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three composing organizations. This problem is the most urgent for Central Asia: the time is quite short before the exit of NATO contingent from Afghanistan, and it is high time for the staff officers of the allied countries to work out finally the plans of specific actions in case of escalation of tension in the region. The Uzbek Fronde will not hinder them any more, and one may express thanks to Tashkent for it. But if they fail in talks and if the agreement is not be concluded, it will not be possible to make Uzbekistan answer for it.
"Rossiya v globalnoi politike", M, 2012, t. 10, N 4, pp. 70-80.
E. Denisov,
Political analyst
CENTRAL ASIA AS A REGION OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
Central Asia (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan) on the eve of XXI century attracted greater attention of the world economic and political centers. The summit of five states of the region, held in Tashkent in January 1993, introduced the term "Central Asia" in political usage. Beforehand, this territory was named "Middle Asia and Kazakhstan" in national publications. However, from the point of view of the geographic science, Central Asia is a bigger region, which besides Middle Asia and Kazakhstan includes also Mongolia and the western part of China; UNESCO holds this point of view. As the members of the Central Asian-Caspian region it is possible to regard also Azerbaijan and bordering territories of Russia near Kazakhstan - from Astrakhan region in the west and up to Altai krai in the east This trend is conditioned as follows: by the rising competition among big regional and global powers striving for getting
influence in the region; by numerous trans-border threats and challenges coming from it; by the discovered deposits of hydrocarbons. The future of the region is uncertain. It depends both on external reasons, and on political stability, and on the rate of internal integration.
The significance of Central Asia (CA) in world economy is determined by its natural resources. For international players the agenda in the political sphere includes the threats, coming from CA, such as export of instability, terrorism, religious extremism, narcotics traffic, migration etc. The contemporary struggle of external forces in CA assumes the forms of competition of various integration projects supported by some or other non-regional forces. The struggle for directions of transport communications, particularly of pipelines, turns out to become a significant part and parcel of these projects.
Each international region is characterized by some or other structure of formal and informal institutions. The first ones are international law, statutes and decisions of United Nations and other international organizations, bilateral and multilateral treaties. The second ones may be regarded as identity, cultural-civilization's norms and systems of values of the region, traditions of reciprocal action, worked out for the period of historic development.
As far as the post-Soviet space is concerned, a group of western and some Russian researchers think that it is in the process of disintegration and that its member-states are "drawn" to other international regions, which, from the point of view of Dmitri Trenin, a known political analyst of the Moscow Carnegie Center, possess greater chances for keeping stability and inter-regional cooperation than the leading integrator CIS - Russia.
The higher is the rate of institutionalization of international relations in any region, the more significant is the role of formal and informal institutions. The contemporary West Europe may be used as
an example. For the 1990s the idea of mutually beneficial cooperation came forward there. Against the background of consequences of disintegration of the USSR, there functioned with efficiency in UE also the multilateral structures, which tried to replace by certain parameters the functions of separate states. Owing to the minimal transaction expenses of reciprocal action of the countries of this region, this process became attractive also for the East European countries striving for minimization of expenses for the transitional period also by means of the West European assistance.
Economic and political characteristic
of Central Asian region (CAR)
The political situation in the states of the region is fraught with internal instability. The shaped authoritarian political regimes are based on domination of personality of the president, who uses (in various proportions in different countries) for consolidation of his power's different patronage-clientele networks and forceful structures. The periods of the leader's change represent the significant challenges for such systems. The mere age factor shows a possibility of the perspective president's change for the period of five-seven years in two biggest countries - Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The consecutive struggle for power may cause significant destabilization in the region as a whole.
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan as the bordering states in Fergana valley are subject to important internal political threats connected with activities of religious-extremist and terrorist groups.
