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Aleksei Malashenko, D. Sc. (Hist.), Moscow Carnegie Center INTERESTS AND CHANCES OF RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA
In the early 1990s Central Asia was for Russia something like an "uncoupled wagon," but today the Moscow Kremlin is trying to couple this "wagon" to the Russian train as firmly as possible. Such course is conditioned, first of all, by political, and only then, economic, reasons. The economic value of Central Asia for Russia is not too great and it is determined, above al, by the latter's interest in the transit of energy resources. The main aim of Moscow in the region is to create (or recreate) a zone of its special interests, turn these former Soviet republics into "satellites," and restrict, if possible, the influence of outside "actors," primarily the United States and China.
Kazakhstan occupies a special place in this political configuration. Russia's relations with it are especially close, and President Putin's efforts aimed at reaching post-Soviet integration are based primarily on Russian-Kazakh relations.
At the end of the past century Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote that Russia was too weak politically to be able to close the region completely for outside forces, and too poor to develop these regions (especially Central Asia) exclusively with its own forces. The situation has not changed practically at present either.
National Interests of Russia in the Central Asian Region
Russian interests in Central Asia are conditioned, first of all, by its desire to preserve its influence in the region, keep under its aegis the remnants of the post-Soviet area, and thus reaffirm its role of a Eurasian power, failing to be a world power. Such claims are one of the main
motives of the foreign policy of the Moscow Kremlin, which is suffering from inferiority complex in connection with the general weakening of its influence. The post-Soviet countries are, perhaps, the only place in the world where Moscow could claim leadership, although not absolutely, but with reservations. But even this area can be regarded the Wild Ass's skin.
Secondly, Russia's interests demand the preservation and maintenance of the regimes which are loyal to it and ready to develop relations with it. But to tackle this task is becoming ever more difficult. The foreign policy of Central Asian countries is distinguished by a many-vector trend, and the Russian direction has long ceased to be the only one. Turkmenistan has proclaimed its foreign-policy neutrality a long time ago, which was actually a challenge to Russia, and after a conflict with the Russian "Gazprom" monopoly in 2009 its relations with Moscow have noticeably cooled. Relations with Uzbekistan have also become more complex, because the latter is slowly drawing closer to the American foreign-policy orbit. Relations between Russia and Tajikistan are invariably marked by certain ambiguity: President Emomali Rakhmon wishes to be friends with Russia, but at the same time fears to enter into too close relations with it. Today Moscow feels better in dealing with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. However, friendship with these countries has a very pragmatic character
On the one hand, the Moscow Kremlin is interested in preserving authoritarian regimes close to it in spirit in the region. However, experience has shown that similarity of systems is not an a priori guarantee of political closeness. The authoritarian rulers of the Central Asian states remain loyal to their many-vector political course, and their foreign partners, above all the United States and the European Union, are ready to cooperate with the local regimes, disregarding their
dictatorial nature. At the same time Russia is developing relations with "protodemocratic" Kyrgyzstan, which renounced authoritarianism.
Moscow's problem lies in that it is unable (or almost unable) to exert any tangible influence on the domestic political situation in Central Asian countries. Transfer of power in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, or elections in Tajikistan do not depend on it any longer. In this connection suffice it to recall Moscow's attitude to the coming to power of Gurbanguly Berdymuhamedov in Turkmenistan in 2006. Moscow remained passive and silent during the first ("tulip") Kyrgyz revolution in 2005, as well as during the second revolution in 2011. The level of Russian influence on the domestic policy of Central Asian countries will remain at a "Zero" level in the future, too, all the more so since the Kremlin elite is gradually losing personal ties with the local elites, which is very important in the post-Soviet countries.
Thus, the main task facing Russia is not to support the authoritarian regimes as such in Central Asian countries due to their similarity to the Russian model, but to evolve common economic and political aims, and, what is more important, to build relations with the new rulers - the ruling class and national business, all the more so since both are inseparable.
