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neighboring states, and also causes interethnic tension, mistrust and conflicts.
3. Different level of the economic development of the countries of the region, which lowers the effectiveness of solutions of common problems facing the Central Asian region.
4. Close proximity to unstable Afghanistan and Pakistan, persisting threat of penetration of large groups of Islamic extremists in the region, as well as the presence of separatist and extremist movements on the territory of the Central Asian countries themselves.
5. Possibility of turning Central Asia into one of the world's "trouble spots" in an event of the aggravation of rivalry between the world powers in the region with all ensuing consequences.
"Mirovye derzhavy v Tsentralnoi Azii, "Moscow, 2011, pp. 7-12.
Dina Malysheva,
D. Sc. (Politics), Institute of World Economy
& International Relations,
Russian Academy of Sciences
THE "ARAB SPRING" AS SEEN
BY RUSSIAN SCHOLARS. "THE MIDDLE EAST,
ARAB AWAKENING AND RUSSIA: WHAT NEXT?"
The book under review (published in Moscow in 2012) is a jointly written monograph thoroughly analyzing a very complex and contradictory phenomenon of the "Arab spring," or "Arab awakening." The authors reveal a broad range of competing interests and numerous factors and prerequisites which have determined the original features of the wave of protest sweeping the Middle East. Besides, the book gives a detailed forecast of the further turn of events and scenarios of the
future political configuration of the Arab East, and shows the specific features of the attitude to the developments in the Middle East of representatives of the Russian academic community and, what is especially important, the significance of the events and situation there for Russia. One of the first articles in the book under review was written by Academician Yevgeni Primakov, a well-known political and public figure and an authority on Middle East problems. Another article belongs to V. Naumkin, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, also a well-known expert on Middle Eastern affairs. All articles are based on trustworthy factual information and documents from various sources. The authors tend to regard the "Arab spring" as the beginning of the transformation of Arab societies. There were many obstacles preventing this transformation, among them the archaic political superstructure in a number of countries which were ruled by "strong men" like Colonel Gaddafi or General Mubarak, the absence of civil freedoms and social lifts, social and property disproportions, systemic corruption, weak social policy, economic stagnation, etc. The "Arab awakening" is regarded as a consequence of the incomplete decolonization and the global economic crisis, and also as a sign of developing democratization. All this has exacerbated the problems in the unstable part of the Arab world and has not allowed the Arab economy to progress by the beginning of the protest movements. And the latter developed differently in different countries, according to their own laws.
One of the results of the "Arab awakening", in the view of Russian scholars and experts, was that an "unstable and contradictory balance of interests and forces emerged between various factions, which, in one way or another, are products of the former rule. New forces have come to the fore, which often position themselves as Islamic, they are radically-minded, demand changes and their own
place under the sun." Some countries of the region run the risk of renouncing the idea of stable development and entering a new round of slowing down growth and losing incentives to progress. All these circumstances conditioned numerous interpretations of the "Arab spring" as a result of the influence of outside forces. This version is offered in the article by O. Pavlov who writes that "everything that has been going on in the Middle East in the past three years is a result of the actions of the world financial-political elites which prod Washington, and London and Paris along with it, to bring to the logical end the globalization processes, and with the help of Islamic radicals to complete the destruction of national sovereign states in Eurasia (in this their aims coincide with those of the Islamists), create the situation of chaos in which it would be easier to prolong the life of the dying dollar, and prevent the formation of the really multipolar world. The creation of big regional blocs of states having their own strong regional currencies capable to throw a challenge to the present currency-financial system could become the foundation of such world. This is why the sharp edge of "Arab revolutions" is aimed not at Arab dictators, but at the Eurasian Union and China taking shape before our very eyes now."
Some other articles of the book comment on the absurd nature of the attempts to reduce the entire complex character of the present-day motley international relations in the Middle East only to the struggle of the outside forces for control over resources and for the geopolitical redivision of the world, the first fiddle in which is played by the United States. It would be wrong to present the Egyptian or Tunisian opposition leaders, as is sometimes the case of Russian political analysts, as people manipulated by the West and used in its selfish aims. There are articles which note the positive role of Russia and China which come out with the idea of mediation and bringing the two
warring side in the Syrian conflict to a national dialogue. An analysis of the twists and turns of outside interference in the Arab affairs enables the authors of the collection to draw certain lessons concerning serious changes of the international climate, not for the better, unfortunately. The point is the growing importance of the military force in the interventionist drive on the part of a number of western countries. As V. Naumkin justly notes, "the large-scale military confrontation, which resulted from the struggle between the rebels and the ruling regimes in Libya and Syria, has pinpointed the question of legitimacy, permissibility and conditions of interference with internal conflicts on the part of outside forces, including for the declared humanitarian purpose of protecting the civilian population."
