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sphere with a positive image not only of a regional, but also global importance.
References
1. Xin Jinping. Statement at the SCO summit in Dushanbe on September 12, 2014 // Renmin Ribao, 13.09. 2014.
2. V. Putin. Statement at the SCO summit in Dushanbe on September 12, 2014 // http://news.kremlin.ru/.http:// www.russian. xinhuanet. com/.SCO summit in Dushanbe: results // StanRadar.com. No 82 (http://www.stanradar.com/).
"Rossiya i noviye gosudarstva Evrazii / IMEMO RAS', Moscow, 2014, No 4, pp. 52-65.
K. Popov,
Ph. D. (Law), head of Ural regional information-analytical center of the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies (Yekaterinburg) THE PLACE OF UZBEKISTAN IN U.S. CENTRAL ASIAN POLICY
From the time of the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. the United States has regarded Uzbekistan as the key power of the region, having the largest population and military force in Central Asia, situated at the crossroads of the main transport routes, and prone to rapprochement with the West. Tashkent regarded the U.S.A. as an alternative to Russian influence, a condition of building an independent national state, a source of investments and technologies, and also a means of strengthening security against the backdrop of an upsurge of radical Islamism. Relations between the two states developed unevenly and passed through several stages.
1992-2005: The U.S.A. as an alternative to Russia
The United States and Uzbekistan established diplomatic relations in February 1992. In March 1992 the U.S. Embassy was opened in Tashkent and in February 1995 - the Embassy of Uzbekistan in Washington. The first personal meeting of Islam Karimov and Bill Clinton took place in June 1996.
In the 1990s Uzbekistan granted American companies the right to develop gold ore deposits and sale uranium on foreign markets, and also allowed western non-governmental organizations and the western mass media to work in the republic. Tashkent demonstrated its loyalty to America on a number of disputed questions of the international agenda (for example, in November 1995 it voted together with the United States and Israel against the UN General Assembly resolution denouncing the embargo against Cuba).
In 1999 Uzbekistan refused to prolong the Treaty on collective security with Russia and joined the GUAM patronized by the United States and using anti-Russian rhetoric in the CIS area. For its part, the United States actively supported the Uzbek projects of "alternative integration" of Central Asia without the Russian Federation, which proved abortive due to contradictions between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
In 2001 an American military base was opened in Khanabad and donor aid was considerably increased. In March 2002, during a visit of President Islam Karimov to the United States, the two sides signed the Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework between the United States of America and the Republic of Uzbekistan.
At the same time relations between the two countries were not too serene. They were spoilt by the desire of the White House to reform the regime in the republic by interfering in its internal affairs through non-governmental organizations and mass media, and contacts with the opposition. To support loyal politicians in Uzbekistan resource centers
were set up which rendered various technical assistance. On August 20, 2002, the U.S. Department of State issued a special report which outlined the task to ensure the strengthening of political parties, opposition journalism, and printing facilities in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, that is, the countries of the region where there were American military objects. In 2003 the U.S. Congress banned direct aid to the central authorities of Uzbekistan within the framework of FREEDOM Support Act until they demonstrated considerable progress in democratization.
2005-2008: Andizhan and Crisis of Relations
Militant fighters of the radical Islamist organization "Akramiya" attacked the city of Andizhan in the Ferghana Valley on May 13, 2005. They seized hostages and a number of administrative buildings. As a result of the counter-operations of the Uzbek special forces, the city was freed from the fighters, but about 500 civilian people were killed. Despite the definite ties of "Akramiya" with the extremist terrorist underground of Afghanistan and Central Asia, western diplomats and expert community interpreted the events in Andizhan as suppression of popular unrest against the ruling regime and sharply condemned the actions of the Uzbek authorities.
The leading mass media in Europe and the United States openly sympathized with the terrorists (moreover, it was found that the BBC journalists were in the militants' headquarters during the operation).
