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Nikolay Kosolapov,
cand. of historic sciences Marina Strezhneva, doctor of political sciences THE POST-SOVIET SPACE: CONVENTIONALITY OR REALITY?
The post-Soviet space is considered below not as a conglomerate of territories of new independent states emerged after liquidation of the USSR but as a certain political, economic, humanitarian and cultural-historic community. The experience of common life in the Soviet Union and the long-term active reciprocal ties connect the population of most countries of the region. The mutual action of these countries has its own political-organizational basis, which consolidates gradually, although seems to be rather amorphous. At the same time, inclusion of former Baltic republics of the USSR (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) and at present members-states of the EU and NATO into the postSoviet space would be wrongful, since over there the elite and the population perceive themselves and actually represent a part of the European integration and of the Trans-Atlantic and not at all the postSoviet space.
The member-countries of the Community of Independent States form primarily the post-Soviet space: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Moldavia, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine, as well as Turkmenistan. The latter has the status of observer in this organization; however, which is more significant, orientates to economic and humanitarian reciprocal action just with former union republics. Actually, Abkhazia and South Ossetia may be included in the post-Soviet space, although it is not institutionalized. These young states in some or other way are included in it by means of Russia.
At the same time, the presence in the post-Soviet space does not depend on the subjective will of any separate state. It is determined to a deciding extent by the objective circumstances, which can not be changed instantly. The decision of the national leadership is not sufficient in this case. It should be the result of the radical changes in economy, including the culture of production, as well as the change of political traditions, psychological condition of the people, their mentality etc. And all this needs time. The post-Soviet states are connected by a dense network of formal and informal reciprocal action and, despite national specifics, have many common features, solve similar problems connected with consolidation of the recently acquired statehood in the context of new public relations. The material discussed below has the following task: on the one side, to appraise the capacity of the uniting trends within the fixed territorial limits and, on the other side, to find out the disintegration factors. In other words, the question is to determine the potential sustainability of mutual relations of most former Soviet republics as a local system of the contemporary international relations. Only in this case it will be possible to make hypotheses concerning their future role and place in the globalization process.
The Community of Independents States created immediately after liquidation of the USSR is the most extensive structural entity in the post-Soviet space. Although it did not fulfill its original formulated functions (keeping the united defense, economic and humanitarian space) and, probably, will not fulfill them in future, it played a rather essential positive role in the process of division of "union property" and formation of new independent states. The attempts to transform the CIS into an efficient organization and, in essence, to re-integrate the former union republics (even if on a new basis) turned out to be unavailing.
There are many objective and subjective reasons of this failure. They consist in the policy of Moscow for the 1990s and in the position of Kiev, which originally regarded the Community as an instrument of "civilized divorce", and in dissatisfaction of most Soviet republics by the Belovezhsk agreement of the three republics-founders of the USSR (RSFSR, USSR and BSSR), which terminated the existence of the Soviet Union. But the determined factor in this respect is the great difference among development stages of former parts of the former united state. They demonstrate adherence to different forms of political systems and social-economic models, different mentalities of their citizens and the cultures of production. At the same time, each of them has its own appraisal of common history and perception of their national interests, which do not often coincide with the national interests of other CIS participants.
Under the historic conditions of the USSR, only Russia could play the role of the uniting force in the post-Soviet space. However, Russia turned out to be unready for it. In time of B. Yeltsin presidency, Russia was subject to the aggravate crisis and survived the hardships of the transitory period, went on through the period of acute struggle for power and property, was waging the exhausting war in Chechnya. The institutions of state governance were in great extent paralyzed, and the army was in the state of decay. The idea of "shock therapy" was discredited in the eyes of the leaders of new independent states. The Russian partners in the CIS were looking for new foreign policy orientations. Given the weakening positions of the RF in the Community, many centers of the world politics actively were engaged in the struggle for influence in the post-Soviet space. The leading western powers and the countries, such as China, Turkey and Iran, rapidly filled in "the vacuum of the force". This circumstance to a large
extent promoted the structural-organizational separation within the Community.
The states, which still appreciated the allies' ties with Russia (Armenia, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan) preserved their membership in the Treaty of Collective Security (DKB). At the same time, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan refused to take part in prolongation of the Treaty (April 1997). Jointly with Ukraine and Moldavia they created a new association - GUAAM, which was aimed primarily for limitation of Russian influence in the Trans-Caucasus, in the Caspian and the Black Sea zones. As a whole, the process was going on directed to diminishing the ties among the former union republics and, correspondingly, to "coming unraveled" the post-Soviet space.