The interpretation of the events in Libya in the collection cannot but attract attention. It differs from the version widely publicized in the West, and partly in Russia, according to which there was confrontation between the supporters of the archaic and cranky ruler and the positive forces of democracy supported by the West. When turning to the complex history of Libya and the role of different secular ideologies and Islamic trends there, it may be possible to understand the specific features of the political struggle in that country. A. Yegorin writes that in the formation of statehood and national strategy in Libya throughout the past two centuries two main stages could be singled out: religious-political asceticism based on Sunnism and Sufism, and "Gaddafism" based on the power of the people as statehood and "direct democracy" based on Islamic religious dogmas. The internal confrontation was conditioned not only by the ideological factor - differences between supporters of "Gaddafism" and those adhering to Sunnism and Sufism, but also dissatisfaction of the national medium-sized and big business with the slow pace of reforms. Outside interference has only deepened and widened the internal political split.
The Syrian conflict is analyzed in connection with the anti-government actions and manifestations in the late April - early May of 2011. According to the latest historical tradition, the army and its command have been playing the key role in decision-making in domestic and foreign policy of the country. This distinguishes the Syrian conflict from the Libyan one. In the latter the army actually betrayed its commander Gaddafi, whereas in Syria the army remained the consolidating force of the regime, which is still capable to rebuff the attacks of the well-armed units of the patchy opposition supported by outside forces.
The authors of the collection come to the conclusion that the events in the Arab world, or the "Spring of Wrath," did not look at first like revolts or mass protest movements typical of developing countries so far. Neither were they analogous to the "color revolutions," inasmuch as the model worked out by western political technologists for the non-violent change of the ruling regimes in countries of East and Central Europe and the post-Soviet area could not prove efficient in the conditions of the clan structure of Middle Eastern societies. As it is claimed in the collection, the events of the "Arab spring" are rather similar to the national-liberation revolutions which swept the Middle East in the 20th century and brought independence to Arab countries, along with major shifts in the economy, politics and other spheres. This is why it cannot be excluded that the "Arab spring" will be regarded as a milestone on the road of establishing democracy, naturally with an Arab and Islamic face. This was not a class, anti-imperialist or religious revolution, but trans-social, trans-national and trans-confessional revolution. It is another matter that revolution is prepared and begun by some people, and later it is usurped by others. This is why the authors of this collection pay attention to another important subject - the role of the religious factor in the "Arab awakening." Despite all differences in
the Middle East countries, the protest movements there had one common feature: at the initial stage in street manifestations there was no noticeable participation of Islamic extremists in them, no demands were put forward to renounce the secular character of the state or introduce the Sharia law in judicial practice and public life. At a later stage, instability following revolutionary development has turned a number of countries into a haven for terrorists who are doing everything possible to increase their activity and influence.
