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ISLAM IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES
2018.01.011. ALEXANDER KRYLOV, ANDREI FEDORCHENKO. THE MIDDLE EAST: STATE PROSPESCTS OF REGIONAL SITUATION DEVELOPMENT // "Ezhegodnik IMIM (MGIMO MID Rossii)," Moscow, 2015, Iss. 3(13), P. 57-85.
Keywords: the Middle East, the Middle East settlement, «the Arab spring», radical Islam, «Islamic state», Syria, Iraq, Libya , Egypt, Arabian monarchies, Yemen, Israel, National Palestinian Autonomous Territories, the Middle East national economies.
Alexander Krylov,
Dr.Sc. (Hist.), Andrei Fedorchenko,
Dr.Sc. (Economics),
Institute of International Studies,
Moscow State Institute for International Relations,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia
The authors note that the Middle East has recently been high-conflict area. Former confrontation gained even greater edge in Iraq and Syria. The Islamic State (IS) started a wide-scale expansion, in consequence of sanguinary battles part of territory of these states came under the control of Islamists.
In Libya influence of the IS was rising, separatism was increasing, battles between government forces and formations of Islamists were waged. Islamic groups in Egypt always tried to organize mass sedition. In Yemen Islamists suffered defeats -Houthis insurgents secured their control not only over the
Northern but the Western part of the country, reached the Red sea, captured the capital Sana. It caused international punitive expedition headed by Saudi Arabia. Internal contradictions became aggravated in the face of rivalry increasing between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Turkey and Syria, Israel and the Palestinian territories. Years of the Arab spring demonstrated that Western countries still try to use geopolitical changes in this region for their purposes, including revision of postwar international legal system.
The U.S. Middle East policy crisis
The U.S. Middle East policy crisis is undoubted. The plan of democratic development of Libya after M. Kaddafi toppling made under the scenario of NATO faulted. The government not only controls the situation in the country, but also can't ensure its own security. On the territory of Libya there are armies which consist of paramilitary forces numbering many hundreds of thousands of combatants. Terrorists and tons of weapons are brought from Libya to the hot spots of North Africa and the Middle East. Richest oil fields which NATO states strived to monitor are controlled now by radical Islamists, tribal militias and smugglers who import million barrels of crude oil by illegal channels.
In 2012 the U.S. supported deposition of H. Mubarak and rise to power of «Moslem Brotherhood» in Egypt. However the short-term period staying in power of «Moslem Brotherhood» proved that the U.S. made another mistake making a bid for a party which didn't have government control experience and then it was neutralized by army headed by General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.
Civil war in Iraq is in full swing. American invasion in 2003 disrupted the balance of political, confessional and ethnic powers in the country established for a long time. Intended by American politologists "democratic changes" and specifically assembled puppet government of Nouri al-Maliki broke down. The government of al-Abadi which changed the previous isn't without
bias capable of stabilizing the situation in the country and far less confronting adherents of medieval caliphate restoration.
B. Obama administration in August 2014 sanctioned bombardment by aircraft and missiles against combatants of the "Islamic State" in Iraq and Syria. Regional allies of the U.S. in the Middle East and particularly Saudi Arabia and Qatar finance and equip Islamists parties and factions, including the "Islamic State" aimed at strengthening the positions of conservative Islam in the Arab world and countereffort to "Shia Muslim expansion."
Phenomenon of the "Islamic State"
The "Islamic State" was established in 2006 in Iraq in the result of embodiment of eleven radical Islamist groups separated from "al-Qaeda." Spiritual leader and close companion of Osama bin Laden - Abu Musab al-Zarqawi took an active role in this organization founding. Until 2013 the "Islamic State" grouping was among Sunni autonomous militant groups and estimated not more than 4 thousand people. However in a short span of time the organization became the centre of attraction for jihadists migrating among countries of the Middle East. North, West and East Africa. Nowadays about 80 thousand people (50 thousand in Iraq and 30 thousand in Syria) fight under the black banner of the "Islamic State." According to European media sources, about 3 thousand people from Europe, the U.S. and republics of the former USSR as well from Russia (generally from Chechnya) took sides with army of the new "caliphate."