From the economic point of view, the raw resources economies of the region are very weak and depend on conjuncture changes in the world markets. For the Soviet period, the Central Asian republics were separated from the outside world by "iron curtain" and were connected
primarily wit other former Soviet republics. The extent of their internal economic cooperation was rather high: the inter-republican trade made up from 57% to 78% of the GNP. The traditional diversity and many-vector external economic interests of the region was restored for a rather fast period after disintegration of the USSR. The weakening of trade ties within the region was another external economic indication. It was caused, first, by the fact that all of them produced various kinds of raw resources (often identical) and, consequently, were in need of markets of industrialized developed countries. Second, the efficient internal regional integration of the region's states does not exist, and there is no needed institutional basis of reciprocal trade, since no state in the region is ready to forgo shortsighted interests for the sake of its creation. For instance, the share of other countries of Central Asia in the external trade turn over of Kazakhstan, having the largest economic capacity in the region, did not surpass 3% (with illegal trade and smuggling, including narcotics traffic, - 5 or 6%).
The crisis of developing markets in 1997-1998, enlarged by Russian default in August 1998, led to the customs war among members of the integration structure "Central-Asian Economic Community". Uzbekistan periodically terminated shipment of gas to Kyrgyzstan, while Kazakhstan switched off international telephone connections in Uzbekistan. The trains coming from Tajikistan were subject to robbery at the points of crossing the Uzbek boundary. The weakness of regional economic connections is the characteristic of the region's countries. The hierarchy of the main trade and investment partners is subject to constant changes. The table below shows the main external economic partners of the states of Central Asia for the midterm of the decade.
Table 1
Main external-economic partners of countries in Central Asian region for the years of 2004-2006
Country Place / share in trade Import (%)
Kazakhstan Share of five main partners 63
1 Russia - 96.4
2 China - 19.3
3 Germany - 7.4
4
5
Kyrgyzstan Share of five main partners 69.9
1 Russia - 38.1
2 China - 14.4
3 Kazakh - 11.7
4 USA - 11.7
5
Tajikistan Share of five main partners 87.3 62.2
1 Netherl. - 40.7 Russia - 24.6
2 Turkey - 31.7 Kazakh - 10.8
3 Iran - 5.4 Uzbek - 10.2
4 Uzbek - 4.8 China - 8.6
5 Russia - 4.7 Azerb - 8
Uzbekistan Share of five main partners 59.2 68
1 Russia - 23.7 Russia - 27.6
2 Poland - 11.6 S. Korea - 15.1
3 China - 10.4 China - 10.3
4 Turkey - 7.6 Germany - 7.8
5 Kazakh - 5.9 Kazakh. - 7.2
Turkmenistan Share of five main partners 69.4 52.5
1 Ukraine - 47.7 UAE - 15.5.
2 Iran - 16.4 Turkey - 11.1
3 Azerb - 5.3 Ukraine - 9.1
4 Russia - 9
5 Germany - 7.8
The complex de-modernization in a number of spheres in various correlations was characteristic for the period since 1991. It was displayed as follows: decrease of the share of city population (de-urbanization) and of industrial production relating to agricultural
produce and/or the final product within industrial production, rapid fall of level of living and standards of education and health care, outflow of labor resources. The states of CAR actually do not use the potential of economic cooperation created for the Soviet times. In particular, the structure of resources distribution in the region might organize an efficient exchange of hydro-energy produced by downstream flows of upper reaches of the rivers of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in exchange for the hydrocarbons, oil and gas produced by Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and especially Turkmenistan located in the low reaches of the rivers.
The significant discords preclude optimization of electric energy production in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and irrigation of cultivated fields in Uzbekistan, as well as alleviation of ecological problems of the Aral Sea. Uzbekistan hinders construction of new hydro-stations on the territory of its northern neighbors, ensures for them discharge of water in the periods of maximum consumption of electric energy justifying it by the need to maintain the water balance in the region.
The tension around and within CAR is being intensified by the fact that the territories with big deposits of hydrocarbons cause discords among neighbors. The most essential conflict is the dispute between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan relating to the deposits in the Caspian Sea. Iran also presents is claims for the same sector of the sea. The Central Asian states to a large extent depend on external investors, new technologies of mining natural resources, development of pipeline systems. The geopolitical competition of external players for regional resources and the discords among them create obstacles for economic development and even create uncertainty in the directions of export flows of the region in the short term perspective. The U.S.A. prevents transportation of oil and gas from Iran to Europe. As a result, only European companies under "swap" agreements with Iran are able to use this route. The positions taken by Iran and Russia prevent construction
of the pipeline via the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan. Up to the present time, this route is used by tankers bringing oil from Kazakhstan, for instance, via the modernized port Aktau. The going on conflict in Afghanistan as well as discords between India and Pakistan block completely construction of gas pipeline from Turkmenistan along the southern route.