Meanwhile, the forces referred by the West to "political Islam" and often called "Islamist" (the Egyptian "Muslim Brothers" are among them) are not unified organizationally. They consist of numerous groups, movements and currents whose members and participants adhere to either radical or relatively moderate views, remain serious, and sometimes, the only opponents to the ruling regimes. It cannot be excluded that some of them who are termed "Islamists" today are trying to implement a modernization project according to the one implemented by the Party of Justice and Development in Turkey. Or they will implement social programs aimed at improving the life of rank-and-file Muslims, like it is being done by the Palestine HAMAS movement or the Lebanese "Hezbollah." It is indicative that the leading opposition party of Egypt "Muslim Brothers" has called, after the removal of the former president Mubarak, for the establishment of a civilian government and consolidation of the "guarantees of human rights and freedoms" in the Constitution of the country. Thus, the "Muslim Brothers," just like the Turkish Party of Justice and Development, have quite easily abandoned traditional religious terminology and switched over to the language of general civil intercommunication. This enlarges the opportunities of the "Muslim Brothers" to take part in the country's life as a systemic political party and allows some researchers to hope for certain people in Egypt being
able to search for a balance between religious principles, on the one hand, and pragmatism in domestic and foreign policy, on the other. The growing role of the religious factor as a result of the "Arab spring" gives ground to Vitali Naumkin to suppose that the present developments in the Arab world could be called the "Great Islamic revolution." According to some data cited by L. Kulagina and V. Akhmedov, the Iranian ruling elite tends to regard the revolutionary events in the Arab world part of "Islamic awakening." However, this does not mean that adherence of the Islamists to democracy is a fait accompli, inasmuch as it is still not clear whether the Islamists (of course, moderate and enlightened enough) are ready to live according to the rules of a secular state, or they will persist in reaching their main aim - the creation of an Islamic state. The authors conclude that the Arab revolutions have changed the balance of forces in the region. First, Turkey has actively joined the struggle for influence in the region, claiming the role of the new regional leader. Secondly, a new role has been taken by the monarchies of the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Thirdly, the collapse of the regimes which have ruled Egypt, Tunisia and Libya for decades, and possibly those who will be forced to leave the political scene (Syria) has noticeably increased uncertainty in international relations in the Middle East, especially against the backdrop of the old conflicts which had been contained by the overthrown secular regimes.
The transformation of the Arab East is taking place against the background of the changing international context. The economic and military interest of the United States and its allies in the region has diminished to a certain extent due to the successful development of the alternative energy source, namely, shale gas, which reduces interest in and demand for the Middle East hydrocarbon resources. Along with this, the United States still wishes to raise the strategic importance of
the Middle East by drawing Central Asian countries to this region within the framework of the project of the Greater Middle East and the New Silk Route. At the same time the direct interests of the United States in the Middle East have suffered a great damage, where, as a result of the war in Iraq and the downfall of Saddam Hussein's regime, the positions of Iran have become more solid and influential. Besides, the information monopoly of the United States on the interpretation of all conflicts and world events has been shattered due to the growing influence and prestige of "Al Jazeera" Company. In general, the time has passed never to return when Washington could place and remove the rulers in Eastern countries at its own free will. The "Arab awakening" can influence, though indirectly, the situation in the regions of Russia, with the predominantly Muslim population. If radical Islamists succeed in realizing their aims in the Middle East, the wave of extremism may reach the South of Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia. True, such alarmist version is not wholly accepted by the authors of the collection. Some of them say that there are hardly any grounds to speak of any special scenario of the foreign forces for Russia on the pattern of the "Arab spring," if the causes of the protest movement in the Arab East are explained exclusively by the schemes of the West. Equally counterproductive would be to transform the Syrian conflict and slightly more strained relations of Russia with the United States and the West into calls for harsher foreign policy. It would not be worthwhile to pursue such a course in the context of a very fragile international trust which is constantly facing new challenges.
It is another matter if new realities in the Middle East place Russia in the face of new serious challenges. They might reveal themselves not only in the further destabilization of the Greater Middle East and its Islamization, which will be combined with the latter's penetration in the southern regions of Russia. There is another
important circumstance, namely, the fact that "the United States regards practically all developments in the Middle East in terms of its struggle with Iran, which has become the main target of American policy in the region," in the view of Academician Yevgeni Primakov. He connects Washington's course at overthrowing the Asad regime in Syria, which is so friendly with Iran, with the Iranian factor. On the whole, destabilization of the situation close to the Russian borders in connection with the attempts to change the ruling regimes in Syria or Iran increases threats to Russia from the Middle East, inducing it to more effective actions aimed at opposing the use of military force in the region.
For those who deal with the Middle East professionally the work under review will undoubtedly be very useful because it contains a thorough analysis of quite a few socio-economic, political, cultural and religious problems of the region. It will also help those who would like to better understand the development of the post-Soviet republics of the former Soviet Union, including the Russian Federation. The book may give answers to questions which are of crucial importance for all states with transition economies, inasmuch as the range of the problems discussed goes far beyond the framework of the Middle Eastern region.
"Rossiya v globalnoi politike," Moscow, 2013, No 1, January - February.
