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people. Undoubtedly, the national and ethnic background, the associations based on defense of national interests will play the dominant role in this process.
Summing up, it should be said that the unsolved social-economic problems of the main part of the population of the country were always the reasons of inter-national and inter-confessional clashes.
"Sovremennoe razvitie roionov Rossii: politico-transformatsionnye I kulturnye aspekty", Ufa, 2010, p. 79-83.
Elena Kuzmina,
cand. of political sciences (the IES of the RAS) THE CHANGE OF POWER IN KIRGIZSTAN: A NEW TURN IN GREAT GAME
The change of power and the subsequent inter-national clashes in the south of the country made experts and journalist discuss again the security problems in the Central Asia. Some of them, for instance A. Pabst in his article "A New Game in Central Asia as Kirgizstan suffers" ("the National", 18 June 2010) recalled the New Game in the region for the XIX century-the beginning of the XX century plaid by the Russian Empire and the British Empire and try to extrapolate its principles to the present situation.
To A. Pabst mind, the events in Kirgizstan were caused by the rivalry for political hegemony in the Central Asia in the XXI century between Moscow and Beijing like in the XIX century between the two empires (Russian and British). At the same time, the West allegedly only watches this rivalry, which does not let assert that the world gradually approaches the universal model of liberal market economy. To what extent is rightful the similar historic extrapolation, all the
more, the reproach, if not the imputation in hindering public progress of two influential but not the only geopolitical subject in the region?
The temptation of the historic analogy is great, since the situations seem to be quite similar, and one wishes to explain everything by external forces. However, everything is not so simple. The events differ in substance, form and aim. First, it is not the interimperialist war aimed at enslavement of indigenous peoples. Second, the territories are not seized and the borders are not re-divided, like in the past. Third, not so much the re-division of the spheres of influence as the struggle for change of the development model with traditional patron-client relations for liberal market democracy goes on (which is ignored by the opponent). Actually, Russia and China occupy the most powerful positions in the region. At the same time, the economic influence e of the latter is growing by great tempos. Only for the period of the world crisis in 2009-2010, the CPR made investment in economy of the region in the form of loans, credits and material assistance, which exceeds several times the corresponding investments of Russia, the USA and the EU. At present, China occupies the economic niches, which Russia did not want or was not able to keep.
However, it would be incorrect to speak only about economic interests and positions of only these two states. The countries of the region are also interested in extending their exports; and it concerns not only Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, which possess big reserves of hydrocarbons, gold, uranium and other non-ferrous and rare-earth metals. Kirgizstan and Tajikistan, which lack so big reserves, also to a large extent live at the expense of development and export of small deposits of gold and silver. The export of the main resources is directed to the West.
However, the flows of the main export product - the hydrocarbons - from the region are rather peculiar. The principal
pipelines have been laid from the region to Russia and China. Beijing intends to use the Central Asian hydrocarbons for their own needs, while Moscow is mainly charged with their transit to Europe. Since Russia uses its pipelines for political games, the European consumers with the USA support try to re-direct some flows of oil and gas to the non-Russian energy routes. Let us recall many proposals to Kazakhstan to join the oil pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and lobbying in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan of construction of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline with its further connection to the projected European gas pipeline Nabucco.
One should not forget that even the greatest investments in the resources extraction industries of the region were made by European and American companies. For instance, by 31.03.2010, according to the National Bank of Kazakhstan, the share of American investments in the mining industry of the country made 39%, the share of the Netherlands - 26.7%, of China - 9.4%, of Russia - 1.7%. The same situation is in the gold mining industry: the main partners of Uzbekistan and Kirgizstan are American and European companies. The interests of Russian, Chinese and European actors are interwoven in construction of transportation communications.
China makes investments not only in construction of routes from the country to the Central Asia but also in modernization of transport infrastructure within the region. These investments, on the one hand, let extend the Chinese business, particularly from the bordering Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous region, in the Central Asian market, on the other hand, by means of "opening" of the closed economic space of the Central Asia to ensure security in the border Chinese territories. At present, 87 transport routes function, including 43 for passengers and 44 for cargoes shipment - with Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan and Tajikistan. Within the framework of the Organization of Cooperation of Railways,
the International Union of Railways and UN ESCATO, the "Northern Corridor" is subject to a thorough study. It is the sole international route, where the direct tariff schedule of traffic from China to Germany and the simplified customs and border procedure are agreed among officials of the railways of Kazakhstan, China, Russia and Byelorussia. Beijing proposes for the states of the region to create the transit railway for a distance of 4 thousand km from the Chinese-Kazakhstan border through Kazakhstan and further to Turkmenistan and Iran with the European track gauge (1435 mm). China, taking into account the interest of the CA countries in the transport exits to the sea, opened province Sinkiang for cargoes transit to port Gvadar in Pakistan. The other option of the Eurasian railway transport corridor is the restoration of the so called Great Silk Route in its modern variant: from the south of Japan by means of submarine tunnel through the Korean channel and via the Republic of Korea and China to Europe.
