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40INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE JOURNAL / МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫЙ НАУЧНЫЙ ЖУРНАЛ
The lion and the dragon: a new stage in Sino-Iranian strategic partnership
Лев и дракон: новый этап китайско-иранского стратегического партнёрства
Арутюнян Агавни Александровна
Отдел Международных отношений Института Востоковедения Национальной Академии Наук Армении aghavni.harutyunyan1@gmail.com DOl: 10.24412/2686-9675-2-2021-214-242
АННОТАЦИЯ
В июле 2020 года было установлено новое партнерство между Ираном и Китаем по вопросам экономики и безопасности, о чем подробно говорится в предлагаемом соглашении на 18 страницах, и которое возможно откроет путь для миллиардов долларов китаиских инвестиции в энергетику и другие секторы. Предлагаемая 25-летняя дорожная карта между Ираном и Китаем называется «Всеобъемлющее стратегическое партнерство Ирана и Китая». Партнерство значительно расширит китаиское присутствие в банковскои сфере, телекоммуникациях, портах, железных дорогах и десятках других проектов. Взамен Китаи будет получать регулярные и льготные поставки иранскои нефти в течение следующих 25 лет. В документе также описывается углубление военного сотрудничества, которое потенциально может дать Китаю точку опоры в регионе за счет совместных тренировок и учении, совместных исследовании и разработок оружия, а также обмена разведданными. Все это может подорвать усилия администрации Дональда Трампа по изоляции иранского правительства от его
ABSTRACT
In July 2020, a new partnership between Iran and China on economic and security issues was established, detailed in an 18-page proposed agreement that will clear the way for billions of dollars in Chinese investment in energy and other sectors. The proposed 25-year roadmap between Iran and China is titled Iran-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. The partnership will significantly expand its Chinese presence in banking, telecommunications, ports, railways and dozens of other projects. In exchange, China will receive regular and preferential supplies of Iranian oil over the next 25 years. The document also describes the deepening military cooperation that could potentially give China a foothold in the region through joint training and exercises, joint weapons research and development, and intelligence sharing. All of this could undermine the Trump administration's efforts to isolate the Iranian government from its nuclear and military ambitions. It was argued that "even a partial implementation of the Sino-Iranian strategic partnership will signal a serious escalation of the United States strategic rivalry with China and at the same time will punch
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ядерных и военных амбиций. Утверждалось, что «даже частичная реализация китайско-иранского стратегического партнерства будет сигнализировать о серьезнои эскалации стратегического соперничества США с Китаем и в то же время пробьет дыру в проводимои администрации кампании «максимального давления» на Иран.
Ключевые слова: Китаи, Иран, Всеобъемлющее стратегическое партнерство, Инициатива «Один пояс, один путь».
Для цитирования: Арутюнян А.А. Лев и дракон: новый этап китайско-иранского стратегического партнёрства. Современные востоковедческие исследования. 2021; 3(2): 214-242.
INTRODUCTION
Iran initiated diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1971, only after the United States (U.S.) broke the ice with Beijing [64]. The warming relationship culminated in a state visit to Iran by Hua Guofeng, then-China's Premier and Chairman of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1978 [38]. Prior to the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Beijing welcomed the Shah's "anti-imperial and anti-colonial" policies, viewing Iran as a "defense zone" against the Soviet Union (SU). At the same time, the Anti-Soviet position of the two countries was in line with the U.S. strategy to counter the SU in the region [12, с. 56-64].
However, Beijing expressed support for the Islamic revolution led by Khomeini in 1979. China was taking into account Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI)'s strong strategic position in the Middle East (ME), as well as Tehran's growing influence throughout Asia and its ambitions for the role of leader of the Islamic world [3, с. 37-38]. Although the new leadership of the IRI was skeptical of Beijing because of its previous relationship with the
a hole in the administration's campaign of "maximum pressure" on Iran.
Keywords: China, Iran, Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, Belt and Road Initiative.
For citation: Harutyunyan A.A. The lion and the dragon: a new stage in sino-iranian strategic partnership. Modern Oriental Studies. 2021; 3(2): 214-242.
Shah, it did not stand in the way of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in March 1979 [37, p. 4].
The ties developed over four decades across three phases: military cooperation during the 1980/88 Iran-Iraq War; energy cooperation in the 1990s as China developed quickly; and oil deals which defied sanctions [70]. Bilateral ties strengthened in the mid-1980s, when Beijing developed a defense and arms transfer cooperation with Tehran. Since then, relations between the two countries have expanded to a number of domains. Trade relationship between Iran and China have steadily developed over time, despite international differences over the nuclear program [50].
