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102MODERN ORIENTAL STUDIES
СОВРЕМЕННЫЕ ВОСТОКОВЕДЧЕСКИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ
ISSN: 2686-9675
international science journal / международный научный журнал
КИТАЙСКАЯ ИНИЦИАТИВА «ПОЯСА И ПУТИ» И СРЕДНИЙ КОРИДОР ТУРЦИИ
CHINESE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE AND TURKEY'S MIDDLE CORRIDOR
Harutyunyan Aghavni Alexander
National Academy of Sciences of Republic of Armenia aghavni.harutyunyan1@gmail.com
аннотация
Благодаря своему идеальному географическому выгодному положению в качестве евразийской страны, расположенной на стратегическом перекрестке Европы, Азии, Кавказа и Ближнего Востока и охватывающей Черное и Средиземное моря, Турция имеет стратегическое преимущество в интересах Китая с точки зрения более легкого доступа к европейским рынкам и богатым ближневосточным и африканским природным ресурсам. Турция также является важным геополитическим и геостратегическим «мостом» в «Транс-каспийской коридорной линии» или «Среднем/Железном коридоре» для Нового Шелкового пути Китая, который играет важную роль в разработке новых логистических проектов для удовлетворения энергетических потребностей и обеспечения взаимодействия между Востоком и Западом с точки зрения сухопутного, морского и воздушного транспорта. Между тем, Турция нуждается в китайских инвестициях в строитель-
abstract
Due to its ideal geographical favorable position as a Eurasian country, located at the strategic crossroads of the Europe, Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East (ME), and covering the Black and Mediterranean Seas, Turkey has strategic advantage for China's interest in terms of easier access to European markets and rich ME and African natural resources. Turkey is an important geopolitical and geostrategic "bridge" in the "Trans-Caspian Corridor Line" or "Middle / Iron Corridor" for the New Silk Road of China, which plays an important role in the development of new logistics projects to meet energy needs and ensuring interaction between East and West in terms of land, sea and air transport. Meanwhile, Turkey needs Chinese investments in the building of ports, airports, railways, tunnels, energy, machinery, telecommunications and other infrastructure-related areas.
Keywords and phrases: China, One Belt, One Road, New Silk Road, Turkey, Middle Corridor.
ISSN: 2686-9675
международные отношения/ harutyunyan а.а. / aghavni.harutyunyan1@gmail.com / удк 327
ство портов, аэропортов, железных дорог, туннелей, энергетики, машиностроения, телекоммуникаций и других связанных с инфраструктурой областей.
Ключевые слова и фразы: Китай, один пояс, один путь, Новый Шелковый путь, Турция, Средний коридор.
Для цитирования: Арутюнян А.А. Китайская инициатива «пояса и пути» и турецкий Средний коридор. Современные востоковедческие исследования. 2020; 2(5): 76-91
For citation: Harutyunyan A.A. Chinese Belt and Road initiative and Turkey's Midlle corridor. Modern oriental studies. 2020; 2(5): 76-91
Diplomatic relations between Republic of Turkey (RT) and People's Republic of China (PRC) were established in 4 August 1971, against the background of "detente" in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States (U.S.). However, exchanges between the two countries were expanded only from the 1980s (65, P. 12), began to improve rapidly from the beginning of the 1990s (66, P. 5) and full-scale revitalization of Turkish-Chinese relations occurred only during the rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey, which came to power in 2002 (7, C. 71). In recent decades, Turkish-Chinese trade and economic relations from the directions of Turkey's multi-vector foreign and Asian-Pacific policy have been the most successful (61, P. 1; 20, P. 2).
An important event strengthening relations between the two countries was the Joint declaration on Establishing Strategic Relationship of Cooperation of 2010, where both sides identified themselves as "emerging developing countries" (64, P. 205). Sino-Turkish strategic cooperation was also strengthened by President Erdogan's state visit to China on July 29-30, 2015 and his participation in the Fifth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in
Beijing on June 15, 2019 (39). The enthusiasm for expanding cooperation with China, in a sense, is also explained by the fact that many young and ambitious Turkish bureaucrats, conducting their master's or doctoral studies in China, and a new group of qualified bureaucrats who have appeared in the influential ministries of Turkey, see huge potential for cooperation between two countries (40).
