Chinese “One belt, one road” in Аrab countries in North and Eastern Аfrica Текст научной статьи по специальности «История и археология»

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Chinese "One belt, one road" in Arab countries in North and Eastern Africa

Китайский «Один пояс, один путь» в арабских странах северной и восточной Африки

Арутюнян Агавни Александровна Aghavni A. Harutyunyan

Отдел международных отношений Department of International Relations

Института Востоковедения Национальной Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy of

Академии Наук Армении, Ереван, Армения Sciences of Armenia, Yerevan, Armenia

[email protected] [email protected]

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АННОТАЦИЯ

Китай стал маргинальным игроком на африканском континенте в 1980-х и начале 1990-х годов, когда доминировало соперничество «холоднои воины» между Соединенными Штатами и Советским Союзом. Однако распад Советского Союза и быстрыи переход Китая к рыночнои экономике привели к тому, что Пекин вернулся в Африку с гораздо более определенными стратегическими перспективами, сфокусированными на развитии торговли, новых рынках и приобретении новых энергоно-сителеи/сырья.

В последние годы Китаи превратился в одну из самых активных иностранных держав на африканском континенте. Пекин поощряет и поддерживает инвестиции и бизнес китаи ских предприятии в Африке. Китаиская инициатива «Один пояс, один путь» (ОПОП) сделала Африку крупнеишеи целью для своих

ABSTRACT

China became a marginal player on the African continent in the 1980s and early 1990s, when the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union dominated. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union and China's rapid transition to a market economy resulted in Beijing returning to Africa with a much more defined strategic outlook focused on developing trade, new markets and acquiring new energy / raw materials.

In recent years, China has emerged as one of the most active foreign powers on the African continent. Beijing encourages and supports the investment and business of Chinese enterprises in Africa. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has made Africa the largest target for its infrastructure projects and other BRI activities. The topic of the research is the implementation of the BRI in some Arab countries of North and East Africa.

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инфраструктурных проектов и других мероприятий ОПОП. Тема данного исследования — реализация китаискои инициативы ОПОП в некоторых арабских странах Севернои и Во-сточнои Африки.

Ключевые слова: Китаи, Африка, ОПОП, Египет, Тунис, Марокко, Алжир, Ливия, Эфиопия, Судан

Для цитирования: Арутюнян А.А. Китаи скии один пояс, один путь в арабских странах Севернои и Восточнои Африки. Современные востоковедческие исследования. 2022. 4 (2). https://doi.org/10.24412/2686-9675-2-2022-62-

Keywords: China, Africa, OBOR, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Ethiopia, Sudan

For citation: Aghavni A. Harutyunyan. Chinese one belt, one road in Arab countries in North and Eastern Africa. // Modern oriental studies. 2022. 4 (2). https://doi.org/10.24412/2686-9675 -2-2022-62-97

1. Beijing's Growing Presence and Influence in Africa

China's presence in Africa has been the topic of numerous discussions and forums of political scientists, economists and mili-tary experts from various countries for a number of years now. Recently, China's actions on the African continent have drawn particularly close attention in the geopolitical arena.

The beginning of the development of modern relations between China and African countries can be considered April 1955, when the Conference of 29 countries of Asia and Africa was held in Bandung (Indonesia). During it, China's Prime Minister Zhou Enlai met for the first time with the leaders of African states (Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, Sudan, Liberia and Ghana). After the conference, China intensified contacts with the countries of the continent, and on May 30, 1956, a joint communique was

signed with Egypt on the establishment of diplomatic relations, which became the first African and Arab country to establish diplomatic relations with China [6, p. 84-91].

China began to actively penetrate Africa in the late 1950s. For the first time, the special services of the Celestial Empire were no-ticed on this continent during the Franco-Algerian war. Since 1958, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has been secretly helping the National Liberation Front of Algeria (Front de liberation nationale / FLN). In March - April 1959, one of the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Liu Shaoqi, received the leaders of the Algerian rebels in Beijing, and China began to generously sponsor the FLN members with weapons and money. In October 1960, the PRC officially announced the provision of aid to Algeria, which gained independence from France in 1962 and in the 1960s, became China's main base for expanding its influence in Africa [8].

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The further development of China's relations with the countries of the continent was impeded by the difficult international situation prevailing at that time, as well as the beginning of the "Cultural Revolution" in the PRC (1966-1976). China was in a state of confrontation with the Western countries (accordingly, it could not establish relations with African regimes loyal to them), but at the same time, relations with the Soviet Union (and, therefore, with regimes loyal to it) also deteriorated significantly [6, p. 84-91].

Opening up and reform in 1979 was a watershed in PRC's foreign policy as well as Chinese history. Beijing needed to adjust to its shift in economic focus, and thus began to create a favorable international environment for its domestic economic construction, which became the main goal of its foreign policy. By then all African countries had gained their national independence and they were facing the same task of having to develop their economy [123, p. 26]. The absence of China's colonial past contributes to the deve-lopment of Sino-African relations, in which economic interests are given priority. It is reflected in the postulate "prosperity first" or "firstgrowth, then rights", which implies the exercise of economic, social and cultural rights over civil-political rights [58, p. 133].

Over the past few years, China has gradually strengthened its economic presence in North Africa (NA) through trade, investment, and infrastructure projects. Beijing is intensifying its relations with the countries of the region on a bilateral, multilateral basis, in particular within the framework of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum

(CASCF) and Forum on China-Africa Cooperation

(FOCAC) [98].

CASCF, established in 2004, is an official initiative between China and Arab League countries, which aims at dialogue, cooperation, peace and development [80]. China and the Arab countries have established a strategic partnership of all-round cooperation and joint development through the CASCF, which has become an important platform for collective dialogue and pragmatic cooperation between the two sides [67].

FOCAC was established in October 2000 at the first Ministerial Conference in Beijing as a multilateral platform for exchange and cooperation between China and 53 out of 54 African countries that have formal diplomatic relationships with China [88, p. 5]. FOCAC, which meets every three years leading to a three-year action plan (overseen by a monitoring committee) bilaterally between China and African countries, provides an alternative to traditional deve-lopment assistance mechanisms and is part of the growing trend of South-South cooperation [108, p. 1; 37, p. 1]. The FOCAC partnership has one pre-condition for cooperation with African countries - adherence to the principle of the "One China" policy, which implies the rejection of formal political relations or contacts with Taiwan as a sovereign state [72, p. 11]. The adoption of the "Beijing Consensus"1 by African leaders is driven by the attractiveness of Beijing's soft power: a long history of friendly ties, the provision of valuable, "unconditional" financial and technical assistance to both elites and those most in need, and increased trade between the world's largest developing

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country and the continent with the most developing countries [55, p. 2].

FOCAC is based on five guiding principles and goals set out in the White Paper on China's Africa Policy in 2006:

- sincerity, friendship and equality;

- mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity;

- mutual support and close coordination;

- learn from each other and strive for common development [79, p. 29-30].

At the 2006 meeting of the FOCAC, a plan was announced to establish five Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Africa to attract Chinese investment and integrate China's complex economic activities throughout the continent [91, p. 9].

