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24INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE JOURNAL I МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЙ НАУЧНЫЙ ЖУРНАЛ
China-South Caucasus: cooperation in transport and logistics nodes of the Belt and Road
Китай-Южный Кавказ: сотрудничество в транспортно-логистических
узлах «Пояса и пути»
Арутюнян Агавни Александровна
Ведущий научный сотрудник Национальной Академии Наук Армении, Ереван, Республика Армения aghavni.harutyunyan1@gmail.com https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3237-4157
AghavniA. Harutyunyan
National Academy of Sciences of Armenia, Yerevan, Republic Armenia aghavni.harutyunyan1@gmail.com https://orcid.org/0000-0003-323 7-4157
удк 327 i научная статья | https://d0i.0rg/10.24412/2686-9675-4-2022-112-137
АННОТАЦИЯ
Южный Кавказ (ЮК) является зоной перекрестного влияния, где пересекаются интересы глобальных и региональных, старых и новых держав. Россия, Турция и Иран традиционно имели значительное влияние на ЮК, к которому после распада СССР добавились нерегиональные игроки, такие как США, Евро-пеискии союз (ЕС) и Китаи. Однако вдали от своеи традиционнои сферы влияния, в регионе, не считающемся внешнеполитическим приоритетом для Китая, интересы Пекина сложно было считать стратегическими по сравнению с другими мировыми акторами — Россиеи, США и ЕС.
С 2010-х годов, исходя из геополитических реалии региона, Китаи усилил свое политическое влияние и экономическое присут-
ABSTRACT
The South Caucasus (SC) is an area of cross-influence, where the interests of global and regional, old and new powers intersect. Russia, Turkey and Iran have traditionally had a significant influence on the SC, to which non-regional players such as the United States (US), the European Union (EU) and China have been added after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, far from its traditional sphere of influence, in a region not considered a foreign policy priority for China, its interests could hardly be considered strategic in comparison with other world actors - Russia, the US and the EU. Beijing's interests were mainly limited to establishing cooperation with the countries of the SC, and using the region as a base to export Chinese goods to EU markets.
Since the 2010s, based on the geopolitical
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ствие в ЮК. Китайская Инициатива пояса и пути (ИПП) стала ключевым инструментом продвижения китаиских интересов в регионе, ко-торыи как важная часть исторического Великого Шелкового пути пересекается со стратегическим вектором Север-Юг-Восток-Запад.
Научная цель даннои работы заключается в изучении общих черт, трансформации и инструментов политики Китая на ЮК, особенно в исследуемые периоды реализации ИПП. Исследование проводилось с использованием методов описательного, исторического и контент-анализа.
Ключевые слова: Китаи, Южныи Кавказ, Армения, Грузия, Азербаиджан, инициатива «Пояс и путь»
Для цитирования: Арутюнян А.А. Китаи -Южныи Кавказ: сотрудничество в транспорт-но-логистических узлах «Пояса и пути». Современные востоковедческие исследования. 2022; Том (4). С. https://doi.org/10.24412/2686-9675-4-2022-112-137
realities of the region, China has strengthened its political influence and economic presence in the SC. The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has become a key tool for promoting Beijing's interests in the region, which, as an important part of the historic Great Silk Road, intersects with the North-South-East-West strategic vector.
The scientific goal of this work is to study the common features, transformations and tools of China's policy in the SC, especially during the studied periods of the BRI implementation. The study was carried out using the methods of descriptive, historical and content analysis.
Keywords: China, South Caucasus, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Belt and Road Initiative
For citation: Harutyunyan A.A. China-South Caucasus: Cooperation in Transport and Logistics Nodes of the Belt and Road. Modern Oriental Studies. 2022; 4 (4). P. (In Russ.) https:// doi.org/10.24412/2686-9675-4-2022-112-137
Introduction
During the Soviet Union (SU) era, relations between the countries of the South Caucasian (SC) - Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia and the China were weak and mediated by the Kremlin. Political, economic, and cultural relations between China and SC countries began to improve only after 1991 (Hovhanesian, Manasyan 2014, 6). Armenian-Chinese contacts at the state level began on December 1991, after the official recognition of the independence of the Republic of Armenia (RA) by the People's Republic of China (PRC). Diplomatic rela-
tions between the two countries were established on April 1992 (Посольство КНР в РА 2010; Мок-рецкий 2012, 165). Georgia and PRC signed the Protocol on the establishment of diplomatic relations on June 1992 (MFA of Georgia 2013). Diplomatic relations between China and Azerbaijan were established in April 1992, a year after the PRC recognized the republic's independence (Амелина, Бахревский, Тасиц 2013, 122).
