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СТРАТЕГИЯ «ЖЕМЧУЖНОЙ НИТИ» КАК МЕРА ДЛЯ РЕАЛИЗАЦИИ ИНИЦИАТИВЫ КИТАЙСКОГО МОРСКОГО ШЕЛКОВОГО ПУТИ
"STRING OF PEARLS" STRATEGY AS A MEASURE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHINESE MARITIME SILK ROAD INITIATIVE
Арутюнян Агавни Александровна, канд. ист. наук, ведущий науч. сотрудник Отдела Международных отношений Института Востоковедения Национальной Академии Наук Армении. aghavni.harutyunyan1@gmail.com
АННОТАЦИЯ
В статье предпринята попытка показать значение стратегии «Жемчужная нить» -аналогично «Логистическому комплексу двойного назначения» в качестве меры для реализации китайской инициативы Морской Шелковый путь, нацеленного на создание морских опорных пунктов или «точекудушья» с военным или геополитическим влиянием вдоль побережья Индийского океана, а также в Персидском заливе и Средиземном море. Стратегия «Жемчужной нити» предназначена для построения инфраструктурных проектов, охватывающих китайские морские линии связи и основана на потребности Китая в приобретении иностранных нефтяных и торговых маршрутов, имеющих решающее значение для его развития, а также в усилении влияния и расширении присутствия на морских путях за счет использования инвестиций, экономических, политических, дипломатических и военных средств. Китайская экспансия и его военное присутствие неуклонно растет с целью защиты своих интересов и обеспечения безопасности китайских многомиллиардных инвестиций в инфраструктурные проекты по всей ширине Морского Шелкового пути. Благодаря стратегическому контролю над ключевыми точками вдоль «Жемчужной нити» и новым возможностям для начала военных операций
ABSTRACT
The article attempts to show the significance of the "String of Pearls" strategy - similarly to the "Dual-Use Logistics Facilities" as a measure for the implementation of the Chinese initiative Maritime Silk Road, aimed at creating sea strongholds or "Choke Points" with military or geopolitical influence along the Indian coast ocean, as well as in the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea. The "String of Pearls" strategy is designed to build infrastructure projects covering the Chinese Sea Lines of Communication and based on the need of China to acquire foreign oil and trade routes, which are crucial for its development, as well as to strengthen its influence and expand its presence on the sea routes through the use of investments, economic, political, diplomatic and military means. Chinese expansion and its military presence grow steadily in order to protect its interests and ensure the safety of Chinese multi-billion-dollar investments in infrastructure projects across the entire width of the Maritime Silk Road. Thanks to strategic control over key points along the "String of Pearls" and new opportunities for launching military operations of the People's Liberation Army Navy, China can not only change the balance of power at the regional level, but also have an impact that goes far beyond its traditional scope.
The author analyzes the reasons for advancing these strategies, characterizes the likely difficul-
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Военно-морского флота Народно-освободительной армии, Китай может не только изменить баланс сил на региональном уровне, но и оказать влияние, выходящее далеко за рамки его традиционные возможности.
Автор анализирует причины выдвижения этих стратегий, характеризует вероятные трудности, с которыми Пекин может столкнуться в процессе их осуществления.
Ключевые слова: Китай, Один пояс, один путь, Морской Шелковый путь, «Жемчужная нить», «точкиудушья», морские линии связи.
Для цитирования: Аратюнян А.А., Стратегия «жемчужной нити» как мера для реализации инициативы китайского морского шелкового пути. Современные востоковедческие исследования. 2020; 2(2): 100-120
ties that Beijing may encounter in their implementation process.
Keywords and phases: China, One Belt, One Road, Maritime Silk Road, "String of Pearls", "Choke Points", Sea Lines of Communication.
For citation: Harutyunyan A.A., "String of pearls" strategy as a measure for the implementation of the chinese maritime silk road initiative. Modern oriental studies. 2020; 2(2): 100-120
CHINESE MARITIME SILK ROAD OF THE 21TH CENTURY
"All rivers flow into the sea; everything returns to its owner."
This old Chinese saying is the key to the Chinese strategy of the New Silk Road (NSR) or One Belt, One Road (OBOR), with the official goal of creating a public good for all of humanity, the main beneficiary of which is, above all, the creator [AnuxaHOB, 2017]. The strategy was officially renamed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI or Belt and Road (B&R)) in 2016 and was written into the constitution of the Chinese Communist Party, showing how dedicated Beijing is to developing the project as a way to ensure China's economic influence [EFSAS, 2019, P. 3].
BRI was launched by President of People's Republic of China (PRC) Xi Jinping in 2013, which aims to connect Asia and Europe via the Middle East (ME), Africa and Central Asia (CA) through a series of vast networks of transcontinental railways, pipelines, ports, airports and other infrastructure pro-
jects [Molavi, 2018]. The idea of the NSR is to create both the Economic Belt of the Silk Road (EBSR) -rail and roads running through CA and onto Europe complemented by the Maritime Silk Road of the 21st Century (MSR) - ports and shipping lanes that will connect Southeast Asian States and countries which border the wider Indian Ocean. Together, both sections make up the BRI - an extensive global trade project that will potentially encompass a region of over 70 countries with a total population of 4.4 billion people [ISDP, 2016, P. 1]. The funding pledged for this ambitious project is an additional US $124 billion including assistance, grants, and loans to countries within the BRI. Various estimates for the capital needs of the projects under the BRI range from US $ 2 trillion to US $ 8 trillion for an indefinite period [Sharma, A., 2019, P. 2].