Thirdly, Russia is striving to contain the strengthening of foreign forces on the territory of Central Asia, primarily, the United States and China. Realizing that it is unable to prevent the activity of foreign actors, the Moscow Kremlin is striving to find a balance between rivalry and partnership with these countries.
Chinese expansion is formally economic and financial, above all. China helps create ramified transport and energy infrastructure which binds Central Asia to it and at the same time enables it to advance in the western direction to Europe. Characteristically, China is developing
relations with Central Asia on the "Russian field," inasmuch as Russia also claims a leading role in the creation of regional infrastructures.
Answering the Chinese challenge, Russia is striving to preserve its influence through multilateral integration - the Uniform economic area, Customs Union, the future Eurasian Union (to be formed in 20150, as well as the Collective Security Treaty Organization. At the same time Russia takes part in joint projects with China, and Beijing does not object against this, inasmuch as it plays the leading role in them.
China ostentatiously avoids interference with the domestic policy of Central Asian countries. Beijing naturally proceeds from the premise that whoever comes to power in these countries will not risk to be at loggerheads with the powerful neighbor. The growing presence of China in Central Asia retards the economic activity of Russia, but Moscow accepts it as inevitability, emphasizing that Central Asia is a territory of partnership of the two countries. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) can be regarded a symbol of such partnership; true, people speak more about prospects of this organization rather than of its real achievements.
Having reconciled itself with Chinese "onslaught," Russia opposes the United States energetically, trying to reduce its influence in the region.
The approach of the United States to Central Asia, formulated in the 1990s and later revised, boils down to supporting the sovereignty of the former Soviet republics, ensuring regional stability, preventing conflicts, as well as supporting democratization in economic development. These strategic tasks can be interpreted as a challenge to Russia at least because sovereignty in this case means greater independence of the Central Asian states from their former "metropolitan" country, and democratization - the creation of political
systems, which will correspond to western models to a greater degree. The United States helps reform local economies, which is something that Russia cannot do properly, inasmuch as it needs modernization itself. Russia alone is unable to ensure stability, but if it does tackle this task, it will do everything to make Central Asian countries renounce part of their sovereignty. Consequently, it would be more advisable for the governments of the Central Asian countries to turn to the "third forces" outside, thus ousting Russia from the region, partially at least. All the more so, since both the United States and China are interested in Russia continuing to bear part of responsibility for the situation in the region.
The withdrawal of the American troops from Afghanistan in 2014 will enhance the role of Central Asia in American strategy, inasmuch as Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan become a "territory of observing stability" in the south of the Asian continent on condition of the preservation and emergence of American bases there. (In 2011 rumors began to be circulated about the possibility of the emergence of a U.S. base in Kazakhstan, but soon they were disproved.) U.S. prestige will largely depend on whether it succeeds to minimize the costs of its withdrawal from Afghanistan and later contribute to solution of the Afghan crisis.
The presence of the U.S. military bases in Central Asia requires "unofficial approval" of China and Russia. Beijing does not seem to worry on this score so far. It does not comment on the problems connected with the preservation of the U.S. airforce base in Manas (Kyrgyzstan), and also the possible opening of a base in Khanabad (Uzbekistan), and another one in Tajikistan. The American military presence in Central Asia is even advantageous, in a way, to Beijing, because it contains the activity of Islamists in the region, which has a
positive influence on the situation in the Xinjiang-Uighur autonomous district in China.
The American bases in Central Asia do not present any direct threat to Russia because they are oriented southward. On the other hand, the U.S. military presence diminishes Russia's significance as the guarantor of regional security. Thus, it is Russia's prestige that is threatened, but not Russia as a state.
Finally, the national interest of Russia lies in containing drug-trafficking from Afghanistan through Central Asia and further on. In 2011 Afghanistan produced 5,800 tons of opium. Thus, Afghanistan and Central Asia have turned into a unified drug-enclave consisting of two parts: the producing part (Afghanistan) and transporting part (Central Asia).
Today, there is no effective "macro-system" to fight drug production and drug trafficking with Russia, the United States, China, Central Asia and Afghanistan participating. Moreover, instead of cooperation there is competition between projects submitted by the United States and Russia, which hampers joint actions in this sphere.