Under conditions, when the USA tried to consolidate its military presence in the Central Asia (bases in Kirgizstan and Uzbekistan, the attempts to come to an agreement with Tajikistan on location of military objects, the plans for creation of such structure as "the Caspian Guard" etc.), the Treaty of Collective Security, signed in 1992, did not respond to the essential needs of today. The decision was taken to transform it into the Organization of the Treaty on Collective Security (ODKB). The Statute and the Agreement on the legal status of ODKB were adopted in October 2002. The Agreement contained an article of collective liability of members of the Treaty in case of aggression against one of them. And what is more, four years later the statute documents of the Organization were supplemented by the provision on the obligatory agreement by its members concerning the location of foreign military contingents on their territories.
Thus, Russia actually ensured its more efficient control over its space to defend it at least within the limits of this alliance. At present, seven states are members of ODKB: Armenia, Byelorussia,
Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Ts task is as follows: to counteract to the external risks, to take actions against international terrorism, religious extremism and narcotics' traffic.
It was decided to form within ODKB a well armed and trained group - the Collective Forces of Operative Reaction (KSOR), which will be formed by five countries (Russia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Tajikistan and Armenia). The activities aimed at realization of this decision were started in Summer-Autumn of 2009. The headquarters, the training camps etc were located in the city of Osh (Kirgizstan). In October the large-scale training exercises of member-states were arranged in October on the territory of Kazakhstan under the name of "Mutual Action - 2009". The training exercises were aimed at organizing the response to the attack of armed bands against a conditional state. At the same time, ODKB member-states shoe their wish to avoid limitation within their own framework and to take part in other systems of international security and to promote its enforcement. The leaders of ODKB at their meeting in Dushanbe (on 31 July 2009) discussed the internal aspects of their cooperation as well as the issues of coordination of foreign policy training courses and carrying out the coordinated policy relating to such organizations, as EU,NATO, OSCE and UN. In the course of the meeting the item of the agenda was discussed on the support of joint support of Russian initiative on conclusion of the Agreement on European Security. The situation in Caucasus and Afghanistan was also discussed. It should be said that the member-states of ODKB, if they do not take part in military actions against talibs, nevertheless, give an essential support to the forces of the western coalition, providing for them transit corridors and trade centers for delivery of non-military cargoes as well as recently the military cargoes. In particular, in September 2009, a new transit agreement between Russia and the USA was put into force on delivery to
Afghanistan and arms by the Russian air bridge. The question is the passage of ten (and more) American military transport airplanes per day.
The parties display their interest in military-political, militarytechnical cooperation as well as in creation of the corresponding collective structures, and its shown in the bilateral ties of Russia actually with all former union republics, including Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Moldavia and Ukraine. It concerns the deliveries of arms and military technique on preferential terms, the training of military specialists, the cooperation in the sphere of the military industrial complex (MIC) etc.
Russia has efficient military bases in Tajikistan and Kirgizstan, its servicemen are located also in Armenia and in the zone of TransDnestr conflict. Since 2008-2009, the Russian body guards started their service in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Russian detachments of the conventional forces are located there. The radio-location and cosmic detection stations in Byelorussia (Baranovichi and Vileika), in Azerbaijan (Gabala) and in Tajikistan (Nurek) are used for the interests of the Russian military command. However, it is possible to speak about the united defense space even within the framework of ODKB only with certain degree of relativity. Russia maintains its security mainly by its own so to say vertical efforts (including its powerful rockets nuclear capacity), since other ODKB members have much less limited capacities. But the matter is not only this fact. The differences in the geopolitical position of new independent states determine the nuances in their appraisal of the sources of real and potential threats to security. For instance, Uzbekistan had its own reasons to avoid participation in KSOR, including the tense relations with Kazakhstan (for the whole post-Soviet period), the inimical relations with Tajikistan, the dissatisfaction with the decision of Moscow to locate the
base of KSOR not in Uzbekistan but in Kirgizstan, finally, the wish to abstain from taking other obligations. However, the matter, probably, is more significant. The Uzbek leadership in this way informs Washington about its readiness to resume military cooperation with the USA, which was interrupted after the Andijan events in May 2005. The other clear example testifies to the lack of complete and unconditional unity of the military-political allies of Russia. It is characteristic that not a single member of ODKB, having condemned the aggression of Georgia against South Ossetia in 2008 and approved in principle the actions of the RF to force the Tbilisi regime to peace, did follow Moscow to recognize independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It is evident that they did not want to complicate their relations with western countries.