Iran is the third largest economy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region after Turkey and Saudi Arabia, with an estimated gross domestic product (GDP) of over US $ 400 billion [68]. In 2019, China became Iran's largest trading partner, with trade between the two countries estimated at US $ 20 billion, which the two countries planned to increase to US $ 600 billion over the
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next decade, while also building stronger cooperation as part of a 25-year plan [71]. Bilateral trade reflects China's purchases of oil, petrochemicals and minerals, gas condensate and industrial goods [60]. Apart from trade, China is the leading investor in the Iranian market. About 100 large Chinese companies are investing in key sectors of Iran's economy, especially energy and transport [32].
At present, Iran, which due to its geographical location is one of the main players in the ME in the new "Great Game" of geostrategic-political confrontation, has become a possible factor in China's geopolitical ambitions in Central Asia (CA) and the ME. Moreover, as a relatively stable security partner in the troubled ME region, Tehran could become one of the main links between CA, the ME and Europe as part of the Chinese New Silk Road initiative [39; 32]. Relations between Beijing and Tehran, which date back to Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's "Pivot to the East policy", have blossomed under Chinese President Xi Jinping, who is pushing China's ambitious initiative [70].
2. IRAN'S SIGNIFICANCE IN THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE
2.1 Iran as a Part of the Belt and Road Initiative
New Silk Road (NSR) or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is set to take 10-15 years and US $ 1 trillion to connect China to global markets through a vast array of land (Economic Belt of Silk Road/ EBSR) and sea (Maritime Silk Road of 21st Century/ MSR) trade routes across Eurasia. Originally announced in 2013 by Chinese President Xi Jinping with the goal of restoring the ancient Silk Road linking Asia and Europe, the scope of the BRI has expanded over time to include new territories and development initiatives. This project envisages the construction of a large network of roads, railways,
seaports, electric networks, oil and gas pipelines, and related infrastructure projects [31].
BRI was warmly welcomed from the outset by Tehran. As one of the founders of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the IRI joined the bank on April 7, 2014 as the 34th member [54]. After talks on 23 January 2016, in Tehran with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Iran and China agreed to expand bilateral relations and increase trade to US $ 600 billion over the next 10 years and agreed on forming strategic relations [as] reflected in a 25-year comprehensive document [55]. Relying on their respective strengths and advantages as well as the opportunities provided through the signing of documents such as the "MOU on Jointly Promoting the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road" and "MOU on Reinforcement of Industrial and Mineral Capacities and Investment" [49]. Thus, Iran expressed its readiness to participate in both parts of China's NSR project — the EBSR and the MSR trade routes — which could serve Iran's political, geostrategic, security and economic interests at a regional level [71]. 17 agreements were signed to expand cooperation and mutual investments in various areas including communications, railway, ports, energy, industry, commerce and services, finance, telecommunications [16].
After meeting with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, Xi Jinping announced that the Chinese authorities support Iran's application for full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) after the lifting of the United Nations (UN) sanctions that impeded it. The parties agreed to strengthen cooperation in the exchange of intelligence information and the joint fight against regional threats, terrorism and extremism [5]. According to the ideologues of Iran, the inclusion of leading Islamic countries (Iran, as well as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, etc.) in the SCO will allow uniting the efforts of five non-Western civilizations — Russian, Chinese, Islamic, Hindu and Buddhist in
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search of a new world on the basis of "fair globalization". At the same time, Iran sharply distinguishes itself both from the West (US, EU) and from the East (Russia, India, China), offering the whole world an Islamic identity based on the Iranian-Islamic (Shiite) civilization [25, c. 28]. It is no coincidence that Chinese and Central Asian leaders view Iran as a security partner because Iran, with its Shiite majority population, poses no threat in terms of exporting radical Islam, and its Islamist ideas have limited appeal in Central Asian states with a Sunni majority or among the Muslim minority of China, which historically fears the role of Sun-ni-majority states [31].