During the Fourth FOCAC Ministerial Conference, held in Sharm El Sheikh (Egypt, November 89, 2009), China announced its willingness to invest more in Africa, planning more projects and increasing its "no strings attached" ("unconditional") presence [122]. New areas of cooperation at FOCAC 2018 could include renewables and New Silk Road Initiative (NSRI) [76, p. 1]. 2

China endorsed the New Partnership for Africa's Development in 2001, Action Plan for Accelerating Industrial Development in Africa in 2007, Africa Infrastructure Development Plan and Africa 2063 Vision in 2013. In 2014, China introduced the "461" China-Africa cooperation Framework, which means:

1. Four Principles including; equality, prag-

matism, sincerity, trustworthiness;

2. Six major projects: industry, finance, poverty reduction, environmental protection, cultural exchanges, peace and safety;

3. All under One platform: China-Africa forum [117].

Events during the Arab Spring in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, the uprising and civil war in Libya, and the mass protests that spread across the Maghrib, Mashrik and down the Arabian Peninsula - created something of a challenge for China [22, p.64-104; 20, p. 105-128]. The fact is that Beijing's economic interests are the most dominant factor in determining its foreign policy towards the countries of the region, and it focuses on stability to ensure continued access to natural resources, even without considering Beijing's concerns about the general undesirability of overthrowing governments by mass movements [84, p. 6].

In general, the strategic location of the five Arab countries (Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia) of NA on the southern Mediterranean coast means that China's presence will only expand, especially in the economic sphere, where Egypt, Morocco and Algeria are the highest priority. While China's relations with Egypt and Algeria are characterized by strong diplomatic and security partnerships, its growing presence in countries such as Morocco and Tunisia remains largely economic and cultural. And despite the fact that China has signed Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) with Libya and Tunisia, it has not yet established a formal partnership with any of the NA states [17].

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China is the main trading partner of the African continent. According to China Global Investment Tracker, trade between China and the five Maghreb countries reached nearly US $ 23.5 billion in 2019. Chinese investment and contracts in the Maghreb region totaled US $ 29.6 billion between 2005 and 2019, with Algeria taking over the lion's share (US $ 23.6 billion) [98]. The Chinese are building roads, hospitals, stadiums in Africa, invest in the development of new technologies in agriculture. On the African con-tinent, the Chinese have bought more than 3 million hectares of fertile land [5]. It is also known that almost all major mineral exploration and production contracts in the African continent fall to Chinese businessmen [21, p. 417-418].

According to experts, China's claims about a "mutually bene-ficial model of cooperation" with African countries are only partially true. For example, the African Development Bank estimates that by 2021, Africa's infrastructure deficit was US $ 93 billion a year [115, p. 4]. About 17 low-income African countries have either been faced with a "debt crisis", or have had difficulty servicing their public debt. There are reports of more than 1,000 Chinese loans in Africa between 2000 and 2017, totaling more than US $ 143 billion. Ethiopia has also experienced debt concerns over Chinese-built projects. Repayment on its US $ 4 billion railway linking capital Addis Ababa with neighboring Djibouti has been extended by 20 years over concerns of debt distress. Concerns about China's unsustainable lending in Zambia have forced critics to say that China will take control of key government assets because of Zambia's debt. There is a view that China may as well seize the port of Kenya Mombasa, unable to pay US $ 2.27 billion in debt [24, p. 148].

There is also an opinion that Chinese businessmen impose restrictions on labor laws in their enterprises, which leads to social tensions. Such an ambiguous policy of the Chinese authorities, accompanied by mass immigration of Chinese, is criticized by African countries [5]. China's policy of attracting Chinese labor for its infrastructure projects in Africa has resulted in over 200,000 Chinese citizens working under OBOR contracts across Africa. This gives Beijing a justification for a practical approach to protecting them, as well as its burgeoning investment. The OBOR has heightened the need for a global strategy to protect China's foreign interests, and the CCP has adopted the concept of "protecting overseas nationals" as a core Chinese interest [103].

China is setting up NA to play an integral role in connecting Asia, Africa and Europe — BRI goal. While the BRI map officially included only Egypt, MoUs were signed between China and every state in NA [17]. Noteworthy that only one African city, Nairobi, was identified as a B&R hub, through which the MSR will supposedly pass [48, p. 61]. In 2019, the Egypt and United Arab Emirates (UAE) were the only Arab countries that sent top-level representation to attend the Second Belt and Road Forum in Beijing [47, p. 9].

As the early focus of OBOR, East Africa has developed into a central node in the MSR, connected by planned and finished ports, pipelines, railways, and power plants built and funded by Chinese companies and lenders. A standard gauge railway connecting Mombasa to Nairobi — the biggest investment in Kenya since its independence — is a flagship OBOR project in East Africa. The electric

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railway from Addis Ababa (Ethiopia's capital) to Djibouti, where China established its first overseas naval base and has stakes in a strategic deep water port, is another. From Djibouti, the MSR connects planned and completed Chinese port clusters in Sudan, Mauritania, SenegalGhana, Nigeria, Gambia, Guinea, Sâo Tomé and Principe, Cameroon, Angola, and Namibia. Another route links Djibouti to Gwadar, Hambantota, Colombo, Myanmar, and Hong Kong. The final arc of this corridor connects Walvis Bay to Chinese port clusters in Mozambique, Tanzania, and Kenya before also connecting to Gwadar [103].

China is investing in ports along the Suez Canal from the Gulf of Aden to the Mediterranean Sea. Of the 49 countries with which China has signed a MoU or formally endorsed the BRI, 34 (almost 70%) are located off the coast of Africa, 16 in the West, 8 in the North and East, and 2 in the south. These include the following ports: Djibouti (Djibouti - first overseas military base), Sudan (Sudan), Said and Tevik (Egypt), Ain Sokhna (Egypt), Zarzis (Tunisia) and El Hamdania (Algeria). In the future, China could use its influence on these ports for economic (transport of raw materials, finished goods and labour) and military (surveillance and blockade of overseas and deep-sea maritime traffic) purposes [115, p. 4].

2. The Synergy of the OBOR and the Egypt Vision 2030

Despite the fact that the official establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Egypt took place only in 1956, the interaction between the two countries developed earlier. So, for

example, in the 1930s, twenty Chinese Muslim students were sent to Egypt to study at Al-Azhar University, upon completion of their stu-dies, they became translators and teachers of Arabic in China. After the establishment of official diplomatic relations, Egypt supported the PRC in its aspiration to become a full member of the United Nation's Security Council (UNSC) with a veto, and China condemned the aggression of Great Britain, France and the United States (US) against Egypt during the Suez crisis [3].

Beijing emphasizes Egypt's role in regional and international affairs and, given the traditional activity of Egyptian diplomacy, sees Cairo as a potential partner in the Arab-Muslim world [101]. It is no coincidence that Egyptian-Chinese relations have a special place in the Sino-Arab dialogue, in particular in the framework of the CASCF [26, p. 150]. Egypt is also an African power, so Egyptian-Chinese relations have a special place in the FO-CAC. Egypt is seen as a bridge to China's expanding ties with the Arab world and Africa [46].

In April 1999, a joint memorandum on establishing a strategic partnership between the two countries on the 21st century was signed in Beijing [2, p. 9]. In June 2006, a "Deep Strategic Cooperation Program between China and Egypt" was signed, under which a political agreement and a MoU on establishing mechanisms for strategic dialogue were signed between the two countries' foreign mi -nistries [26, p. 151].

Egypt plays a key role in China's 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) due to its strategic location between Africa, the Mediterranean and Europe. Through MSR, China intends to gain access to

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the natural entry point to the Mediterranean from the east and make Egypt one of the largest centers for the production of Chinese goods destined for the markets of Africa, Europe and the Middle East (ME) [75]. The Suez Canal has an advan-tageous geographical position, and therefore Egypt can become the industrial, trade and logistics center of the region [13].