At the Chinese B&R forum in 2019, it was announced that Chinese companies had invested US $ 90 billion in B&R countries, which is a lot, but this is only a drop in the ocean. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) New
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Development Bank have US $ 150 billion at their disposal, and the Silk Road Fund (SRF) for infrastructure - US $ 40 billion. Chinese companies can gain access just under US $ 600 billion from the state-controlled financial sector [Sharma, M., 2019].
The idea of establishment the MSR was revealed during Chinese Premier Li Keqiang's attendance at the 16th ASEAN+China summit in Brunei (9-10 October, 2013) and Xi Jinping's speech in the Indonesian parliament (3 October, 2013) [Szczudlik -Tatar, 2013, P. 3]. At the Indonesian legislature, Chinese President particularly talked about the sea path of the Silk Road (SR) [Bai, 2013, P. 12] and called for establishing a MSR adapted to the needs of the 21st century. Premier Li said that since ancient times, Southeast Asia has been an important center of the ancient sea Silk Road, China will strengthen maritime cooperation with the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and use the China-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Fund, founded by Government of China, for the active development of maritime partnerships under the MSR [Ruan, 2014]. This coincides with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang's pledge to upgrade the Gold Decade (2000-2010) of China-ASEAN cooperation into a Diamond Decade [Zhou, 2014].
Relying mainly on ASEAN countries, the MSR should contribute to the development of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and further strengthen China's commitment to supporting the implementation of the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity [Rahardjo, 2015, P. 13].1 As part of its comprehensive transport strategy, China intends to solve the problems of financing the ASEAN railways with the help of the SRF, creating transport corridors through Asia [Beauchamp-Mustafaga, 2015, P. 3].
MSR covers more than 20 countries, varying in size, development, history, religion, language and
culture, and passes through the regions that are sensitive to international strategy and has complex geopolitics [Li, C., 2014, P. 9]. The main attention in the planning of MSR was paid to close cooperation in the field of finance and economics, infrastructure projects (joint construction of roads and railways), expansion of cooperation in the field of security, technology and science [Szczudlik-Tatar, 2013, P. 3].
MSR AS A TOOL TO SUPPORT THE CHINESE "GREAT MARITIME WALL"
The MSR will complement the EBSR by linking Chinese ports with other countries via maritime links, focusing on the use of sea routes and Chinese coastal ports [BDO, 2015, P. 4]2 to connect China with Europe via the South China Sea,3 the Straits of Malacca, Lombok, Sudan and along the north Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf, Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, encompassing South and Southeast Asia, particularly Sri Lanka. Thus, the MSR will extend from Asia to the Near East, ME, East Africa, the Mediterranean and Europe, China's largest export market [Clemens, 2015, P. 6].
The two from six OBOR economic corridors are included to MSR:
China-Indo-China Peninsula Economic Corridor (CICPEC); or China-Southeast Asia Corridors - (three lines Kunming through Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar also connect through Nanning to Guangdong Province);
Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC) - (rail construction, road construction, industrial parks) [Harutyunyan, 2017b, P. 76-86].4
The Maritime Silk Road will begin:
From Quanzhou in Fujian province and also hit other southern Chinese ports - Guangzhou (Guangdong province), Beihai (Guangxi) and
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Haikou (Hainan) before heading south to the Malacca Strait;
From Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia) the MSR heads to Kolkata (India) then crosses the rest of the Indian Ocean to Nairobi (Kenya);
From Nairobi goes north around the Horn of Africa and moves through the Red Sea into the Mediterranean, with a stop in Athens (Greece) before meeting the land-based EBSR in Venice (Italy) [Brugier, 2014, P. 1-2; Tiezzi, 2014].
MSR targets key littoral states along major Indian Ocean trade arteries for the construction of two mega-projects - the land-based CPEC5 and the sea-based BCIM-EC, which, with large investments from China, can fundamentally change the political and economic landscape of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) [Zhou, 2014], one of the most strategically significant in a world which has become a friction point for tension between the United States (U.S.), China and India, and where China and India are fighting for superiority over sea lines. Such tension intensifies as each state takes measures to counter the others and project dominance within the region [Abeyagoonasekera, 2019, P. 48].
MSR will allow China to enter the Pacific Ocean, "control the South China Sea in the south" and enter the Indian Ocean from the South China Seas through the Strait of Malacca, breaking through the U.S. environment [Beauchamp-Mustafaga, 2015, P. 3]. Thus, putting the South China Sea in its sphere of influence may lead to China's transition from geopolitical vulnerability to a strong position, effectively supporting the "Great Maritime Wall", and providing China with unhindered access to the Indian and Pacific Oceans [Bouvin, 2019].
THE "CHOKE POINTS" OF THE INDIAN OCEAN AS THE MOST STRATEGICALLY SIGNIFICANT IN THE WORLD
In 21st century the Indian Ocean will have more significance; its waters cover an approximated 73.5 million square km, combining half the world's latitudes and seven of its zones, along with 48 independent seashores and island countries including of 2.6 billion people which is world's 39% of population [Khan, Khalid, 2018, P. 247-248].
Unlike the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, the Indian Ocean is a closed one, bordering four continents, which makes its access very limited. Its many straits, called "Choke Points",6 some of the famous of them around the world are:
The Malaccan strait in the Indian Ocean;
The Gulf of Hormuz in the Middle East;
The Suez Canal linking the Mediterranean and the Red Sea;
The Panama Canal linking the Atlantic with the Pacific Ocean;
The Strait of Bosporus (Turkish Strait) linking the Mediterranean Sea to the Black Sea;
The three Danish Straits linking the Baltic Sea with the North Sea;
The Strait of Bab al-Mandeb forming a gateway for vessels to pass through the Suez Canal, through the east coast of Africa [Marine Insight, 2019].