Relations have also taken on a military character over the last decade, as Turkey pursued a more autonomous foreign policy from the West and pushed for greater strategic maneuvering space during the earlier months of Arab Spring movements (40). In 2013, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, visiting St. Petersburg, repeated his request for Turkey to be admitted to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in order to "get rid of troubles" when trying to enter the European Union (EU), while at the same time possibly approving Turkey's entry into the Eurasian Union (EAU) led by Russia (46).
However, if in the middle of 2015, antiChinese actions were held in China with the broad support of the largest foreign Uyghur community, then after the deterioration of relations between Russia and Turkey (as a result of an incident with
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a Russian Su-24 shot down by Turkey), Beijing and Ankara began to strengthen relations by the end of the year, and Turkey even expressed its readiness to fight the movements previously supported by it to create East Turkestan. In early July 2016, contacts between Turkey and China intensified, primarily in discussions on the construction of railway communications within the Chinese New Silk Road initiative (NSRI) or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), including through the transport corridor with the participation of Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and Ukraine (2).
After the failed coup attempt in July, 2016 Erdogan has reiterated that RT shares more "common values" with the Shanghai Five: China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, and that SCO is better — much more powerful than EU (47]. Moreover, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said in December 2016 that in its efforts to strengthen the falling lira, RT is taking steps to allow trade with Russia, China and Iran in local currency (33].
Sentiment on Turkey's need to find new allies in Russia and China intensified after the U.S. supported the Kurdish forces in conducting the Raqqa operation in Syria and after holding the BRI forum in May 2017 in Beijing (49, P. 84), where President Erdogan supported the Chinese initiative to build the BRI, expressing Turkey's readiness to take advantage of its unique geographical location (31). After negotiations for membership in the EU were unsuccessful, Turkey began to consider BRI as an alternative to the EU (49, P. 75).
Turkey as a Bridge and Transit Country for BRI
Originally announced in 2013 by Chinese President Xi Jinping with the goal of restoring the ancient Silk Road linking Asia and Europe, the scope of the NSRI has expanded over time to include new territories and development initiatives. This project, also called the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) or Belt and Road (B&R) or One Belt, One Road (OBOR) envisages the construction of a large network of roads, railways, seaports, electric networks, oil and gas pipelines, and related infrastructure projects (43, P. 143)1.
Turkey is along the route of both land and sea branches of the BRI, and Ankara have signed several agreements under the B&R project regarding the development of railway infrastructure, the use of ports and the creation of roads (49, P. 81). Turkey's geo-strategic position makes Turkey a leading energy corridor and a transit centre for the main oil and natural gas producers in the Caspian, Caucasus and Central Asia (CA) as well as for consumer markets in Europe (41, P. 222). The foundations of B&R cooperation have been strengthened especially with two inter-governmental agreements signed during the G20 summit in Antalya (Turkey) in November 2015, namely the memorandum of understanding on "Aligning the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road with the Middle Corridor Initiative", and the Agreement on "Cooperation in the Field of Railways" (21, P. 121).
One of the six BRI corridors is a land-based China-Central and West Asia Economic Corridor (CCWAEC), which requires China to coordinate
1The first part of the project is called the Economic Belt of Silk Road (EBSR) or Belt, which is actually a network of predominantly land roads that are expected to connect China with Central Asia (CA), Eastern and Western Europe. The second is called the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) or Road, which is a sea route that is expected to connect China's southern coast with the Mediterranean Sea, Africa, Southeast Asia and CA.