Until the 2000s, China occupied a low profile on the political and economic map of the region. To strengthen its position in the region, Beijing placed
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its main stake on its most competitive external resource - economic penetration with the deployment of the potential for progressive expansion in domestic markets. Despite this, the indicators of China's economic cooperation with the SC countries were much more modest than their trade and economic relations with Russia, the US or the EU (Агаджанян 2013).
However, since the early 2000s, trade and economic relations between the SC countries and China have noticeably intensified. According to Chinese customs statistics, between 2001 and 2020 trade with the region increased from US$ 25 million to US$ 3.7 billion, or from US$ 1.1 billion in 2009 to almost US$ 4 billion in 2020. However, China's place in the ranking of the largest trading partners of the SC countries was not very high. In 2020, China was only the 4th largest trading partner for all three countries of the SC combined, and for Azerbaijan and Georgia separately (after the EU, Russia and Turkey). For Armenia alone, China was the 3rd largest trading partner, after Russia and the EU. At the same time, the share of China in the trade turnover of the SC countries ranges from a minimum of 7.5% in Azerbaijan to a maximum of 13.6% in Armenia, and is slowly but steadily growing (Лексютина 2022, 59). At the same time, all republics have a negative trade balance. Chinese imports are several times higher than exports from the SC. (Воробьева 2020, 662).
China's investment activity in the region is extremely low. According to Chinese official statistics, for the period from 2014 to 2019 China's accumulated foreign direct investment (FDI) in the countries of the SC annually did not exceed US$
700 million. Many of the investments promised by Beijing, including those related to the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), have not arrived in the region, and many announced joint projects remain at the planning stage. However, one must also take into account the fact that there are a small number of innovative high-tech companies or international brands in the SC that could be of interest to Chinese investors (Лексютина 2022, 61-71).
In general, in relations with the countries of the SC, Beijing adopted a "cluster approach" rather than an individual partnership, developing relations with all SC countries at the same level, using the common toolkit, considering mainly economic, not political factors (Skiert-Andrzejuk 2018, 85). In their turn, all countries in the region reaffirm their commitment to the "One China" policy on Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR). The PRC avoids involvement in regional conflicts (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh), calling for the resolution of territorial disputes exclusively through political consultations and diplomatic negotiations in accordance with the UN (United Nation) Charter and international law (МокрецкиИ 2016, 151). The PRC does not prohibit its partners from establishing private economic ties with Taiwan, emphasizing private entrepre-neurship and not being burdened by any political obligations (Воробьева 2020, 653). Therefore, in turn, Beijing implements business projects in the fields of winemaking in Abkhazia, mineral exploitation in Karabakh and tourism in Abkhazia (Lambert 2018).
The rapprochement of relations with the
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countries of the SC region was facilitated by the absence of historical wrinkles, China's advocacy of maintaining regional stability, the pursuit of the principle of non-interference in political conflicts and problems, human rights, Eurasian integration issues, the development of trade and investment activities without political preconditions, etc. Beijing, unlike Russia's Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) or Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has not sought to integrate SC countries into military-political or economic projects, or unlike the European Eastern Partnership, has not tried to involve them in democratic processes (Роллан 2018, 5-6). For the countries of the SC, China acts as a global actor, taking the place of a permanent member of the UN Security Council. And non-participation in the "bloc system" (NATO, CSTO) provides extra space for foreign policy maneuvers with the countries of the SC. It is acting in this situation as a kind of "vacuum" that fills the space where the main actors of the region are powerless due to objective restrictions (Воробьева 2020, 652-653).
The SC, adjacent to the Middle East (ME), is also important for Beijing in terms of confronting and countering threats related to pan-Turkist ideology and Islamic fundamentalism, due to the presence of XUAR separatist ideology supporters among Muslims living in the region (Жильцов, Алексанян и др. 2019, 7-25). The SC could become a "corridor" through which the ideologies of Islamic fundamentalism could spread from the ME to XUAR and impact China's Uyghur population (Skiert-Andrzejuk 2018, 86). This concern is not completely groundless because in the ranks of the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIS), such prominent
people as Tarkhan Batirashvili (Umar al-Shishani) or Muslim Margoshvili came from the Ahmed region of Georgia (Pankiskoe Valley). At the end of 2017, 900 people from Azerbaijan and 200 citizens of Georgia participated in ISIS in the ME (Воробьева 2020, 660).
Developments in the international arena since the 2010s have highlighted the geostrategic and geopolitical relevance and importance of the SC in terms of controlling East-West, North-South security lines, trade crossroads and transport corridors (Ogut^u 2015, 103). It is known that some countries in the Caucasus and Caspian Sea are rich in natural resources, especially oil and natural gas, for energy imports to support China's economic growth (Ван, Вань 2013). So, the further interaction of China with the SC can increasingly rely on its desire to use energy resources, trade and transport corridors (Muzalevsky 2010, 13).