Judging from the fact that its literature of propaganda the "Islamic State" publish in 5 European languages there are a lot of recruited people outside the Middle East.
Using grievances of Iraqi and Syrian Sunnis against ruling authorities the "Islamic State" got a wide social support. On the territories controlled by the IS there were held populist actions: there were organized distribution hubs of free medicaments and food, sweetmeat and toys for children, families of died
combatants got allowances and other benefits etc. Now the "Islamic State" involves in the sphere of its influence tens of thousands of local Sunnis, also combatants from other Islamist organizations and adepts of jihadism from abroad.
The "Islamic State" became widely known in summer 2014, when fighters launched a large-scale assault on Northern and Western districts of Iraq. During a month radicals could took control over a few major cities including Mosul and Tikrit and come to grips with Baghdad. In Syria extremists of the IS occupied Northern province of Raqqa in the central town of which there is the same name headquarters of the organization. The IS spreads by hotbeds. Beyond Iraq and Syria the IS could consolidate in Libyan Eastern province Barka (Cyrenaica). On 5 October 2014 Shura Counsel of Islamic young people in Libya declared Barka the territory controlled by the "Islamic State." By February 2015 "caliphate" adherents established order in Dern, Nofaliya, al-Mabruk and also besieged regions of oil recovery in Sirt.
Principles of drawing power of the "Islamic State" are next. First, policy of Al-Maliki puppet government was aimed at strengthening Shia dominance in Iraq, that moved the Sunni citizens forward armed resistance. In Syria conflict between power and opposition has nature of outright resistance of Shias (Alawites) and Sunnis. Caliphate considered being a sincere and ideal on its installation formed in VII-IX centuries is opposed to modern forms of government control which inevitably give rise to social injustice, lawlessness, corruption, oppression of the poor and abuse of power of the rich stratum. In millions Sunni's consciousness caliphate is a unique Islamic institution which can eradicate all exertions of state nepotism, protect Muslim community from foreign political and economic dependence and religious and cultural impacts. Secondly, the "Islamic State" doesn't need a financial support from abroad. Caliphate obtains billions of dollars due to banks and shops robberies, confiscated property of people of other faiths, hostage swapping for ransom, slave trading, control over drug trafficking and illegal channels of oil spread. The "Islamic State" is the richest
terrorist organization with the budget 2,3 billion of dollars and daily enriches its active assets in 1 million dollars at the expense of speculations in oil black market.
Self-proclaimed "caliphate" has all attributes of a state. It has wide controlled territory and own capital - Raqqa. Sunni people basically support new regime. The regime executes sate strategy, including principles and methods for solving social, political, economic, national and religious and other problems and goals through a structured mechanism of state management. "Caliphate" of Al-Bagdadi has two deputies(sharifs). 12 governors (vali) of controlled "Islamic state" districts of Syria and Iraq and ministry are dependant on it. The particular role belongs to the deliberative board (Shura) consisted of warlords and Muslim theologists who consider every decision of governors and ministers concerning their correspondence to Sharia's laws.
The "Islamic state" is a flexible structure capable of restoring. Its horizontal networks doesn't coincide with schemes of modern armies network activities. This structure is more germinative there where national borders are transparent in Northwest Africa, Somali, Ethiopia. Actual absence of borders helps to shift, high level of ethnic conflicts also favours it.
Researches suggest that to localize the IS there are indispensible systematic efforts aimed at recreation of central authority in Iraq and also decisive moves for resolving conflicts in Syria. Fight against the IS should be waged by combination of political, military, economic and social measures. Moreover it should be coordinated at the international level. Among nonmilitary methods of fight against the IS there should be controlled illegal oil supplies through Kurdistan and Turkey and isolated jihadists from international financial system by blocking work of banks arranged on the territories occupied by terrorists in Iraq and Syria.