During Xi's Egyptian visit in January 2016, China signed a MoU with Egypt to enhance cooperation on the implementation of the BRI [34; 14]. In 2017, China and Egypt signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement to expand cooperation and enhance Egypt's status among China's partners [75]. In October 2018, Egypt and China had signed deals worth US $ 18 billion as part of the BRI [65]. In April 2019, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, speaking at the opening ceremony of the B&R international forum, said that Egypt is increasing energy production, diversifying energy resources and turning itself into a regional energy center [13]. In 2020, the parties agreed to continue work on the integration of the Chinese initiative and the national development strategy "Egypt Vision 2030" [9].

In November 2006, Egypt recognized China as a country with a full market economy [57; 7]. China's exports to Egypt reached US $ 7.61 billion in the first eight months of 2018, while its imports from Egypt totalled US $ 1.22 billion. China-Egypt bilateral trade volume grew 26.7% year-on-year in January-August 2018 to reach US $ 8.83 billion. About 1,080 Chinese companies are operating in Egypt in various sectors, notably industry, information technology and economic zones [121]. China and Egypt signed US $ 1

billion financing agreement for Egypt's central bank and a US $ 700 million loan to state-owned National Bank of Egypt [39].

The Suez Canal attracts most of the Chinese investment in the country through the redevelopment of many of the canal ports, such as Ismailia and Port Said [75]. Both the harbors at the ends of the Suez Canal have a great influence over the ME, Africa and the entire planet in terms of geopolitics and global trade. Egypt plans to open six new ports and more industrial parks alongside the canal, and launch in the nearby areas projects like a new industrial city, which is capable of hosting hundreds of factories [118]. In August 2014, a 72-km expansion of the Suez Canal Economic Zone (SCZone), launched in 2009, was approved by the Egyptian government to boost the country's ailing economy [107]. Chinese construction firms are already the largest investors in Egypt's mega-project [19].

In January 2016, China and Egypt signed a five-year outline document in which the two sides vowed to "double their efforts" to develop the China-Egypt Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone. It covers an area of 6 km, located some 120 km to the east of Cairo near the Suez Canal, and is only about 50 km away from Egypt's new administrative capital, where the BRI and Egypt's Suez Canal Corridor Development Project meet. The project was to attract more than 100 textile, clothing, oil, motorcycle and solar energy enterprises to Egypt. For over a decade, it has directly offered jobs to over 3,500 people and created 30,000 job opportunities through the industries it gathered. The program has managed to attract invest-ments

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from the world's top companies [119]. The special market zone was home to more than 30 Chinese enterprises [68]. "TEDA Fun Valley"3 in the China-Egypt Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone is also one of the main cooperation programs and attracts tens of thousands of visitors every year. In addition to a cluster of industrial enterprises, the cooperation zone will be transformed into a city with many ancillary facilities such as restaurants and super-markets, as well as commercial residential areas and a shopping center [119]. In August 2018, Egypt officially opened its "New Suez Canal" [118].

In 2008, COSCO4 Pacific, China's largest shipping state-owned enterprises (SOE), invested US $ 185.6 million in a joint venture to operate and manage the Suez Canal Container Terminal (SCCT) in Port Said East Port, located in the western Sinai Peninsula at the northern end of the Canal [23, p. 63]. For Port Said East Port's second development phase, operating since 2012, China's largest state-owned enterprises and the second largest dredging company in the world - China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC) invested US $ 219 million to construct a 1,200-meter quay. CHEC also completed a contract valued at US $ 1 billion to construct a quay in al-Adabiya port at the southern entrance to the Canal [59, p. 11] 5.

In May 2018, Egypt's New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA) signed a MoU with Chinese construction company CGCOC Group (formerly known as CGC Overseas Construction Group Co., Ltd) to establish the first industrial zone in the city of New Alamein. CHEC started in August 2018, the main phase of the construction of a new terminal basin in Sokhna Port south of the Suez Canal north-

east of Egypt, while the National Bank of Egypt (NBE) signed in September a loan agreement of US $ 600 million with the China Development Bank (CDB) in Beijing [121].

In 2017, Egypt signed a preliminary agreement with China Fortune Land Development for US $10 billions of investments over a period of 10 years for development works at the new administrative capital, located 40 km east of Greater Cairo, between Cairo and the Suez Canal. Once completed, the city is expected to accommodate around 5 million inhabitants [35, p. 22; 56]. The plan for the new capital, where most of the Egyptian government will relocate upon completion, could exceed US $ 20 billion, and the China State Construction and Engineering Corporation (CSCEC) has begun const-ruction of a US $ 3 billion new business and administrative district, mostly funded by Chinese banks. Other Chinese companies are actively engaging with Egyptian authorities on other aspects of the multibillion-dollar project to build a new desert capital [19].

Chinese drilling company ZPEC has 11 rigs in Egypt and it plans to bring more of them to join the Canal Sugar project. Since 2016, ZPEC has worked in Egypt's 1.5-million-feddan reclamation national project and drilled 38 agricultural wells for the Egyptian military in the Sinai Peninsula. At the end of 2018, ZPEC deployed three 650 horsepower 40-meter rigs and other heavy equipment in various locations in the desert, about 50 km west of the Mallawi area in Minya (Western Desert near the southern Egyptian province of Minya) [64].

In March 2018, the Egyptian government signed a MoU with China State Construction Engi-

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neering Co. on designing and const-ructing three closed gymnasiums in Sharm al-Sheikh, Hurghada and Luxor in preparation for hosting the 2021 World Men's Handball Championship. In September 2018, Egypt and China signed deals, including the construction of a pumping and storage station in the Mount Ataka area in Northeast Egypt, a coal-fired power station in Hamrawein on the Red Sea coast and the second phase of central business district in the new administrative capital. The signings also included building a textile industrial project, a refinery and a petro-chemicals complex in the Suez Canal corridor area. In December 2018, Egypt's Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI) announ-ced on the agreement with China Railway 20 Bureau Group Corpo-ration (CR20G) to establish an industrial facility to manufacture monorails and express trains. Also in December, Egyptian Air Forces signed an agreement during EDEX 2018 exhibition in Cairo to purchase drones from China's National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC) [121].

In August 2018, Chinese fiberglass giant manufacturer Jushi, which was introduced to Egypt via the cooperation zone, completed the production base of 200,000 tons of fiberglass by its local branch, making Egypt the world's fifth largest fiberglass producer [119]. The natural resources discovered in Egyptian Zohr offshore gas field are increasing the opportunities to develop further partnerships in buil-ding offshore facilities within the MSR platform and granting new chances for China in the energy sector [75].

The large natural gas reserves discovered in Egypt in the late 1990s allowed it to become one of

the leaders in the production of this type of hydrocarbon, not only in the ME, but all over the world [12, p. 157; 25, p. 309]. As a fuel importer, China has been cooperating with Egypt since 1993 in the gas and heavy oil sectors to increase the efficiency of technologies used in old oil wells and to develop equipment for the petrochemical industry [52, p. 14].

3. China-Tunisia: Strengthening the Partnership within the Framework of OBOR

China established diplomatic relationship with Tunisia on January 10, 1964 [113]. During the long presidency of Habib Bourguiba (1957-1987), Tunisia had rather distant and even antagonistic relations with China. His anti-communist and proWestern policies made it difficult to establish close ties. Throughout the 1960s, Bourguiba denounced China for its foreign policy actions, especially the border dispute with India. However, in 1961, he began voting for China's participation in the UNSC. Foreign policy tensions did not prevent the establishment of trade relations as early as 1958. In 1983, the two countries signed the Sino-Tunisian Joint Committee on Economic, Trade and Technological Cooperation to facilitate trade relations, and made efforts to strengthen bilateral ties [120].