China's presence in the SC became more tangible when the attention of the traditionally active players there - Russia, the US and the EU - shifted to the Ukraine crisis, the ISIS, the Iran nuclear issue, and when the countries of the region began to look for new economic partners in the background of the relative "decline" of Russian power in the region and the inability of Iran and Turkey to assume a more significant role (Роллан 2018, 23). Against the background of the global confrontation between the West and Russia, China could become a new major player in the SC, significantly rearranging the existing geo-economic configurations with its influence on the regional processes (Егиазарян 2004, 70). However, the SC did not have the same geostrategic and political significance for China as
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for Russia, so Beijing was not seen as a threat by Moscow (Skiert-Andrzejuk 2018, 87). And indeed, China's objective in practice was not to compete with Russian influence, but rather to secure its economic interests in the region and increase Chinese investment (Lambert 2018).
The SC Countries Involvement in the BRI
China's New Silk Road (NSR) or BRI announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, particularly contributed to the strengthening of Beijing's position in the SC (Сергеев 2013). The concept is based on five principles: political convergence, communication infrastructure, free trade, circulation of capital and the rapprochement of peoples. BRI aims to connect Asia and Europe via the ME, Africa and Central Asia (CA) through a series of vast networks of transcontinental railways, pipelines, ports, airports, and other infrastructure projects with up to US$ 1 trillion of Chinese investment. The BRI consists of the land corridors of the Economic Belt of the Silk Road (EBSR) and the sea lanes of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR). Building on a series of transport initiatives aimed at improving connectivity, the BRI envisages investment in both corridor and complementary infrastructures such as energy and information and communications technology (ICT) (Harutyunyan 2021a, 41-65)1.
BRI became a powerful impetus for Chinese interests in the region. SC countries actively support the BRI, as it is in line with their foreign policy visions of serving advantageous strategic position of the region as an important corridor connecting Europe to Asia (Тасиц 2019, 80). In 2015, China signed documents (protocol, declaration, memo-
randum) with Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. On March 9, 2015, the Georgian leadership was one of the first to sign a protocol of intent with China to jointly build the EBSR. Armenia and China adopted a Joint Declaration on the Further Development and Deepening of Friendly Cooperation Relations, as well as a Memorandum on Strengthening Cooperation in the Creation of the Silk Road Economic Belt in March 2015. Azerbaijan formally supported the Beijing BRI in December of the same year. During the visit of President Ilham Aliyev to China, the parties signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the joint construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt. In April 2015, Georgia and Azerbaijan became founding members of the China-based AIIB. In March 2017, the AIIB approved Armenia's application to join the financial institution (Tac^ 2019, 81). Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's historic visit to three SC countries in May 2019 testifies to Beijing's "cluster approach" to the region, and the agreements reached during the visit on the EBSR indicate that the SC may be part of China's geopolitical mega-project (MapKegoHOB 2019).
However, Beijing is not among the main creditors of the SC republics. Armenia completely lacks cooperation in the credit sphere with China. Georgia received only a US$ 141 million loan from the AIIB in July 2017 for the construction of a bypass highway in Batumi. In December 2016, China allocated a US$ 600 million loan to Azerbaijan through the AIIB for the construction of the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) (Tac^ 2019, 87).
It should be noted that BRI aims to connect Europe and Asia, also with an ultimate goal of establishing a free trade zone (FTZ) (Li L. 2016, 8). A
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future FTZ between China and the EEU is planned, which was agreed upon in May 2015 at the meeting of the leaders of Russia and China (PanARMENIAN.Net, 2015; РИА Новости 2015).
As part of the BRI, in May 2017, Beijing and Tbilisi, despite Georgia's declared course to join NATO and the EU, signed a free trade agreement (FTA), which was the first in its format in the entire post-Soviet space and came into force on January 1, 2018 (Маркедонов 2019)2. To speed up the process of concluding a FTA with China, Tbilisi relies on the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area agreement (DCFTA) with the EU, signed in 2013 and entered into force in 2016. That is beside FTAs with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) including Russia, as well as with Turkey and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) states (Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Liechtenstein). Market access is matched by a regime of low taxation, low regulation and high transparency, making Georgia one of the easiest places to do business in the world, according to the World Bank (WB) (New Europe 2016).
To establish the EBSR, China needs to properly handle its relations with existing integration organizations and the major powers involved. Within the EBSR there are currently a large number of regional cooperation organizations with varying economic cooperation programs, including Eurasian Economic Community (EEC), Customs Union, EEU,3 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC) (Li J. 2015, 12). Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan are members of the BSEC. Armenia also is a EEU member. On July 10, 2015, at the SCO sum-
mit in Ufa, it was decided to admit Azerbaijan and Armenia to the SCO as new dialogue partners (Мокрецкии 2016, 152).