The Palestinian-Israeli deadlock
In Palestinian-Israeli area until 2013 Obama administration didn't announce initiatives which would have been admissible for both parties interested in Middle East settlement. When B. Obama came to power first of all he intended to confront Iranian nuclear programme. In August 2009 the U.S. State Department offered their main partners in NATO to consider the possibility to realize "transactions" which imply toughening Western sanctions capable of shattering Iranian economy in exchange for building freeze in Jewish settlements. This suggestion caused negative reaction both in Israel and National Palestinian Autonomous Territories (NPAT). Benjamin Netanyahu let see that his government would not impede building in big enclaves Ariel, Modiin, Gush Etzion, Ma'ale Adumim (about 10% of all the territory of the West Bank) and also Jewries of East Jerusalem. Furthermore recognition of the legitimacy of some enclaves on the West Bank meant de-facto waiver of previously supported resolutions of the United Nations Security Council requiring of Israel withdrawal from occupied territories in the war of 1967, the territories where there should be created Palestinian state. It's clear that such an "initiative" wouldn't be approved by the United Nations Security Council member states. Russia, China, Britain and France oppose policy of development of Israeli settlement sector on the West Bank including East Jerusalem. The U.S. demand that Israel freeze its settlement activity however it shouldn't be a condition for resumption of negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians.
After victory in the second presidential elections B. Obama administration reviewed negotiation process negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians and the role of the U.S. in this process. The team of advisors of the American president on the Middle East was considerably widened and enhanced. The majority of crew members took part in preparation and holding of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations which were held under the
aegis of B. Clinton in 2000-2001 in Washington, Camp David and Taba. 12 years later in conditions of serious progress absence on Palestinian-Israeli track the U.S. again tried to galvanize the plan of territory exchange. Arab peace initiative 2002 proposed recognition of Israel by Arab states in the case if it withdraws its troops from the occupied Arab territories and would agree to creation of Palestinian state. B. Obama administration hoped to achieve the diplomatic breakthrough in the beginning of 2014. It was supposed that in January 2014 J. Kerri would submit a plan to resolve problems of the Middle East settlement on the basis of 1967 borders and territory exchange. In the plan there would be included schedule of its implementation. In would also raise problems of regional world, Arab peace initiative and would contain a programme of Palestinian economy development.
However the new government of B. Netanyahu formed by the results of special elections in 2013 adopted 84 drafts of additional construction in settlements stressing that it was neither going to freeze nor to stop settlement activity on the Palestinian territories. Negotiations between two states for solving Israeli-Palestinian conflict lost any significance whereas Israeli politicians and lawmakers have in fact embarked on an accession procedure of the Jordan Valley to Israeli borders. The Jordan Valley and Northwest coast of the Dead Sea occupy a special place in military strategic estimations. On modern Israeli maps this territory is included in borders of State of Israel. The territory bordering on Jordan frontier is a «closed zone». Creation of entire field by natural river bed permits Israel to control allocating of Jordan water resources and regulate the movement process of Palestinians and goods to Jordan and back on the territory of the West Bank. Military control over the West Bank territory provides cutting off the access to the Jordan Valley. Separation of the Jordan Valley from the West Bank rules out the possibility to create a proper Palestinian state.
A logic outcome of American initiatives failure based on the idea of territory exchange became more serious changes in
the region of Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Triple negotiations through the intermediary of the U.S. (2013-2014) were primarily doomed to failure. While "Likud" block is in office Israel won't take concrete steps for positive solving of the conflict with Palestinians under no circumstances. Government formed on 14 May 2015 with the support of religious and nationalist parties headed by B. Netanyahu can't objectively fulfill serious changes in internal or external policy of Israel. Still it will be intensified anti-Iranian atmosphere, will be continued policy of total blockade of the Gaza Strip and spreading of settlement activity on the Palestinian territories on the West Bank. Negotiation process with Palestinians will remain in deadlock and hence solution of main definitive status problems will be frozen for an undefined period.