Besides, incomes from narcotic business in Central Asia are laundered by investments in local businesses, thus becoming a legal part of economic life. This makes the fight against drug trafficking senseless and undermines the health of people of Russia, where, according to official figures, there are three million drug addicts. From sixty to seventy-five tons of Afghan heroin comes to Russia via Central Asia annually. An additional complication of the struggle against narcotic business lies in that a reduction of drug production in Afghanistan and drug trafficking through Central Asia will inevitable cause the growth of drug production in the Central Asian region, inasmuch as just like in Afghanistan the cultivation of poppy and hemp
is already an important source of income for certain groups of the rural population there.
There will be more problems complicating the fight against drug trafficking if Kyrgyzstan enters the Customs Union. In the view of the director of the Central Asian center of drug-policy Alexander Zelichenko, "if the border between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan is controlled, the border between Kazakhstan and Russia is not, and the Russian authorities complain that more drugs are smuggled into Russia. The problem will aggravate when there is no border control between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan."
The problem of Central Asian migration is among the national interests of Russia for it can be regarded a challenge to both sides containing mutual advantages and mutual complications.
The exact number of migrants from Central Asia is not known, inasmuch as most of them come to Russia illegally. The number of migrants from Kyrgyzstan, according to various estimates, fluctuates from 400,000 to one million (Kyrgyzstan's Ministry for the Interior gives the figure of 500,000). Migrants from Uzbekistan number from 600,000 - 700,000 to one or two million. According to the Minister for the Interior of Uzbekistan Bakhodyr Matlyubov, there were 220,000 Uzbek workers in Russia in 2007. The number of workers from Tajikistan is not known. In November 2011, the newspaper "Novaya gazeta" published different figures - one million, 1.5 million and two million.
Migration rather closely connects the former Soviet republics of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to the former metropolitan country. Up to 33 percent of the able-bodied people of Uzbekistan leave their country (primarily for Russia) in search of work, and the money the migrants send back account for from 15 to 59 percent of Uzbekistan's GDP. According to statistical data of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, the total volume of financial transfers of Tajik
migrants back home amounted to $2.2 billion in 2010 (the volume of Tajikistan's GDP was $5.6 billion. In 2011 Tajik migrants transferred $2.96 billion, which was more by $444 million than the record of 2008. The money from Tajik migrants received in their country comprised 45.5 percent of its GDP.
The influence of migration on relations between Russia and its southern neighbors are of a contradictory character. Migration contributes to the strengthening of contacts between the Russian and Central Asian communities, but at the same time it is a factor of mutual irritation and alienation. The attitude to migrants of Russian society is negative, which increases the sentiments of xenophobia and nationalism.
The Islamization of migrants has become a new (and quite negative) problem for Russia. In other words, previously people from Central Asia arriving in Russia in search of work did not show much interest in religion, whereas now, beginning from the early 2010s, the strengthening of Islamic identity in their midst is clearly observed. People from Central Asia keep a fast, regularly visit mosques (there are five mosques in Moscow, and the number of Muslims, including migrants, comprises up to 1.5 million, that is, the number of mosques is insufficient). Finally, radical sentiments penetrate in Russia through migrants from Central Asia, which is especially noticeable in the Volga-Urals region.
The State Duma has repeatedly discussed the question of the introduction of a visa regime for the Central Asian countries. In 2013 President Putin said that such regime would be introduced from 2015 for all countries, apart from member-states of the Customs Union, that is, Kazakhstan and Belarus. This will allegedly help solve the unemployment problem and reduce criminal activity in Russia. However, experts studying migration processes in Russia have long noticed that the toughening of the migration legislation leads to a
growing number of illegal migrants. It can hardly be expected that an acceptable solution to the migration problem will be found, which would satisfy both sides. Thus, relations between Russia and its southern neighbors will apparently worsen.
