CC BY
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Karimov opredelilsya s Evraziiskim soyuzom (Karimov Made up His Mind
Concerning the Eurasian Union] // URL.: http://www.node/Formirovanie_
edinjgj_ekonomicheskogo_prostranstva_vSNG
Evraziiskaya integratsiya iRossiya {Eurasian Integration and Russia].
Cited by Bakayav A.K. Voyenno-politicheskaya bezopasnost Kazakhstana
[Military-political Security of Kazakhstan] // CA&CC.Press&AB. - URL.:
http://www.ca-c.org/journal/cac-04-1999/st_10_bakaev.shtml
Khamidova P. Otkroyetsya li v Tajikistane voennaya baza SShA? [Will a Military
Base of the U.S.A. Open in Tajikistan?] // URL.: http://www.centralasia.ru/
newsA.php?st=123389740
http://www.km.ru/world/2012/08/16/razmeshchenie-baz-ssha-v-uzbekistane Zayavleniye Fonda Progressa [Statement of the Foundation for Progress] // URL.: http://www.polit.kg/newskg/268
"Elitologiya Rossii: Sovremennoye sostoyaniye i perspektivy razvitiya," Moscow, 2013, vol. 1, pp. 530-544.
15
Dmitri Popov,
Ph. D. (Law), Head of the Urals Regional Information-analytical Center of Russian Institute of Strategic Studies (Yekaterinburg) PARTICIPATION OF CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES IN SUPPLYING U.S. TROOPS IN AFGHANISTAN
Formation of Northern distribution Network
In 2009 the NDP was commissioned on the basis of a series of intergovernmental agreements signed as a result of the active work of American diplomacy. The network represents a system of transport corridors used for supplying the grouping of the U.S. armed forces in Afghanistan through countries to the north of the theater of military hostilities. It includes communication lines of the Baltic countries, Russia, Central Asia, as well as Turkey and the Caucasus. The network considerably facilitates solution of the military tasks of Washington in
Afghanistan. As to the transit republics of Central Asia, it meant a new stage of cooperation with the United States. The consequences of turning the region into a sort of a rear base of the U.S. military operations require proper attention from the point of view of the long-term interests of Russia in Central Asia.
In the conditions of an unfavorable financial and economic situation and considerable reputational losses, the key task of the United States as proclaimed by President Barack Obama was the completion of the expensive and unpopular campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Its solution presupposed a curtailment of the American military presence in these countries, on the one hand, and on the other, the establishment of loyal ruling regimes capable, with western help, to ensure an acceptable security level and guarantee observance of the long-term interests of Washington in the form of access to oil and military bases. In February 2009, President Obama announced the withdrawal of the main U.S. forces from Iraq before the end of 2011 and stage-by-stage transfer of responsibility for security to the local forces of law and order. This proved feasible after a stabilization of the situation reached there, according to official estimates, in 2007-2008.
The experience gained in Iraq was planned to be transferred to Afghanistan. In July 2010 General D. Petraeus, who commanded the multinational forces in Iraq in 2007-2008, was appointed commander of the U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan.
The new strategy in Afghanistan required a considerable increase of the flow of cargoes and optimization of logistics work in the U.S. armed forces. In December 2009 President Obama ordered dispatch to Afghanistan of another 30,000 servicemen with a view to bringing the total numerical strength of the American grouping there to 94,000, and the coalition forces - to 142,000/
At the same time, from the logistics point of view, delivery of cargoes to Afghanistan is difficult due to the country's geographic position, no access to the sea, mountain terrain, and climatic conditions, but most important, the absence of a developed infrastructure, and unsafe land communication routes. Another problem for the United States was the complete dependence of communication routes on Pakistan.
Offensive operations against the Taliban in these conditions were doubtful and prompted the U.S. command to look for alternative supply channels. The most convenient were in the north via the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, primarily Uzbekistan, where there was the necessary infrastructure from the time of the military operations of the U S S R. in Afghanistan in 1979-1989.
By the beginning of 2009 the opening of the northern routes of supplying the U.S. armed forces and the international forces under the aegis of NATO in Afghanistan became one of the foreign-policy priorities of the White House. A special working group was formed, which included diplomats and Pentagon officials, to conduct negotiations with the interested states. Agreements have been reached within a short time with most transit countries. An agreement with Russia was of key importance. In January 2009 General Petraeus visited Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The U.S. embassies in the region became more active and announced the American desire to buy a great quantity of accompanying non-military commodities.