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with participants in six countries of different levels of development and political stability: Turkey, Iran, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (45, P. 46). With the increase in global energy demand and trade made through China, it is aimed to provide direct transport economic corridors between Chinese export centers and European markets by modernizing the transport networks through planned and implemented projects that involve Turkey (37, P. 121). Geographically, EBSR starts from China at the eastern end of the Eurasian continent, passes through Central, Western and South Asia and some other regions with three corridors, approaches the Caspian, Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and the Arabian Peninsula and arrives in Europe and North Africa on the west end of Eurasia. Specifically, the EBSR considered the establishment of three trans-Eurasian economic lines or corridors:
1. "North Line": (China-Central Asia-Russia-Europe) starting from China, via Kazakhstan, through southern Russia, through Ukraine, the Belarus area, by Poland and other Eastern European countries, and finally reaches Germany, arriving in Western Europe.
2. "Middle Line": (China - Central and West Asia - the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea) starting from China, via Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries, by Turkmenistan, and continues along the south shore of the Caspian Sea, finally reaching Europe through Turkey.
3. "South Line": (China - Southeast Asia - South Asia - Indian Ocean) starting from China, via Afghanistan, Pakistan, through Iran into the Arabian Peninsula, and then reaches North Africa through Egypt (6; 56, P. 3-4; 42, P. 75).
In the new rail and road links, however, the pivotal points of entry into Europe are through Turkey, assigning it a strategic role. One of the EBSR corridor - New Eurasian Land Bridge railway project, is being planned linking the Port of Shenzhen (near Hong Kong) to Kunming in Western China and onwards to Myanmar, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Iran, and then across Turkey into Rotterdam in the Netherlands. It will cross 20 countries and measure 15,000 km, a much shorter distance than by sea via the Indian Ocean through the Malacca Straits. A branch line would begin in Turkey, crossing Syria and Palestine and end in Egypt, providing a rail link from China into Africa (51, P. 135).
The new road route runs via CA and Iran, through Turkey, into Europe via VeniceRotterdam-London, in addition to the road leading to Europe via Russia (22, P. 279). China plans to build a high-speed railway between China and the United Kingdom (UK), which will connect Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Austria, Germany, Belgium and France. The project, with an estimated cost of US $ 150 billion, was planned to be completed in 2020-2025 (14).
The further route involves the interconnection of trade routes with Istanbul (where railway tunnels are already running along the bottom of the Bosporus), Athens, Naples, Marseilles and other Mediterranean cities (58). Another railway project plans to build the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway (53, P. 38; 4), that would go from Kashgar in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR, China), through Torugart and Kara-Suu in Kyrgyzstan, to Andijan in Fergana Valley
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of Uzbekistan, then across Afghanistan (52), and in the longer term, the planned route might provide a shorter rail link from China to Iran, Turkey and even to Europe (35).
China, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey in November 19, 2015, agreed to establish a consortium for the transportation of goods from China to Europe via the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TCITR) (42, P. 158-161), which runs from China through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, and further via Ukraine to Europe (9), that will help the EU get rid of Russian "transit dependence" and aiming to continue the path to Turkey (8). TCITR provides Beijing with access to the Black Sea coast of Georgia with subsequent shipment of cargo to the ports of Romania, Ukraine (Odessa) and Bulgaria (Varna, Burgas) (13).
Wort to note that Turkey's importance for the implementation of Chinese initiatives increased especially after China lost the tender for the creation of a deep-water port in Anaklia in Georgia, which would become a logistics center for communication between the Caucasus and CA railway network with Eastern Europe via the Black Sea (1).
Turkey, in turn, intends to develop its transport infrastructure, and by 2035 expand the Turkish track and railway infrastructure from 12,500 km to 31,000 km, presumably with an investment of about 30 billion euros (36, P. 9). Turkey is the most important link for China in connecting the railway system of Western China, the coun-
tries of CA and Iran with a gauge the width of the "European" standard (1).
According to Turk experts, the pragmatic interest of the Turkish Justice and Development Party's (JDP) government in China's BRI, especially after the failed coup on July 15, 2016, has two main economic reasons: the expectation of growth in direct Chinese investment, the consolidation of Turkey itself as a transportation hub in the "Middle Corridor", which uses coordination mechanisms for rail transport and customs clearance of ports for the China-Europe corridor (38, P. 296), also to become a manufacturing and logistics base for Chinese enterprise (54).