Main vectors of CAR foreign policy.
Chances and reality
The first vector - Russia and its strategic partners in the postSoviet space (Belarus, Armenia). Orientation of CAR to the Central Eurasia - macro-region, and unity with CA is conditioned historically. Integration was forced by Soviet modernization. At present, Russia takes active steps for the sake of re-integration of the post-Soviet space and carries out activities within the framework of the organizations, such as EvrAzES, ODKB and ShOS, playing the role of the guarantor of military stability in the region. It is the most significant trade partner of CA and annually imports a big labor force from the region. At the same time, "post-imperial ideology" is based on the respectful attitude to the role of Russia and the USSR, Russian culture and Russian language in modernization of the region. In its liberal modernization variant this ideology actually does not differ from the pro-Western choice. For the period of XVIII-XX centuries Russia was the historic mediator, specific though, in the process of mastering by Central Asia of western culture and technologies. A very significant synthesis of cultures of indigenous and non-indigenous peoples took place in the social-cultural field of the region. The nationalist and extremist feelings, the lack of Russian strategy in transformation and development of the historic potential prevent development in this direction. Should CAR select Russia with consequent consolidation of
anti-western trends, the rise of competition between Russia and China, on the one hand, and western countries, on the other hand, will be inevitable. At any rate, all pro-Russian ideologies in CA have "weak points". They propose for the region the orientation to the space, which has not sufficiently recovered from consequences of the crisis, connected with disintegration of the USSR, and therefore creates the feelings of disillusionment in Russia in the minds of elites of CA. At the same time, Russia keeps under its control oil and gas transport systems of the region, possesses the key factors of control over profits gained thanks to hydrocarbons by Turkmenistan and to a lesser extent by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The hydrocarbons were mainly shipped from these countries to the markets of CIS countries, which were unable to pay the world prices. And the Russian oil and gas were "liberated" for export to Europe.
The second vector of the region's foreign policy orientation is the U.S.A. and the EU, i.e. the western world. The influence of western culture and identity on the region in the past time was not big and was realized via Russian influence. The migration waves from Eastern Europe for the XIX and the first half of the XX centuries, including German re-settlers to Central Asia, promoted this process. At present, the cultural influence of the West grows rapidly thanks to inclusion of Central Asia in globalization processes. For the period following disintegration of the USSR the economic influence of the EU was growing steadily in the region. The member states of the EU occupied the principal positions in trade with Central Asia, in financial-investment activities in the region and in rendering assistance in many other forms. The cooperation with the U.S.A. after disintegration of the USSR was concentrated mainly in the military-political sphere within the framework of NATO program "Partnership for Peace" and reached its apogee for the period of anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan since
2001. It should be mentioned that it would have been impossible without agreement of the Russian leadership to provide for air forces of the coalition the air corridors. Washington does not have direct chances for maintenance and strengthening of its influence in the region, despite cooperation in the military sphere and the consequent creation of military base in Atyrau. The non-state subjects supported by military power of the U.S.A., such as transnational corporations (TNC), play important role in CA. Probably, just the American oil lobby played an essential role in the rise of the U.S.A. interest paid to Central Asia since the middle of the 1990s. In particular, it was displayed by risen activities of western oil companies in the Caspian region after signing in 2004 of "Contract of the Age" with Azerbaijan, by projects for laying new pipelines routes (Trans-Caspian and Trans-Afghan).
The peak of the big lobby campaign arranged by American oil TNC in this direction was in 1997. Its aim was as follows: to make Administration of Clinton carry out its policy in Central Asia more efficiently in the interests of American oil companies. Just in 1997 the Caspian region was proclaimed as a zone of the U.S.A. "national interests". For the period of the 1990s the expert community also paid greater interest to the Caspian region. In this connection, the activities of "Heritage" Foundation, Institute for Central Asia at John Hopkins University and others should be mentioned. The expert community as well as TNC has essential influence on formulation and working out of political priorities of western countries in Central Asia. These perspectives attracted attention also of British business - the British Petroleum (BP), which became one of the main initiators of political advancement of the western countries to this region of the post-Soviet space. The West and the U.S.A. as its leader comes forward as a complicated and multi-lever construction, where the main interests in the main are coordinated but certain differences in opinions and
priorities are not excluded. For instance, just the U.S.A. blocks cooperation of European energy companies with Iran in the Caspian region.