In order to deepen cooperation within the framework of BRI, various events dedicated to the initiative are being organized in the countries of the SC. The first international forum on BRI was held in Tbilisi in October 15-16, 2015. The event highlighted Georgia's willingness to be at the forefront of China's outward-facing foreign policy push, and to help shape Eurasian engagement with the BRI (Pantucci, Lainp 2016, 1)4. In February 2018, a conference was held in Beijing on the topic "The Role of the Trade and Transport Trans-Caspian International Route 'East-West' in the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative", organized jointly by the embassies of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkey and with the support of the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC (Тасиц 2019, 82).
It is worth noting that BRI is credited with ambitions to "reorganize Eurasia under its umbrella to counter American influence". According to some views Beijing's interests also collide with Moscow, which considers the post-Soviet territories its sphere of influence and whose EEU and Greater Eurasian Partnership strategy compete with the BRI (Роллан 2018, 24). From here it was assumed that a clash between the EEU and the B&R is inevitable (Kaczmarski 2015).
In order to "prevent the such conflict of interests", the two countries decided to "harmonize relations" through the convergence of the EBSR and EEU (Nursha 2015). At the Moscow summit in May 2015, the leaders of Russia and China, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, signed a Joint declaration
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on cooperation in coordinating development of EEU and EBSR - reaching a new level of partnership and actually implies creation of a common economic space in Eurasia (Harutyunyan 2017, 20). The undeclared division of spheres of influence between the parties was also expressed in the geopolitical calculations of the two countries, according to which China willingly cedes defense and security spheres to Russia in return for freedom of action as well in SC financial and economic spheres that do not interfere with Moscow's interests (Po^^aH 2018, 24).
On June 20-21, 2022, the participants of the session of the Intergovernmental Council of the EEU in Minsk agreed to develop a Eurasian transport corridor from Europe to China to connect with the BRI. Due to the disruption of logistics and trade chains around the world, the parties considered the development of infrastructure in the territories of the EEU member states in the East-West and North-South directions to be an urgent issue (^HbMHHb ^H6ao, 2022).
South Caucasus — Transport and Logistics Hub in the B&R Strategy
SC countries are gradually emerging as an important transport and logistics hub in the B&R strategy. Azerbaijan and Georgia are actively lobbying in China for one of the three EBSR corridors5 the project of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) or Middle Corridor (MC) / Iron Silk Road (ISR) (Ta^ 2019, 82). TITR was developed at the end of 2012 within the framework of TRACECA (Transport Corridor Eu-rope-Caucasus-Asia)6. The fundamental difference between the TRACECA and Chinese CCWAEC pro-
jects is actually that TRACECA, initiated by the EU (the "West"), aims to restore the ancient Great Silk Road and connect the economies of these countries to the EU. Meanwhile, the CCWAEC ("the East") plans to establish trade and economic relations between the involved countries (Ismailov, Papava 2018, 10). CCWAEC runs through China, Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, further to Turkey and then through the territory of Ukraine to Europe, connecting all countries along the East-West line (Тасиц 2019, 82). TITR provides Beijing with access to the Black Sea coast of Georgia with subsequent shipment of cargo to the ports of Romania, Ukraine (Odessa) and Bulgaria (Varna, Burgas) (Harutyunyan 2020, 80).
The MC can be viewed in terms of the institu-tionalization of the three regions involved: the PRC, the EU and the post-Soviet economies, plus Turkey (Kenderdine, Bucsky 2021, 1; Арутюнян 2022, C. 110). In practice, the construction of the Middle Corridor and investments in alternative routes aim to free the EU and China from Russian "transit dependence" and continue the road to Turkey (Harutyunyan 2020, 80). This is evidenced by Brussels' establishment of good political relations along the Middle Corridor with countries that are rich in hydrocarbon resources or are transit points for such resources7 .
In 2014, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and China established the Coordinating Committee of TITR (CCTITR) to develop 4,766 km long multimodal route (Forbes.com 2017), and in 2015 they agreed to create a consortium to transport goods from China to Europe (Grey 2015; Корреспондент 2015). Later it included JS Ukr-
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zaliznytsia (Ukrainian Railways) and LLC Ukrferry, Translogistic (Moldova) and PKP LHS (Poland). The Hungarian Rail Cargo Hungaria Zrt joined the project, which will allow to use the capabilities of Zahony, Epereske stations and BILK terminal. Ukraine and Lithuania signed a memorandum on the merger of the "Viking" container train with TITR. Thus, the EU, which has a FTZ with Ukraine, could supply goods to China and CA, bypassing Russia and is set to become competitive with the traditional overland route (Forbes.com 2017). So, the TITR parties want to launch the transportation of goods to Northern and Eastern Europe via Ukraine (Regnum, 2015; Real Russia Today, 2015; CTS
2015) and the Baltic States (Think Railways 2015). So, goods from CA and Kazakhstan will be delivered to Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, Baltic States, Poland and EU countries by container train named "Friendship" (Dyussembekova Zh. 2016).