The Middle Corridor or Iron Silk Road
Trans-Caspian East-West-Middle Corridor Initiative shortly named as "the Middle Corridor", is a big gain for Turkey to have an alternative for both the Northern Route (it is also called Trans-Siberian Railway), which includes Russia, and the Southern Route, which covers Iran (21, P. 119). The Middle Corridor is more economical and faster compared to the Northern Corridor as a trade route between Europe and Asia and as such, is 2.000 km shorter, has more favorable climate conditions and shortens the travel time by 1/3rd (15 days) compared to the sea route (60)2.
Caspian Sea is another geostrategic pivotal point as all the freight trade from China will eventually pass through north of Caspian Sea via Russia. An alternative option being considered is turning southwards from Kazakhstan to Turkmenistan,
2In one year, out of approximately 10 million containers that are transported from China to Europe, 96 % utilizes the sea and only the remaining 4 % uses the Northern Corridor. Furthermore, the Middle Corridor offers great opportunities for the cargo traffic in Asia so that the loads can reach ME, North Africa and Mediterranean region by benefiting from the port connections in Turkey.
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Iran and Turkey called the Iron Silk Road (ISR - the railway connection between China and EU) or "Middle Corridor" (34, P. 137). Any of these routes aligning to connect China to Europe such as Trans-Asian Railway (TAR), Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR), Trans-China Railway, Baku-Tblisi-Kars (BTK) as a part of ISR, are accepted as links of ISR (50, P. 2). Turkey will play a key role in the NSR with its recently attracting mega investments like Marmaray, Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge (entered service on August 26, 2016), Eurasia Tunnel (inaugurated on 20 December 2016) that connects the Asian and European sides of Istanbul via a 14.6 km undersea highway, £anakkale 1915 Bridge, the New Airport (3rd), that is an international airport under construction on the European side of Istanbul with 150 million annual passenger capacity (49, P. 82). With the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars (BTK) railway line, the Marmaray railway tunnel and the Third Bridge in Istanbul/Turkey, 'Middle Corridor' is estimated to cut the Beijing-London transportation period from 45 to 15 days (22, P. 279). "Middle Corridor" will enable Turkey to provide new services and products to countries in East and South Asia amid escalating trade wars and tightening customs rules (38, P. 296).
The Edirne-Kars high-speed "East-West" railway project (worth US $ 30 billion), linking the BTK railway line with Europe and crossing the country from one end to the other, with a view to connecting the north-eastern province of Kars with the north-western province of Edirne, which goes straight to Bulgaria, is also part of the BRI (32).
China already took an active part in the Turkish railway infrastructure sector back in 2005, when it won the contract for the construction
of a high-speed railway line between Ankara and Istanbul worth of US $ 1.2 billion (23). In 2014, China state-owned companies completed the second session of Turkey's Ankara-Istanbul HighSpeed Railway with the assistance of US $ 720 million loans from China Exim Bank (69; 28). In July 2014, the second phase project of the Ankara-Istanbul High Speed Railway completed by a Chinese company opened to traffic successfully (39). The estimated speed of trains on the Ankara -Istanbul line (including Eskisehir) is 250 km per hour. But Chinese experts are confident that this figure can be increased to 280 km per hour (16).
Marmaray is a railway project that connects the railway lines of Istanbul's European and Asian sides with a tube tunnel passing under the Bospho-rus. The first stage of the Marmaray project, which was started in 2004, was completed in 2013 (49, p. 83). In November 2019, the first container train from Xian to Prague passed through the Marmaray submarine tunnel. To further develop this direction of cargo transportation in the near future, Turkey plans to send trains with export goods to the new corridor to China (12).