However, the American interest in the region was becoming less as the prognosticated estimations of oil deposits were diminished. The American and British energy companies, having raised the interest in prospected regional reserves of hydrocarbons, later initiated the significant re-appraisal of sizes of the Caspian reserves. Some Russian experts think that the correlation between reasons and consequences was different in this case: the evaluation of the extracted reserves was set too high for the political objectives.
After disintegration of the USSR the leaders of Central Asia proclaimed their readiness to support the western global project with its priority of individual rights over society, the competitive political system with free elections as the only legitimate form of political governance, free internal market as well as the priority of the above principles relating to the national legislation of the states. However, the specific social-political systems of Central Asia adapt with difficulty to these principles. Individualism contradicts the traditional clannish system. The competitive democracy raises political chances of Islamic radicals (like in Uzbekistan) and may provoke civil conflict (the war in Tajikistan). The market economy gets on with difficulties with the political systems based on the authoritarian governance. The priority of international law comes up against "nationalism" of young nations. The countries of CAR can not paying attention to alter-global criticism, which stresses the fact that globalization in its contemporary form preserves the division of the world into "global billion" and the exploited periphery with inevitable inclusion of the region.
The other variant of pro-western choice is being supposed by the course to economic and political integration with the West Europe and
the U.S.A. Since 1991, all countries of Central Asia, particularly political elites of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, cooperate with NATO, the U.S.A. and the EU. It is worth mentioning that one may see a higher support of the pro-Russian ideological views. It is connected with historical role of Russia in modernization and westernization of the region.
The aims of the Central-Asian policy of the European Union in terms of hierarchy became often subordinate to the Russian policy of EU. Even the projects of "alternative transportation" being the main subject of discords with Russia were often used as an instrument of pressure on it. For instance, European policy of "energy diversification" in relation to CA partially is the response to disinclination of Russia to follow the principles of the European Energy Charter. From the formal point of view, by the middle of 2006 Russia was the gainer in political struggle for CA against the U.S.A. from the middle of 1990s. Four out of five Central-Asian states simultaneously became members of the integration projects supported by Russia (CIS, EvrAzES, ODKB and ShOS).
The other essential vector of probable development is China and the Asian-Pacific region. The Asianism (or Pan-Asianism) is a rather intricate complex of ideologies spread at present in the Asian-Pacific Region (APR) and India. The unity of these peoples was formed owing to the gigantic trade zone connecting all countries of the region (subject to influence of the Chinese culture - Confucianism, Indian Buddhism and Hinduism as well as Islam). The ideology was born after the victory of Japan over Russia in war of 1905-1907. In the course of the Second World War, Japanese committed many crimes having raised animosity of other Asian peoples against themselves. Nevertheless, the economic boom in Japan after the war gradually alleviated their attitude and contributed to the emergence of Asianism,
which side by side with anti-colonial and anti-post-colonial feelings included perception of social-economic modernization based on the traditional values and structures in the trade-investment reciprocal action with the West. In the APR there appeared an attractive (for many non-western societies) development's model correlating successful development of market economy with preservation of national social-political institutions. Following Japan there appeared new Asian "tigers": Singapore, Hong-Kong, Taiwan and South Korea. After reforms of Dan the process of rapid economic growth started in China. At present, many experts talk about transfer of the center of world economy from the North-Atlantic to the Asian-Pacific region. The authoritarian, semi-authoritarian or Communist regimes prevail there. The region lacks "democracies". At the same time, they are very young (South Korea and Taiwan), while other countries are characterized by specific "Asian" peculiarities, for instance, domination of one party in Japan.
The adoption of "Asian" identity might solve many problems of development of CAR. In particular, it will eliminate dilemma "Islam or development". The people of Malaysia profess Islam and are included in the group of successfully developing peoples of the Pacific Basin. However, some foreign and internal policy impediments are unavoidable on this way. CA may "be included" in APR only via and by support of China, and this circumstance disseminates in the region the fear to be controlled by the eastern neighbor and be subject to the Chinese influence. From the point of view of internal policy, the APR membership demands a high economic dynamics and limitation of the surveillance of the state over economy. The elements of control may be left but not in the present form, when the power gives the chance for control over private property.