A rather dense substance of reciprocal ties among former union republics also makes it possible to speak about certain unity of the postSoviet space. The considerable share of external trade turnover of the CIS countries accounts for the partners in the Community, primarily Russia (except Russia itself and Azerbaijan). A great role is played by the border trade, which actually is not estimated by the official statistics. The lack of visa regime allows citizens of the CIS freely to move within its limits, makes easier labor migration. Millions of residents of the former union republics have jobs in Russia and send home their earned money, which in Tajikistan and Kirgizstan make the sums comparable with the state budgets of these countries. The new independent states have to retreat into themselves, since their industrial and agricultural production (with rare exception) does not withstand competition in the world market. The trips of labor migrants outside the post-Soviet space may confront difficulties not only due to visa, legal and language barriers but also for the reason of the low qualification of Gastarbeiters.
At the same time, the enclave feature of the post-Soviet space relating to the globalizing world consists not in its small inclusion in the globalization processes but in still going on process of formation and consolidation of private property. The ruling circles of most countries in the post-Soviet space comprehend the need of radical market reforms, which become the condition for overcoming the social-political and technological backwardness, while the external economic ties may not be reduced to a simple trade turnover. They have to coordinate their activities in the sphere of economy with the partners in the CIS, to create the corresponding mechanisms, providing the latter with some transnational functions. Up to present, the economic integration slips. In this case, the lack of activities of the Eurasian economic cooperation (EvrAzES) is a negative example. This situation is explained by the lack of internal pre-conditions, namely the weak industrial basis and poor development of market relations. This is an exclusive circle.
In the Central Asia, Kazakhstan demonstrates the greatest successes and, like Russia and China, is ready to participate in implementation of expensive and large-scale projects. The sphere of activities is very great - from extraction and transportation of hydrocarbon resources, development of such resources as uranium and gold to construction of electric stations, railway and automobile routes.
For the post-Soviet period, the infrastructure objects of the Soviet time (gas and oil pipelines, railways and highways etc.) kept mainly under Russian control tightened the new independent states. However, this resource of unification most likely will be reduced. For the last decade, the energy policy of Russia in the post-Soviet space was characterized by a constant raise of economic pragmatism. For 20052006, the concluding stage of transferal of reciprocal action with former
union republics in the energy sphere to the market relations was terminated.
The new mutual relations in the energy sphere in principle change the configuration of the post-Soviet space. The question is that the intensification of competition among producers of hydrocarbons for markets was started and was going on. Azerbaijan delivers oil to Europe via the pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan. Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan implement the projects of energy transportation to the southern and the south-eastern direction (Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and China), reducing their dependence on Russian transit. The construction of the Trans-Caspian pipelines is not excluded; these pipelines will allow them enter to western markets avoiding the territory of the RF. Russia itself tries to diversify the routes of export of its energy bearers (the pipeline "North Flow" along the bottom of the Baltic Sea; "South Flow" - on the ground of the Black Sea; via the territory of Eastern Siberia to China and the Pacific Ocean) and reckons to consolidate its positions in relations with transit countries: Ukraine, Byelorussia and Moldavia. The authors of collective studies "Russia and the World in the Beginning of the XX century", conducted by the institutions of social sciences of the RAS, rightly stressed that for the CIS states the question was as follows: would their development be rapid and would it bring results, if they were integrated with Russia or with anybody else, primarily with the EU? Certainly, the RF is interested in cooperation with the EU and the USA, in attraction of foreign investments. However, other questions arise as well. The first question is, whether and to what extent the states of the post-Soviet space are ready to master the experience of the developed countries of the world, to accept the models not only of economic but also of political development according to the western example? And the second question is as follows: are the participants of
the EU ready to include them in their structure in perspective? The answer is evident: they are not yet ready to do it. At the same time, the authors of the cited study are absolutely right, when they conclude that the USA and the EU regard the cooperation with the post-Soviet states, inter alia, as an important factor of deterrence of Russia, being their competitor. However, up to present, this cooperation is rather limited.
The cultural-historic common feature of the states in the postSoviet space (given difference of national traditions and mentality) is a rather essential, however, not the principal, factor of maintenance of this space. This common feature, shaped as far back as in time of the Russian Empire and finally formed in the Soviet period, still exists. Despite the seemed ephemeral feature of this phenomenon, which lacks any numerical estimation, its presence (like the interests of security and economic development) has a rather great impact on the type of relations among former union republics.