As a country at the intersection of three - the Mediterranean, Islamic-Arab and African civilizations, Tunisia's signing of the B&R agreement with China in January 2019 sets an example of bilateral cooperation for other Arab countries [47, p. 9]. According to the Chinese Investment Tracker, Beijing's investment in Tunisia between 2009 and 2014 amounted to merely US $ 110 million [47, p. 2].

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Trade has risen between China and Tunisia, with the latter's imports from the former valued at US $ 1.85 billion in 2017, ranking third behind France and Italy. However, China still views the country as an investment risk and is skeptical of its democratic transition and economic challenges [17]. Tunisian imports from China represented 8.4% of Tunisia's total imports, with a clear predominance of electrical machinery, and equipment (56%) and fairly balanced between metals and metalwork (10%) and textiles and textile fabrics (10%) [74].

Tunisia, a country with key strategic positions in the Southern Mediterranean, NA and the Arab world, joined the BRI in early September 2018 [53]. Tunisia and China, as part of the 2018 FOCAC, signed an agreement that marked the country's first tangible steps towards forming a "strong partnership" with the BRI. The deals include projects to transform Tunisia's southern port of Zarzis into an economic and commercial hub, the construction of a bridge linking Djerba, Tunisia's main tourist island, with Djorf in the mineral-rich Mede-nine region, and the construction of a 140-km railroad linking the coastal Gabes region of the petrochemical and phosphate industry to Zarzis. Tunisia and China have agreed to open a car plant in Tunisia, operated by China's state-owned SAIC Motor Corporation Limited, which will manufacture and export vehicles to the Medi-terranean region and Africa. They signed a tourism cooperation agreement that includes plans to open an air route to attract more Chinese tourists to Tunisia and expand the NA country's tourism industry, which is a major source of foreign exchange [86].

Undoubtedly, China is interested in the Tunisian port of Bizerte because it provides easy access to Europe; in addition, the port is located at the critical node of the submarine fiber-optic network cables [120].

China's Huawei Marine Networks delivered the "Hannibal" cable, linking Tunisia to Italy, in 2009, as well as another major cable linking Libya to Greece, in 2010. This has led to concerns about Chinese commercial investments being used for non-com-mercial activities, such as intelligence gathering and naval/military cooperation in the Mediterranean [17].

The Chinese energy construction company Sinohydro signed a contract with the Tunisian government in 2016 for the construction of a dam (passes through the mountains in the El Kef province in northwest Tunisia), which will be completed in 2022 and will be one of the largest dams in Tunisia. The dam, with a total storage capacity of 190 million cubic meters of water, will protect the region from flood and meet the needs for irrigation and domestic use of water in the region [63].

In 2018, China started its first attempt to construct an overseas centre for its self-developed Beidou Satellite which has become the fourth global navigation satellite system preceded by the Global Positioning System (GPS) of the US, Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) of Russia and Galileo of the EU. Situated in the Djazala Science Park on the northern outskirts of Tunis, the Beidou Satellite Centre is a flagship project between Beijing and the Tunisia-based Arab Information and Communication Technology Organi-zation (AICTO). The centre facilitates smart city functions, enables

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unmanned driving of agricultural machinery, and helps farmers reduce costs, resource wastes, and damage to the environment [47, p. 11].

In April 2019, China and Tunisia signed a MoU, with a par-ticular focus on the development of clean energy such as wind and solar energy. At the beginning of 2020, TBEA Xinjiang New Energy, a high-tech enterprise specializing in solargrade high-purity poly-silicon material, together with the Amea Power from the UAE, won a contract to construct a power plant of 100MW in Kairouan, located in north-central Tunisia [47, p. 10-11].

Chinese firms can enter European markets through Tunisia, which is the first country along the southern coast of the Mediter-ranean to achieve free trade with the European Union (EU). In the 1990s, Tunisia signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the EU to facilitate economic exchanges between the two shores of the Mediterranean [114].

Despite the fact that tourism, culture, agri-food, renewable energy and automotive sectors are all of interest to Chinese investors, but they are hesitant to invest because of political uncertainty, inse-curity, a conservative business climate, and restrictive fiscal mea-sures [120].

4. OBOR — a Means of Diversifying the Moroccan Economy

Relations between China and Morocco are centuries old. Ibn Battuta, the famous Moroccan explorer who toured China from 1345 to 1346, was the first to introduce China, especially the Great Wall, to the West and Arab world [97].

In November 1958, Morocco became the second country in Africa to recognize the PRC (105). China has rendered Morocco certain economic aid since 1961, but mutually beneficial cooperation bet -ween them was initiated in 1983 [99].

According to the Chinese Investment Tracker in 2014, PRC's investment in Morocco amounted to US $ 780 million [47, p. 2]. Morocco's imports from China were worth US $ 3.14 billion in 2017, behind only those from France and Spain [17]. Presently China's contracted projects in Morocco mainly concentrate on fishery cooperation. The commodities China exports to Morocco mainly include light in-dust-rial products, textiles, green tea, mechanical and electronic products, etc. China imports phosphates, chemical fertilizer and cobalt sand [99].

The state visit of King Mohammed VI of Morocco to China in 2016 led to the signing of a number of important agreements, including the signing of a China-Africa Investment Fund. China sees Morocco as an opportunity to develop factories for export to the EU, right across the Strait of Gibraltar [83]. In November 17, 2017, China and Morocco signed a MoU on joint construction of the B&R [40].

In October 2000, the Moroccan Bank for Foreign Trade set up an office in Beijing (99). Bank of China (BOC) opened its first branch in Morocco in 2017. In 2016, the Moroccan government hosted the first Sino-African Entrepreneurship Summit in Marrakech, where Morocco later hosted the COP22 Summit [83].

In 2011, Sinochem signed a 4-year contract with Morocco's OCP Group to purchase 2 million tons of phosphate fertilizer [100]. After China's

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Haite Group pulled out of the project, the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) and its subsidiary, the China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC), signed an MoU with Morocco's BMCE Bank. Construction on the "Tech City" had already begun as of July 2019. Following the announcement of the "Tech City" project, Chinese auto manu-facturing companies, including BYD, CITIC Dicastal, and Aotecar New Energy Technology, signed agreements with the Moroccan government to build various plants [17]. CITIC6 Dicastal set up a US $ 400 million plant to supply equipment for the French Groupe PSA's car assembly plant [96].

China is looking to play a strategic role in the development of Europe — Africa connectivity across the Western Mediterranean. The Chinese presence in Morocco is concentrated in industrial zones, Free Trade Zone (FTZ), and financial centers. In Morocco, these include the Atlantic Free Zone in Kenitra, Casablanca Finance City (CFC), and the Tanger Med Port Complex [54].

Beijing has a stake in Morocco's emerging trade transport corridor from West Africa to Western Europe, based on the Mo-roccan high-speed railway line Al Boraq and the largest port in the Mediterranean, the recently expanded Tangier Med port, made pos-sible by an investment from China Merchants Group. CCCC is building the Mohammed VI Tangier Tech City industrial center (the plan was announced in March 2017) to attract more multinational and Chinese firms to Morocco [96]. The Chinese investment is expected to reach US $ 10 billion in this project while providing employment for about 100,000 workers.

It is expected to become the largest Chinese investment project in NA and to feature several industrial zones. At the latter port complex, Chinese companies, including Huawei, are planning to establish regional logistics centers [17].