As a result, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan agreed with and approved transit operations on their territory in February 2009, Azerbaijan - in March, Uzbekistan - in April, and Kyrgyzstan - in July, 2009. Georgia did it earlier (in 2005) and Russia - in 2008. The system of transport corridors through these countries was named the Northern Distribution
Network (NDN). As K.S. Dowd, supply director of the U.S. Central Command noted, this was more than a simple logistics initiative. In fact, it was an instrument of diplomacy.2
Routes and Volumes
of Cargo Transportation by NDN
There are three main land routes operating within the NDN framework - Southern, Central and Eastern.
The first goes via Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Part of cargoes from U.S. bases in continental Europe and Iraq goes to Turkey on land. Shiftment on the Caspian Sea takes place in Baku (Azerbaijan) and Aktau (Kazakhstan).
The second corridor covers Baltic countries, Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The main part of cargoes is taken by railway from the port of Riga (Latvia), partly the port of Tallinn (Estonia) and the port of Klaipeda (Lithuania).
The third route also begins in the Baltic countries, passes through Russia and Kazakhstan, and then turns to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Cargoes are taken across these countries, which have no through railway system, by motor transport.
According to investigations carried out on order of the Soros Foundation in 2011-2012, the cargo flows of the NDN are divided between Central Asian countries in the following way: 100 percent of all cargoes of the three land routes are delivered to Kazakhstan from where about 80-90 percent are shipped by railway via Uzbekistan to Afghanistan. The remaining 10-20 percent are transported by highway-freighters via Uzbekistan or Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan., Turkmenistan with its neutral status does not participate in the NDN officially.3
In 2009 the Pentagon studied the possibility of using routes through Far Eastern regions of Russia and China, but the issue remained unresolved.
According to initial agreements with partner-countries, the NDN was supposed to be used for transporting different materials, engineering and transport equipment, reservoirs for water cleansing, food products, drinking water, etc.4
Such advantages as security, relative variety of materials and ways, as well as the desire of the U.S.A. to reduce its dependence on Pakistan prodded the White House to putting greater load on the NDN. In 2009, when the U.S. military logistics was reorganized in order to be used in the new system, the share of non-military cargoes delivered to Afghanistan by the NDN did not exceed 10 percent.5 However, in 2011, according to the December report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the share of the NDN grew to 40 percent of all rear logistics, having outstripped the Pakistan and air corridors (29 percent and 31 percent, respectively)6 According to the U.S. Department of State data, more than 58,000 containers of "general cargoes" were delivered by the beginning of 2012.7
The NDN acquired still greater importance at the end of 2011, after a sharp deterioration of relations between the United States and Pakistan. In answer to an American air raid which cost the life of several Pakistani servicemen, the Pakistani authorities have closed the port of Karachi and their land communication lines to the Pentagon, which were used at the time by up to 5,000 American trucks every month.8 Pakistan demanded public apology from the American administration and higher payment for transit of containers (from $250 to $5,000)9.
In July 2012, after the apology delivered by the then U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Pakistan agreed to open its
infrastructure, but warned about stricter demands to cargo traffic. However, the two sides were unable to sign a new agreement on transit, and by the beginning of 2013, about 70 percent of all cargoes for Afghanistan were transported, as before, by the NDN, and the remaining 30 percent - directly on board U.S. and NATO planes.10
Problems of Cargo Transit by NDN
The NDN is four times longer than Pakistani communication lines and requires the crossing of four state borders, and sometimes the use of several types of transport, which considerably raises the cost of transportation. At Congress hearings in June 2012, the Pentagon chief L. Panetta assessed additional expenses caused by changing the traffic route from Pakistan to the NDN at $100 million a month and asked the Congress an additional $2.1 billion to cover them. By the beginning of 2012, the average cost of delivery of a 20-feet-long container by the NDN was $17,500 as against $7,200 a year earlier via Pakistan.11 (Although it is considerably cheaper for the United States than air transportation, which costs $40,000).12 Since February 2011, Uzbekistan's railway lines charge for the delivery of one container to Afghanistan $2,00013 For comparison's sake, the duty taken by Pakistan from one truck did not exceed $250 previously.14 Moreover, with the beginning of withdrawal of the western contingent from Afghanistan, Uzbekistan has raised the railway tariff for cargoes going in a reverse direction by 50 percent at once15.