At the same time, for two decades of the separated existence, the changes took place in the sphere of human connections, which do not promote preservation of the united language information and intellectual space. At present, the problem of keeping and extending the sphere of use of the Russian language in the CIS countries is quite urgent. This problem is characterized not only by its humanitarian but also by its political substance. Russia, striving for keeping its influence in the Community for a long time, is interested in preserving the situation, when not only the present but also the future generation of political leaders, business elite, intellectuals and common citizens of neighboring countries (in direct and indirect meaning) will speak with Russians in the same language.
Some new independent states, formed after disintegration of the USSR, adopted the laws on the language. They contributed to exclusion of Russians and Russian speaking citizens from the organs of state and
local governance, from high executive posts, including social and production spheres. It promoted the outflow of the Russian speaking population, including most qualified specialists. As a result, the potential of the former union republics' development is being lowered. Many Russian schools and higher education institutions with teaching in Russian were closed. At present, when the power and property in the post-Soviet states are divided among local clans, the task of modernization of economic development comes forward. It is difficult to achieve this task without close cooperation with Russia, and therefore the situation started to change to some extent. Education in Russian, giving opportunity to study in Russian higher education institutions becomes an urgent request and even a prestige. The essential augmentation of Russian budgetary means for support of Russian schools in the CIS countries is a device for probable consolidation of the traced trend.
G. Berdymukhammedov, the president of Turkmenistan, connecting the successful future of his country with its rapid modernization, seems to acknowledge that the country needs qualified cadres, who are well trained in all spheres of science. It is impossible to ensure implementation of educational projects without Russia. This question was discussed as far back as in his first meeting with president of Russia V. Putin in Moscow in April 2007. Two weeks later both presidents took part in founding of the school with teaching in Russian, which should function on the basis of Russian curricular and Russian attestation for graduates. Turkmenistan asked for an assistance for creation of the International University (as the department of the Moscow University), primarily for the cadres of professors.
Kirgizstan expresses its permanent interest to education of their citizens in Russian. As far back as in the beginning of the 1990s, exactly in Bishkek the Russian-Kirgiz Slavonic University was
founded. At present, the commission of its branch in the Moscow suburbs Mytishchi is subject to discussion to make education here accessible for young Kirgiz, who temporarily stay and have jobs in Russia.
Tashkent also feels the rising interest in education of the national youth in Russian higher education institutions. Uzbekistan is interested primarily in training of qualified engineers and technicians; the leadership of the country needs them for the accelerated economic development. The specialists in economy and the oil and gas sphere are in great demand. It is not accidental that for the last years, already three branches of the most authoritative higher education Russian institutions were established in Tashkent: Plekhanov Academy, MSU and Gubkin Academy of Oil and Gas (in September 2007).
It is evident that Russia is interested for the long perspectives in implementation of the education projects of the CIS countries. In essence, the question is formation in neighboring countries of the new generation of the political, military and intellectual elite, which is loyal to Russia. It is urgent more so, as in some former union republics the reduction of the sphere of use of the Russian language is accompanied by the rise of interest in education in English and graduation from higher education institutions in the West.
It is rather significant that the leadership of Kazakhstan took the decision to change the Cyrillic Kazakh alphabet for Latin alphabet (in 2007). This official decision was apprehended in mass media as a political step and the urge of Astana towards a distance from Russia. However, this apprehension seems to be unfounded. For 1920-1930, Kazakhstan as well as Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan used Latin alphabet and late changed it for Cyrillic alphabet. Following the proclamation of independence, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan returned to Latin alphabet. Kazakhstan did the same for
the pragmatic reasons. N. Nazarbayev determined it as follows: at present, the Latin graphic determines in the communication space, and it is not by accident that many countries, including the post-Soviet union republics adopted it. In other words, the former union republics, including Kazakhstan, strive for ensuring the direct access to the world sources of information, advanced technologies and for promoting cooperation with the countries of the West.
At the same time, for the last years, the interest paid to the Russian language in the post-Soviet space not only remains but even rises. However, it seems to lose, probably, its former almost dominant position. This fact should be accepted as a phenomenon of the globalizing world and not at all as the schemes of the competitors. Meanwhile, the Russian elite should not rest an indifferent observer of the trends unfavorable for Russia. The state support of various programs aimed at extension of the sphere of application of the Russian language abroad, intensified for the last years, should further be in the focus of the Russian leadership attention.