5. OBOR — a Precondition for the Resumption of Sino-Algerian Cooperation

China was the first non-Arab country to recognize the provi-sional government of Algeria in December 1958, and under Mao Zedong saw Algeria as the core of the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggle in Africa, a means of confirming the Communist Party of China's (CPC) own revolutionary ideological claims, and a prize in inter-communist rivalry with the Soviet Union. Throughout the Cold War, relations between China and Algeria were "a marriage of convenience ... based more on symbolism than on any particular connection" [82].

In the 1990s, after Algeria abandoned official references to socialism and by this point the Chinese economy began to flourish, trade relations between the two countries began to expand. However, progress was hampered by the civil war in Algeria (1992 -2002), and after the end of this conflict, China's economic presence in Algeria increased [82].

The progressive development of the bilateral relationship is anchored in three documents: the Declaration on Strategic Part-nership and Cooperation (November 6, 2006, Beijing) [38], the Five-Year Plan for China-Algeria Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation (June 6, 2014, Beijing) [116], and the MoU on Cooperation under the BRI Framework (September 5, 2018, Beijing) [27]. On June 6, 2014, China and Algeria signed the Five-Year Plan for

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Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation between China and Algeria [116]. On September 4, 2018, on the sidelines of the FOCAC in China's capital Beijing, Algeria and China signed an MoU on the joining the BRI. The decree said Algeria and China shall cooperate in the framework of the MoU in the fields of policies coordination, infrastructure interdependence and other areas [29].

China became Algeria's top trade partner in 2013, overtaking France. There is a significant trade deficit, and while China has become Algeria's primary source for imports, which were valued at US $ 7.85 billion in 2018, Algeria's exports to China remain relatively insignificant compared to its exports to European count-ries, and are almost entirely from the hydrocarbon sector. However, its exports to China are rising, having jumped 60-fold between 2000 and 2017 [17]. During the first five months of 2019, China remained the top supplier of Algeria with exports worth US $ 3.5 billion [29]. Although Algeria's exports to China are minimal, its imports from China totaled US $ 5.4 billion in 2019 [96]. China, especially through construction companies, is the first foreign investor in Algeria by 2016 [28]. While Algeria has ranked among the top construction countries in China since the mid-2000s, it has not been the main destination for Chinese overseas investment. Algerian imports from China are heavily focused on capital goods, equipment, and electro-nics rather than cheap, poorly manufactured consumer goods. To reduce the trade deficit, the Algerian government imposed volume limits on electronic goods and household appliances, which led to a sharp decline in imports from China [82].

China's documented joint construction and investment activities in Algeria between 2005 and 2020 were heavily concentrated in the transport and real estate sector and amounted to US $ 23.85 billion. Nearly three quarters of that amount was accumulated prior to the 2013 BRI launch. Since then, about US $ 9 billion in Chinese construction and investment deals in Algeria have accounted for only a small fraction of the value of these activities in the Arab ME and other countries in NA (5%) and Sub-Saharan Africa (7%) [82].

In the 2000s, Algeria frequently asked Chinese contractors to implement the Economic Recovery Support Program (2001-2004) and the subsequent Economic Growth Support Program (2005-2009), which were financed by skyrocketing oil revenues. The goal was to catch up during the 1990s, when oil prices were low and when the "fight against terrorism" dictated spending and budgetary priorities. Since the liberalization of foreign investment laws and restrictions on structural adjustment programs, Chinese contractors have become very competitive, easily won numerous public tenders and taken the best part of the production, winning 80% of infrastructure contracts in Algeria, at a time when Western contractors were fleeing insecurity and poor business climate [109]. Over the past two decades, Chinese enterprises were granted various public development projects valued at more than US $ 70 billion. In Algeria, Chinese companies are primarily interested in the construction, housing, and energy sectors [82].

Since 2002, starting in the low-cost housing sector, Chinese state-owned companies have quickly secured contracts for major infrastructure projects,

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such as the expansion of the rail network and the East-West highway, worth about US $ 11.2 billion [77, p. 9]. Beijing is supporting the creation of an infrastructure corridor through Algeria that will connect sub-Saharan Africa to the Mediterranean. In 2016, Algeria signed an agreement with CSCEC and CHEC for the construction of the Algerian port of El Hamdaniya. With a capacity of 6.5 million TEU, Hamdaniya can function as a corridor junction between Africa and Europe [96; 111]. Chinese companies have built the new Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) building, a new terminal at Houari Boumediene Airport [82], the Opera House, the Sheraton Hotel and Oran, the Great Mosque of Algiers, and the East-West Highway, mark the landscape, as do the thousands of Chinese workers who have established a "Chinatown" in a suburb of Algiers [17].

Algeria ranks fourth in the world in terms of phosphorite reserves. In 2018, China's CITIC Construction signed an agreement with Algeria's Sonatrach to build a US $ 6 billion integrated phosphate plant that will increase Algeria's annual production to 10 million tonnes [96].

In 2008, China and Algeria entered into an agreement to establish a second Chinese SEZ in NA, the Jiangling Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone, to be located in Mostaganem, western Algeria, with an emphasis on vehicle assembly. The agreement was attended by the Chinese company Jiangling Motors Cooper and Jiangxi Coal Corporation Group, as well as their Algerian partner Groupe Mazouz [77, p. 10]. Chinese automaker Foton and Algerian car dealer KIV formed a joint venture in April 2017 to enable them to assemble cars and trucks in NA. The assembly plant is located in the

province of Annaba, 535 km east of Algeria [42].

Algeria is Africa's fourth largest crude oil producer7 by 2008. More than 90% of exports of its high -quality, low-sulfur, low-sulfur crude oil go to Western Europe and not to China. China's imports of Algerian oil remain insignificant compared to oil imports from other parts of Africa. China's share in Algeria's oil industry is focused on exploration and development projects. At the same time, China's role in exploration and future development in Algeria, as well as its overall role in the hydrocarbon sector in Algeria, is small, especially compared to the role of international energy giants such as Statoil, Shell, British Petroleum or Total SA [45, p. 11].

In October 2002, China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (SINOPEC) teamed up with Algeria's state-owned Sonatrach8 in the first Chinese oil development venture in Algeria to jointly develop the Zarzaitin oil field in southeastern Algeria at cost US $ 525 million; SINOPEC has taken over 75% of the total investment. In July 2003, the China National Petroleum Exploration and Development Corporation (CNODC), a division of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), built a refinery at Adrar in southwestern Algeria for US $ 350 million. In 2004, agreements were signed between CNPC, SINOPEC and Sonatrach on oil exploration rights and related projects. Algeria has granted the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) an exploration license for the Hassi Bir Rekaiz field. In October 2009, Sonatrach announced that SI-NOPEC is one of a group of four international companies shortlisted for design and engineering consideration for a new refinery in Tairet, in western Algeria, at an estimated cost of US $ 6 billion. Si-

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nopec is also represented along with other companies bidding for the design, engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) of an oil refinery in Algeria for an estimated US $ 300 million project. China's imports of Algerian Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) are insignificant, despite the fact that Algeria is the sixth largest producer of LNG in the world, the fourth largest exporter of LNG in the world, 70% of which is exported to the markets of Europe, the US and other countries [45, p. 11].

The COVID-19 pandemic and falling oil prices have seriously impacted the Algerian economy, as oil and gas sales account for 60% of the state budget. Fearing to enlist the support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Algeria is turning towards China. In October 11, 2020, the China Inter-national Development Cooperation Agency signed an agreement with Algeria to further expand Algeria's participation in BRI [96].