These narrow straits regulate incoming and outgoing traffic and have historically been used to restrict access to trade routes during the war. The Indian Ocean multiple straits are its main access points:
the Strait of Bab al-Mandab7 connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden:
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the Strait of Hormuz8 connecting the Persian
Gulf to the Gulf of Oman:
the Strait of Malacca9 between Malaysia and
Indonesia:
the Sunda Strait and Lombok Strait in Indonesia [EFSAS, 2019, P. 2].
More than 80% of the world's maritime trade oil passes through Indian Ocean "Choke Points", in which:
40% oil passes through Strait of Hormuz;
35% passes through Strait of Malacca;
8% passes through the Bab al-Mandab
Strait.
A significant part of exported goods produced in the PRC goes to the world market through the Indian Ocean to the Strait of Malacca [Jash, 2018, P. 73]. Through the Suez Canal 14% of world merchandise trade and 60% of Chinese exports to Europe pass; and half of the imported Chinese oil source with expectations that it will double by 2035. Through the Bab al-Mandab Strait passes most of China's daily exports to Europe cost US $ 1 billion [Matar, 2018]. Some 30% of China's sea trade worth more than US $ 300 billion presently moves across Indian Ocean [Khurana, 2008, P. 2-3]. China imports 80% of its oil (through the Strait of Malacca) and India imports 65% of its oil through Indian Ocean from ME and North Africa (MENA) [Khan, Khalid, 2018, P. 248]. According to U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), more than 17 billion barrels of oil passed out through the Hormuz Strait per day. More than 85% of the crude oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz - the geographical "Choke Point" and the main artery for transporting oil from the MENA - goes to Asian markets, especially to two rapidly growing economies and largest oil importers - China and India, and also in South Korea and Japan, whose
fuel dependence is growing and highly dependent on MENA oil [Roudgar, 2017, P. 74].
By the end of 2013, China had become the largest trader and largest importer of oil in the world. And since China becomes more and more dependent on oceans for international trade, fuel supply and cargo shipment, the ME remains the most important source of energy, security in the Indian Ocean and, therefore, Sea Lines of Communication security from Bab el Mandeb, Hormuz to the Strait of Malacca are vital for China [Zhou, 2014].
The Indian Ocean also plays an important role for China in its space exploration program. The vessel for tracking and controlling spacecraft and satellites "Yuan Wang" is based west of Australia; and in the port of Karachi there is a Chinese ground station that performs this kind of function. Under the auspices of the PRC, the Asia-Pacific Space Organization has been created, which includes Iran, Bangladesh, Pakistan and other countries [Лебедева, 2011].
SEA LANE SAFE COMMUNICATIONS
AS A KEY TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE MARITIME SILK ROAD
The Indian Ocean also has an impressive number of shipping lines, also known as Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) - sea passages between ports. Given that over 90% of world trade is shipping, these SLOCs have great geopolitical value, since the country that controls them can either open or restrict their access. As some of the fastest growing economies are located in Asia, the number of SLOCs in the Indian Ocean is expected to grow over the next few decades. The 13 busiest ports in the world are in Asia, and as production grows, the need for safe transit routes in the Indian Ocean is growing more than ever [EFSAS, 2019, P. 2].
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The Indian Ocean as well is home to China's important SLOCs, thus raising the stakes for China to maintain security and stability in the IOR to avoid any instances of being choked [Jash, 2018, P. 73]. In this sense, China's strategic and defensive goals for the MSR project are the securing seaports as "outposts", naval support, route development, supply lines, political and economic ties [Kuo, 2017], as well as definition of the broader geopolitics, maritime order and balance of power in the Asia, ME, Africa and IOR [Chellaney, 2015a].10
The most critical interest is China's energy "life line", passing through the IOR and, to a large extent, constituting its "strategic vulnerability" from the ban on the part of the U.S. or India. This makes the defense of its SLOC one of the most important functions of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA)'s Navy (PLAN) missions in the IOR and reinforces the need for China's continued presence on the naval forces in the IOR [Khurana, 2018a, P. 201]. The PLANs modernization has been merged with the B&R, so that the goals of the two projects can mutually benefit one another [Payette, Sun, 2017, P. 4].
Modern Chinese maritime policy is based on the "Agenda of China on the Seas and Oceans for the 21st Century" (1996) and the "White Paper on the Development of the Marine Economy in China" (1998), which put forward a strategy for the continued development of the country's marine economy and set the following goals:
1. effective protection of the marine rights and interests of the state;
2. rational development and use of marine resources;
3. effective protection of the marine environment;
4. the development of science, technology and
education in the field of oceanology;
5. integrated marine management;
6. ensuring the peaceful use, development and protection of the seas and oceans and the resolution of all maritime disputes on an equitable basis [Au, 2011, C. 162-163].
It is no coincidence, that President Xi Jinping's vision of the MSR reinforced the PLA's naval imperative, which adheres to the principle of "flag follows trade". The 2014 Chinese White Paper on Defense — the first official formulation of China's military doctrine or strategy, published May 26, 2015 — for the first time explicitly pointed to the PLAN's task of "open seas protection". This indicated a shift from the PLA Navy's doctrine of 'offshore defense' to that of 'offshore defense-cum-open seas protection' for securing China's distant interests [Khurana, 2018a, P. 201]. The White Paper says: "... (World) Ocean is the guarantor of China's peaceful existence and sustainable development. The traditional mentality proclaiming the dogma of land over the (World) Ocean should be discarded ... Great importance should be attached to the presence in the (World) Ocean in order to protect communications and the foreign presence of China" [AnuxaHOB, 2017]. That means, developing the ocean fleet, and also solving the problem of the lack of logistics infrastructure, that is, creating a base for the Chinese fleet in the Indian Ocean. White Paper emphasizes that China's national interests change as China grows — these are now various global factors, such as the threat of international terrorism, global epidemics, or the problem of maritime piracy [KyBangHH, 2015].