The "Akramiya" grouping received arms and ammunition from neighboring Kyrgyzstan where a "tulip revolution" took place in March of the same year, which inspired the opponents of Islam Karimov. After the May events in Andizhan dozens of militants pursued by the Uzbek law-protection agencies and special services fled to Kyrgyzstan. In July 2005, under pressure of the United States and its European allies,
President K. Bakiyev of Kyrgyzstan, ignoring the demands of its neighbor Uzbekistan, allowed these militants to flee to Romania. As the expert of the American Brookings Institute Fiona Hill noted, Islam Karimov was absolutely sure that the attack on Andizhan had been prepared with the help of international organizations, including the nongovernmental organizations sponsored by the United States.
In contrast to the European Union, which denounced Tashkent in May 2005 and imposed sanctions on it in November, the U.S. reaction was more complex and prolonged. The White House demanded that an international investigation be held, and tried to gain concessions from the Uzbek authorities which would have eased the situation of the opposition Uzbek groups loyal to Washington. However, the pressure brought to bear on Uzbekistan's leaders had an opposite effect.
Dozens of people have been arrested, brought to trial and sentenced on the Andizhan affair, including opposition figures and nongovernmental organizations' employees. Uzbekistan demanded that the United States dismantle the Khanabad military base, which it did in November 2005, after which Uzbekistan resumed its membership in the CSTO. Islam Karimov denounced certain documents pertaining to Uzbek-American relations and abolished privileges granted American corporations in Uzbekistan. The gold-mining Newmont Company was deprived of its assets. Some leading western non-governmental organizations in Uzbekistan had to close down their offices in Uzbekistan.
2008-2014: New Approaches
of the Obama Administration
Inasmuch as President Karimov was not satisfied with quite a few Russian projects in the sphere of collective security and post-Soviet integration, the next rapprochement of Uzbekistan and the United States
was only a matter of time. At first the task of resuming closer contacts with the U.S. leadership was entrusted to Uzbekistan's Ambassador to the U.S., A. Kamilov, who was greatly helped in achieving this goal by Bukhara Jews (a Judaist religious community in the U.S.A. and Canada).
President Islam Karimov demonstrated his readiness for a dialogue with the West at a summit of the North Atlantic alliance in Bucharest in April 2008.
Officially, the normalization of relations became possible after the election of Barack Obama to the post of the U.S. President in November 2008. Washington's new strategy envisaged the economic rehabilitation of Afghanistan largely due to the strengthening of ties with neighboring countries (Greater Central Asia and New Silk Road projects) and the intensification of military operations against the Taliban, for which purpose it was necessary to open additional supply channels for the coalition forces from the North (the Northern network of supplies). Closer cooperation with Central Asian countries, and first and foremost with Uzbekistan, was one of the key elements for achieving this goal.
In 2009 Tashkent joined the Northern network of supplies and had the first bilateral annual consultations with the United States in Washington. Programs in the sphere of security were revived and economic projects of mutual interest were thoroughly discussed, particularly, on the development of the infrastructure between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. The United States softened its human rights rhetoric and preferred to distance itself from direct participation in resolving water-and-energy conflict between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in 2010, having transferred the issue to the World Bank. In November 2010 the Assistant U.S. Secretary of State R. Blake stated in
the U.S. Congress that Uzbekistan was now "the key partner in US. efforts in Afghanistan."
Further on, the White House redistributed financial resources earmarked to Uzbekistan for a broader participation in the sphere of security. Officially, from 1992 to 2010, more than $970 million were allocated for the implementation of the Department of State and USAID Agency projects in Uzbekistan. In 2012 - 2013 their financing was reduced, but simultaneously expenses along the Pentagon line grew to hundreds of millions of dollars.
At the same time the Andizhan experience has left a considerable imprint on Uzbekistan's establishment' perception of American approaches, perhaps, setting the limits to rapprochement of the two sides. Despite certain outward liberalization the government of the republic has consistently pursued a harsh course toward the foreign non-governmental organizations. Prospects of possible new deployment of military objects of the United States are still rather vague, although Uzbekistan suspended its participation in the CSTO in June 2012, it has published the concept of foreign policy containing the elements of neutrality, according to which Uzbekistan renounced participation in military-political blocs and the granting of its territory for deploying foreign military bases.