The national interests of Russia are inseparable from the problem of the transit of fuel-and-energy products through its territory. This problem goes beyond the bounds of the Central Asian problems as such, and is broader than the Caspian problem For the first half of the first decade of this century the "Gazprom" Company tried to keep the export of Russian and Central Asian gas under control in the hope to preserve these countries in the sphere of Russian influence, but in effect it brought an opposite result. In December 2009, Chairman Hu Jintao of the People's Republic of China opened the world's longest gas pipeline between Turkmenistan and Xinjiang, which meant the end of the Russian monopoly on transporting fuel-and-energy resources from Central Asia. The big gas flow was now divided into several smaller ones, bypassing Russia. An inevitable and predicted diversification of routes has taken place, which was largely prompted by the well-known Russian-Ukrainian quarrel of 2008 - 2009 and an explosion in April 2009 (certain people in Ashkhabad hinted that the explosion was specially provoked by "Gazprom" in order to tie Turkmen transit to Russia). At present China surpasses Russia in purchases of fuel-and-energy products in Central Asia.
In the late 1990s it could be supposed that sooner or later the consumers of Russian hydrocarbons and also those who receive Russian gas through Russian transit would take care to open alternative routes: projects of such routes (the main one being Baku - Ceyhan) were examined at the time. However, stagnant inertia, drive to monopolization, inability to orient oneself quickly in new circumstances have weakened Russian positions in this sphere. If
"Gazprom" had acted more rapidly and flexibly and agreed to minor concessions, it could have retained its advantageous positions. Unfortunately, this was not the case, and Russia has found itself thrown out of the "project of the century" - the TAPI gas pipeline (Turkmenistan - Afghanistan - Pakistan - India), with a capacity of 30 billion cubic meters, which would become a strategic trunk pipeline connecting the Central Asian and South Asian regions. Turkmenistan has refused to cooperate with "Gazprom" in financing the project. Simultaneously, the Chinese National Petroleum Company stated that the volume of Turkmen gas to be supplied to China in 2015 would grow from 13.5 to 60 billion cubic meters, and the State Bank of China granted credit to Turkmenistan to a sum of $4. lbillion. It can be viewed as a challenge to Russia, or as its own blunder.
Speaking of Russian national interests in Central Asia we did not mention stability in the region which, paradoxical as it might seem, is not the indisputable strategic imperative for Russia. Of course, on the one hand, stability in Central Asia formally remains the "sacred cow" of Russian politics, but on the other hand, political fragility plays into the hands of Moscow: a threat of conflicts in the region and tension on its southern borders give Russia a pretext to present itself as a guarantor against any threat.
Almost eight million Russians actually abandoned by their Motherland have found themselves outside the sphere of Russian interests. Russia does not render any tangible assistance and support to the Russian population and has not once used the "Russian question" as an instrument of bringing pressure to bear on its southern neighbors, despite the fact that in an event of any socio-political cataclysms the defenselessness of the Russian (or in a broader sense, the Slav) population may turn into a tragedy, especially if conflicts acquire a religious-political character.
Russia and Regional Organizations
In what way is Russia striving to realize its national interests in Central Asia? Moscow's strategy here is integration which it carries on with the help of the already existing and newly-formed regional organizations, not only with the participation of Central Asian countries, but also other countries in the post-Soviet area. The use of the possibilities of the CIS, the CSTO, the Eurasian Economic Community, and also the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is regarded very important in official Russian documents. The expert on Central Asia Roy Allison writes that Russia is trying to come out from the positions of "protective integration", that is, offers its services in integration, guarantees its advantages and its protection on condition of retaining the role of the integration center. Supremacy, or attempt at supremacy, of Russia in one or another organization does not remove contradictions between participants in it. Russia has always to think of consensus between all of them.
The Eurasian Union, which Russia began to set up in 2011, is to be the leading organization. Its predecessor is the EurAsian Economic Community. Apart from that, a decision was adopted in 2007 to form a Customs Union consisting of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. The first supranational body - Commission of the Customs Union - began to function in the post-Soviet area. According to the first deputy premier of Kazakhstan Umirzak Shukeyev, the volume of mutual; trade between the member-countries of the Customs Union increased by 57 percent during the first nine months of 2011, as compared to the same period of 2010. A uniform customs tariff was introduced within the framework of the Customs Union in January 2010, and on July 1, 2011 customs control on the borders between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus was lifted.