It is worth noting that at the SCO summit in Ufa in July 2015, the heads of the SCO member states and the organization's observers, among whom were Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping and Hassan Rouhani, highlighted the prospects of the initiative to form a single SCO transport system and discussed at an expanded meeting plans to link the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and EBSR [51, p. 107; 33]. The expansion of the EAEU is one of the most important ways to develop integration in the territory of the former SU with the prospect of creating various free trade zones (FTZ) of the EAEU with countries that are not part of it. And an important role in this process can be played by the current relations between the EAEU and the countries of the ME, primarily with Iran, a temporary agreement on a FTZ with which came into force in October 27, 2019 [1]. The agreement provides for limited product coverage, but includes almost all major tradable products, which account for 55% of total EAEU exports [4].2 The EAEU has reduced import duties for Iran on more than 500 items [1].3
In August 2019, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Zarif visited his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi and presented a roadmap to the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement between Iran and China, signed in 2016 year [7].4
It was then that secret provisions were added to the document, which include a number of privileges for China [16].
However, the agreement was stalled by Trump's destruction of the nuclear deal and a campaign of colossal pressure on China, which was forced to slow down the momentum of the Iranian-Chinese cooperation, which was gaining strength and again put tanker oil deals into the shadows [24]. Iran struck a nuclear deal with the so-called P5+1 in 2015, which involves the waiving of sanctions in return for curbing nuclear enrichment activities [50].
2.2 Sino-Iranian Comprehensive Strategic Partnership agreement of June 2020
The Sino-Iranian talks on comprehensive strategic partnership agreement resulted in an 18-page document called the "Sino-Iranian Comprehensive Strategic Partnership", approved by the administration of President Hassan Rouhani in June 2020. However, the partnership document is non-binding and looks more like a statement of intent [74]. Although the parties were in no hurry to disclose all the details of the signed document, part of which is classified, the Iranian government, which approved the Iranian-Chinese agreement as a project, announced the possibility of signing the document only after it was signed by the governments of both countries [16].
An as-yet-to-be-signed agreement between Beijing and Tehran covering trade, energy, infrastructure, telecommunications and even military cooperation [79], suggests China will invest a total of US $ 400 billion in Iran's banking, transport and development sectors [27]. Iran will offer special visa conditions for Chinese entrepreneurs in Iran and for Iranian entrepreneurs in China [18]. Chinese firms also continue to exploit the seabed resources of the southern coast of Iran [45].
China and Iran will also seek cooperation on renewable sources and civil nuclear power [45].
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China National Nuclear Corporation is upgrading Iran's Arak IR-40 heavy water reactor to meet non-proliferation requirements as part of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. The Chinese government has extended a US $ billion loan to Chinese companies to build dams, power generators, and other infrastructures in Iran [32].
China's "Information Silk Road". The document provides for cooperation in developing telecommunication infrastructure (Digital Silk Road, 5G), basic services (search engines, email, and messaging applications), communication equipment (satellite navigation, switches, servers, and data storage), and consumer products (mobile phones, tablets, and laptops). Providing Iran with know-how and equipment will allow it to completely separate from the global Internet and form a national information network [74]. The Chinese BeiDou global satellite navigation system will be developed in Iran [15] and, accordingly, through Iran entering the ME. Iran Electronics Industries (IEI) was to create a space data collection center. With Chinese search engines, postal services, messaging apps and social media, Iran will be able to block the external Internet for a long time without jeopardizing day-to-day online activities [59].5
Conceptually, BeiDou is located within China's "Information Silk Road", a subset of its land and maritime silk routes under the BRI. China is now able to extend influence in a multidomain environment (land, sea and space) via its BeiDou space system, which provides navigation to aircraft, submarines, missiles, as well as commercial services dependent on such navigation [67]. The American war with Huawei, sanctions and even the arrest at the end of 2018 of Huawei's commercial director Meng Wangzhou for trying to disguise Chinese investments in Iran did not bring real success. Despite everything, 5G networks were rolled out and launched in Iran this February [24]. Iran also instructs China to develop the 5th generation of mo-
bile phones (5G) networks in Iran, built by Huawei, which is being ousted from the United States [45].
China's investment in the Iranian fuel and energy complex. The main pillar of the updated agreement will be China's investment in the Iranian fuel and energy complex in the amount of US $ 280 billion over the next five years [7]. Under the agreement, Beijing expects to receive regular supplies of Iranian oil at significant discounts over the next 25 years [27]. Iran needs to increase oil production to 8.5 million barrels per day, which will go to the PRC at favorable tariffs for China and Iran will become the largest oil supplier to the PRC. Such a deal is especially important for Iran's energy sector, which is in dire need of significant investment to rebuild an aging oil industry that requires more than US $ 150 billion to modernize wells, refineries and another infrastructure [17]. Iran has set a goal of increasing oil production from 3.8 million barrels per day to 5 million by 2020, but most estimates indicated that Iran will not be able to produce more than 4.2 by the end of this decade, as the country needs US $ 200 billion in foreign investment over the same period [68].
