding from these considerations we shall determine our policy toward the formation of and entry of Uzbekistan into intergovernmental associations and alliances."12 It follows from these words that political independence (sovereignty) for Uzbekistan is a priority.
Expert analyst Y. Yusupov, following Uzbekistan's President, states: "Any economic integration is better than its absence. Economic integration gives an opportunity to all participants in it to get additional benefits in the form of increased competition within national economies, in finding its own 'niches' in the international division of labor, and broader sale markets for national producers manufacturing competitive commodities. Russia will only gain from such pragmatic integration with its neighbors. Another question: do all its neighbors need integration precisely with the Russian Federation?"13
What integration model is preferable for Uzbekistan becomes clear from President Karimov's speech at the 48th session of the UN General Assembly. "Uzbekistan can reach a high position in culture,
science, technology and economy by all indices and become an integration center in Central Asia. Our republic could be a springboard for interaction of the OSCE and UN in ensuring regional security and cooperation and preventing conflicts".14
Inasmuch as the regional leader status is one of the top priorities for Uzbekistan, participation in integration associations is regarded by it as a mechanism for reaching its goal.
One thing is clear, namely, that the model of regional integration offered by Russia has caused doubts in Uzbekistan, which resulted in suspension of its activity in the CSTO on June 28, 2012. The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Central and South Asia R. Blake called Uzbekistan the most important partner of the United States in the Afghan operation in the region.
In contrast to Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan does not claim regional leadership and refuses from participation in integration processes, maintaining the status of permanent neutrality which was proclaimed by its first ruler S. Niyazov (Turkmenbashi). The Military doctrine of independent and constantly neutral Turkmenistan adopted under the present rule of G. Berdymukhamedov includes refusal to participate in military blocs and alliances, interstate associations with strict commitments presupposing collective responsibility of participants, refusal from political or any other steps which could lead to war or military conflict, ban on deployment of foreign military bases on its territory, and ban on transportation through its territory of arms or the armed forces of any states to third countries.
In contrast to Turkmenistan, Tajikistan proclaims the principle of active participation in "the coalition of countries waging a struggle against international terrorism and extremism, welcomes collective efforts in the sphere of regional and global security, and recognizes the need, based on international agreements, to cooperate effectively with
other states and international organizations whose task is the fight against terrorism and extremism.
The influence of the situation in Central Asia on the position of Tajikistan is recognized by the Concept of the Republic of Tajikistan on the struggle against terrorism and extremism: it says, among other things, that "at present Central Asia after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. has become a region of the redivision of the spheres of influence. In turn, using the economic and political crisis of this region extremist movements, organized criminal groupings and drug production and trafficking business, have stepped up their activities and are merging with international terrorism and extremism. In mapping out Tajikistan's position on opposing these threats, the Concept notes that the struggle against terrorism and extremism is a component part of ensuring security not only of Tajikistan, but the entire world community. This is why the question of deployment of a U.S. military base on the territory of Tajikistan and the use of Tajik airfields for refueling U.S. military transport planes has repeatedly been examined by the Tajik authorities.15
Kyrgyzstan is a state which legally allows the military presence of a foreign country on its territory (there are military bases of the United States and Russia).
The Concept of national security of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan emphasizes that it is striving for "demonopolization" of foreign-policy priorities, diversification of ties with partners, and equal distance from global political leader-countries. For this purpose Kyrgyzstan pursues a many-vector, balanced and pragmatic foreign policy aimed at forming conditions for the realization of the national development priorities and ensuring national security.
Kyrgyzstan's choice of a many-vector strategy is prompted by calculations to secure a constant replenishment of financial and material
means, mainly at the expense of new credits and grants, privileges and preferences.
It should be noted that in June 2013 Kyrgyzstan's parliament adopted a decision, and its President A. Atambayev signed a Law on denunciation of an agreement with the United States about the Center of transit transportation and its removal from Kyrgyz territory in 2014. However, it can be assumed that the United States will do everything in its power to preserve its military presence in Kyrgyzstan even after the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan.
Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian participant in the Customs Union which is oriented to promotion of its interests in the Central Asian region and in the entire world. In its Strategy of national security it is said that among the important elements of its realization is the republic's participation in such organizations as CIS, SCO and CSTO. Kazakhstan also highly values the long-term and all-round cooperation with the Russian Federation and the development and strengthening of friendly relations with China. At the same time one of the key issues of ensuring Kazakhstan's security is the development of intensive cooperation with the United States in various spheres, notably, military cooperation. In August 2012 the then U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called Kazakhstan "a strategic partner of the United States in a dialogue".16
As is known, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have individually been invited by the United States to participate in the NATO program "Partnership for Peace," which gives the right to take part in NATO military exercises. The United States has also promised to increase the financing of American - Central Asian cooperation in the military sphere annually.
One of the variants of its interpretation of national security is offered in a Statement of the "Foundation for Progress" of Kyrgyzstan.
It says, in part: "We are sure that the presence of foreign military bases and military objects is a form of disguised annexation of a country and undermines its sovereignty." The Foundation calls on President A. Atanbayev of Kyrgyzstan to initiate the elaboration of a New Concept of national security, which will envisage impermissibility of granting the republic's territory for deployment of military bases and military objects of foreign countries. This premise should be included in the new Constitution. After that bilateral political consultations should be started on withdrawal of the U.S. air base and the Russian air base, as well as other military objects from Kyrgyzstan's territory. Without this it would not be possible to talk of ensuring genuine independence of the Kyrgyz Republic.17
It should be noted that Islamic countries are increasing its influence on Kyrgyzstan, primarily through the opening of Islamic centers, public foundations and associations, and construction of mosques and prayer-houses. Turkey is especially active in this respect.