Projects linked with the BRI in Algeria will accompany the development of this Maghreb country and thus create new opportu-nities for companies based on the northern shore of the Mediterranean and improve connection between Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa [28].

6. OBOR — a Factor in Stabilizing Libya

Beijing views Libya — a country connecting the Mediterranean Sea to sub-Saharan Africa — as a potentially valuable BRI partner. Libya became the last NA country to "recognize" China in 1971, but it did not establish diplomatic relations with the PRC until 1978 [52, p. 13]. Since then, Libya has not terminated periodic political relations with Taiwan [18].

Until the beginning of 2011, that is, before the start of the civil war in Libya [22, p. 81-90], China was widely represented in the oil sector of Libya, in the field of railway transport and telecommunications [11]. The Chinese have been busy with billions of euros in oil development and infrastructure projects [4]. Libyan oil exports to China increased by 25% during 2010, fueled by a number of factors: low energy costs, optimal conditions for transporting products to Europe and the US, tax advantages and even labor costs were below Chinese standards. China became the third consumer of Libya's oil, using 10% of Libya's oil exports, while the share of Libyan oil in supplies to China was no more than 3.5% [104]. The value of Chinese contracts, mainly construction projects, reached US $ 18 billion. The largest Chinese companies in the Libyan market were: Commu-nication Construction and China Railway Construction Corporation, China Civil Engineering Construction, which oversaw the Eastern Sahara irrigation project. The China Gezhouba Group built homes in five southern cities, and Huawei Technologies built the infrastructure for mobile communications [70]. Of the US $ 6.6 billion in trade turnover (2010) between the two countries, the lion's share was oil, but it also included many other industries, largely due to the fact that China never imposed sanctions on the Gaddafi regime [87]. When fighting broke out in February 2011, there were 36,000 Chinese citizens in Libya working for 75 companies in the oil, railways and telecommunications sectors [18]. In the period from February 22 to March 5, the PRC government in just 9 days managed to carry out an unprecedented operation to evacuate 35,860 of its citizens by land, sea and air from Libya [15].

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In 2014, when Libya was divided between two centers of power (Tripoli and Tobruk), the complex conflict in this NA country posed new challenges in terms of China's interests. In line with the UN position, China recognizes the Government of National Accord (GNA) as the "legitimate" government of Libya. Since 2016, officials in Beijing have met with their GNA counterparts at least nine times [71]. Drawing on the lessons of its 2011 experience and officially supporting the GNA, China is pursuing a policy of cautious neutrality and diplomatic and economic diversification with a focus on long-term interests. In July 2018, during the 8th FOCAC ministerial meeting in China, GNA foreign minister Mohamed Taha Siala signed a MoU with State Counselor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi, paving the way for Libya to join the BRI. GNA also welcomed the return of Chinese businesses to Libya in 2018, especially in the areas of Libya's infrastructure modernization and rehabilitation, and has supported Chinese telecommunications companies including Huawei and ZTE. In 2019, bilateral trade between the two countries totaled US $ 6.21 billion, mainly driven by a recovery in Libyan oil exports to China [66]. Libya's oil exports to China have more than doubled since 2017 [17]. In 2019, China imported approximately US $ 4.8 million worth of petroleum from Libya [71].

A senior delegation from Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC) visited China in July of 2019 to hold talks with CNPC officials regarding crude oil purchases and possible collaboration on exploring and developing Libya's oilfields and services. And CNPC's PetroChina can count on its ongoing cooperation with Libya's NOC since the bulk of the country's oilfields sit in territory controlled by the

Libya National Army (LNA) [98].

Turkey's ongoing military intervention in Libya aimed at strengthening the power of the Transitional National Council (TNC) is fueling some tensions between Beijing and Ankara, despite the fact that China nominally supports the TNC. Wang Jingyan, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, stressed that while Ankara's support of pro-GNA forces changed the situation against Haftar, the Turkish intervention is considered provocative, caused by President Recep Tay-yip Erdogan's internal problems within Turkey and is likely to leave Ankara in greater isolation in the eastern Mediterranean. Other Chinese foreign policy analysts see Ankara as over-ambition in Libya. There is also the view that "the stronger Turkey is in Libya, the less China will gain, as Ankara will seek to reduce US concerns in exchange for their support (or neutrality) in their ongoing struggle with Russia and the UAE" [71].

While countries like the UAE, Russia, France or Turkey can provide powerful military equipment to win battles, China is one of the few countries that can provide financial and technical support to rebuild and transform a country, no matter which faction dominates the ongoing civil war. But after the conflict reaches a balance point, China can use the synergy between the BRI framework and the post-conflict reconstruction of Libya, and with a cautious and limited approach taken by Beijing, will achieve greater opportunities to intervene not only in Libya's economic affairs, but also in its political sphere [98].

So, the events of the civil war in Libya have become a new test for China's foreign policy, based

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on the long-standing doctrine of "non-intervention". It has been transformed into a new strategy of "non -alignment", in which Beijing, without staying aloof from the conflict, did not take sides between the GNA and the LNA [60]. Instead, the Chinese seem to be betting on both sides of the conflict and continue to watch from afar, awaiting a final political settlement and peace that could lead to a stronger Chinese presence [73].

For their part, the conflicting parties discussed China's role in finding a peaceful solution to the Libyan crisis and its contribution to the reconstruction of Libya [89]. In fact, the Libyan experience has become another step in shaping a fundamental change in China's foreign policy towards a more active approach to protecting China's global interests [1, p. 12].

7. Application of the Chinese Model in Ethiopia

Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie established diplomatic rela-tions with the PRC in 1970, but the 1974 revolution, which led to the emergence of a regime close to the SU, provoked a distancing of Addis Ababa - Beijing links until the late 1980s [78, p. 54]. China needed Ethiopia and other African countries at the UN, and Ethiopia, ruled by Emperor Haile Selassie I, was the diplomatic leader for African independence and could no longer ignore the most populous third world country, involved in solidarity and material support in the anti-colonial struggle [16]. It was not until the armed opposition victory in 1991, the fall of the Mengistu regime, and the rise to power of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) led by Meles

Zenawi that bilateral relations began to experience real growth. The EPRDF, which came to power with the support of the US, advocated a market economy (with the exception of issues such as land ownership and the maintenance of state monopolies) and declared its readiness to establish a federal and democratic state. It was only in 1995 that the regime decided to change the balance of its foreign policy in favor of Russia and China. The main EPRDF leaders wanted to learn about China's "socialist market economy" and agricultural development [78, p. 54].

Ethiopia's growing interest in China is attributed to economic aid, an alternative partner to the West and an example to follow. For China, the important role of Ethiopia in the political history of Africa and its strategic position as the seat of the African Union, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, various international and regional organizations and diplomatic missions — a country that is the diplomatic capital of Africa [69, p. 16].

Ethiopia is a source of attraction for China more so with a population of about 90 million and a potential access for other regional markets such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). With the introduction of liberalization policy in 1992 in Ethiopia, China poised to exploit this opportunity by investing in various economic sectors. Notable among others are road construction, electric power generation and tele-communi-cation [94, p. 7].

Ethiopia views China as a source of economic aid and invest-ment, as well as low-cost technologies that can lift millions of small entrepreneurs out of poverty through access to agricultural machi

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--nery and transport, as economic growth cannot be achieved without sustained technological and industrial modernization and structural transformation. Ethiopia also sees China as a vast market for its agricultural products and therefore a means to improve the lives of farmers, who make up about 80% of the population [16]. In Ethiopia, China has developed special trade and economic cooperation zones, which allow for the improvement of poor infrastructure, inadequate services, and weak institutions by focusing efforts on a specific geographical area [90, p. 85].