By 2020, TITR was expected to increase trade turnover from US$ 646 to 922 billion (Ka3HH$opM
2016) with an annual capacity of 27.5 million tons of containerized cargo and up to 300,000 TEU (twenty-foot equivalent) (Eurasian Business Briefing 2016). Since July 2016, preferential tariffs have been introduced on the route for participating countries, enabling the cost of shipping containers to be closer to the Russian route, at approximately US$ 5,500 per container, although it is almost US$ 2000 cheaper than in 2015, and 3 times faster than by sea. TITR remains slower and more expensive than Russia, partly due to the lack of infrastructure and common market in this direction from the SU, low trade flows, border customs bureaucracy and corruption problems typical of the region (Forbes.com 2017). The lack of infrastructure for
easy transit in the Caspian Sea from CA ports to Azerbaijan, as well as deep-water ports in the Georgian sector, also causes problems (Standish 2022). Therefore, based on the dependence of the success of China-Europe-China transcontinental container cargo transportation on cooperation with Russian and Belarusian railway companies, Kazakhstan Temir Zholy has created a United Transport Logistics Company — Eurasian Railway Alliance (UTLC ERA), to coordinate all related work (Altynsarina 2018). It should be noted that Russian trains that deliver goods directly to Europe by rail or port or enter through Belarus have become the main land trade route between China and the EU, accounting for 68% of westbound traffic and 82% eastbound traffic in 2021 (Standish 2022).
Although TITR was the most problematic of the EBSR routes, due to frequent modes and border changes, Western sanctions against Russia, virtual bans on the transit of Ukrainian cargo to Asia, months-long blockade of Turkish cargo (Forbes.com 2017), it has become the main alternative for many Chinese freight forwarders due to military operations in Ukraine. According to forecasts of the TITR association, in 2022 cargo transportation through the territory of CA and the Caucasus may amount to 3.2 million tons, which is 6 times higher than the figure in 2021. The cancellation of new bookings through Russia in April by one of the world's largest shipping corporations, Maersk, which preferred TITR cargo, and was joined in May by the Finnish company Nurminen Logistics, gave a boost to the Middle Corridor. The governments of Romania, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and Kazakhstan discussed (the presidents of Turkey and Kazakhstan in Ankara in May) further
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investments and deepening of cooperation along the TITR route (Standish 2022).
Azerbaijan is a part the Trans-Caucasus Transit Corridor (TCTC/CTC), which connects Azerbaijan and Georgia with Europe, China, and other nearby regional partners. The corridor is comprised of roads, railways, the Caspian Sea port of Alat, and the Black Sea ports of Poti and Batumi in Georgia. The length of the corridor in Azerbaijan is about 503 km from Baku to the Georgian border. In Georgia, it extends for about 384 km eastward. Significant infrastructure investments in both Azerbaijan and Georgia are expected to have a noticeable effect on transit times to and from the seaports in the Black and Caspian seas (The World Bank 2020a, P. 3). The TCTC has the potential to play a larger role in connecting China with Europe, and CA with the global economy. The strategic importance of the corridor is determined by geopolitical, economic, transport and other factors. But it faces many challenges as it crosses multiple borders, the Caspian and Black Seas, and includes major economic blocs with competing interests such as the EU, China and Russia. The EU is interested in expanding the trans-European transport network to Azerbaijan and Georgia, and joining China through the inclusion of the BRI in the TCTC (The World Bank 2020a, 5).
Worth noting that most of infrastructure projects along the TCTC are financed not by Beijing, but by Baku (including the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan, the sovereign wealth fund) and international financial institutions such as the World Bank Group, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the AIIB, the European Investment
Bank. Investment projects, both completed and ongoing, include Baku's new port in Alat (Alat Free Economic Zone/FEZ created within Alat International Sea Trade Port); construction, repair, electrification and modernization of Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway; Rehabilitation of the Baku-Ganja and E-60 road to the Georgian border (The World Bank, 2020b, P. 4).
The already operational BTK railway is also of great interest to Beijing (Варданян 2021). As an important component of the ISR, is a new significant stage in the development of the Silk Road Transport Corridor (or TRACECA) project (Ismailov, Papava 2018, 10). Although China was not involved in the financing or construction of the BTK line, it will serve as another route for Chinese exports to Turkey and Europe (Tavsan 2017).