On January 1, 2012, the Customs Union came into force, however, advantages from it will be seen and felt only after some time. It is believed that Russia loses up to $1 billion annually within the framework of the Union. Besides, Russia pays about 90 percent of all customs duties there. Independent observers vary a great deal in their assessments of the Customs Union's activity. On the one hand, it is believed that the Union is a step forward to integration, and on the other, it is considered "a fence around the economies of its three member- countries." In the view of the leader of the Kazakh opposition party "Azat" Bulat Abilov, two-thirds of Kazakhstan's population are disappointed with their republic's entry in the Customs Union. Prices of fuel and prime necessities have risen by 15 percent in the two years of its operation. The opposition insists on adopting a decision of Kazakhstan's participation in the Customs Union only after a special referendum on the subject.
Migration presents a special problem. In 2012 free movement of labor force was introduced within the framework of the Customs Union. This is not of a too great importance for Russia and Kazakhstan. But in Belarus the number of people leaving for Russia in search of work will noticeably increase. Permission for free movement of labor force will increase migration flows from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, if these countries join the Customs Union.
Prior to 2011 integration was limited to a formal level. Its implementation was hampered by complex procedures inherent in the bilateral relations of Russia with its partners, particularly in the sphere of energy, and integration itself bore a halfway, unobliging character. Moscow's tactical error was its desire to draw in integration as many countries as possible for a long period of time. But gradually Moscow came to the conclusion that integration should be speeded up, because
the slowing down of the process will inevitably result in the weakening of Russia's positions.
In November 2011 President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko, President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev and President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev signed the Declaration of Eurasian economic integration, which should lead to the creation of the Eurasian Union in 2015, and also the Treaty on Eurasian Economic Commission. From January 1, 2012, this commission became a single supranational body regulating relations within the Customs Union. As President V. Putin said, "the point was to turn integration into an attractive project understandable, stable and long-term to citizens and business, which should not depend on ups and downs of the present economic situation." The Russian President made a reservation that "there was no desire to recreate the U.S.S.R. in any form."
Naturally, these three countries are interested in expanding the market. However, while signing the documents on the formation of the Eurasian Community, politicians and economists in Kazakhstan and Russia raised the question of its expediency. For example, in the view of the director of the Central Asian Institute of free market Mirsulzhan Namazaliyev, the Customs Union was advantageous to Russia, above all. "To enter such union for small countries, like Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan, or even Ukraine, is not necessary. Kazakhstan, too, will lose if it enters the Union." The director of Alma-Ata Center of current research "Alternative" Andrei Chebotarev believes that the Eurasian Union is the most advantageous for Russia, "because it will allow it to regain its influence in the Central Asian region, inasmuch as the CIS has long lost its integration potentials..."
In 2011 President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan actually rejected the idea of Uzbekistan's entry in the Eurasian Community. He publicly expressed the view that the main aim of creating the Eurasian
Community lay in politics. He said: "Unfortunately, there are some forces in the post-Soviet area which cherish the idea of reviving the empire called the U.S.S.R in a new form..."
Indeed, Moscow prefers to keep silent about the political implications of the Eurasian Community, claiming that the future Union bears purely economic character. But economic interaction is unthinkable without political, and the economic superiority of Russia will inevitably entail political hegemony. Uzbekistan has clearly expressed its aversion to it. Evidently, Kazakhstan does not wish to return to Moscow's control either. In April 2012 President N. Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan reemphasized that the aim was to create only economic Union by 2015.
.Speaking of the use of the Eurasian Community and Customs Union as instruments of political integration, the Russian expert Aleksey Vlasov notes that "the post-Soviet area should be consolidated economically, above all, and only then think of political aspects." The Kazakh analyst Talgat Mamyraiymov believes that economically Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are of no interest to the Customs Union and Russia, and their inclusion in the Customs Union is exclusively of a geopolitical character.