In turn, American diplomacy, which became more cautious to Uzbekistan, did not refuse from using its traditional instruments. The republic is subjected to criticism in the annual reports of the Department of State on the human right conditions, and it is included by the White House in the list of countries violating human rights and not satisfying the standards of preventing slave trade. Uzbekistan is included in the level "Tier 3", which threatens it with economic sanctions. Among big American non-governmental organizations working in Uzbekistan there is the National Democratic Institute (NDI),
whose projects are oriented to deputies and functionaries of the state apparatus.
American representatives maintain contacts with the Uzbek opposition abroad, for one, the People's Movement of Uzbekistan, an association of a number of Uzbek political organizations in exile, which proclaimed as its aim the overthrow of Karimov's regime. This movement may become a useful instrument for Washington in the future in case of an aggravation of the socio-economic situation or a political crisis in Uzbekistan
Trade and Economic Cooperation
At present Uzbekistan is interesting to the United States economically as a state having a common border with Afghanistan. The development and strengthening of ties with it may help economic rehabilitation of Afghanistan within the concept of the New Silk Road. The concept published by the Obama administration in the summer of 2011 is aimed at forming a new economic region uniting Central Asia, Afghanistan and South Asia (India and Pakistan). It presupposes the creation of an infrastructure connecting them, and also liberalization of mutual trade. This should not only make the secular government in Kabul more stable and lower its requirements for outside donations, but also weaken economic orientation of Central Asia to Russia and China. The idea of the New Silk Road finds favorable response among Uzbekistan's leadership which sees in it an opportunity to expand sales markets for Uzbek commodities in Afghanistan and carry out modernization of its transport system at the expense of foreign donors.
Uzbekistan welcomes the initiatives of international donors to increase electricity generation and supply electric current to Afghanistan. It also intends to step up its own electricity generation and export electric energy in the southern direction.
A factor increasing economic attractiveness of Uzbekistan for the United States is the presence of great reserves of oil, gas, uranium and gold in the bowels of its earth. However, access to them for western companies is hindered by the restrictive measures of the Uzbek government, unfavorable investment climate, geographical distance, and competition with Russian and Chinese corporations.
For one, American transnational companies are not represented in the mining and transportation of hydrocarbons in Uzbekistan, where Russia and China are working actively in this sphere. In the production of gold Uzbekistan holds fourth place in the world in deposits and seventh place in the level of mining. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union and with a view to developing natural resources the leadership of the republic has set up a joint venture with one of the world's biggest producers of gold - the American Newmont Mining Corporation - called Zarafshan-Newmont with 50 percent of the shares belonging to each party. In 2006, against the backdrop of the exacerbation of relations with the United States, the authorities of Uzbekistan abolished tax privileges for the joint venture and claimed $49 million, after which the enterprise was closed by a court decision.
Further on, the Uzbek leadership continued its policy of concentrating gold mining in the hands of the state, having pushed aside the British Oxus Gold from the "Khandiz" gold ore deposit. Uzbekistan's relations with western partners in uranium mining were different. (Uzbekistan holds seventh place in the world in uranium reserves). Even after the Andizhan conflict commercial relations were not broken with the American-German company 'Nukem", now an affiliation of the North American uranium giant Cameco.
At present China and India also display a great interest in coming to the Uzbek uranium market, and they will have to uphold their positions in stiff competition with Nukem.
Along with gas, gold and uranium, a key source of hard currency for Uzbekistan is its cotton. The republic holds sixth place in the world in the production volume of cotton and third place in its export, which is a state monopoly. The United States is itself one of the biggest producers of raw cotton and textiles in the world, and it has recently called for limiting access of Uzbek cotton to western markets, accusing Uzbekistan of using child labor on cotton fields. Under the influence of the American administration and trade networks in Europe about a hundred companies and networks in Europe and the United States have refused to buy Uzbek cotton and cotton textiles. Thus, it can be seen how the United States uses political instruments for the aims of unfair competition.