Thanks to the B&R, Georgia as a logistics and transport hub will become a multi-regional hub connecting Europe, East Asia, India, CA and the ME (Политонлайн.Ру, 2015). Taking advantage of its unique geographical location, Georgia can expand cooperation with China in such areas as railway transport, port and road construction (Xinhua 2016). With the strengthening of GUAM8 and the positions of the US, Georgia has become an arena of collision between the interests of the US on the one hand and the interests of Russia and China on the other. Special concerns about the "manipulation" of Georgia by the West appeared in China after it signed the Association Agreement with the EU in 2014 (Воробьева 2020, 658).
Georgia is also investing heavily in infrastructure projects on its part of the Asia-Europe route. Tunnels and bridges along the railway line
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on the border between Azerbaijan and Tbilisi have been restored, Poti port has been modernized with the financial support of the EU. In 2019, the US Foreign Private Investment Corporation signed a US$ 50 million loan agreement with the Georgian-American transport company PACE Group for the design, construction and operation of a new multipurpose marine terminal at the Port of Poti. With financial support from the WB, the Asian Development Bank, the AIIB and other multilateral development banks (MDBs), Georgia has begun expanding the East-West Highway (^eKCMTHHa 2022, 67).
In January 2017, China Energy Company Limited (now CEFC China) signed a Memorandum of Understanding to purchase a 75% stake in the Poti Free Industrial Zone (FIZ) in Georgia. The 300-hectare FIZ opened in 2011, housing companies ranging from timber to IT services. CEFC committed to developing FIZ with its expertise and technology and investing in processing, modern technology, warehouse management and logistics (Larsen 2017). The port of Poti in Georgia is also of interest to China. CEFC China Energy Concern, which specializes in the energy sector and whose founder, according to some reports, maintains close ties with the People's Liberation Army (PLA), owns a 75% stake in the Poti FIZ acquired in September 2017. Caught at the center of an international corruption scandal, the CEFC has been under the administration of the financial arm of the Shanghai Municipality since March 2018. Under its influence, the port of Poti should become a "common market zone" serving as a financial and logistics hub, as well as a platform for the export of Chinese goods to Europe and CA (Po.MaH 2018, 15).
During the Tbilisi Silk Road Forum in October 2015 the Georgian Anaklia deep-water port development project was considered as one of the first and major projects to be implemented within the BRI (Caucasus Business Week 2017). However, the victory was claimed by the joint US-Georgian venture Anaklia Development Consortium (ADC). In February 2016, a Georgian-American consortium developed a €3.3 billion project to develop the one-of-a-kind deep sea port of Anaklia (with a total capacity of 100 million tons per year and with the ability to receive large sea vessels) on the eastern coast of the Black Sea, which connects Europe with CA and China through a sea corridor (New Europe 2016). At the end of 2017, Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries (ZPMC - Chinese company that provides 70% of the world's port crane production) signed an agreement with the Anaklia Development Consortium, according to which ZPMC (as a subcontractor of ADC) would provide the port of Anaklia with the latest container cranes of modern standards and other equipment necessary for the management of the container terminal (Sputnik 2017). However, in January 2020, after a series of scandals and revelations, the Georgian government terminated the contract with ADC for the development of the port of Anaklia and began looking for new investors (^eKCMTHHa 2022, 67).
As of 2015, up to 25 Chinese investment, construction, telecommunications and financial companies operated in Georgia (ManaBapuaHH 2015, C. 146). In order to intensify business ties and humanitarian contacts between the two countries, since June 2011, direct flights between China and Georgia began to operate (ManaBapuaHH 2015, C. 148). As of 2017, nearly 30 Chinese enterprises, includ-
INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE JOURNAL / МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЙ НАУЧНЫЙ ЖУРНАЛ
ing Fortune 500 companies, such as China State Grid, Power China, CRCC, Huawei, CEFC and other Chinese companies like Hualing Group have invested in Georgia. They are engaged in different sectors, such as energy, communication, finance, trade, agriculture, tourism, timber industry, infrastructure, special economic zone and industrial park, as well as other key areas (Embassy of the PRC in Georgia 2017)9.
As for Armenia, despite its landlocked and vulnerable position in terms of participation in many regional logistics and energy projects, because only two of the four neighboring countries -Georgia and Iran - have an open border, Beijing considers the Armenian direction a connecting link between EEU and Tehran (Маркедонов 2019) through highway and railway lines connecting the Caspian Sea with the Black Sea (Harutyunyan 2017, 36-37; Harutyunyan 2018, 21-26). Yerevan hoped that its major highway - the North-South Road Corridor and the future Armenia-Iran railway can be used for developing the proposed EBSR (Ghazanchyan 2015; MFA of PRC 2015). Chinese companies are contractors on some of the activities on the north-south corridor improvement (The World Bank Group 2020c, 13).