The total length of the BTK railway line, which forms the backbone of the Middle Corridor, is 838.6 km (22, P. 279). The project, worth US $ 450 million, reduces the transportation route between Asia and Europe by about 7,000 km, and aims to unite Azerbaijan and Turkey through the capital of Baku in Azerbaijan and the cities of Tbilisi and Ahilkelek in Georgia and transfer to the city of Kars in Turkey. This is the third largest project, jointly implemented by Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia after the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline projects, will deliver
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goods from China to the Caspian Sea and the port of Baku-Alat via Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and then to Europe through Georgia and Turkey, eventually connecting Beijing with London by uninterrupted rail (49, P. 82-83). BTK is important both for trade between Turkey and China and CA, and for trade between Europe and CA and China (22, P. 279), allowing the latter two, which so far traded with Turkey mainly through Russia, to be included in transport and logistics chains (11).
RT invited Iran to join the BTK railway project, intending to create an alternative to the BTK railway through the Kars-Igdir-Nakhichevan project with access to Iran, which would allow Turkey to direct cargo flows east to Iran, Pakistan, India and Southern China. Trains arriving from Edirne to Kars could continue their journey through Tbilisi and Baku with access to Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and then reach the northwestern provinces of China (15].
It is also planned to build a logistics center in Kars, which will allow the Turkish side to send 300 -400 trains along the corridor in 2020, and in the next three years to increase this number to 1000, giving a new impetus to the further development of agricultural production in the country (12).
The Russian company Far East Land Bridge (FELB), which operates most of the container trains between China and Europe, is preparing for a new container train between Suzhou (China) and Poti (Georgia) and, if run regularly, it could be the precessor of China-Turkey train, approaching very close to the Turkish border and providing cargo connections with Turkey after Poti (50, P. 6).
It should be noted that Ankara closely followed the plans of Chinese corporations to invest
billions of US dollars in the development of transport infrastructure during the implementation of the strategic plan of the Syrian President "Four Seas" (3). In this context, the civil war in Syria is of interest, which created a trilateral alliance between China, Russia and Iran over the interests of Russia in the Tartus naval base, and, in turn, brought Iran and Russia to the Chinese Maritime Theater, initiating a series of exercises at sea expanding the scope of these new triangular relations (40).
Despite this, there is also an opinion that China and Turkey are gradually withdrawing the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) -Indian-Russian-Iranian project- from the big game because of Great Britain, which, after leaving the EU, promised India, Pakistan and China a privileged trade partnership. This is why Tehran continues to persistently cut through the corridor to Syria with the Iran-Iraq-Syria railway project and the Iran-Iraq -Syria gas pipeline (so far in the Iran-Iraq format), and Moscow, Tehran and Damascus were determined to take the initiative by opening a joint transport corridor in Latakia (Syria) (15).
As for the MSR project, Chinese companies have also invested in Turkish ports since 2015 and are most interested in Kumport, fandarli and Mer-sin (49, P. 81). Two Chinese port companies, China Merchants Group, based in Hong Kong, and China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO), and the country's largest state fund, China Investment Corp. (CIC), have signaled their intent to buy Turkey's largest private port, Kumport (44). At the end of 2015, they bought out a nearly 65% stake in one of the largest Turkish container terminals at Kumport in the port of Ambarli (located in Istanbul's European side) for almost US $ 1 billion (5, P. 74). Turkey and
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China could also expand their partnerships in Turkey's other ports, in the Mediterranean Sea, in the Aegean Sea, and at the Black Sea. And a critical move is not just to combine these ports with railway projects and extend the lines, but to create a logistical network" (30). However, ports intended to be developed in Filyos, fandarli and Mersin still require substantial investments, while China already preferred Greek port of Piraeus under BRI (48). From a military point of view, the addition of a new "Pearl of String" in the Mediterranean Sea in the form of the Piraeus, allows China to control maritime access to Istanbul and the Black Sea ports of Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, southern Russia and Georgia (29, P. 10).
Wort to note that Ankara and Minsk are interested in organizing freight traffic along the Dnieper, including the construction of a river port in the village of Nizhny Zhary in the Bragin region (Belarus), which in the future could become an important transit hub connecting the eastern and western parts of the New Silk Road from China to Europe (17).