Another problem creating difficulties for the United States and NATO was large-scale and all-pervasive corruption which has repeatedly become a subject of discussions at the U.S. Congress. Bribes are widespread for speedily handling cargoes at customs and border points of Central Asia where great quantities of cargoes are kept. True,
certain American transport companies are involved in cargo and financial transactions not without benefits for themselves. According to information leaked from the U.S. Embassy in Tashkent in 2009, one of the biggest Uzbek commercial holdings "Zeromax" connected with Gulnara Karimova, the elder daughter of the President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov, set up a consortium with seven American firms for carrying on business in Afghan transit.16 As reported by the American "Harper's Magazine," the consortium included "FMN Logistics,"17 closely connected with Zeromax. This made it possible to curtail the time required for cargo deliveries across Uzbekistan by half18. "FMN Logistics" was founded in the United States specially for participating in the NDN by G. Yustas who headed the board of the American-Uzbek Trade-industrial Chamber in Tashkent, the body whose sponsor was the same Zeromax who lobbied the repeal of American sanctions against Uzbekistan.
The White House has undertaken a number of measures to draw means of international financial institutions and foreign donors for expanding the capacity of the NDN. The Asian Development Bank, in which large shares belong to the United States and Japan, has invested $165 million in the construction of a railway line from Hairaton to Mazari-Sharif, connecting the Uzbek transport system with the principal city of Northern Afghanistan19. The construction of this 75-kilometer line was completed in November 2011. So far this line is used only for cargo transportation and is expected to increase the monthly goods turnover between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan from four thousand tons to up to 40,000 tons20.
In August 2012 a Japanese international organization agreed to finance the electrification program of 465 kilometers of the Marokand -Karshi - Termez railway line, which cost $330 million21. It had a priority over the competitive reconstruction project of the Tashkent
electric power plant, as it was recommended by the U.S. Embassy in a cable sent to the Department of State published in the WikiLeaks at the end of 2009, along with a request to influence proper organizations in
Tokyo.22
There are many difficulties for transport agents in Afghanistan itself. Several highways leading to Central Asia are out of order23
Fuel Supply from Central Asia
to Afghanistan
With the beginning of military operation in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq demand for oil products has grown sharply in the responsibility zone of the U.S. Central Command. The needs of the U.S. grouping increased from 40,000 gallons a day in 2002 to over 1.1 million gallons in 200924. The U.S. base Bagram was the main consumer of fuel in the northern and central parts of the country, whose daily requirements in the middle of 2010 were estimated at 500,000
gallons25.
From 2007 the Central Command and the Defense Center of power supply of the U.S.A. began to transfer purchases of fuel and lubricants in Pakistan to Central Asia. By 2010 fuel supplies through the NDN grew from 30 to 70 percent in the total supply volume of the American grouping in Afghanistan26.
Initially, the key role in fuel supply of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan has been played by Kyrgyzstan among all Central Asian countries. By 2009 the U.S. air base in the Bishkek "Manas" airport handled up to a third of all necessary fuel.27 In 2009 fuel worth of $230 million was bought for the needs of "Manas"28.
The commissioning of the NDN at the beginning of 2009 allowed the Pentagon to increase transportation of fuel and lubricants
from Central Asia by land. From that time on, the role of the leader of supplying the American contingent in Afghanistan with oil products has been played by neutral Turkmenistan, which did not participate officially in the NDN.
In 2012 the United States earmarked $820 million for purchasing Turkmen commodities, and the greater part of this money was spent on payment for fuel contracts. Thus, the rear expenditures in Turkmenistan in 2012 comprised 63 percent of all American purchases in Central Asia.29 The main agent in purchases of Turkmen fuel and lubricants was the offshore company Red Star Enterprises, which became known for its involvement in the corruption scandals around the Kyrgyz "Manas" base.