In order to ensure the "interconnection" between these projects, it is first necessary to expand and modernize the network of national highways to Georgia in the north and Iran in the south (Мокрецкии 2016, 153), as well as using Yerevan's membership of the EEU, to activate the FTZ activity established in Meghri (south of Armenia) on the joint border with Iran (Воробьева 2020, 662).
Furthermore, the signing in March 2021 of an agreement on the "Sino-Iranian Comprehensive Strategic Partnership" between Iran and China for the next 25 years creates certain opportunities for Armenia (Harutyunyan 2021, 217)9. Furthermore, the geographical position of Armenia is favorable in terms of participation in the B&R due to Armenia's distance from the potential risk zones of the ME - Syria, Kurdistan, Iraq, etc. In this regard, Beijing is ready to invest in the construction of roads and railways in Armenia (Воробьева 2020, 656). Worth to note, that India is also interested in the transit opportunities of Armenia, whose ambassador to Iran announced in March 2021 that New Delhi plans to connect the western part of Chaba-har, the Indian Ocean with Eurasia and Helsinki through Armenia, creating a North-South corridor (Варданян 2021).
Conclusion
After the collapse of the SU, the SC has become one of the hotbeds of international controversy, where the interests of the world's leading powers are increasingly clashing in the struggle to establish control over regional and international communications, transport, infrastructure, fuel and other raw materials. In addition to the largest centers of the multi-centered world - US, EU, Russia and traditional regional players - Turkey and Iran, other states pursuing geopolitical and geo-economic interests, particularly China, actively joined that struggle.
While establishing relations with the newly independent republics of the region Beijing applied a "cluster" and not an "individual" partnership approach, pursuing a policy of non-intervention, and
международные отношения | Арутюнян А.А. | AGHAVNI.HARUTYUNYAN1@GMAIL.COM | УДК 327 | научная статья
used a balanced and proportionate toolkit among the countries of the region, emphasizing the expansion of economic activity. Since 2010s, Beijing's political ties are expanding, and its economic role is steadily growing in the SC. In the context of the implementation of the BRI, the region acquires significant geopolitical and geostrategic significance for China as a crossroads connecting the East-West, North-South transport routes and corridors, as well as the Black and Caspian seas and the Persian Gulf.
The transport, communication, infrastructure and investment programs proposed by Beijing were attractive to the countries of the region, as they corresponded to foreign policy ideas about serving the interests of their countries through important regional corridors connecting Europe with Asia. Georgia's national strategy to become a logistics and transport hub coincides with China's initiative to build the EBSR. China has become one of the largest foreign investors in Georgia, which is ready to make full use of its unique geographical location and expand cooperation with China in such areas as railways, ports and road construction. The implementation of major transport projects in the SC, such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway and the Alat FTZ at the Alat International Seaport, TITR, Trans-Caucasus Transit Corridor, Georgian port of Poti (Poti FTZ), Anaklia deep-water port, and Batumi port in Black Sea boosted the region's vitality in becoming a hub for the China-Europe trade route. So, Azerbaijan and Georgia are included in the Middle Corridor initiative due to their location in the TITR.
Armenia can also cooperate with Beijing by incorporating its major road and rail projects into
the construction of the B&R transport corridors. As a member of the EEU, taking advantage of the establishment of cooperation between the BRI and the EEU, Yerevan can also contribute to the deepening of cooperation between them. However, it should also be taken into account that Armenia does not have a common border with the EEU countries, while China itself has a common border with the two largest members of the EEU, so it can easily supply its goods to the EEU markets through them. Therefore, in the case of Armenia, closer cooperation with Georgia and Iran will be essential. Although Armenia is not included in the Middle Corridor initiative, as an official B&R country, it has the potential to benefit from Chinese foreign direct investment.
As a result of the research of the China's foreign policy in the SC, we came to the conclusion that although China's growing presence and importance in the region cannot be compared with Russia, the West, Iran and Turkey, it is no longer a force that cannot be ignored and should be considered as an important factor. Against the background of the global confrontation between the West and Russia, China is becoming a new major player in the Caucasus-Caspian subregion.
However, there are also a number of obstacles on the way to deepening cooperation. The market of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia is too small for Beijing, so it is more interested in using them mainly as a "window to Europe". China's investment in the region is not large because in the area of lending, including infrastructure, Beijing's strong competitors are multilateral development banks. The most important thing is that for China, the
INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE JOURNAL / МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЙ НАУЧНЫЙ ЖУРНАЛ
Trans-Caspian transport corridor is not a priority since simpler options for land transit of goods from China to Europe are transit through the territory of Russia or Kazakhstan and Russia.