Thus, the Chinese military doctrine of MSR illustrates the shift in China's emphasis from continental to maritime strategy, that is, a shift from long-standing attention to the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans to the Indian Ocean, which has become
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the world's largest and strategically important maritime corridor for the global economy and security. China's ambitions towards the status of a great power can be achieved by strengthening the dominant role and gaining freedom of navigation in the most important waters of the Indian Ocean, which is catalyzed by the Chinese Dream [Jash, 2018, P. 73]. The goal of the Chinese Dream or Great Dream is the revival and rejuvenation of the Chinese nation [Qiu, 2014, P. 108; Harutyunyan, 2018, P. 2843], which Beijing formulates as "universal harmony in the world" [Hu, 2013, P. 126]. To realize this dream, China needs a peaceful and stable international and peripheral environment, and will realize its dream through persistent endeavors for peaceful development [Yang, 2014, P. 9].
In this context, Beijing's MSR strategy is of great interest, which focuses on creating Chinese strongholds or "naval posts" with military or geopolitical influence along the Indian Ocean littoral, in the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea, called a "String of Pearls" - similar to the "Dual Use Logistics Facility" [Lin, 2011, P. 10].
CHINESE STRATEGY OF MARITIME "STRING OF PEARLS"
Beijing has begun work on projects for the "Dual Use Logistics Facility", which should make up the "String of Pearls", at the end of the 20th century and continues to this day. The "Dual Use Logistics Facility" is characterized by its light footprint, its emphasis on providing logistics support to overseas non-traditional security missions, and its dual commercial and military nature. The "String of Pearls" model is similar to the "Dual Use Logistics Facility" except that it would include secret access agreements and covert development of commercial facilities to support later military use, with the ultimate objective of being able to support major com-
bat operations against India and to dominate the IOR [Yung, 2015].
According to Christina Lin, several elements are needed to carry out "String of Pearls" strategy:
Gaining access to airfields and ports through the construction of new facilities (sometimes with significant subsidies for construction, given that they will be provided if necessary) or the establishment of cordial relations with countries that already have key facilities.
Expanding diplomatic relations, so that airspace and shipping lanes remain free and are often accompanied by mutually beneficial trade and export agreements. Since securing a "String of Pearls" depends on linking a number of dissimilar places, it is important to ensure that each pearl is safe from any potential threats from neighboring states.
Modernization of the armed forces for an effective movement to maintain individual pearls, if necessary, as well as in preparation for appropriate actions and exercises [Lin, 2011, P. 10].
The theory for the Chinese "String of Pearls" is related to Beijing's need for geostrategic security of the "Choke Points" and maritime [oil and trade] routes critical to its development] [Bozhev, 2019]. The "String of Pearls" strategy is designed to build infrastructure projects covering the Chinese SLOCs [KyBa^gHH, 2015], and based on China's need to establish an increased level of influence and advanced presence on the sea routes through the use of investment, port development, economic, political, diplomatic and military means [Devonshire-Ellis, 2009]. Dai Xu, a former PLA Air Force colonel, argued in 2009 that to effectively fulfill its international responsibilities and build a good image, China "needs sufficient power to protect world peace".
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Fulfilling this obligation requires a special supply facility for the provision of support" [Yung, Rustici, Devary, Lin, 2014, P. 14].
Worth to note, that China has never officially used the term "String of Pearls" strategy in relation to the Chinese network of marine facilities in the Pacific and Indian Oceans [KyBangHH, 2015]. The term was coined in 2005, when the U.S. consultancy Booz Allen Hamilton (BAH) published the "Energy Futures in Asia: Final Report", predicting that China would try to expand its naval presence throughout the IOR by building maritime civilian infrastructure in friendly states in the region, a strategy dubbed the "String of Pearls" [Baker, 2015]. The authors argued that if China needed to protect its flow of energy through the Indian Ocean, it could build on its existing commercial and security relationships to establish a string of military facilities in South Asia. The analysis in the BAH study has come to be accepted in some Indian and U.S. policy circles as a description of China's actual strategy for its out of area activities. At the time, China had contributed to construction of naval bases in Burma, funded construction of a new port in Gwadar, Pakistan, and invested in commercial port facilities in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh [Yung, Rustici, Devary, Lin, 2014, P. 14].
Moreover, China's economic assistance in the aforementioned countries (and Greece), together with investments in overland pipelines, roads and railways through the Caspian region (EBSR), is part of the "String of Pearls" military strategy to ensure a free flow of energy and naval-access outposts along the great trade arteries in the event of a Taiwan conflict and resultant U.S. naval blockade [Lin, 2011, P. 10].
In essence, the "String of Pearls" strategy is aimed at achieving the goal of obtaining direct access to China in the Indian Ocean through the
Bay of Bengal, bypassing the Strait of Malacca, which became doubly relevant in connection with the adoption in 2000 of the program for the accelerated development of the southwestern provinces of China - Yunnan, Sichuan etc. The construction of a network of roads and pipelines in these provinces and deep into China from ports in the Indian Ocean, for example, in Myanmar, accelerates and cheapens the delivery of goods and energy resources [Лебедева, 2011].