Perspectives of Arabian monarchies modernization
Relative calm is observed in Arabian monarchies. They are still out of Arab "thaw" zone (excluding Bahrain). Authorities of these countries are able to maintain political and social stability based on combination of three factors. First, hydrocarbons export revenues dive a possibility to eliminate real and potential hotbeds of social protest. Secondly, the regimes support alliance with conservative religious groups and leaders of tribal clans. Thirdly, national security is guarantied by Western powers chiefly the U.S.
At the back of societies there are complicated social-economic processes. In spite of partial modernization of political systems in the counties of GCC during the existence of this organization the process is slow and has a "multispeed" character. There is a burning issue of transition of supreme power which is concentrated in hands of 80-90 years old founders' of the state children, in Qatar and Oman the supreme power required the search of supreme ruler successors. Shrinking and inconsistent modernization doesn't transform political elite itself which continues to play its traditional patriarchal role of
"benefactor" as for the lieges. Accelerate transformation of the Arab world affected this peninsula of seeming tranquility. Leaders of GCC states are forced to advance reforms to prevent the proliferation of the "Arab spring" on their territories. However changes go with inertia not as rapidly as in other Arab countries.
In some states of the Arab peninsula measures are being taken for strengthening constitutional dual monarchies (Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE with especially specific form of government control in Emirates). Problem of succession is put on the back burner because of more «democratic» procedure of supreme leader change. Conflict among clans is added by growing claims of emerging civil society to restrict coercive powers of monarchs. In the longer term it can lead to transformation of constitutional dual monarchies into parliament monarchies.
In other counties of GCC the problem of succession is urgent, because absolute and absolute theocratic monarchies experience generation change. If in Qatar this change has already happened then in Saudi Arabia and Oman important ones are being prepared. With regard to future developments in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Oman and Qatar there are no grounds to expect that monarchical regime will be changed after succession of generations and there will originate conditions for establishment of constitutional monarchy. There will be needed many years to overcome absolutism inertia.
Death of the King Abdullah on January 23, 2015 lead to change in the balance of power in the Saudi leadership but not in the system of succession. After acceding to the throne King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (on January 23, 2015) reshuffled top government echelons of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In defiance of contemplations of some experts the seat of heritor occupied not the eldest son of demised monarch prince Mut'ib but prince Muhammad bin Nayef. Many people call him the most influential man after the King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Muhammad bin Nayef is considered to be a reformist and relative
liberal. It is possible that he will be the first Saudi monarch with Western education. As a result of tipping the balance of forces destabilization of power may happen in the ruling elite. Advances in internal and external policy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia many people associate with accession to power the successor -M. bin Nayef. Personal changes can result in positive shifts in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia policy relating to Iran, Iraq and Syria.
Shape and perspectives of Yemen conflict
In the South of the Arab peninsula in Yemen high expectations were aligned with convocation if March 2013 of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) with participation of leading political parties and movements. The NDC formally stopped its work in January 2014. Its results had interstitial nature as resolution of the main item - about state - administrative arrangement-was put aside and entrusted to Khadi interacting with most influential political parties representatives. Moreover such important primarily proclaimed goals of the conference as publication of a new constitutional draft, announce of constitutional referendum and election dates weren't achieved.
Convocation and arrangement of the NDC didn't mean ceasing war conflicts on the country's territory. Efforts of national reconciliation were made with large-scale offensive of Houthis in the North and continuation of military coups and terror attempts in the South. Offensive tactics of Houthis brought them military rewards. In the result the central leadership of the state lost control over the North. Houthis form authorities here provide people with security. In spite of their promises to surrender heavy weapons and take part in national reconciliation they probably seek to re-establish in one form or another theocratic subnational entity in this part of Yemen.