No less important condition is the preservation of military-political stability in the SC, which has become aggravated in recent years. The problems of the political attitudes and peculiarities of the economic policy of the countries of the SC also restrain China's economic expansion in the region. And although China will try to take advantage of the opportunities that arise in the SC region, it will most likely expect more initiative in this matter from the countries of the region themselves.
Notes
1. In 2016, the NSR strategy was officially renamed the BRI or Belt and Road (B&R or One Belt, One Road (OBOR)). It consists of 4 land-and 2 sea-based corridors: China - Mongolia - Russia Economic Corridor (CMREC), New Eurasian Land Bridge Economic Corridor (NELB), China - Central Asia - West Asia Economic Corridor (CCWAEC), China -Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), China -Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor (CICPEC) and Bangladesh - China - India -Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM - EC). The EBSR seeks to improve China's transport overland to Europe and Asia through 6 BRI corridors. The MSR aims to build or improve ports along sea lanes, one of which connects the coast of China passing the South China Sea through the Straits of Malacca to the Indian Ocean and extending to Europe; the other passing through the South China Sea and
extending into the South Pacific. BRI will be realized mainly through the China-led Asian Investment Infrastructure Bank (AIIB), the Silk Road Fund (SRF) and the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB).
The FTA allowed the Georgian side to exempt more than 90% of its products from taxes.
The EEU is an economic union of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan.
More than 800 high officials attended the Tbilisi Silk Road Forum.
In 2015, the main routes of the EBSR were designated — Northern (from China through Central Asia and Russia to Europe), Central (from China through Central Asia and Western Asia to the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea), Southern (from China to Southeast Asia, to South Asia and to the Indian Ocean).
The route of the "New Silk Road" largely coincides with the 10th international corridor of the Organization for Cooperation of Railways (OSJD), which connects the railways of the CIS countries, Eastern Europe, Mongolia and China. The transit corridor is largely a legacy of the USSR and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). It starts in Odessa, passes through Varna, Batumi, Tbilisi, Baku, Turkmenbashi, Tashkent and ends in Ak-togay, Kazakhstan, on the border with China. The current TRACECA route differs only in that the cargo from Baku will be sent not to the Turkmenbashi, but to the Kazakh Aktau and then follow only through the territory of Kazakhstan up to the Chinese border.
международные ОТНОШЕНИЯ | АрУТюнян А.А. | AGHAVNI.HARUTYUNYAN1@GMAIL.COM | УДК 327 | НАУЧНАЯ СТАТЬЯ
10.
Georgia has an EU Association Agreement. Armenia has signed the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with the EU. Azerbaijan was conducting negotiations on signing the Association Agreement with the EU.
In October 1997, the regional organization GUAM was created, which includes the Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Russia and China reacted quickly enough, due to the fact that such a turn of events was very unfavorable, first of all, due to the emerging competition with the West for the energy resources of CA.
The Khadori hydropower station constructed by the Chinese side was the first power station and the first large-scale foreign investment after Georgia's independence. Chinese companies have built 82.1 km of roads, 40.6 km of railway and provided a railway modernization technical solution for Georgia. Hualing Group built the Athlete Village for Tbilisi European Youth Olympic, Tbilisi Sea Special Economic Zone, Kutaisi Free Industrial Park and invested in BASIS Bank.
Agreement was approved by the administration of President Hassan Rouhani in June 2020. It provides for Chinese investment in the amount of US$ 450 billion, in addition to economic ones, also has quite a lot of political significance. It applies not only to the traditional areas of cooperation — economic and cultural, but also to such sensitive areas as the military and intelligence areas. This agreement testifies to the great importance of Iran for China in the context of the BRI.
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Информация об авторе
Арутюнян Агавни Александровна
Ведущии научныи сотрудник, кандидат исторических наук
Отдел международных отношении
Института Востоковедения
Национальнои Академии Наук Армении,
Ереван, Республика Армения
aghavni.harutyunyan1@gmail.com
МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЕ ОТНОШЕНИЯ | Арутюнян А.А. | AGHAVNI.HARUTYUNYAN1@GMAIL.COM | УДК 327 | НАУЧНАЯ Штья
Information about the author
Aghavni A. Harutyunyan
Leading Researcher, Ph.D. Department of International Relations at the Institute of Oriental Studies National Academy of Sciences of Armenia, Yerevan, Republic Armenia aghavni.harutyunyan1@gmail.com
Информация о статье
Поступила в редакцию: 25.09.2022 Одобрена после рецензирования: 10.10.2022 Принята к публикации: 20.10.2022
Information about the article
The article was submitted: 25.09.2022 Approved after reviewing: 10.10.2022 Accepted for publication: 20.10.2022