Such organizations as "Suleimania," "Jamaat Tabligi," "Khizb ut-Tahrir," and others continue to bolster up their positions in Kyrgyzstan. They draw to their ranks government officials, employees of the special services and law-enforcement agencies, big businessmen, and parliamentarians. Mention should be made of the distribution of Islamic banking. In 2007 a law was adopted in Kyrgyzstan on bank operations based on the Islamic principles of financing.
A question arises as to why a definite part of the elite community of Central Asian countries insistently opposes the idea of the Eurasian alliance whose potential is greater than the potential of other integration models.
Some experts believe that the integration attempts are retarded or thwarted by those who should contribute to and help them, namely, the
national elites who have tasted undivided power and do not wish to share it with anybody even in the name of high national interests.
Such are reasons and conclusions followed from discussions among the political and expert elites in Central Asian countries on the subject of Eurasian integration.
Notes
V. Putin. Novy integratsionny proyekt dlya Evrazii — budushcheye, kotoroye rozhdayetsya segodnya [New Integration Project for Eurasia - the Future Born Today] // URL.: http://www.izvestia.ri/news/502761
Evraziiskaya integratsiya i Rossiya [Eurasian Integration and Russia] // URL.:
http://ceasia.ru/forum/evraziyskaya-integratsiya-i-rossiya.-chast-6.html
Ibid.
Paramnov V., Strokov A. Osnovniye stsenarii razvitiya Tsentralnoi Evrazii [Basic Scenarios of Development of Central Eurasia] // URL: http://ceasia.ru/ politika/osnovnie-stsenarii-razvitiya-tsentralnoy-evraziihtml Evraziiskaya integratsiya iRossiya [Eurasian Integration and Russia]. A. Gladilov. Kyrgyzstanu ne usidet na dvukh stulyakh, no i stoyat ne khochetsya. Tem boleye s protyanutoi rukoi [Kyrgyzstan Will Not Be Able to Suck and Blow at the Same time, but It Would not Like to Beg with an Outstretched Hand] // URL. :http://www.polit.kg/newskg/268
Beshimov A. Tamozhenny soyuz: Kyrgyzstan pered trudnym vyborom [Customs Union: Kyrgyzstan Facing Difficult Choice] // Mosty - 2010 - No 3, May // URL.: http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesrussian/76721
Strany Tamozhennogo soyuza ogranichat sebya v defitsite byudzheta [Customs Union Countries Will Restrict Themselves in the Budget Deficit] // URL. :http://lenta.ru/ntws/2010/10/15/eep
Rymbayev S. Rasshireniya Tamozhennogo soyuza poka ne dudet [There Will Be No Eaxpansion of Customs Union] // http://www.region/kg/ index.php?option= com_content&viewed=704:2013-02-19-13-18-22&catid= 4:politika=7Itemid=5 Inomzhonov H. Regionalnoye institutsionalnoye sotrudnichestvo v Tsentralnoi Azii // Istotiya i samosoznaniy. IV: regionlnaya integratsiya i istoriya [Regional Institutional Cooperation in Central Asia // History and Self-consciousness]. -Tashkent, 2008. - P. 271.
Allison R. Blockaden und Anreize. Autoritarismus und regionale Kooperation // Sapper, Manfred, Weichsel, Volker, Huterer, Andrea. Machtmosaik in Zentralasien: Traditionen, Restriuktionen, Aspirationen. - Bonn, 2007. - P. 266.
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Karimov opredelilsya s Evraziiskim soyuzom (Karimov Made up His Mind
Concerning the Eurasian Union] // URL.: http://www.node/Formirovanie_
edinjgj_ekonomicheskogo_prostranstva_vSNG
Evraziiskaya integratsiya iRossiya {Eurasian Integration and Russia].
Cited by Bakayav A.K. Voyenno-politicheskaya bezopasnost Kazakhstana
[Military-political Security of Kazakhstan] // CA&CC.Press&AB. - URL.:
http://www.ca-c.org/journal/cac-04-1999/st_10_bakaev.shtml
Khamidova P. Otkroyetsya li v Tajikistane voennaya baza SShA? [Will a Military
Base of the U.S.A. Open in Tajikistan?] // URL.: http://www.centralasia.ru/
newsA.php?st=123389740
http://www.km.ru/world/2012/08/16/razmeshchenie-baz-ssha-v-uzbekistane Zayavleniye Fonda Progressa [Statement of the Foundation for Progress] // URL.: http://www.polit.kg/newskg/268
"Elitologiya Rossii: Sovremennoye sostoyaniye i perspektivy razvitiya," Moscow, 2013, vol. 1, pp. 530-544.
15
Dmitri Popov,
Ph. D. (Law), Head of the Urals Regional Information-analytical Center of Russian Institute of Strategic Studies (Yekaterinburg) PARTICIPATION OF CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES IN SUPPLYING U.S. TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN
Formation of Northern distribution Network
In 2009 the NDP was commissioned on the basis of a series of intergovernmental agreements signed as a result of the active work of American diplomacy. The network represents a system of transport corridors used for supplying the grouping of the U.S. armed forces in Afghanistan through countries to the north of the theater of military hostilities. It includes communication lines of the Baltic countries, Russia, Central Asia, as well as Turkey and the Caucasus. The network considerably facilitates solution of the military tasks of Washington in