It is also worth remembering that the "String of Pearls" strategy was developed in part due to the lack of progress on the Kra-Canal project (across the Kra isthmus in Southern Thailand), which would allow Chinese vessels to enter the Indian Ocean from the South China Sea [Devonshire-Ellis, 2009], bypassing the Strait of Malacca and Singapore located on its shores. Then the Thai authorities were not ready to delegate national sovereignty to the Chinese, explaining their refusal by the quirks of local legislation that prohibits foreigners from registering land as property [Цатурян, 2016].11
Currently China's investment is spreading from Hainan Island in the South China Sea through the coastal areas of the Strait of Malacca, including port facilities at Malacca (Malaysia), a container port in Chittagong (Bangladesh); Coco, Hianggyi, Sittwe or Kyaukphyu (Myanmar), port of Chauphyu on Ramree Island in the Bay of Bengal (Myanmar), Mergui and Zadetkyi Kyun (Myanmar); Laem Cha-bang (Thailand) and Sihanoukville (Cambodia). They stretch across the Indian Ocean, Colombo and Hambantota (Sri Lanka), Male (Maldives), the port of Gwadar and Pasni (Pakistan), port of Djibouti (Djibouti), Victoria (Seychelles) and the islands within the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf [Храмчихин, 2017; Devonshire-Ellis, 2009]. China has invested as well in ports of Greece, the Netherlands, Singapore, Kenya, Togo [Takes, 2016, P. 7].
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Beijing insists that all these investments were economically motivated and part of the MSR [Kleven, 2015]. By 2017, about US $ 46.6 billion of investments were announced or completed in China, including 40 port projects, the largest of which are:
Tanzania (Bagamoyo - US $10 billion);
Sri Lanka (Colombo and Habamtota - US $ 3
billion);
Burma [Myanmar] (Sittwe port in Maday
Island - US $ 2.5 billion);
Australia (Darwin, Newcastle, and Melbourne
- US $ 2.2 billion);
Israel (Ashdod and Haifa - US $ 2.9 billion)
[Kuo, 2017].
Level of ownership and volume of investments in the port vary. Taken together, Chinese port operators China Merchants Port Holdings, China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company (COSCO Group) and China Shipping Terminal Development, all mainland companies, easily compete with the two largest container flow companies in the world - PSA International of Singapore and Hutchison Ports Holdings from Hong Kong [Kuo, 2017].
THE "STRING OF PEARLS" STRATEGY AS A MILITARY INITIATIVE
In fact, the "String of Pearls" concept is often viewed a military initiative, with the aim of providing China's navy access to a series of ports stretching from the South China Sea to the Arabian Sea and oil-rich ME [Harutyunyan, 2017a, P. 95-102]. It begins at the Yulin Naval Base on the territory of the PRC itself, on Hainan Island - the largest naval base in Asia, capable of receiving and servicing ships of all classes. In the underground shelter of the Naval Base there can be up to 20 submarines, including a nuclear submarine-launched ballistic
missiles (SLBMs) and a nuclear submarine. Although in the Pacific Ocean, outside the territorial waters of the China, there were no PLA naval bases, but there were two auxiliary facilities - a satellite weather station on the island of Karakira (Solomon Islands) and a post of equipment for monitoring the surface situation on the island of Tuamotu (French Polynesia). The latter is interesting because the PRC intelligence object is, in fact, located on the territory of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member country. In addition, the PLA Navy can be used to refuel Port Moresby (Papua New Guinea) [XpaMHHXHH, 2017].
Actually, China was adopting a "Dual-Use Logistics Facility" approach, involving ports that would ostensibly serve both commercial and logistics purposes rather than full-scale military operations [Dorsey, 2019, P. 210].
Here are some of the dual-use Chinese logistics facilities:
Hong Kong (China): strong central base;
Sanya (China): submarine base;
Paracel Islands: base area for resupply; an upgraded airstrip on Woody Island, located in the Paracel archipelago about 300 nautical miles east of Vietnam;
Spratly Islands: submarine locations and re-supply;
Sihanoukville (Cambodia): naval access base;
Isthmus of Kra (southern Thailand): strategic protected corridor for access from South China Sea to Gulf of Thailand to Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean;
Smith Island (Myanmar): naval base with electronic intelligence;
Sittwe (Myanmar): Strategic location as re-
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supply point, a deep-water port under construction;
Chittagong (Bangladesh): amphibious naval installation, a container shipping facility;
Hambantota (Sri Lanka): military base utilized for protection;
Marao (Maldives): military base utilized for protection and marine expeditions;
Gwadar (Pakistan): strategic, protected location for China as a naval base and intelligence installation;
Port Sudan (Sudan): strategic location for resupply and resources, upgraded facilities which provide vital access to the Suez Canal and the Horn of Africa;
Al- Ahdab (Iraq): oil and petroleum location, troop support location;
Lamu (Kenya): strategic port location for African resources [Sterioti, 2017, P. 3-4];
Hainan Island (China): upgraded military facilities;
The South China Sea: oil-drilling platforms and ocean survey ships;
Great Coco Island (Myanmar) near the Strait of Malacca: intelligence-gathering facilities;
Irrawaddy transportation corridor:
it would link China's Yunnan province to the Bay of Bengal through Burma;
The Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline:
a potential extension of the IPI through Islamabad and over the Karakoram Highway to Kashgar in Xinjiang province, intended to transport fuel into China [Lin, 2011, P. 11].