At the level of declarations, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in the beginning of 1990s expressed their sympathies to the "Chinese way". Actually, the political elites of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan failed to ensure economic openness according to the APR model and fast inflow of foreign investments.
At present, Kazakhstan approaches to ideology of Asianism for two reasons. On one hand, thanks to successful use of natural resources it is the sole country in the region, which demonstrated high tempos of economic growth. At present, programs of industrial and post-industrial development of the country are subject to preparation. On the other hand, Kazakhstan gradually moves from European images of democracy. It is proved by prolongation of the powers of the president, who rules the country since 1990 and by the domination in the parliament of the pro-presidential party "Nur Otan".
The fourth probable vector of development of the region is the Islamic world. The supporters of this paradigm of CAR development find out the basis of their position in history. Today, Islam is perceived by many people as the component of culture and identity. The Central-Asian countries see connections with the Islamic world also in economic contacts. To some extent, the Islamic choice may be regarded as an alternative to the western liberal model. Saudi Arabia and other countries of the Persian Gulf display a particular interest in consolidation of Islamic positions in CA. At the same time, they come forward as adversaries to preservation in the region of the Russian-Soviet cultural tradition. The conservative circles of some Muslim countries do not support westernization and all the more "Asianization" of CAR.
However, even in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, where before 1917 the positions of Islam were more powerful, the Soviet heritage and adherence to secularism of the ruling elites prevent full acceptance of
ideologies spread in Islamic countries. Besides, within the Islamic world itself, for instance, in OIC, they failed to arrange efficient reciprocal action even for the key problems of policy and international relations, such as the Arabic-Israeli conflict or relations with the West. As far as the Islamic Bank of Development is concerned, it does not play a significant role in the integration processes.
In 1985, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey established the inter-government Organization of Economic Cooperation (OEC). After disintegration of the USSR five Central-Asian countries and Azerbaijan entered this organization and made an attempt to restore cultural and economic unity of the Eastern Islamic world. The member-states of OEC differ greatly in terms of level and tempo of economic development and economic power. The objective economic reasons preventing integration are supplemented by political discords. The more intensive economic ties have been shaped between OEC countries and industrially developed countries, which purchase their natural resources. The idea of probable change of geo-political orientation of CA has shaped in the countries of Islamic tradition. This idea is based on the routes of oil and gas transportation to the southern directions. In this case the following conflict of interests becomes unavoidable: on one side, with Russia, which evidently prefers the northern routes of transportation, and, on the other side, with APR, first of all, with China, which prefers the profitable orientation to the east.
However, within the "Islamic community" there is no unity relating to geography of laying the energy routes from CA. Pakistan is interested in shipment of oil and gas from Central Asia in the southeastern direction in order to get a part of raw resources (primarily Turkmen gas) and to become simultaneously a transit country for energy and goods flows to the shore of the Indian Ocean. As a rival of
Pakistan there comes forward Iran, which needs a part of Kazakh gas and Turkmen gas to cover the energy deficit in the northern part of the Islamic Republic for the sake of shipment of its own hydrocarbons to Europe and Turkey. For political reasons the Turkish-Iranian cooperation in this sphere has been blocked, and the project of Trans-Caspian oil pipeline comes forward. With support from the West, they tried to start implementation of the project within the framework of TRACEKA - "Great Silk Route" program. However, thanks to agreements between Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan signed in 2007 the implementation of this project is not foreseen in the near future. This circumstance allows make the conclusion that "the Islamic world" has a weak influence on contemporary political processes in Central Asia and on its development in the sphere of energy.
For the beginning of the new millennium, the foreign policy priorities of the Central Asian countries and their adherence to various models of development started to shape.