China will be able to purchase any oil and gas products (oil, natural gas and petroleum products) with a minimum guaranteed discount of 12% off the 6-month average price for comparable benchmark products + up to 8% of this figure as compensation for risks. Beijing will also be given the right to defer payment of up to 2 years, and the ability to pay for goods in soft currency obtained as a result of doing business in Africa and the countries of the former SU, which, if skillfully converted, could give a discount of up to 12%. The total discount on oil and petrochemicals can be up to 32% [14].
Worth to note, that China has funded a number of petrochemical projects in Iran, reportedly providing US $ 13 billion for Iran's Sabalan, Lordegan, Bushehr, and Masjed Soleyman
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petrochemical projects. In the first six months of 2014, Iranian projects received the second largest batch of Chinese investments, totaling US $ 17.2 billion, and US $ 11.6 billion was invested in the Iranian energy sector [60].
In January 2016, during Xi Jinping's visit to Iran, the Chinese state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed a US $ 4.8 billion natural gas development project, 30% of which it will control along with two other partners [44]. At the end of December 2018, the state-owned Chinese corporation Sinopec announced its readiness to invest US $ 3 billion in the development of an Iranian oil field. The deal was part of an existing contract for the exploitation of the Yadava-ran field (the Yadavaran contract was signed back in 2007), located in southwestern Iran near the Iraqi border, which has reserves of 5.7 bln barrels of oil. Washington allowed Beijing to buy 360,000 barrels of Iranian oil daily. Earlier, CNPC received the consent of the White House to invest in the North Azadegan and Masjid-i-Suleiman oil fields in exchange for freezing investments in Iran's largest gas field, South Pars (which is the world's largest and shared with Qatar): CNPC replaced Total with South Pars "after the French company left Iran due to the restoration of U.S. sanctions. CNPC put into operation the first phase of North Azadegan with production of 75,000 barrels per day in November 2016 [26]. In August 2019, China "reengaged" in the development of the Jask oil terminal, which sits east of the Strait of Hormuz [32].
Thus, Iran will become one of the main sources of energy supplies for China. However, experts believe that such a project contradicts the current policy of official Beijing, but with increasing American pressure it becomes more and more attractive for the Chinese authorities [7]. The inclusion of such a strategically and geographically significant country like Iran fits into the logic of gaining wider access to the oil-rich ME, where six states in the
region are integral members of OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) and have historically been allied with the U.S. because of their political, economic and strategic interests. For China, the need to offset U.S. economic interests in the Persian Gulf requires more states to participate in Chinese NSR, with Iran as an important stakeholder given its geographic proximity to the region and its uneasy relationship with the U.S. [50]. It is believed that China's NSR could facilitate international access to Iran's gas, oil and mineral deposits [43].
A Military Component of the Deal. One of a
feature of the Iranian-Chinese military-technical cooperation is the fact that Beijing not only supplies ready-made weapons, but transfers a number of technologies to Iran, assists in the creation of its military-industrial complex capable of producing tactical and operational-tactical missiles, artillery systems, warships and boats [9, c. 246]. The Iranian leadership views China as one of the leading partners in military and military-technical cooperation aimed at strengthening Iran's conventional weapons and military equipment, in particular in the field of cyber weapons. After the lifting of sanctions against Iran in 2016 (in accordance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action - JCPOA), it purchased 150 Chengdu J-10 fighters from China for US $ 1 billion [16].
The new agreement includes as well China's plans to develop several ports in Iran, which will provide the Chinese side with the island of Kish or the strategically important port of Bandar-e-Jask for a long-term lease [18] and will give the green light for the deployment of 5,000 Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) servicemen on Iranian territory (some of them in the Persian Gulf region) with the possibility of increasing the number of personnel to guard and ensure the safety of the transit of oil, gas and petrochemical products to China. Renting a port opens up wide opportunities
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for China to project its naval power in the Persian Gulf [16]. A separate article provides for the joint creation of the latest weapons and plans to help Iran in the creation of ballistic missiles [17].