On the whole, despite certain projects, the trade potential of the United States with Uzbekistan remains small (135th place among trade partners in 2013).
Washington has traditionally advocated the speediest entry of Uzbekistan in the World Trade Organization. The republic made the initial application back in December 1994, but then "froze" negotiations with the organization. The principles and rules of the WTO contradict the harsh restrictive measures in the trade sphere adhered to by Uzbekistan in recent years. Officially, Tashkent regards the process of joining the WTO as long-term one and fears undermining its national automobile and textile industries.
Repeated rapprochement of Uzbekistan and the United States in military-political problems was accompanied with growing western investments in the Uzbek economy. This process was encouraged by the two governments. The key project was the creation in 2008 by the U.S. General Motors and the Uzbek concern UzAvtosanoat a joint venture under the name GM Uzbekistan, with a capacity of 250,000 cars a year (the share of the American side - 25 percent). However,
subsequently the direct American investments in the Uzbek economy began to dwindle continuously (up to $71 million in 2012).
The activity of western investors is retarded by currency restrictions, complex customs and administrative procedures, corruption, and other factors inherent in the Uzbek economy.
In order to bolster up bilateral business projects the American-Uzbekistan Chamber of Commerce was set up in 1993. In 1997 another independent association of foreign business was organized in Tashkent -AmCham Uzbekistan, representing the influential American lobby group -Chamber of Commerce of the United States.
Military-technical Cooperation
in the Security Sphere
Uzbekistan maintains close military-political contacts with the United States. The republic is interested in American participation in rearming its army and balancing Russian influence in the sphere of military-technical cooperation and liquidating armed groupings based in Afghanistan and Pakistan and fighting the secular regime in Tashkent. Washington regards Uzbekistan as a suitable platform for deploying its military objects and infrastructure for carrying on combat operations in Afghanistan and transportation of cargoes, as well as a potential military-political ally having the biggest armed forces in the region.
In the 1990s a series of terrorist attacks and the movement of the Taliban closer to the Uzbek border became an impetus for rapprochement with the United States. It was also prompted by the weakness of Russia, which was waging a war in Chechnya on its own territory In 1999 Uzbekistan withdrew from the CSTO and stepped up its relations with the United States.
Under the treaty of October 2001 Uzbekistan granted the airbase Khanabad near Karshi to the United States. This base was to be used for supporting combat operations in Afghanistan. About 1,500 U.S. men and officers, including "Green Berets," were deployed there. . At the same time the United States increased the volume of its military aid to Uzbekistan. But in 2003 the U.S. Congress reduced this aid, connecting it with the progress in reforming I. Karimov's regime. The dual character of the U.S. position on Uzbekistan was clearly revealed in the White House reaction to the Andizhan crisis in May 2005. Having assessed Washington's approach as a violation of partnership relations Tashkent demanded that the United States dismantle its base on Uzbek territory By November 2005 the United States transferred part of its personnel to the international "Manas" airport in Kyrgyzstan.
In 2006 Uzbekistan returned to the CSTO. Nevertheless, it regarded membership in it formally, avoiding to assume greater obligations in the sphere of security. In 2008, after the election of Barack Obama to the post of the U.S. President, Uzbekistan decided to draw closer to the United States. A new agenda was worked out, including two central points - opening of corridors for supplies of the American troops in Afghanistan by joining the Northern network of deliveries, and U.S. participation in the rearmament of the Uzbek army and special services.
Having a convenient infrastructure close to the northern part of Afghanistan, Uzbekistan became the key link of various cargo deliveries to that country. By 2013 about 70 percent of all cargoes for the U.S. grouping in Afghanistan were transported through Uzbekistan. At the same time the United States increased its purchases of food and other commodities for the needs of its own and the Afghan armies.
In addition to land communications, the U.S. administration, with mediation of South Korea, achieved the opening of an air supply
channel via the Uzbek airport Navoi in May 2009. In contrast to Kyrgyzstan's Manas used by Americans up to July 2014, the agreement on Navoi dealt exclusively with civil cargoes, and banned the presence of American servicemen on Uzbek territory and flights of U.S. military planes directly to Afghanistan.