The restoration of the united cultural milieu existed in the USSR but greatly eroded for the post-Soviet period is another direction in the field of humanitarian cooperation of Russia with the CIS countries. It is not worth discussing particularly the assertion that not a single national culture may successfully develop without reciprocal action with cultures of other peoples. The Russian culture was always a part of the world culture. In Soviet time, it enriched itself and absorbed the most important achievements of many peoples of the USSR. At the same time, exactly by means of inclusion in Russian culture and Russian language environment the writers, such as Ch. Aitmatov, F. Iskander, N. Dumbadze and others, enjoyed widest popularity and became classics of the Soviet and the world culture. The same concerns the cinematograph, which hardly could have been created outside the
Soviet cultural context, as well as the development of dramatic and opera-ballet theaters, the dance groups etc.
After disintegration of the Soviet Union, when the creative associations of writers and arts representatives of the multinational country were liquidated, when Academy of Sciences of the USSR was transformed into the Russian Academy of Sciences, when the state borders emerged among the union republics, the creative and scientific intellectuals of the former Soviet Union turned out to be separated, many former ties were lost. These processes went on under conditions of the gravest extensive economic and political crisis in the new independent states. It was not a question of scientific and cultural development, of the reciprocal action in these fields. The question was the physical survival. Only for the latest period of time, when the CIS participants went through the first stage of the state construction, the leaders paid attention to the problems of science and culture. In August 2005, at the meeting of the leaders of the Community in Kazan the agreement on humanitarian cooperation was signed. The Forum of the creative and scientific intellectuals of former union republics, held in April 2006, determined the spheres, forms and principles of this cooperation.
At the same time, of great significance is the reverse process. Not only foreign audience is in need of the information. It is desirable that the Russian citizens should be informed about life of the nearest neighbors of the RF. The TV of the RF contains many programs on exotic countries of the world but no one big TV channel (out of dozens) shows regularly any programs about the present situation in former union republics, about their history interwoven with the Russian history, about their architecture, culture, traditions and custom, about their role in the common civilization development of the post-Soviet world. (As exception, the current events, political cataclysms, street
disturbances, demonstrations are covered by the news programs). The same concerns the publications. Meanwhile, the existence of the united information environment is one of the conditions of keeping the common post-Soviet space.
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The above analysis shows that at present the post-Soviet space, given the contradictory processes going there, does not correspond to the criteria, which make it possible to appraise it as a trans-national political space. It is possible to say about correlation of the interests of most state in this space for ensuring their security. And that is all. The political elites and the business community of former Soviet republics perceive the urgent need to overcome the economic and social-political backwardness of their countries comparing with the developed powers of the world. The collective efforts and the support of the more "advanced" partners are needed for achievement of this task. The states of the post-Soviet space as a whole possess the unique pre-conditions, which allow them to expect to occupy an adequate place in the globalizing world. They possess a vast territory and huge transit routes, the biggest natural resources, including the energy resources, a great scientific and intellectual capacity. The cultural-historic common feature and the remained humanitarian ties are able to alleviate the cooperation directed to realization of the determined competitive advantages.
But given the political-organizational structures formally aimed at regional integration, common political institutions (the rules of political life) and all the more the mechanisms, which would ensuring these rules in the whole post-Soviet space, lack here, as well as there are a no fixed perspectives of their legalization, since neither the postSoviet elites, nor the population as a whole in the formed circumstances
constitute the transnational community directed to its political "assimilation".
"Transnatsionalnoe politicheskoe prostranstvo: Novye realnosti mezhdunarodnogo razvitiya", M., 2010, p. 37-50.
Pain Emil,
publicist
THE COMMINITY SLAVES
The multiculturalism is one of the most ambiguous terms of the political lexicon, since both adepts and opponents of multiculturalism appraise it from different positions. The similar collision emerged in the course of discussion of the political declarations made in the end of 2010 the beginning of 2011 by the leaders of three countries -Germany, Great Britain and France relating to "failure" of multiculturalism policy.
Two groups of critics appraise multiculturalism. The conservative criticism (often called by observers to be "cultural imperialism" or "new racism") proceeds from the need to change multiculturalism for monoculturalism and insists to install the legal regime characterized by privileges for dominant cultural groups (religious and ethnic). The adepts of such position (neo-Nazis in Germany; activists of extreme right "English League of Defense" in Great Britain or party of Marin Le Pain in France) disapproved the declarations of their present national leaders considering them as "toothless", "empty PR" and "deceit of the society". At the same time, the position of A. Merkel, D. Cameron and N. Sarkozy is closer to the liberal criticism of multiculturalism, which proceeds from the assertion that preservation of cultural peculiarity is the unconditional right of all