Commercial ties were institutionalized most rapidly. In 2006, the Ethiopian government signed a major financing framework agreement with China EXIM Bank, which led to a rapid increase in the number of Chinese infrastructure projects. The framework agree-ment requires that all exports to China be controlled by the Com-mercial Bank of Ethiopia, the largest public financial institution. Ethiopia intends to receive export earnings to help pay off Chinese loans (36). In 2010, a MoU was signed between the EPRDF and the CCP. Economic ties also increased rapidly. According to a 2012 World Bank survey, Chinese FDI increased "from virtually zero" in 2004 to US $ 74 million annually in 2009 [51].

China has invested more than US $ 20.6 billion in Ethiopia since 2005 to 2017, most of which has been focused on infrastructure projects such as roads, rail lines and telecommunications [112]. Chinese companies have invested around US $ 4 billion during the last two decades in Ethiopia, employing 111,000 Ethiopians on permanent and temporary basis [44]. Ethiopia is China's main eco-

nomic and strategic partner in East Africa [95, p. 12]. China is Ethiopia's largest trading partner, bilateral trade between the two countries reached US $ 6.37 billion in 2015 [61].

Trade between China and Ethiopia is largely based on mecha-nisms such as the Joint Ethiopian -China commission (JECC), Sino-Ethiopian Agreement for Mutual Promotion and Protocol of Invest-ment -1988, Sino - Ethiopia Agreement for trade, economic and technical cooperation -1996 and FOCAC Sino - Africa at continental level, since recent times [94, p. 7].

China-built US $ 3.4 billion railroad linking Addis Ababa and the port city of Djibouti opened in October 2016. A new 750-km line, which completely replaces the long-defunct French line, built in early 20th century, reduces travel time between two cities - up to 10 hours out of two to three days. The new line will provide Djibouti with unprecedented access to the 90 million Ethiopian market [112]. The Chinese-built railway is expected to help the landlocked African country improve access to the sea and accelerate its booming industrialization process [61].

Chinese firms have invested in a water pipeline from Ethiopia and a new international airport [106]. China's largest footwear manu-facturer Huajian International — the world's largest footwear manu-facturer — entered Ethiopia in 2012 and opened its first factory in the Eastern Industrial Zone, employing 7,000 people. It was the only company to produce footwear exclusively thanks to the efforts of the Ethiopians [41].

By 2012, China accounted for more than half of Ethiopia's imports of furniture and furnishings, over

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% of Ethiopian imports of travel goods and handbags and apparel and clothing accessories, and nearly 90% of Ethiopia's footwear imports [93, p. 235].

In 2006, China's ZTE was granted a monopoly over the market as the Ethiopian government seemed to ignore its own procurement rules requiring competitive bidding. A US $ 1.6 billion agreement was signed in 2013 with Huawei and ZTE to upgrade existing infrastructure [51].

A Chinese firm has signed a MoU with Ethiopia authorities on establishing a National Artificial Intelligence Infrastructure (NAIF) in Ethiopia. The MoU was signed between Ethiopia Innovation and Technology State Minister, Sisay Tola and Chen Kuan, the founder and CEO of Chinese firm Infervi-sion Technology Corporation in Ethiopia's capital Addis Ababa in November 2019 [43].

The Ethiopia is China's second largest borrower in Africa. The external debt of the Ethiopian government is 60% of GDP, 1/3 to China, which makes the country vulnerable, and there are fears that China may have a say in its future domestic policies [95, p. 12].

China's strategic partner Addis Ababa receives significant military and economic aid without any political strings attached. Ethiopia maintains ties with the West, using Chinese aid as a bargaining chip in negotiations with European donors, and vice versa [90, p. 86].

8. OBOR — a Factor in Stimulating the Sudanese Economy

On February 4, 1959, Sudan established diplomatic relations with China, becoming the fourth

Arab and African country with diplomatic relations with China after Egypt, Morocco and Algeria. The visit of PM Zhou Enlai and Vice Premier Chen Yi to Sudan in 1964 marked the beginning of the development of bilateral rela-tions [62].

Although China allowed trade, aid, cultural, political and military ties with Sudan, China did not play an important role in Sudan's politics or foreign relations until the 1989 coup that brought Omar al-Bashir to power [81, p. 182].

In 2015, China and Sudan announced their strategic partnership, ushering in a new era of bilateral relations. In April 2019, China gave strong support to the Sudanese transitional government. Beijing has twice sent its Special Representative for African Affairs to Sudan and has defended it at the UNSC and many other international events [62]. Sino-Sudanese cooperation has long been the benchmark for Sino-African cooperation and a model for South-South coo-peration [92].

Since 1976, China has provided Sudan with free assistance in finding minerals and developing exploration talents and has suc-cessfully discovered more than three million tons of proven chromite reserves. Chinese miners have invested over US $ 100 million in Sudan in the development and processing of minerals, including gold, copper, chro-mite and marble, and brought advanced mining and smelting technology and equipment to Sudan [31].

Since the mid-1990s, economic and trade cooperation between the two sides has grown significantly in scope. China has been the largest investor in Sudan for several years, as well as the contracting partner for most projects in Sudan.

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According to incomplete sta-tistics, more than 120 Chinese enterprises have made investment totaling over US $ 13 billion in Sudan, in a wide range of sectors, including oil, buildings, road bridges, textile, mining, agriculture, hydropower, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications, and automobile manufacturing [31].

Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Sudan since 1996 has focused primarily on finding resources and has expanded the technological and financial capabilities of the country's oil sector [85, p. 3]. Sudan, which for decades has been out of the access zone of Western oil companies for decades, has become one of the key suppliers of oil to the Chinese market: 600,000 barrels of Sudanese oil are shipped to the PRC every day [10]. CNPC owned 40% of the Greater Nile Petroleum Operation Company (GNPOC), which was formed in November 1996 to develop blocks 1, 2 and 4 in the West Upper Nile. CNPC acquired a 41% stake and Sinopec a 6% stake in Petrodar Operating Company, formed in October 2001 to develop Blocks 3 and 7. Block 6, located between southern Darfur and Kordofan, was 95% owned by CNPC [49, p. 59]. Before South Sudan became independent in 2011, China had a monopoly on the oil sector in Sudan.

Sudan's dependence on China, along with Chinese investment in Sudan, grew when a series of economic sanctions imposed by the US government on Sudan between 1997 and 2007 forced most Western companies to leave the country. As a result, China, along with India and Malaysia, was the commercial, military and diplomatic beneficiary of Western sanctions against Sudan. Sudan has switched from Western to Arab and Asian

countries, especially China, in terms of sources of development finance, markets for its oil, investment in Sudanese weapons factories and arms purchases [32, p. 62-63].

Since August 2006, China has sought to expand oil investment in Chad. Faced with a protracted conflict amid a regional geography of interests and an ongoing North-South peace process, China has also had to face unintended consequences of its role, including supplying arms and supporting Khartoum [50, p. 38]. During Hu Jintao's largest tour of Africa in 2007, Beijing for the first time officially expressed its desire to establish military bases on the Black Con-tinent The first candidate for the deployment of Chinese peace-keepers in Africa was the province of Darfur in Sudan, where the Chinese oil state corporations have long and firmly established themselves. China was ready to send a full -fledged military contin-gent to Sudan and in negotiations with Khartoum insisted on the deployment of mainly Chinese UN peacekeepers in Darfur [8]. When South Sudan, which hosts a large amount of Chinese oil investment, seceded from Sudan with UN approval in 2011, China expanded development projects and loans to this new state [90, p. 84].