One of the priority projects is the construction of the highway and the railway the CPR - Kirgizstan - Uzbekistan. As a result of the negotiations for thirteen years the parties succeeded to determine the strict direction of the ways. However, it is necessary not only to construct the mentioned ways and to create the land transport system but also to execute the complex of inter-state measures for the maximum possible reduction of transport expenses and transit tariffs. The optimal way of lobbying the corresponding decisions for the CPR is within the framework of ShOS. The European Union also gives active support to the development of transport infrastructure along the line East-West. The Central Asia is located far away from Europe. Two regions are connected by some modern routes, and most of them are laid through the territory of Russia. The construction of the modern transport system and diversification of its directions is a must for extension of trade and economic reciprocal actions as a whole. It is
impossible to avoid formation of favorable transit and customs conditions for functioning of this transport direction. The project TRACEKA became a model project in this respect. Over 40% of its budget is directed to implementation of investment infrastructure projects. As a whole, with participation and support of KES there were implemented 60 projects for the amount of 121 million euros.
The strategy of its development up to 2015 determined the main priorities and the most significant tasks for promotion of trade, transport and transit in the region. For this sake, the administrative border procedures are being simplified and harmonized, the basis of the integrated multi-model transport system is being shaped and the tariff policy of international shipments is being perfected. New instruments are applied for attraction of external investments in the infrastructure of TRACEKA and for consolidation of cooperation with the European Union. In particular, the following technical projects were implemented for the sake of development of the transport corridor: harmonization of border procedures, the united policy of transit customs and tariffs, general legal basis for transit shipments. Many member-states of TRACEKA adopted some new normative acts promoting rapprochement of their legislative acts with western standards in the transport-communication, trade-economic, investment and other spheres.
As it is evident, not only Russia and China carry out their activities in the Central Asia. Other national states and inter-state organizations in the CA region and in adjacent regions as well as of the outside regions realize their interests in the region itself. It means that not only two actors, as A. Pabst asserts, form and carry out their activities in the Central Asia.
The roster of the main external actors in the sphere of regional security remains unchanged: Russia, China, the USA and the EU.
However, the forces are distributed in another way. All these countries participate in settlement of the main issues of regional security - the struggle against religious extremism and terrorism as well as narcotics traffic. China, though, unlike Russia, the USA and member-states of NATO do not possess there military bases and supplementary military objects but cooperate within the framework of ShOS and at the bilateral, mainly diplomatic level.
It is high time to pose the question: are Russia and the USA the allies or the rivals in the struggle against terrorism? On the one hand, they cooperate for the sake of ensuring the anti-terrorist campaign of the USA in Afghanistan: non-military cargoes of NATO are transported via the air space of Russia. On the other hand, there exists a constant hidden counter-opposition relating to the military objects on the territory of the Central Asia. The USA regards the region primarily as a strategic base for the long-term domination there and for its military presence in Afghanistan. Washington prefers amalgamation of Afghanistan and the Central Asian states in the united region - the Great Central Asia with the aim of withdrawal the region's states from the exclusive influence of the adjacent powers - Russia and China, and for withdrawal of Afghanistan from the orbit of Pakistan and Iran. This project was originated in the Institute for Studies of the Central Asia and the Caucasus at the J. Hopkins University in Washington and became widely known after publication of the corresponding article of its director F. Starr in magazine "Foreign Affairs" in 2005. As a whole, this strategy is directed to installation and maintenance of the USA dominance in the region by means of consolidation there of the role of Pentagon and NATO. The American experts express their common opinion that for the last ten years the military component is the dominant factor in relations of the USA with the Central Asian countries and often contradicts the general policy of Washington in the
region. For instance, the ministry of defense of the USA intends to construct some military objects in Afghanistan and in the region. In particular, the USA intends to locate an operative military base near Afghan city Mazari-Sharif at the distance of 50 km from the Uzbek border. The USA intends to build the border guards' points and the training camps for creation of local security forces in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kirgizstan. The location of additional bases is not so much the alternative to "Manas" base in Kirgizstan as a new American strategy based on the principle - bases located everywhere, considers A. Malashenko, an expert of Carnegie center in Moscow.