In fact, the Indian Ocean is considered the main region for preparing the PLA navy and provides the conditions for navigation and operation in the deep -sea region, which gives the PLAN an excellent opportunity to practice the escort and defense of the Chinese commercial fleet [Payette, Sun, 2017, P. 5]. A recent announcement by the Chinese government about the reduction of the PLA with the calculation of an increase in the size of the Marine Corps from 20,000 to 1,000,000 indicates a tectonic shift in its focus from protecting the periphery of China to protecting the naval forces. Some of these buildings will be located at facilities operating in China, in Djibouti and Gwadar [Tsering, 2018, P. 70]. China's military exchanges between Thailand, Myanmar, Cambodia, Pakistan, the Maldives, Sudan, the Seychelles, Saudi Arabia, and others, have laid a foundation for further military cooperation in the western Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf [Degang, 2015].
However, it would take the PLA Navy many years to bring into operation a full-fledged Carrier Task Force, and possibly decades to make it effective enough to achieve sea-control against advanced navies. Meanwhile, this process can deliver an indelible blow to China's goal of promoting a "soft" and "constructive" image in the Indo-Pacific region (IPR), including through its MSR [Khurana, 2018b, P. 177]. It is nothing more than an attempt to restructure the strategy of the "String of Pearls" in harmless soft terms [Chellaney, 2015b].
For comparison, on the MSR, special attention is paid to infrastructure programs that will stimulate economic growth and development along their path and link the component of the "road" with the component of the land-based "belt". To achieve this, the roadmap requires coordination of policies, expansion of ties in transport (both waterand land-based) and energy infrastructure, as well
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as the removal of trade barriers. Commonalities between "String of Pearls" theory and the MSR include:
Deepening relationships with target countries;
Focusing on strategic waterways in the Indo-
Pacific;
Developing infrastructure in target areas;
Sustaining and encouraging economic growth;
Safeguarding and enhancing China's energy
security [Drun, 2017].
China's defense guidance tasks the PLA with playing a more prominent role in Beijing's new military diplomacy and national security strategy, a further shift away from "keeping a low profile." The PLA Navy's participation in international coun-terpiracy patrols in the Gulfs of Aden and Guinea, China's first naval deployment outside Asia, is one example of the PLA's recalibrated engagement [Nantulya, 2019]. In the eyes of foreign observers, the most striking illustration of China's global ambitions was the sending of Chinese ships to the shores of Somalia to fight pirates in 2008 - the first in 500 years China's participation in a naval campaign outside its territorial waters [^h, 2011, C. 163]. Between December 2008 and August 2018, China sent 30 naval escort task forces to Somalia in the international anti-piracy effort in the Gulf of Aden. More recently, Beijing also conducted mass evacuations of Chinese and foreign nationals from Libya and Yemen [Gaoyuem, Charm, 2019, P. 5-6].
May assume that a naval presence in Africa will give China greater latitude to support its peacekeeping troops, humanitarian interests, and hard security operations. Together, these deployments form part of a diverse set of deployments that the PLA calls "new historical missions" [Nantulya, 2019].
DOES THE "STRING OF PEARLS" STRATEGY CONTRADICT THE CHINESE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE POLICY?
There has been much discussion in the expert community about the possible links between "String of Pearls" theory and MSR, and their contradictory role to the Chinese principle of noninterference policy. Many experts are sure that having developed the "String of Pearls" policy and established bases in ports, it will be difficult for Beijing to adhere to the principle of protecting non-alignment and non-interference and refuse to pursue a policy of building military bases abroad.
Some analysts believe that "String of Pearls" is not a coordinated strategy on the part of China, and there is no substantial evidence in Chinese sources or elsewhere to support the allegations of commentators, scholars, and officials who use it as a basis for explaining Beijing's intentions in the Indian Ocean [Naval War College Press, 2011, P. 61]. According to Zhou Bo, Honorary Fellow, PLA Academy of Military Science, the only thing that can be justified in the "String of Pearls" theory is that it emphasizes the growing importance of the Indian Ocean for China's ever-expanding national interests [Drun, 2017].
China's stated non-interference policy is an important element of its national security policy, and the absence of Chinese military bases abroad is often cited as an example of Beijing's commitment to non-interference and non-alignment [Naval War College Press, 2011, P. 61], which in turn was seen as a pragmatic step towards securing and maintaining access to vital resources in most developing countries, and played an important role in enhancing "South-South" solidarity in these countries [Aidoo, Hess, 2015, P. 111]. "South-South cooperation," "non-interference," and "non-conditionality" were at the forefront and at the center of China's
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approach, presented as "one of humanitarian and development aid plus influence without interference, in contrast to the West's coercive approach of sanctions plus military intervention" [Campbell, Wheeler, Attree, Butler, Mariani, 2012, P. 8-9].
However, China's long-standing commitment to non-intervention does not mean that the foreign policy community in China has always reached consensus on its validity and relevance. If a few years ago, almost no Chinese scientist challenged the principle of non-interference, infringement on the sovereignty of other nations, in recent years more and more have been arguing about this issue. One important factor contributing to the current domestic criticism of China's strict commitment to non-intervention is regulatory change in the international system [Duchatel, Brauner, Hang, 2014, P. 6]. The current debate in China is resolving around the establishment of what are commonly referred to in the U.S. military as "places", as opposed to bases. This type of strategy involves securing with friendly governments diplomatic agreements allowing access to those nations' facilities in order to obtain essential supplies, such as fuel, food, and freshwater, for deployed forces. Such agreements can also involve reciprocal guarantees of military support in such areas as training, equipment and education [Naval War College Press, 2011, P. 61].