Vladimir Paramonov, an expert from Uzbekistan, is more outspoken in his view about the future of Kyrgyzstan. He says that the latter would do well if it shares at least part of its political, economic and military sovereignty with Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus within the framework of the integration process, allowing them to do what it cannot, or does not want, do itself.
The West keeps quiet about this project, inasmuch as it believes that Russia has not enough strength to create an international organization capable to change the alignment of forces in Central Asia and at the same time to strengthen radically its positions there. Besides,
the economic opportunities of Russia are not great enough to make it a non-competitive partner of Kazakhstan or other potential members of the Eurasian Community. On the other hand, the latter is taken for, perhaps, the last attempt of Russia to create an obedient body controlled by it and try to restore, at least partly, the former sphere of influence. The former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has defined Russia's striving for integration by creating EAC and CU as "a move to re-Sovietize the region."
It is hardly likely that the new integration project will exert a radical influence on the economic situation in Central Asia. Evidently, it will have no tangible effect on the political situation in the region. Despite Russia's activity in this direction, this new integration project for Eurasia will remain a phantom just like its predecessor - EurAz Economic Community. The Eurasian Community may prove a "swan song" of the integration strategy not only of Putin's regime, but, perhaps, entire Russian policy in the southern, as well as the post-Soviet direction.
Russia motivates the creation of the Eurasian Community and the Customs Union by exclusively economic aims, whereas the formation of another association - the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has purely political and military-political tasks before it. After the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. the first Treaty on collective security was signed by Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on May 15, 1992. In 1993 it was joined by Azerbaijan, Belarus and Georgia. In 1999 only six countries - Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan signed the protocol of prolonging their participation in the Treaty for the next five years. Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan refused to sign it. In 2002 the Treaty was renamed "CSTO" which lent it greater respectability and status comparable to other influential international organizations. Membership in CSTO was a trump-card for the states of the region in
their dealings with foreign actors, primarily with the United States. For instance, when the President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov was harshly criticized for cruelly suppressing street riots in Andizhan in 2005, he "got offended" and lowered the level of relations with the U.S.A. by ostentatiously joining CSTO.
The main aim of CSTO, according to its Rules, is "the strengthening of peace and regional security on the basis of collective independence and territorial integrity of its member-states." Among the main tasks of the organizations are "the fight against international terrorism and extremism, illegal drug trafficking and other psychedelic substances, arms proliferation, organized crime, illegal migration, and other threats." Is CSTO capable to fulfill these tasks? This is not quite clear, inasmuch as this organization has never taken part in any military conflicts, drug trafficking continues to increase, and the problems of illegal migration become ever more acute.
In 2009 CSTO member-states adopted a decision to set up Collective forces of operational deployment in order to be able to rebuff aggression from the outside, fight terrorism and extremism, drug trafficking, and rectify consequences of extraordinary situations. The numerical strength of these forces is supposed to reach about 4,000 men. They will include highly mobile units with heavy machines and equipment, ten aircraft and fourteen helicopters based in Kant (Kyrgyzstan).
Uzbekistan, whose relations with the West have improved, has not signed the agreement on setting up these forces. It also spoke against Kazakhstan's proposals to connect the national ministries for emergency situations, interior and special services with these forces.
The CSTO member-states buy Russian arms and military equipment at Russian domestic prices. These arms and equipment are simple to handle and familiar to Central Asian officers from Soviet time.
But their main problem is that they are rapidly becoming obsolete. This is why these countries may ultimately turn to those who could supply them with more up-to-date and effective weapons, and Russia may lose its monopoly in this sphere. Besides, lowered interest in Russian arms and equipment is also due to the fact that after the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan the United States may transfer certain amount of its arms and equipment to Central Asian countries.