Russia also aspires for extension of its military presence in the region, primarily in Kirgizstan. However, its reciprocal actions with K. Bakiyev government did not bring positive results. And what is more, Bakiyev clan, having got political and financial support, did not fulfill a single promise or provision in the signed document. The stumbling-block in the Russian-Kirghiz negotiations on creation of a new base was the place of its location, according to some experts. Bishkek proposed to locate the military object in the Batken region quite near to the border of Uzbekistan. Tashkent disagreed with it, since it is afraid of intensified actions of extremists in this case. Uzbekistan is one of the most significant strategic partners of Russia in this region. Therefore Moscow will look for an option, which will be acceptable for all. Besides, the interests of Russia and the USA have been crossed there. Washington declared that it intended to locate in Batken a military training center, although no corresponding documents were signed. The events in April upset these calculated plans of Russians and Americans. They had to postpone realization of both projects.
The new authorities of the country raised these issues again. R. Kazakbayev, the minister of foreign affairs of the new government declared that the issue on location in Kirgizstan of the second Russian
military base remained quite urgent. Bishkek reanimated this issue to balance the correlation of military forces on the territory of the republic, some experts think. Due to the lack of specific agreements of the base it is difficult to appraise its ability to stabilize the situation in Kirgizstan It is too early to speak about the owners of these objects. Up to present, Bishkek simultaneously makes equal proposals to both powers. Under these conditions, the leadership of China comprehends that it lacks the sufficient forces to oppose the USA in the region on a large scale and prefers to create the regional security system within the framework of ShOS. Thus, the military-political and geo-strategic correlation of forces is not shaped according to the dictate of the "Great Game" of growing again "Old Eastern Empires" - China and Russia but are formed under the impact of the multi-component Great Game (using the terms of A. Pabst) with participation of the biggest world actors - the USA and the EU - and the Central Asian states themselves playing certain role, which is far from being passive.
The appraisal of the contemporary situation in the Central Asia should not avoid the countries of the region. They should not be regarded as the objects of international manipulations. In this case, A. Pabst is right when he said that the region's states for 19 years of their independence did not succeed to construct not only the universal model of liberal market democracy but even its pre-market image. It is connected not so much with the relatively equal forces of external actors in the Central Asia as with the internal political situation in the states of the region.
Having acquired independence, they declared preservation of the secular way of development based on democracy and market economy. However, the CA countries lacked the experience of democratic governance, at the same time the ethnic-bureaucratic states never existed in the CA. The feudal system of khanates functioned in the
region up to the second third of the XIX century presupposed the absolute power of the rulers and did not depend on their nationality. The Russian czarism, which replaced this regime, did not intend to disseminate democratic ideas in new provinces and did not form its administration by the national principal. The Soviet power divided the Central Asian region into the national republics but did not get rid of totalitarian methods of governance there. Actually, by the beginning of the 1990s, the democratic political culture did not form in the region, which promoted preservation of the ancient-long social relations of traditional society.
At the same time, regionalism started to gain in strength. The formed rigid vertical of the supreme power smoothly transforms into multiple power clannish pyramids. Not a single president was able to destruct the clans' connections. They only balance these connections by often cadre movements without favors to the closest circle. The phenomenon of clanship reflects the traditional-patriarchal and social-cultural foundations of the population. Their essence is as follows: the main part of the population regards the institution of the state power as a system of the fair distribution of social and material benefits.
From the legal point of view, the CA states are considered as the democratic republics. The elections of the presidents and of members of the parliaments take place regularly, the power functions are divided etc. But, in point of fact, democracy in the region is limited to some extent comparing with classic western models. The so-called delegated democracy exists in the CA states, and they are more adapted to the traditional structure of regional communities. The functions of various branches of power are transferred to the presidents. The difference among the CA countries consists only in the size of the delegated power. Thus, in Kazakhstan the alleged lesser impact of the leader of the state on the legislative and judicial branches of power has been
created, while in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan the president's power is not limited by any conditions.