However, it should be noted that China's first overseas base in Djibouti, opened in mid-2017, like one pearl in a string, adds the first explicit military component to its MSR, despite the fact that official statements emphasize the purpose of the base: providing support for military operations other than war (MOOTW) [Drun, 2017]. The official goal was to open a logistics support base to become the center of peacekeeping and other strategic policies in Africa and the Indian Ocean region [Lanteigne, 2018, P. 4]. But actually, in addition to providing
a demanded supply point for the PLA Navy, the base will be crucial to expand China's intelligence gathering capabilities in the area and provide the PLA Air Force with the long-awaited opportunity to reach world level [Ghiselli, 2016, P. 7].
From here it should be concluded that the Chinese principle of a policy of non-interference, the rejection of a foreign military presence and ensuring the development of mutually beneficial economic and trade relations as the main task no longer corresponds to the need to ensure China's security and vital interests. Therefore, it is possible that in the foreseeable future, China will increasingly have to become a regional player in competitive cooperation with the U.S. and India [Dorsey, 2017, P. 1].
CHINESE NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AS A SECURITY DILEMMA IN THE REGION
It follows from the foregoing that the establishment of places to support extended Chinese naval activities in the Indian Ocean creates a security dilemma in the region, particularly for U.S. and India. The emergence of tensions regarding the regional order was facilitated by the modernization of the armed forces and the increase in military spending in China, which led to naval expansionism and the construction of artificial islands - not prohibited by international law - and military bases on the islands; also, accelerating the regional arms race in Southeast Asia [Roudgar, 2017, P. 74]. As a result of the implementation of the first stage of the long-term modernization plan, the Chinese navy acquired the ability to "project power" over the entire Yellow Sea, East China and South China Seas within the Philippine Islands and the Ryukyu Islands archipelago [THTapeHKO, 2008, C. 441].
The U.S. and India are concerned that part of the construction of artificial islands includes
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the modernization of runways, largely supported by military facilities such as the site on Woody Island, near Vietnam. This means shifting the balance of power in the Indian and Arabian Gulf from traditional Indian government, backed by U.S. military power, to China, backed by regional diplomatic ties. Now the U.S. and India are more concerned about whether this strategy is intended solely for supply of building materials and trade routes, or whether China will subsequently use them to ensure regional superiority [Devonshire-Ellis, 2009].
Since the IPR is a freedom of action for the U.S. Navy and Air Force in accordance with the principle of "freedom of navigation", Beijing's attempts to establish sovereignty over the South China Sea, as well as its territorial disputes in the region, are seen by U.S. as an encroachment on the principle "Freedom and openness", and as "undermining the sovereignty of neighboring countries" for turning them into "satellites" of Beijing [Морозов, 2018, C. 111]. In this regard, it is not surprising that in 2017 the Trump administration introduced a new strategy in Afghanistan: withdrew the U.S. from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); put an end to the Trans-Atlantic Partnership (TAP) and pursue the Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) in the region [Морозов, 2018, C. 108].
The challenge from the PRC in the struggle for control of the sea spaces to many American experts seems to be perhaps the main threat to American leadership and the existence of the entire international order. They believe that in addition to turning the South China Sea into an inland sea, it will also deprive the U.S. Navy of the ability to act globally to maintain a secure environment and the supremacy at sea that is necessary to maintain the Bretton Woods system [Пономарев, 2016, P. 111].
However, many experts are sure that China did not pose a serious challenge to U.S. naval supe-
riority, and the U.S. Navy continues to maintain a dominant position in the Western Pacific and around the world [Li, F., 2014].12 The growing anxiety surrounding China's military spending must be properly contextualized, particularly given the continued dominance of the U.S. military. China's potential nuclear threat, while growing, is still comparatively small and vulnerable when viewed alongside that of the U.S. China's nuclear stockpile is currently between a tenth and a hundredth the size of the U.S. arsenal [Renic, 2012; Harutyunyan, 2017b, p. 14].
As for India, despite the fact that MSR covers ports in countries around India, such as Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Pakistan, but not in India itself, New Delhi believes that China is invading India's waterways. China's investment in CPEC, which cuts through the disputed areas of Kashmir, and also underlines China's strong connection with Pakistan, is another problem for India [Lain, Pantucci, 2015, P. 2]. Consequently, India views the MSR as a threat or form of competition and the "String of Pearls" - as a challenge to the existing balance of power in the Indian Ocean [Chellaney, 2015a], a threat to Indian security in the IOR, as well as a tool to strategically encircle India. The OBOR is described as "the double road of China to superpower status" to implement global hegemony that would threaten India's dominant position in South Asia and the Indian Ocean and put China in dominant position in Asia-Africa-Europe [Gan, 2015, P. 68-69].
Some experts believe that since America's influence in these regions is weakening, and the peaceful region no longer necessarily requires a U.S. military presence, China's strategy may be conservatively supported by other countries in Southeast Asia, with the possible exception of India. Pro-American countries such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines can take advantage of improving and developing ties with
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China, while countries such as Pakistan, North Korea, Myanmar, and Cambodia are already strong allies of Beijing [Devonshire-Ellis, 2009].
However, more likely that countries in the Indian Ocean may be reluctant to support the Chinese military presence and be interested in maintaining balanced relations with the U.S. and India while developing ties with China.
CONCLUSION
At the end of our study, we conclude that while the Chinese legacy denies the concept of creating a superpower based on naval power to maximize its global dominance, like the British and Americans, Chinese expansion and its naval presence will grow steadily, which according to R. Alikhanov [2017] puts the "String of Pearls" strategy in the forefront, combining key strongholds like Guo stones. Here it is appropriate to draw a parallel, drawn by Henry Kissinger in his book "On China", between the Guo game and the strategy implemented in PRC practice: "While the Western tradition highly values the decisive battle and glorifies acts of heroism, the Chinese ideal [strategy] emphasizes the subtlety, sophistication and patient accumulation of benefits". If other world or regional players, as is customary in chess, strive for absolute superiority or complete defeat of the enemy, then Beijing, as in the game of Guo, tends to achieve relative superiority by avoiding strategic emptiness and filling it, in this case, by implementing its "String of Pearls" strategy and MSR initiative.