The CSTO can be considered a guarantee of the preservation of Russian military objects in the post-Soviet area. In Kazakhstan it is the "Baikonur" spaceship-launching site, test-grounds of strategic antiaircraft and anti-missile forces, the Kant airforce base in Kyrgyzstan, a naval base on Lake Issyk-Kul, and the 4th military base in Tajikistan.
The General Secretary of CSTO Nikolai Bordyuzha maintains that the situation in Central Asia continues to worsen and soon its member-states may find themselves face to face against the Taliban alone. In February 2009, a CSTO summit in Moscow adopted a decision to the effect that its member-states would react to outside threats, including those from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Of all CSTO member-states only Tajikistan has a common border with Afghanistan. Consequently, in an event of a hypothetical invasion of Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan, these countries will have to rebuff the onslaught against them with their own forces.
Russia would like to use the CSTO for maintaining the ruling regimes in the Central Asian countries. Despite differences between Moscow and these regimes arising from time to time, the latter more or less suit the Russian leadership. In turn, the rulers of Central Asian countries believe that Moscow, scared as it was by "color revolutions" of the 2000s and then the "Arab spring," will be ready to support the governments of the Central Asian countries. In December 2011, at a meeting of the CSTO Council on collective security it was decided that
the forces and means of all CSTO member-states may be used for rectifying or suppressing an emergency situation on the territory of any one member-country, which will be unable to cope with it using its own forces and means. Thus, Russia will have an instrument for legitimate interference in the affairs of its CSTO partners.
The international organizations created by Russian efforts in Central Asia are unable to change the main tendency, namely, the lowering of Russian influence in the region. Its economic ties with Russia are decreasing, and now Moscow is placing its hopes on the Eurasian Union which it is trying to create. The Russian expert Andrei Grozin maintains that the Central Asian republics have no concrete and well-substantiated strategy related to regional military-political projects. More often they have in mind not aggression from the outside, but the internal threat from the local radical Islamist opposition.
Interest in Russian-Central Asian cooperation could be revived if the local business elites believe in that participation in such projects promises them real benefit. In that case some uniform Eurasian business elite could emerge in the post-Soviet area capable to become the driving force of cooperation with Russia. But attractiveness of Russian projects to Central Asia is not indisputable. Interaction can take place only at a government level and depends entirely on the position of the political figures at the helm of state at present. The political desires and aspirations of Moscow do not always coincide with the interests of the Russian business elite which has no geopolitical ambitions and measures everything by the amounts of money in western banks. It is not ready for an acute struggle for access to Central Asian resources.
Russian Foreign Policy Is "Minimized"
There is no region in the world today where Russia could act as the successor of the Soviet Union. This can well be seen by the recent
events in the Middle East where Russian influence boiled down only to support of Bashar Asad's regime in Syria. (True, in the spring of 2013, after a visit of the U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry to Moscow, it looked likely that Moscow was ready to change its position to a more flexible one, which was shown by its decision to hold, under the aegis of Russia and the U.S.A., a broad multilateral conference with participation of all conflicting forces in Syria). Naturally, the influence of Russia in Central Asia is much greater than in the Arab world, but the former is definitely diminishing. It is quite evident today that full-fledged cooperation of Russia with all countries of the region is a thing of the past. It looks likely that it will be concentrated on two countries -Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, with Tajikistan possibly joining it. Besides, while increasing its influence in one Central Asian country, Russia may lose it in another. Meanwhile, new forces become more active in Central Asia. For the first time in several centuries India and China become more successful and dynamic in Central Asia, and in Eurasia as a whole, than Russia.
Against this background another serious problem for Russian diplomacy is an acute shortage of professional personnel, people wellversed in the intricacies of the Central Asian region and having the knowledge of local languages (whereas in the United States preparation of such specialists has been going on systematically for many years).
Finally, a change of the regime is quite possible in all Central Asian countries, and political figures entirely oriented to Russia will hardly come to power in any one of them. This will create additional difficulties for Russia, all the more so since it has done very little (if at all) to create and strengthen a pro-Russian lobby among the younger generation of local politicians.
"Pro et Contra," Moscow, 2013, January - April, pp. 21-33.