The fact that the biggest purchases of fuel for Afghanistan are made by Americans in Turkmenistan, but not in Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan, can be explained by the scarcity of export possibilities of the latter due to high domestic requirements and a shortage of refineries. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are pure importers of mainly Russian fuel and lubricants. Fuel and lubricants' supplies to Afghanistan have been organized with American assistance by the Turkmenbashi oil refinery with a capacity of about seven million tons of oil a year30. Turkmenistan intends to supply Afghanistan with more fuel, which is shown by its plans to build an oil terminal capable to handle 540,000 tons in Yimamnazar, close to the border with Afghanistan by February 201531.
Cooperation with the United States is viewed by Central Asian producers of fuel as a very promising field, despite the planned curtailment of the American military presence in Afghanistan. This is connected with the fact that the United States, apart from its own requirements, also pays for the purchases of fuel and lubricants for the Afghan national security forces. During the period
between 2007 and 2012 the United States earmarked $1.1 billion for the purpose32. In 2013, the Pentagon asked the U.S. Congress to allocate an additional $123 million. On the whole, the United States Command evaluates the requirements for fuel of the Afghan national army at $555 million a year, on average, in the period from 2014 to 201833.
The growing domestic market of Afghanistan, which is still short of fuel, attracts Central Asian countries. By average estimates of the U.S. Department of State for October 2012, Turkmenistan accounts for 25 percent of fuel supply to Afghanistan, another quarter is supplied by Russia, and partly Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.34 An additional source of supply of fuel and lubricants can be re-export from Tajikistan which expected to receive from Russia up to 450,000 tons of oil products duty-free in 201335.
On the whole, government officials in Kabul state that their country will be able to provide itself with energy carriers by 2015, and they place great hopes on the development of oil deposits in the Amudarya basin in the country's northern provinces by Chinese companies. However, Afghanistan will preserve the status of net-importer of oil products for a long time. High domestic demand connected with the western military presence and the U.S. financial assistance will draw suppliers from Central Asian countries.
Notes
1 Welch W.M., Michaels J. Doubts about U.S. tactics shadow war in Afghanistan/ William M. Welch, Jim Michaels // USA Today: website. 2010. July 21. URL.: http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/afghanistan/2010-07-21-1Afghanisatn21 _CV_N.htm
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David K.S. Building "Log Nation" in the U.S. Central Command / Major General Kenneth S. Dowd // Army Sustainment. 2010. September-October. Vol. 42, iss. 5, p. 6.
Lee G. The New Silk Road and the Northern Distribution Network: A Golden Road to Central Asian Trade reform?: Occasional Paper Series: Central Eurasia Project / Graham Lee: Open Society Foundations. 2012. October. No 8, pp. 13-15. Nichol J. Central Asia: Regional developments and implications for U.S. interests: CRS Report for Congress / Jim Nichol: Congressional Research Service. 2012. September 19, p. 46.
Russia to expand Afghan Supply Route // The Moscow Times: website 2011. August 10. URL.: http://www.themoscowtimes.com/mws/article/russia-to-expand-afghan-supply-route/442811.html
Central Asia and the Transition in Afghanistan: A Majority Staff Report Prepared for the Use of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate // U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations website. 2011. December 19, p.6. URL.: http://www.foreign.senate.gov/publications/download/central-asia-and-the-transition-in-afghanistan2
Kelly T.P. The Northern Distribution Network and the Baltic Nexus / Thomas P. Kelly. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs // U.S. Department of State: website. 2012. URL.: http://www.state.gov/t7pm/ rls/rm/182317/htm
Felbab-Brown V. Stuck in the Mud. The Logistics of Getting Out of Afghanistan / Vanda Felbab-Brown // Foreign Affairs: website. 2012. July 18. URL.: http://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/137785/vanda-felbab-brown/stuck-in-the-mud Ibid.
Tilghman A. Pakistan war supply routes still not fully open / Andrew Tilghman// Military Times: website. 2012. December 4. URL.: http://www.militarytimes. com/article/20121204/NEWS/212040313/Pakistan-war-supply-routes-still-not-fully-open
Tynan D. Central Asia: Who's the Big Winner in the NDN Sweepstakes? /Deidre Tynan //EurasiaNet.org:website.2012. February 2. URL.: http://www.eurasianet. org/node/64969
See: Central Asia and the Transition in Afghanistan..., p. 6. Lee G. Op. cit, p. 19. Felbab-Brown V. Op. cit.