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan go on the way of synthesis of different ideologies: liberal-European, liberal-Islamic and modernist. They take into account the objective specifics of the region, which prevent it to resemble completely countries of Europe or Asia. At the same time, the combination of modernization with local traditions corresponds to the spirit of "Asianism"
The isolationist trend gained in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, where the role of the state and the presidential power is particularly strong. The attempts to imitate it under conditions of contemporary Tajikistan did not give good results, and Tajikistan, being a strategic partner of Russia, remained in its foreign policy preferences within the framework of many-vector policy.
Thus, while Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in terms of ideology equally are close to all four probable vectors of development,
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are rather far from them. It is clear, if one compares the foreign policy courses of two groups of countries. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan readily participate in all possible integration structures both in CIS and outside this organization. On the contrary, Uzbekistan and especially Turkmenistan avoid participation in any regional and international organizations. Turkmenistan, citing its status of a neutral state, officially recognized by United Nations, some years ago declared the termination of its membership of CIS, remaining in this international community of post-Soviet states only as an associated member. Uzbekistan, formally keeping its membership in CIS and ODKB, avoids participation in most activities of these organizations. Tajikistan due to its complicated economic and political situation, nearness to the zone of the Afghan conflict threatening security of this Central Asian republic, has to balance among various regional and non-regional players and has not finally defined the priority vector of its foreign policy.
Table 2 demonstrates the foreign policy priorities of the countries in the region of Central Asia for the second half of the former decade. Starting from these circumstances, it is possible to come to the following conclusions:
1) the foreign policy interests and priorities of the countries of Central Asia are not determined both in terms of the choice of interests and priorities of the Central Asian countries and in terms of definition of the region of the world chosen for their orientation; 2) these priorities and interests are unstable and subject to conjuncture changes.
Rendering justice to the above said, it should be said that the geopolitical uncertainty was characteristic for CA for the whole period of existence of the region, which historically was "the crossroad" connecting civilizations of distant territories of Eurasia. This process
was going on in ancient times and in Mid-Ages primarily in the form of ethnic migrations from Central Asia in many directions. As a result, CA turned out to be connected by ethnic ties practically with all regions of Eurasia. At the same time, the Soviet and the post-Soviet periods were marked in the region by the outflow of able-bodied population to Russia, which promoted consolidation of ties of peoples of Central Asia and Eastern Europe.
Table 2
Foreign policy interests and priorities of the countries of Central Asia for 2007-2008
Country Spheres of interests and partners Foreign policy interests and priorities Foreign policy type
1 2 3 4
Kazakhstan Economic sphere: Russia, China, U.S.A., EU. Military-political sphere: Russia, China, U.S.A. 1. Many-vector policy. 2. Common integration projects with Russia. 3. Common investment projects with China. 4. Cooperation with American and European oil and gas and other raw resources companies. 5. Military cooperation with NATO and U.S.A.(construction of navy base in Atyrau). Open foreign policy. Integration course.
Uzbekistan Economic sphere: Russia, China, APR countries. Military-political sphere: Russia and China. 1. Friction with U.S.A. and EU. Game based on their geopolitical competition in the region with Russia and China. 2. Interest in external investments, particularly from APR, China and Russia. 3. Interest in China and Russia as countries with minimum claims for human rights observance and democratic standards. 4. Military NATO base (Germany) in Termez. Elements of isolationism. The course for development of bilateral relations.
1 2 3 4
Kyrgyzstan Economic sphere: EU, Russia, China, U.S.A., Kazakhstan. Military-political sphere: Russia, China, U.S.A. 1. Many-vector policy. 2. Interest in investments of all possible external partners. 3. Big migration flows to Kazakhstan and Russia. 4. Military bases of NATO (U.S.A.) and Russia. Open foreign policy. The course for integration.
Tajikistan Economic sphere: EU, Russia, China, U.S.A., Kazakhstan, Iran. Military-political sphere: Russia, China, EU, U.S.A. 1. Interest in investments of all possible external partners. 2. Big migration flows to Kazakhstan and Russia. 3. Military bases of Russia, NATO (France), information on informal interest of India in a military base in Ami. Moderate course for integration. Combination of elements of open and private foreign policy.
Turkmenistan Economic sphere: Russia, EU, U.S.A., China, Ukraine, Iran, Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Turkey. Military-political sphere - the neutral status officially recognized by UN. 1. Dependence in gas export on the Russian infrastructure 2. Many-vector policy in export of gas. 3. Search for alternative routes of gas export. Main potential partners: China, EU and U.S.A., Turkey, India, Pakistan, Iran. Rigid isolationism. The course for development of bilateral relations.