However, another element has now been added to this deal that could change the geopolitical balance in the ME. In early July 2020, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei agreed to expand the existing deal to include new military elements proposed by senior officials in the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) and intelligence agencies [75]. Iranian sources have revealed some of the top-secret military elements of the agreement, which cover "full air and naval cooperation between Iran and China", with Russia playing a key role [56]. Following a planned Iranian-Sino-Russian meeting in August 2020, the Chinese and Russian Air Forces: bombers, fighters and transport aircraft will have unlimited access to Iranian airbases, and specialized dual-use facilities6 recently built by Chinese companies near existing airports in Chabahar, Ban-dar-e-Bushehr and Bandar Abbas will be able to be used by Chinese and Russian ships from November 9, 2020. The electronic component will include all 3 key areas of Electronic Warfare (EW): electronic support (including early warning about the use of enemy weapons), electronic attack (including jamming systems) and electronic protection (including jamming the enemy). The goal of electronic warfare is to neutralize NATO C4ISR systems (command, control, communications, computers, surveillance and reconnaissance). The S-400 complexes will be involved to counter attacks by the U.S. and Israel [14]. It is supposed to link the Iranian air defense with the 19th brigade of the Russian Air Force (Rassvet) near Rostov-on-Don, which is already connected with the Chinese air defense. One of the Russian air jamming systems will be based in Chabahar and will be able to completely disable the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia's air defenses, provided they only have about 2 minutes
of warning of a missile or unmanned attack [75].
Investments in the transport and industrial infrastructure of Iran. Under the agreement of 2020, in the next five years, it is planned to invest another US $ 120 billion already in the transport and industrial infrastructure of Iran [7]. Almost 100 joint Sino-Iranian projects will be included in the B&R megaproject. Airports, high-speed railways, seaports, bridges, ports, roads and other infrastructure facilities will be built here. The PRC will develop FTZ in Maku in northern Iran, in Abadan (where the Shatt al-Arab flows into the Persian Gulf) and on the Qeshm island in the Gulf itself [17]. The development of the South-North corridor (Chabahar-Central Asia), the South-West corridor (Chabahar and Bandar Abbas-Turkey and Azerbaijan) and the Pakistan-Iran-Iraq-Syria "pilgrimage railway" are some notable initiatives [74].
3. CHINESE DEVELOPMENT OF IRANIAN TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE
3.1. Iran as a viable land bridge for landlocked Central Asian and the Caucasus states
Iran's geographic location makes it the only viable land bridge from the Persian Gulf to the landlocked Central Asian states (a market with a population of about 65 million) and the three Caucasus states (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), where China seeks to become a significant economic and political force. At the moment, the CA have three outlets to world markets: east via China, south via Iran, and west via Russia. The successful implementation of OBOR gives China de facto control over two of the three outlets [31].
The location of the deep-water port of Chabahar on the Indian Ocean in the direction of International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) 7, thus, transit relations between Russia, Eastern Europe, North, CA and the Caucasus, on the one hand, and Southeast Asia, the Far East,
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the countries of Oceania and the Persian Gulf on the other hand, are seen as significant advantages for Iran's participation in the Chinese BRI [10].8
China's first practical move towards consolidating connectivity with the ME was when the first freight train, called the Silk Road train, to travel the old Silk Road arrived in Tehran carrying goods from China and making the sea voyage of the cargo ships through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in just 14 days, compared with around 45 days by sea between China's Shanghai port to Iran's Bandar Abbas port city [39]. The train arrived in Tehran on February 16, 2016, leaving Yiwu city in eastern China's Zhejiang province on January 28, covering a distance of 10,399 km [48; 13; 36; 42]. The 575-mile railway line between the Kazakhstan, Iran and Turkmenistan (a part of International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) planned to connect the markets of Russia, China, countries of CA and the ME) [22], was opened back in December 2014 [31]. The most important core of this section was the Gorgan - Inche - Burun - Etrek -Bereket line, the eastern branch of INSTC, facilitating cooperation between countries on the eastern and western shores of the Caspian Sea through northern Iran [8].
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Iran railway. China's railway authority has put forward another ambitious plan to build a SR high-speed railway, which would connect northwest China to West Asia (WA) via CA. The route would lead from China's Urumqi and Yining to Almaty (Kazakhstan), followed by Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan), Tashkent and Samarkand (Uzbekistan) and Ashgabat (Turkmenistan) before finally joining the train network in WA through Tehran [40].9
Iran, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and China railroad project. Agreement to conduct feasibility studies on a railroad project that
would connect Iran to Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyr-gyzstan and China was signed by all involved sides in October 2010. The railroad will reduce the distance for commercial transport between the East (from China to Iran) and the West (toward Western Europe), further shorten the existing route that connects China to the countries of West Asia and the ME in order to take oil products from the Persian Gulf and to help connect Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan to the free waters of the Persian Gulf through the Iranian soil [47]. These countries reaffirmed the importance to construct a railway — then called the North-South Corridor — in July 2012 [78].10
China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway line.