However, despite the fact that the partial success of the "String of Pears" strategy can become the most important condition for the emergence of the Chinese fleet in the Indo-Pacific region on an ongoing basis, for its practical implementation there are a number of geopolitical, geostrategic and geo-economics problems that China has to solve.
And in order to reduce resistance to its rise as a sea power, Beijing needs not only to pay special attention to the realization of its maritime interests and, to this end, to increase its sea power, but also to strengthen political and economic cooperation in the Indian Ocean and the Asia-Pacific region with Japan, the U.S., India and countries of the ASEAN, the MENA. China should not follow the traditional naval force strategy to strengthen the fleet, because the globalization of the world economy has tied the interests of different states in such a tight knot that if any of them wants to ensure the safety of their vital marine communications, then this can only be achieved through cooperation, and not traditional force struggle at sea with rivals.
NOTES
1. The Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity is envisaged to connect ASEAN through enhanced physical infrastructure development (physical connectivity), effective institutional arrangements (institutional connectivity) and empowered people (people-to-people connectivity).
2. The EBSR focuses on connecting China to Europe through Central Asia and Russia, the Persian Gulf through Central Asia and South East Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean.
3. Control over the South China Sea is one of the milestones in the Chinese strategy for dominance. The sea itself is one of the busiest commercial routes and the shortest possible way connecting the West Pacific/East Asia with the Indian Ocean, Africa, and Europe. It also provides direct access to nine of the ten largest commercial ports in the world. Seven of them are Chinese, including Hong Kong and the other two are Busan in South Korea and Taiwan.
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Four of the NSR's six economic corridors are included in the EBSR: China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor (CMREC), China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), New Eurasian Land Bridge (NELB), China-Central and West Asia Economic Corridor (CCWAEC). 9
One of the six NSR economic corridors included in the EBSR is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), that will extend the Karakoram Highway; it already crosses the mountains between China and Pakistan and build highway and rail links all the way through Pakistan to the port of Gwadar.
A "Choke Points" refers to a point of natural congestion along two wider and important navigable passages. Maritime "Choke Points" are naturally narrow channels of shipping having high traffic because of their strategic locations. Maritime "Choke Points", or oil "Choke Points", are congestive pathways in some of the world's famous shipping routes. There are many such "Choke Points" around the world, however, a few of them are extremely famous for ships and thus face high international security conflicts and cross- 10. border terrorism threats.
The Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb is located between Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula, and Djibouti and Eritrea in the Horn of Africa. The 11. Bab-el-Mandeb acts as a strategic link between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.
The Strait of Hormuz is a strait between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. It provides the only sea passage from the Persian Gulf to the open ocean and is one of the world's most strategically important "Choke Points". On the 12. north coast lies Iran, and on the south coast the United Arab Emirates and Musandam, an
exclave of Oman. A third of the world's liquefied natural gas and almost 20-25% of total global oil consumption passes through the strait, making it a highly important strategic location for international trade.
The Strait of Malacca is one of the most important shipping lanes in the world and is the main shipping channel between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, linking major Asian economies such as India, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, China, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. Over 94,000 vessels pass through the strait each year (2008) making it the busiest strait in the world, carrying about 25% of the world's traded goods, including oil, Chinese manufactured products, coal, palm oil and Indonesian coffee. About a quarter of all oil carried by sea passes through the Strait, mainly from Persian Gulf suppliers to Asian markets. In addition, it is also one of the world's most congested shipping "Choke Points" because it narrows to only 2.8 km wide at the Phillips Channel (close to the south of Singapore).
China's interest in the Indian Ocean has grown steadily since 2008, when it embarked on a naval mission as part of a multilateral effort to combat piracy off the Horn of Africa.
And this is not only a matter of regional competition, but of history itself: since 1897, an agreement has been in effect between Thailand and Britain, according to which the Thai side refuses to build a canal in order to preserve the significance of Singapore. Now Americans are concentrating military efforts in Asia to maintain control of the Chinese economy.
According to statistics for 2010, the total tonnage of the American fleet amounted to about 2.6 billion, which is more than the total
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tonnage of all the remaining 17 fleets follow- 4. ing it (out of 17 fleets, 14 belong to U.S. allies). The U.S. Navy is equipped with the most advanced weapons in the world, including centralized and networked weapons systems. In terms of overall missile capabilities, the 5. missile capabilities of the U.S. Navy exceed the combined capabilities of all the other 20 fleets in the world ranking after it. As for the 6. total number of battleships, the U.S. Navy at least corresponds to the sum of the Chinese and Russian Navy (203 versus 205), but the total U.S. Navy tonnage is 263 times the total 7. tonnage of the Chinese and Russian Navy.
13. Here, the Chinese allude to the travel of Zheng
He (15th century), which demonstrated its 8. ability, but not ambition, to dominate the seas or build maritime empires, as they were stopped when it was proved that there were no enemies threatening China from the seas.
9.
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INFORMATION ABOUT AUTHORS
Harutyunyan Aghavni Alexander, Ph.D. in History, Leading Researcher at the Department of International Relations, the Institute of Oriental Studies, National Academy of Sciences of Armenia. aghavni.harutyunyan1@gmail.com
Принята к публикации: 10.04.2020 Submission Date: 2020.04.10