Permanently, CA was subject to political influence of various external forces connected with the Islamic world, China, Russia, India and West Europe and had itself a rather great influence on them. The complex of the above mentioned factors lead to the conclusion that the vagueness of the development model and differences in selection of external partners of the region were inevitable. At present, there are equal reasons either to accept or to turn down any of the above described "external" political orientations. The ruling political elites in the states of Central Asia are afraid that acceptance of any of these vectors may undermine their positions and at the same time also stability of the states. Therefore for the present powers of Central Asia the most advantageous variant is such model of political development
and vague ideology, which would not impose significant obligations and would not threaten political processes directed "from above".
Therefore some experts defined the situation shaped in the CA countries and their foreign policy's choice to be "the suspended neutrality". As its variant one may regard the doctrine of "Eurasianism" interpreted as "orientation" simultaneously to Russia, the European Union, the U.S.A. and China. The other foreign policy ideologies are close to it, such as "many-vector policy" and policy of "open doors" in Tajikistan, the conception of "diplomacy of Silk Route" and regional zone free from nuclear weapons in Kyrgyzstan. The neutrality of Turkmenistan is a special case, while Uzbekistan pursuing the policy of "free hands and unions" actually is guided by ideas of "potential neutralism" in the process of carrying out its foreign policy.
The CA states try to avoid extremes in their foreign policy. On one side, they stay at a distance from Russia and images of "parts of former USSR", and, on the other side, they succeed to avoid temptation to proclaim them to be "a part of the West". However, it would be a mistake to regard the foreign policy of the Central Asian states as "neutrality". Such policy has nothing in common with the classical neutrality of Switzerland and Sweden or with neutrality of ACEAN states. It is dictated by internal and external threats (instability in Fergana valley, closeness of CAR to restless Afghanistan and Chinese Sinkiang).
The lack in CA as a whole of a clear oriented model of development makes this region closer to Africa to the south of Sahara, where there exists the same situation of indefinite civilization's choice. Therefore in the long-term perspective the adoption of such course may lead the CA states to the same results - transformation into failed states. One other foreign policy trend should be mentioned. Today, the CAR states actively urged towards involvement there of external forces,
which would make them solve complex problems of survival and development. In this respect Russian expert E. Yatsenko truly notes that the main interest of the CA states is as follows: acceptance of the proposal solving the whole complex of existing problems (economic and civilization's problems). In its time adherence to the Soviet Union supposed just such decision: protection from eternal threats and suppression of extremism, access to technologies and infrastructure, integration in the united and international economic ties, guarantees of observance of interests of local elites, humanitarian development. Today, the national leadership of Central Asia looks for a new variant of complex decision, which is different comparing with the times of the USSR. On the one side, the Central Asian states need an external partner, which may solve the complex of regional problems, as it was done by the Union's "center", when the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan were union republics in the USSR. On the other side, due to the complex of external and internal political reasons the new independent CA states are not ready to make the choice in favor of any world and regional partner.
In the situation of domination in Central Asia of centrifugal forces there appears its construction as an international region by means of external forces. At the same time, each of them strives for formation of the region according to its own interests, i.e. primarily to establish in it such institutions, which would promote the long-term involvement of CA in the sphere of influence of the corresponding power. Since different countries involved in reciprocal action represent various regions with different orders, they urge towards "inclusion" of CA in the corresponding part of the world promoting washing out regional identity in Central Asian states. At the same time, the paradox is as follows: the keeping unity of the region is achieved not as a result of centripetal forces but owing to the balance of centrifugal forces.
At present, Central Asia exists as a separate international-political region because the external forces with diverse directions prevent each other to dissolve this region in other adjacent regions of the world.
Thus, the analysis of various aspects of regional and international reciprocal action shows: the CA states are close sooner to the pole of minimum institutionalization. They try to avoid excessive obligations and do not follow rigidly any values and principles generally accepted by international practice. All this is fraught with significant consequences for development of paradigm of international reciprocal action in this region of the world.
"Vostok (Oriens) ", M, 2012, N 2, pp. 74-85.