Just two years after independence, in December 2013, when civil war broke out in South Sudan, one of the first casualties was the oil industry. About half of the country's daily production was soon halted by the fighting [30]. The majority of South Sudanese oil revenue, came from Chinese operated oil fields, and accounted for 98% of South Sudan's state revenue. At independence, South Sudan had seceded with 75% of Sudan's known oil wealth, and the majority of oil fields that Chinese

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companies had invested in were located in South Sudan's territory [102, p. 3]. In August 2018, CNPC inked an agree-ment with the South Sudanese Petroleum and Mining Ministry to conduct hydrocarbon exploration in the heart of the country, outdoing French and Kuwaiti competitors [33]. CNPC has a majority stake (41% share) in both Dar Petroleum Operating Company (DPOC) and in the GNPOC (41% share), both of which are the major oil companies operating in South Sudan. SINOPEC has a 6% stake in DPOC, which makes China, South Sudan's major oil investor and leading im-porter [102, p. 3].

Sudan was one of the first countries to actively respond to the BRI and signed an agreement to jointly promote the initiative with China. China aligns the BRI with Sudan's national development strategy and continues to participate in Sudan's infrastructure deve-lopment, promoting key projects such as the new Khartoum inter-national airport and satellite navigation, deepening cooperation in health education, information technology and transport infrastruc-ture. China intends to promote the implementation of the agreement on cooperation and development of Port Sudan, support the const-ruction of a special economic zone in the Red Sea, develop shipping and tourism along the Nile, and build a cargo distribution center on the Red Sea [92]. In March 2021, the three Chinese companies expressed their intention to invest up to US $ 1 billion in Sudan, which will be directed to agriculture, mining and oil fields [110].

Conclusion

From the above, we come to the conclusion that the PRC is strengthening its positions in some

Arab countries of North and East Africa (for most of which it has become an important trading partner) through trade and economic cooperation, investment, humanitarian and economic assistance. The latter provide China with an uninterrupted supply of energy raw materials and minerals, in return for which Beijing invests in the construction of roads, ports, marine terminals, nuclear power plants, dams, schools, hospitals, housing and industrial facilities.

However, the political instability in the Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa after the events of the 2011 Arab Spring posed new challenges and opportunities for Beijing's geostrategic influence and geopolitical ambitions in the region. The construction of a military base in Djibouti can be seen as one of the results of China's changing military strategy and its growing ambition to balance its military and economic power. The need to protect China's increasing investment in Africa has led to a departure from China's traditional noninterference policy in the internal affairs of other countries. This has fueled international concern about China's political, economic and military role in the African continent.

In fact, there are conflicting views in the Arab countries of North and Eastern Africa on whether to expand or limit China's role in their political and eco-nomic life. Investment from Chinese entrepreneurial migration has led to positive (indirect jobs) and negative (crowding out local traders) effects in local African societies. As a rule, the cause of discontent and social tension is the so-called Chinese "neo-colonial policy" — the mass immigration of Chinese labor to countries in the

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region, restrictions imposed by Chinese entrepreneurs on labor law, lack of transparency and accoun-tability in transactions, the scarcity of projects in the interests of the locals, as well as the capture of domestic markets and the large-scale exploitation of natural resources. Criticism of China is growing from trade unions and civil society groups for "poor working conditions, unsustainable environmental practices and job displacement" caused by Chinese factories.

The criticism also includes the "debt traps",9 high interest rates on Chinese loans, environmental problems, low security standards, as well as loans for project revaluations, which are often accompanied by nepotism and kickbacks, with economic and political repercussions. There are fears that China is increasing its long-term influence over weak countries in the region through investment and non-repayable loans ("debt trap theory" or diplomacy), which often leads to the cancellation or delay of B&R projects. Despite this, official Beijing expresses its readiness to continue friendly consultations with some Arab countries of North and East Africa in order to find a solution or reduce their debts to China. Beijing intends to encourage the international community, in particular the developed countries, to take more substantial measures to reduce the debt and ease the debt burden of African countries.

Beijing's advance into Arab countries of North and East Africa, especially the deployment of military bases and the expansion of its naval forces, exacerbated both the Sino-US rivalry. In order to limit or curb China's expansion of influence, Washington has been actively criticizing Beijing's coop-

eration with countries with human rights issues, as well as the growing dissatisfaction with the Chinese neo-colonial policy by the countries of the region.

And although Beijing, emphasizing its "antiimperialist" policy, declared its refusal to create its own military formations outside its national borders, rapid economic growth and the development of the China's economic interests required a revision of the established principles. Under these circumstances, the "non-interference stance" is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain, given the deepening trade ties between China and Africa in general and with the thousands of Chinese workers employed in various projects across the continent.

Notes

1. The "Beijing Consensus" or China's development model as a new alternative development model combining liberal or market economies and authoritarian political systems has become widesp-read, mainly among the authoritarian or semi-authoritarian MENA countries. This was particularly appealing against the backdrop of the "Washington Consensus" model of uniting free market economies backed by Western financial institutions and Western democracies.

2. The Chinese New Silk Road (NSR/ New Silk Road Initiative (NSRI)) or One Belt, One Road, which consists of six land and road economic corridors, is the abbreviated name of the double concept of the Economic Belt of the Silk Road (EBSR) and the Maritime Silk Road of the 21st Century (MSR). It was

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launched by the Chinese President Xi Jinping 9. in 2013 and aims to connect Asia and Europe via the Middle East (ME), Africa and Central Asia (CA) through a series of vast networks of transcontinental railways, pipelines, ports, airports, and other infrastructure projects with up to US $ 1 trillion of Chinese investment In 2016, the NSR/OBOR strategy was officially renamed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or Belt and Road (B&R).

1.

TEDA stands for Tianjin Economic and Technological Development Area, which is located about 150 km east of China's capital Beijing with the Bohai Sea to the east. It used to be a land with salty and alkaline soil, but now it is a modern industrial city with an annual gross domestic product (GDP) of more than US $ 44 billion after more than 30 years of development.

China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company (COSCO Group).

The 2011 Arab Spring turned into a reality the economic and security risks of China's 3. overdependence when Chinese cargo ships were severely detained in the Suez Canal.

CITIC Group — China International Trust and Investment Corporation. 4.

Algeria is the world's 18th largest crude oil producer, and the second largest source of natural gas in the EU. 5.

Sonatrach is the largest company in Africa and the 12th largest oil and gas conglomerate in the world.

The terms of Chinese loans and investments become very clear only when the recipient countries face a debt crisis. Beijing usually invests more in corrupt countries, which sometimes accompanied by "extreme exploitation, corruption and political interference".

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Информация об авторе

Арутюнян Агавни Александровна

Ph.D. (история),

Ведущии науч. сотрудник

Отдел международных отношении

Института Востоковедения Националь-

нои Академии Наук Армении

0019 Ереван, пр. Маршала Баграмяна,

24/4

Республика Армения [email protected]

Information about the Author

Aghavni A. Harutyunyan

Ph.D. in History,

Leading Researcher

Department of International Relations,

Institute of Oriental Studies,

National Academy of Sciences of Armenia

0019 Yerevan, Marshal Baghramian Ave.,

24 /4

Republic of Armenia [email protected]

Информация о статье

Поступила в редакцию: 18.02.2022

Одобрена после рецензирования: 20.04.2022

Принята к публикации: 30.04.2022

Information about the article

The article was submitted: 18.02.2022 Approved after reviewing: 20.04.2022

Accepted for publication: 30.04.2022