Sino-Turkish Cooperation in Finance, Logistics, Energy, Manufacturing and Telecommunication Sectors
During the initial stages of the BRI's implementation, foreign direct investment (FDI) from China to Turkey has increased, albeit modestly. Chinese FDI has been mainly focused on the finance, logistics, energy, manufacturing and telecommunication sectors (63). Turkey became a founding member of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) on April 16, 2015 with shares of 26,099 and a capital subscription
of 2,609.9 (55; 59; 24; 26). To expand the scope of cooperation between the two countries and help the country accelerate the development of urban and energy infrastructure, the AIIB Board of Directors approved two investment projects in Turkey in 2019 for a total of US $ 500 million. Among these investments, a US $ 300 million loan from a sovereign fund for the Istanbul project to reduce seismic risk and prepare for emergencies will increase Istanbul's resilience to earthquake disasters and the city's preparedness for emergencies (18). In addition, a credit facility worth US $ 200 million was added to AIIB investment to provide long-term financing through Turkiye Kalkinma ve Yatirim Ban-kasi (TKYB - Turkish Development and Investment Bank) to private companies in Turkey for investments in renewable energy and energy efficiency infrastructure (19).
The number of Chinese companies (more than 1,000 operate by 2019) in Turkey rose after the world's largest bank state-owned lenders Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited (ICBC) and Bank of China established a presence in the country in 2014 and 2017, respectively (57). ICBC on May 25, 2015, completed the acquisition of a 75.5% (US $ 250 million) stake in Tekstilbank from Turkish GSD Holding, making it the first commercial institution managed by a Chinese bank in the country. ICBC also made a tender offer for the remaining Tekstilbank shares held by public shareholders in accordance with the country's regulatory requirements (26).
In April 2012, both countries signed a nuclear agreement, reaffirming their readiness for deeper cooperation in the field of nuclear energy (40). Preliminary agreements on cooperation
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in the field of nuclear energy were concluded on June 29, 2016, after RT opposed India's participation in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, taking essentially China's position (2].
On June 2, 2016, Beijing and Ankara signed an agreement to create an electronic cross-border trade platform. The basis of Sino-Turkish economic maneuvers - the agreement on a free trade zone between Ankara and Islamabad (which was scheduled for September 2016), in fact means free trade between Ankara and Beijing, as Chinese goods flow unhindered into Pakistan through the railway, which began in northwestern Xinjiang (14).
Tel Aviv also is interested in developing trade with Beijing and Ankara, viewing Turkey as an economic "bridge" to East Asia. Turks are interested in Israeli natural gas, and the Chinese are interested in the achievements of the Jewish state in the field of research and development (R&D) (14).
In 2018, with the aim of supporting the Turkish economy, strengthening partnerships and discussing the possibility of creating joint projects in the private and public sectors, as well as finding new investment opportunities between Turkey and China, the richest fifty-nine Chinese businessmen (the individual welfare of each of them ranges from US $ 15 to 30 billion) led by billionaire Jack Ma (internet giant Alibaba) visited Turkey (27). Jack Ma has decided to invest in Turkish e-commerce firm Trendyol - one of the most famous Turkish fashion retailers, supported by foreign investors and a leader in the fragmented e-commerce market in RT (25).
Huawei, China's largest telecommunications equipment company, is working with 5G Internet with Turk Telecom, focusing on cloud computing, Internet of Things, and most importantly, public
security (30). In the first ten months of 2014, nearly 70 Chinese companies including Hainan Airlines, Huawei and New Hope have invested in Turkey with an aggregate investment of US $ 190 million and year-on-year growth of 11.8 % (39).
However, RT seeks a more balanced trade partnership (RT's trade deficit in relations with PRC exceeded US $ 20 billion in 2017) (10), stimulating the participation of Chinese investors in large infrastructure schemes (23). Bilateral trade grew steadily from US $ 238 million in 1990 to US 28 billion in 2017 (63). In January 2017, China's accumulated direct investment in the RT reached US $ 809 million (68).