According to press reports, negotiations took place between the United States and Uzbekistan in August 2012 on the possible creation of storehouses on its territory for keeping American equipment and arms near the Afghan border.
Another sphere of cooperation between the two countries was U.S. participation in training and equipping the Uzbek special services. Uzbekistan has the biggest paramilitary forces in the region, whose numerical strength reaches 67,000 men and officers, plus 20,000 the national guard units.
Speaking on the occasion of the Day of the defenders of the Motherland in January 2013, President Islam Karimov emphasized that "rearmament and re-equipment of the armed forces is a priority for the country. For this purpose it is necessary to improve and broaden the scope of international military-technical cooperation with foreign partner-countries." Accordingly, consultations with the U.S. administration took place in Washington in January 2013. As western mass media reported, Uzbekistan is interested in a broad range of modern arms and ammunition, including mine-sweepers, bullet-proof vests, navigation equipment, night vision devices, small arms, wheel armored cars, helicopters, drones, etc.
In February 2013 the U.S. Department of State officially announced that the United States would supply Uzbekistan with part of the commodities mentioned, namely, those unfit for "reprisals against peaceful population." Washington's initiative was supported by Britain,
which promised to supply "Leyland DAF" trucks and spare parts to "Land Rover" worth of $700,000.
Another priority for the Uzbek leadership is the use of the U.S. potential in fighting the terrorist groupings striving to overthrow the secular ruling regime in Uzbekistan, which have earlier been ousted to Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Judging by certain signs, both sides carry on joint operations. Additionally, the United States implements in Uzbekistan a program of personnel training for special services and law-enforcement agencies.
Thus, despite mutual mistrust still existing after the Andizhan crisis, the United States and Uzbekistan have succeeded to restore a high level of cooperation, primarily in the military-political sphere. However, it is quite difficult to forecast the dynamics of the further mutual relations of the two countries, inasmuch as they will depend on the two factors constantly present in Uzbek policy in recent years. First, who will take the post of President in Tashkent after Islam Karimov? And secondly, what the situation in Afghanistan will be like.
References
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3. R. Blake. Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. Hearing on the Emerging Importance of the U.S. - Central Asian Partnership /Robert O. Blake // U.S. Department of State: website. 2010. November 7.
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8. Newmont announces operations outlook and diamond investment // Newmont Corporation: website. 2006. September 27.
9. Cotton Fact Sheet. Uzbekistan // International Cotton Advisory Committee: website. 2013. September 14.
10. A.E.Kramer. As NATO prepares for Afghan withdrawal Uzbekistan seeks war's leftovers // The New York Times: website. 2013. January 31.
11. K. Silverstein. Is Pentagon in Bed with "Queen of the Uzbeks"? // Harper's Magazine: website. 2010. March 25.
12. S.R. Weisman, T. Shanker. Uzbeks order U.S. from base in refugee rift //The New York Times: website. 2005. July 31.
13. G. Lee. The New Silk Road and the Northern Distribution Network: A Golden road to Central Asian trade reform? Central Eurasia Project / Graham Lee; Open Society Foundations. 2012. October. No 8, pp. 13-15.
14. A. Tilghman. Pakistan war supply routes still not fully open // Military Times: website 2012. December 4.
15. J. Kucera. Turkmenistan big beneficiary of Pentagon money while Uzbekistan lags // EurasiaNet.org: website. 2012. December 3.
16. V. Felbab-Brown. Stuck in the Mud. The Logistics of Getting Out of Afghanistan // Foreign Affairs: website. 2012. July 18. The Military Balance 2012 / International Institute of Strategic Studies. 2012, p. 291.
17. J. Schogol. Pakistan, Afghanistan, India want leftover US MRAPs // Defense News: website. 2014. April 1.
18. Statement by the President of Afghanistan /Office of the Press Secretary // The White House: office. Website. 2014. May 27.
"Problemy natsionalnoi strategii, "Moscow, 2015, No 1 (28), pp. 74-90.