Tynan D. Uzbekistan: Tashkent's Shakedown Practices Hold Up NDN Traffic-Contractors / Deidre Tynan/ EurasiaNet.org: website. 2012. February 27. URL.: http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65056
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20 21
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26 27
Uzbekistan: From A to Zeromax; Viewing cable 10TASHKENT27 // WikiLeaks: website. 2010. January 20. URL.: http://www.wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10 TASHKENT27.html
Silverstein K. Is Pentagon in Bed with "Queen of the Uzbeks"? / Ken Silverstein // Harper's Magazine: website 2010. March 25. URL.: http://harpers.org/blog/ 2010/03/is-pentagon-in-bed-with-queen-of-the-uzbeks/
Tynan D. Documents Highlight Problems with Uzbek Corridor of Afghan Supply Route / Deidre Tynan // EurasiaNet. org: website. 2010. June 28. URL.: http:// www.eurasianetg.org/node/61427
Mashrab F. Afghan Rail Link Marks a Break-out Moment /Fozil Mashrab // Asia Times: website. 2012. January 11. URL.: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/ Central_Asia/NA11Ag01.html Ibid.
The start of the project of electrification of Marokand - Karshi - Termez railway line // Aloqada.com: internet-site. 2012. August 16. URL.: http://www. aloqada.com/News/2012/08/16/startoval_project_elektrifikacii_zheleznoi_dorogi_ marokand_karshi_termez
Uzbek Rail: Red hot wheels to Afghanistan: Viewing cable 09TASHKENT1577 // WikiLeaks: website. 2009. December 11. URL.: http://wikileaks.org/cable/ 2009/11/09TASHKENT1577.html Felbab-Brown V. Op. cit.
Carra J. B., Ray D. Evolution of Petroleum Support in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility //Colonel Geffrey B. Carra, Chief Warrant Officer 4 David Ray // Army Sustainment. 2010. September - October. Vol. 42, iss. 5, p. 18. Ibid., p. 19.
Carra J.B., Ray D. Evolution of Petroleum Support..., p. 18.
WikiLeaks. The loss of "Manas" will be a slap in the face for the United States and will weaken its position // Cazeta.kz: Internet-site. 2011. May 26. URL.: http:/ articles.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=341752
Nichol J. Kyrgyzstan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests: CRS Report for Congress/Jim Nichol; Congressional Research Service. 2010. September 9, p. 10. Kucera J. Turkmenistan Big Beneficiary of Pentagon Money While Uzbekistan Lags / Joshua Kucera // EurasiaNet.org: website. 2012. December 3. URL.: http:// http://www.eurasianet.org/node//66248
The Turkmenbashi complex of oil refineries will be reconstructed // Regnum: information agency. 2011. April 30. URL.: http://www.regnum.rf/news/fd-abroad/turkmenia/autonews/1400402.html
Turkmenistan will build an oil terminal on the border with Afghanistan // Afghanistan.Ru: Internet-site. 2013. February 4. URL.: http:// http://www. afghanistan.ru/doc/56745.html
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Sopko J. F. Afghan National Security Forces: Limited Visibility over Fuel Imports Increases the Risk that U.S.-funded Fuel Purchases Could Violate U.S. Economic Sanctions against Iran / John F. Sopko; Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction Report. 2013. January 30. P.I. URL.: http://www.sigar.mil/ pdf/alerts/2013-01-30-alert-sp-13-2.pdf Ibid., p. 2.
Sopko J.F. Afghan National Security Forces..., p. 7.
Tajikistan and Russia signed an Agreement on "duty-free oil products" // Avesta: Internet-site. 2013. February 7. URL.: http://www.avesta.tj/business/16685-tadzhikistan-rossiya-podpisali-soglashenie-po-besposhlinnym-nefteproduktam.html; Tajikistan curtailed the import of oil products // Asia-Plus: Internet-site. 2012. December 13. URL.: http://news.tj/ru/news/tadzhikistan-sokratil-import-nefteproduktov
(To be concluded in the next issue)
"Problemy natsionalnoi strategii," Moscow, 2014, No 1 (22), pp. 62-80.