Since Kirgizstan had moved further on the way of democratic reforms and economic openness, it is not by accident that it became the territory of more often people's disturbances and coup d'etat. As experts predicted long time ago, the experience of building the western model of political system in Kirgizstan would in the best case result in the collapse of the system itself. But the worse outcome took place: the uncontrolled breeding ground of permanent instability was created in the region.
This situation was formed not for the last five years during K. Bakiyev rule. This process started in A. Akayev time. The democratic institutions put into operation by the first president of Kirgizstan, given the lack of the corresponding political culture and powerful presidential rule, resulted in chaos. The new democratic system was unable to demolish the ancient-long social relations of the traditional society. This duality radically distinguished the country from the neighboring countries, where the traditional system of the powerful leader of the nation was formed with the account of inter-clannish mutual ties and nominal democratic institutions.
The ethnic-social peculiarity of Kirgizstan is the existence of a rather big Uzbek Diaspora (about 25% of the republic's population) in the south, in the Kirgiz part of the Fergana valley (Uzbeks make not less than 40% of the population in the Osh and Jalal-Abad regions) and in the north, in Tokmak district. The Diaspora consists of the more developed part in the poor country but actually does not participate in its political life. The ethno-bureaucratic policy relating Uzbeks is seen in the information and education spheres. The shaped disproportions could not help giving occasion for inter-national clashes.
The economic situation contributes to complications in the country. Unlike the neighboring countries Kirgizstan lacks big deposits of hydrocarbons, uranium and gold (although it still maintains its economic position thanks to its gold mines), which are in great demand in the world market. Kirgizstan possesses the only rather significant regional natural resource - water. However, the Kirgiz government failed to make it a commodity, due to the strong opposition of neighboring Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, being the main consumers of it, with tacit consent of big world and regional powers.
The narcotics' traffic has transformed in one of the main items of income of not only of the criminal groups but also of the illegal business of the ruling elites, given the weakness of the central government and amalgamation of ruling structures with the criminal groups. For the period of independence, the impoverished people to get resources for support of their families had to arrange transport of Afghan narcotics via the country's territory in the northern direction. The Federal Service of the RF for Control over Illegal Narcotics Traffic stresses two main directions of Kirgiz traffic - "Sogdi" and "Batken". In both cases narcotics comes from Tajikistan and concentrates in Osh region, which is the point of departure via Jalal-Abad to the north of the country and further to Kazakhstan and Russia. As a result of one operation to stop activities of a transnational criminal group, which shipped Afghan heroin to Russia, over 50 kg was seized in 2009. The narcotics' barons have a rather great impact on the political situation in the region. Exactly they arranged the disturbances in Osh and JalalAbad and bought arms. The conflict is advantageous to the narcotic's traders' groups: when military forces and secret services are engaged in suppressing disturbances the flow of narcotics going on through the territory of the republic grows undoubtedly, according to some information.
The last inter-national clashes were marked by participation of religious groups. The leaders of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Union of Islamic Jihad provoked the pogroms, according to the official information. Their strategic aim became the overthrow of the constitutional system in Kirgizstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan for the sake of creation of Islamist state of Caliphate and with the perspective of transfer of the unstable zone to the territory of China and Russia. These organizations maintain direct contacts with movements "Taliban" and "Al-Qaeda". The Bakiyev clan was considered as a main customer.
The events in spring-summer of 2010 in the south of Kirgizstan demonstrated all contradictions inherent in the country: the weakness of the ruling power; the narcotics' business adapted to the authorities; the impoverishment of the population; the consolidation of criminal structures and their coalescence with the ruling structures; the growth of religiousness, particularly in the south of the country. The application of the ethnic-national factor is the simplest means of solving the problem of contradictions between the old and new power, between the criminal and the power, the re-distribution of property and the control over narcotics' traffic. The Kirgiz-Uzbek contradictions were always the smoldering fuse. However, the re-distribution of power and consequently of property in the country has not been terminated. The government of Kirgizstan legalized by the referendum in June the passage to the parliamentarian form of governance, and in October a new parliament should be elected. The key members of the present cabinet, different political forces, leave the posts and concentrate in the struggle for power. At the same time, Jalal-Abad and Osh remains the smoldering fuse of misery and inter-religious mistrust.