Having seized the military initiative and virtually invading the capital Shias made demands to public policymakers: adherence to main decisions of the NDC, including property
redistribution in concordance with decisions of the conference (in their favour) resignation of the government and implementation of Houthis in executive authorities, lowering of fuel prices to pre-crisis levels. But their main goal was elimination from the political and economic arena of "Islah" party and supporting it internal forces. In the result in September 2014 Shias and country's leadership signed an armistice agreement. In accordance with it the government submitted resignation. Houthis in turn affianced to withdraw their troops from the capital and surrender captured weapons. Traditionally this agreement wasn't fulfilled. Units of Houthis left in Sane continuing to control vehicular entrance to the city and strategic assets, to seize houses of people for reinforcement of their military positions. They tried to establish control over oil extraction area Maarib about 120 kilometers east of the state capital and advanced towards sea port in the Read Sea - Hodeida city.
In spite of a clear imbalance of power in favour of Shias' armed forces and weakening of the central authority the trends of further development of the situation on the North of the state weren't defined. It is noteworthy the mixed character of conflicting interests and aims of internal and external forces which are specifically or by implication involved in Yemeni conflict. Shia community crippled Islamists and significantly widened its controlled territory including the capital. Adherents of compromise over decisions of the NDC M. Kataisy and A. Ansi headed the party "Islah." From the outside players supporting Houthis Iran got benefit from it. The former Yemeni president Saleh by the hands of Shias could settle accounts with those who supported "Yemeni revolution" and ousted them from power, strengthen positions of its clan representatives and thus obtain new possibilities of influence on the state's fortune. The president Hadi using others weakened his main political and economic rivals - Islamists from "Islah" party. Compromise with the South became closer to reality. However Hadi and his suite are afraid of further advance of Houthis taking into account their aspiration to restore power lost in 1967.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as the most incorporated outside player is interested in containing Houthis, restrain their political role by weakening Yemeni analogue of Moslem Brotherhood. The position of this state is quite defined: "Houthis did the deed and can leave." Positions of Saudi authorities and Yemeni president (on the need to restrict influence of Iran in Yemen and introduce Shias activity in the north of the country into a certain framework) broadly coincide as evidenced by Saudi-Yemeni negotiations at the summit level in September 2014. Considering maintaining of conflict interests of various political, religious and ethnic groups in Yemen, Saudis defend a plan of reaching compromise among state leadership, Houthis, Sunni's tribal head, the former president Salih, Southern "Harakat" reaching agreement about an alliance in new development process of political situation. In can become a continuation of national dialogue but in conditions of new power balance. Such a scenario involving limiting control of Houthis over Zaydis provinces and preventing the creation of a Iranian bulwark in Yemen is good enough for the U.S.
According to experts the events in Yemen stay within a notion which calls "big Sunni-Shia war" where one party is backed by Iran and the second one by Saudi Arabia. The U.S. is in a difficult situation as somewhere they gently support Sunni and their traditional ally Saudi Arabia, and somewhere as in Iraq they are obliged to support Shias in their struggle against the IS and at root enter into factual alliance with Iran. The only power apart from southerners who get benefit from the civil war is advocates of "Al-Qaida" who seized control of the territory from Hadramaut and Abyan to Ma'rib after erosion of security agencies of A.M. Hadi. This organization can gain preference in case of Houthis crushing defeat becoming factual manager of Yemen which risks converting into "failed state" and just another "black hole" of anarchy in the Middle East.
One of the main factors motivating Saudi Arabia and its "Gulf" allies for affirmative actions in Yemen are problem of oil
transit through Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, prospect of its overlapping by Yemeni Shias in case of total assumption of power by Houthis can hurt complex oil strategy of Riyadh which includes not only countermeasure to the plans of Iran to enter the oil market but fight against shale oil producers in the U.S. and create difficulties for traditional oil exporters on the world market. Among scenarios of possible conflict escalation there is potential speed march of Houthis to petroleous Eastern province of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the majority of the population of which are Shias, with the object of "Shia revolution" stirring.