Difficulties in Sino-Turkish Cooperation Under the BRI
Despite the fact that the BRI provides a wider space for further expansion of cooperation between the two countries, however, there are also many obstacles and difficulties both local, regional and global characters. Due to the fact that Turkey is ready to reduce its dependence on Western allies, some fear that a NATO country, like Turkey, traditionally and historically oriented to the West, is making a mistake trying to establish deeper ties with the eastern powers like Russia and China. But some analysts believe that in this global world this is inevitable (23). Turkey's departure from the West and its dialogue partnership with the SCO "as an alternative to the NATO and the EU" may be "more likely associated with Turkey's disappointment with its Western identity than with a commitment to the common leadership of Russia and China" (38, P. 296). According to the Turkish expert, diversification of alliances with countries such as
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Russia and China, and becoming more independent while remaining in NATO, has long been the goal of Erdogan (57). But the biggest obstacle to Turkey's accession to the SCO may be the demand to begin the process of withdrawing from NATO (47).
It should be noted that since EBSR is being replaced by roads on which the interests of Turkey and its Turkic-speaking partners may prevail, Turkey's active efforts to develop economic and cultural ties with the Turkic countries of the former Soviet Union may revive the Pan-Turkic project, which lost its relevance in the late 1990s. Turkey, because of its ideologization, has too many doctrinal foreign policies based on the principle of "ethnic solidarity" and the idea of pan-Turkism and neo-Ottomanism (11). Although the AKP government has stated that it has abandoned pan-Turkism or the political aspirations of the "unity of the Turkic world", Turkey's cultural influence in CA remains a remarkable force and has evolved from "territorial unity" into cooperation and cultural demands (67, P. 69).
Many experts as one of the obstacles to the construction of the EBSR see the conflict in the Xinjiang of the PRC, which marks the exit of the new highway to CA. The occupation of northern Iraq and Syria by Islamic State (IS) terrorists (Daesh, ISIS) has already jeopardized its southern route through Turkey and Iran. And the terrorist underground in the north-west of China itself poses a threat to both the EBSR project and the new gas pipelines through which Turkmen gas flows to China (11). Beijing is concerned that many Uyghur separatists have taken refuge in Turkey, and many Turkish NGOs with close ties to the AKP support and help Uyghur separatists, and that many Uyghur extremists have left China to join the IS or other
terrorist groups, traveling in Turkey. China fears that many Uyghur extremists (holding Turkish passports offered by Turkish embassies in China and other Southeast Asian states) will return to China to intensify the fight in Xinjiang against the Chinese government (62).
For its part, despite the many advantages of BRI for Ankara, the Turkish side also takes into account the risks associated with China's "colonial goals", China's circumvention of Turkey, widening the current commercial deficit and trade gap, and considers the initiative to be much more profitable for China than other countries, even if the project seems to be a win-win (49, P. 92). Some circles in Turkey view the EBSR as a competitive initiative of China against Turkey in the context of considering CA and the Caucasus as part of its Turkish influence (67, P. 63).
However, in general, the discourses of Turkish media and politicians are optimistic about BRI, and it is believed that the project gives Turkey the opportunity to strengthen its economic, social and political relations with China and Central and Middle Eastern countries, as well as find alternative alliances with the EU and the U.S. (49, P. 92).
Currently, amid tremendous changes in the international and domestic political situation in Turkey, the BRI will not only help Turkey economically compensate for its economic dependence on the West, but will also strengthen the country's strategic partnership with China by offering more options for cooperation. The Turkish need for Chinese technology and foreign investment, as well as China's desire to promote its BRI, create the potential for communication between the countries.
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СОВРЕМЕННЫЕ ВОСТОКОВЕДЧЕСКИЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ
international science journal / международный научный журнал
литература/bibliographic references
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ISSN: 2686-9675
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INFORMATION ABOUT AUTHOR
Harutyunyan Aghavni Alexander
Department of International Relations at the Institute of Oriental Studies
National Academy of Sciences of Republic of Armenia. aghavni.harutyunyan1@gmail.com
Принята к публикации: 09.09.2020 Submission Date: 09.09.2020