As far as the impact of the events in Kirgizstan on the region is concerned, the use of inter-ethnic tensions in the Central-Asian region is the non-risk enterprise. The national enclaves of the title nations exist of the neighboring states exist in all countries of the CA. The ethnic-bureaucratic policy of the authorities aggravates the inter-ethnic relations. It may lead to the spread of inter-ethic oppositions in the whole Fergana valley (the mostly populated multi-national part of the region, marked by great influence of radical Islamism), divided among three states (Kirgizstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). In case of such scenario, the valley shall transform into a permanent hot point of instability and extremism. The worst variant will be the emergence of a belt of instability from Afghanistan to the borders of Kazakhstan and further to the north. However, neither the countries themselves, particularly, Uzbekistan as the biggest state in terms of its population (29 million people) nor the external actors (Russia, China, the USA and the EU) are interested in it.
The existing situation is rather troublesome for Uzbekistan indirectly involved in the conflict, despite very considerate and thoughtful actions of Tashkent. Some appeals were made to bring its troops into Kirgizstan. The party in exile - "Birlik" made the following official declaration: "The armed forces of Uzbekistan should play the role of peace-making forces and put under their control the southern part of Kirgizstan, primarily Osh region, and stay there up to the time of restoration in Kirgizstan of the legal power and to keep peace of two relative peoples. This action is needed not only for protection of the Uzbeks living there but also for preserving historic authority of the Kirgiz, who lack traditions of the statehood".
The similar feelings exist also within the country, but they are rigidly suppressed by the authorities. The president of Uzbekistan officially declared that neither Uzbeks nor Kirgiz are to blame for the
conflict. The external forces organized the diversion and urged towards involvement of Uzbekistan in this opposition. I. Karimov sees that such actions might lead to military conflicts with the adjacent states, while either Tashkent or its neighbors are not interested in it.
At present, Uzbekistan is a host country for hundred thousand refugees from Kirgizstan, and it has to accommodate them in the over-populated valley, which will cost a lot. At present, the main task consists in avoiding a humanitarian catastrophe able to provoke the flow of refugees to their historic Motherland. The inter-ethnic conflicts may become a problem in Uzbekistan itself, where live from 500 to 900 thousand Kirgiz, according to different estimates. Over 250 people flue away from the Kirgiz enclave on the territory of Uzbekistan as a result of pressure of refugees from Osh, since the Uzbek authorities started to settle them there. The extension of inter-national contradictions may greatly raise the outflow of Kirgiz from Uzbekistan.
Up to present, the region lacks any efficient mechanisms for overcoming the humanitarian catastrophe. The documents of the ShOS are still inadequate, although four out five CA states are its members, and the response to an external aggression would confront hindrances. First, the mechanisms are fixed only on paper. Second, the forces of fast reaction (KSOR) have not yet been formed. And the most significant aspect of the problem is as follows: the document foresees the external aggression against all member-states and not the conflicts among them and the internal conflicts in member-states. The located on their territory NATO forces and their support detachments lack such authority either. Therefore it is lawful to speak about the re-division of the spheres of influence in the Central Asia between Russia and China, taking into account their stronger positions in the region. Russia, China, the USA and the EU have a great potential both for cooperation and for rivalry. It is determined to some extent in economic terms. Gradually,
China started to occupy the leading positions, and China for the midterm perspective will become the principal economic subject in the region, and the situation in Kirgizstan will not have a significant influence on position of the main actors.
As far as security is concerned, the often veiled opposition between Russia and the USA will raise in spite of rhetoric on the reset of Russian-American relations. It is connected with the introduction of clarity into policy of B. Obama Administration in Afghanistan and creation of a system of military objects round it. Russia and China will not stop arranging their attempts to limit western military presence. Probably, the new ruling powers of Kirgizstan in order to consolidate their positions will intensify their cooperation with Russia and will agree for installation of new military bases on its territory. However, it will result in consolidation of military positions of the USA in other countries, primarily in Uzbekistan.
The events in Kirgizstan actually did not change the distribution of the external actors' forces but to a large extent complicated security in the region. It will make them look for new ways of strengthening here their strategic positions. Russia most likely will try not only to extend its military presence in Kirgizstan but also the powers of the ODKB. However, this aim should be achieved in the course of a rather prolonged and delicate process to avoid abruptly the relations with Uzbekistan. The USA will carry out further its policy of extension of military presence in the region for Afghan and Middle East policy as a whole. China as usual will be over-cautious and will wait and see having agreed for cooperation between the ShOS and ODKB only in case of rapid and significant enforcement of American military forces in the region. As a whole, the Great Game will continue and will involve greater number of actors under contemporary conditions.
"Mir peremen ", M., 2011, N 3, p. 163-178.