Saudi-Iranian struggle for influence on Southern Yemen can well end with merger into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The majority of Yemeni southerners confess Sunnism. They are reconciled with the Kingdom by the fact that many people of South sent their families there. The power of Saudi Arabia economic attraction for that matter can hardly be overestimated. For of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia possible access to the Arabian Sea is strategically important, bypassing Iranian threat in Strait of Ormuz (the bulk of Saudi trade flows pass by maritime routs). As a first step for integration into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of strategically important Yemeni province Hadramawt experts consider decision of Saudi authorities to contribute the Yemenis living in Hadramawt visa-free entry into of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Among the possible consequences of the civil war in Yemen there may become creation of united Arab armed forces as it was announced at the summit of the League of Arab States (LAS) which took place in Egyptian city Sharm el-Sheikh in late March 2015. The goal of these armed forces is "quick military intervention" in zones of regional military conflicts, response to emerging threats to security. A condition for intervention is recourse to the LAS of official authorities of various conflict-ridden Arab countries. In the summit communiqué it is envisaged voluntary participation in joint military establishments of the LAS member-states. Consequently, military operation
"Decisive Storm" pulled off by Saudi Arabia and its allies in Yemen, where most of the country is controlled by Houthis will culminate in establishment of one more pan-Arab structure, this time of military purpose.
Judging from the perspective of using the LAS armed forces, it was to be hoped that these units will help to coordinate actual and potential international and intrastate conflicts in the region. They could be estimated as future counterweight to NATO in this part of the world, as an instrument for crisis situations resolution not by outside players but with the help of Arab states. At the same time it cannot be overlooked the presence of serious constraints for fulfilling peace-keeping potential of this military contingent. Through the history of the LAS there always were contradictions among member-states in reaching Arab unity.
Problem of economic lag overcoming
Among the problems requiring quick resolving in the Middle East are economic reforms. It's noteworthy the structural economic lag on the regional countries. In recent decades economic growth and imbalance of industrial structure has left the most urgent problems in the strategy of market reforms in most countries of the region. Endurance and incompleteness of the process of regional economy structural adaptation for world economic situation come from the high level of etatism of Middle Eastern countries economic mechanism that typologically conciliates them as geographic location determines affinity of natural climatic conditions for these states. Problems which encounter the Middle East today are insufficient high profile of participation in international division of labour; weakening of industry comparative advantages on the world markets in consequence of imbalance of technological solutions spreading in the world; inflexibility of economic mechanism, and excessive nationalization of which doesn't allow to respond quickly on
frequent changes in external demand; growep of external debt. In virtue of population boom economy cannot absorb millions of workers that provide sustenance for international terrorism.
Only countries specializing in hydrocarbon extraction could avoid marked aggravation on domestic economy situation and minimize economic component of opposition sentiments. Political and economic trends in the region are due to the fact that MENA region stay world reservoir of energy feedstock for access to which there is an intense competition among main centers of economic power in the name of the West and the East. In such a case counties with capital excess stay running, just as main part of the Arab world achieved a stalemate in its socio-economic development. Separation from advanced countries is compounded by consequences of the Arab spring.
At the same time geopolitical changes in future can stimulate creation of regional poles relatively growth balance: Saudi-Egyptian alliance, Kurdistan, Iran, representatives of advanced world - Israel and Turkey.
Author of the abstract - Elena Dmitrieva
2018.01.012. EVGENY BIRYUKOV. RELATIONS BETWEEN SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN IN THE SPHERE OF SECURITY //
"Problems of National Strategy" Moscow, 2017, № 2 (41), P. 21-38.
Keywords: foreign policy of Iran, foreign policy of Saudi Arabia, Iranian -Saudi Arabian relations.
Evgeny Biryukov,
PhD (Economics), Senior Research Fellow, Research Center of Foreign Countries, Russian Institute for Strategic Studies
The exacerbated contradictions between Saudi Arabia and Iran in recent years and their foreign policy strongly influence