Another railway project was the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway, which will connect Kashgar (Xinjiang) with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and the Kyrgyz branch will connect through Tajikistan with Iran and the Persian Gulf countries [76, p. 38; 11]. In 2012, the Chinese construction corporation CRBC11 agreed to conduct a feasibility study for a railway line project running from Kashgar (Xinjiang) through Torugart and Kara-Suu (Kyrgyzstan) to Andijan (Uzbekistan), then through Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey to Europe [72].12
Southern corridor between Kazakhstan, Iran, Azerbaijan and Georgia. China actively lobbied for the construction of a southern corridor in the EU, with the participation of Kazakhstan, Iran, Azerbaijan, Georgia, which was to be joined by the German railway operator Deutsche Bahn. The logistics itself was as follows: from Constanta (Romania) the freight train was to be delivered by sea to the Georgian port, and from there by rail to the Astara station (Azerbaijan), and then by trucks they were to be delivered to the Iranian Gazvin station, and from there by rail to Tehran [19].
After the Iran's nuclear deal, and following the lifting of international sanctions, China allocated
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two credit facilities worth US $ 4.2 billion to finance high-speed rail lines and connect Iran's major cities, including Tehran, Mashhad and Isfahan [71].
Iran is attracting a US $ 2.4 billion Chinese credit line to build the Tehran-Isfahan high-speed railway. US $ 1.8 billion for the project has been provided by the Export-Import Bank of China, and the work will be carried out by the China Railway Engineering Corporation (CREC), with which Iran signed a contract to build the first high-speed line in Iran in 2015 and agreed to provide a loan in July 2017. Trains will run on a 375-km line at speeds ranging from 300-350 km/h. Work on a circuit that will connect the Iranian capital with the international airports of Imam Khomeini, Qom and Isfahan is due to be completed in 2021 [58; 41]. 13
In August 2019, Iran and China signed a contract to implement a project to electrify the 900-km main railroad linking Tehran with the northeastern city of Mashhad. There are plans to build a Tehran-Qum-Isfahan high-speed train line and expand this modernized network northwestward through Tabriz. Tabriz should become a powerful hub for a number of key oil and gas and petrochemical facilities, as well as a starting point for the Tabriz-Ankara gas trunkline (MGP). Tabriz should become the most important base on Iranian territory for the 2,300-km NSR which will run from Urumqi (Xinjiang) to Tehran through Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz-stan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, and then through Turkey to Europe [16].
The India-China Competition Over the Port of Chabahar
A significant role in the rapprochement of the countries of Central Eurasia with Iran, in particular with India and Iran, was played by the lat-ter's consistent striving to become one of the regional centers of energy trade (oil and gas) and transport and energy integration (gas pipeline, IN-STC) [25, c. 19]. Iran, together with India and Rus-
sia, is pushing forward the sea and rail corridor, which is based on the agreement concluded with Russia and India to create the INSTC. It would link Jawaharlal Nehru Port, India's largest container port east of Mumbai, through the Iranian deep-sea port of Chabahar (in southeastern Iran, on the Gulf of Oman), and its Caspian Sea port of Bandar-e-Anzali to Russia's Volga River harbour of Astrakhan and onwards by rail to Europe. The route would reduce travel distance by from 40 days through the Suez Canal to somewhere between 25 and 28 days and cost by 30%. It takes only 19 days for a container shipped from India through the Suez Canal to reach the German port city of Hamburg. If successful, the corridor could challenge the supremacy of the Suez Canal and complement it with China's BRI, and give Iran a significant advantage in the rivalry with Saudi Arabia and the UAE played in CA, which are also key players in Russian and Chinese ploys for dominance in the ME. INSTC also would strengthen Iran's position as a key node in the B&R on the back of a rail link between western China and Tehran that runs across Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan [62]. The competing plans for these ports on the Gulf of Oman highlight both the competition between China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and INSTC, and the broader geopolitical competition in South Asia between India and China [77, p. 17]. However, Russian expert V. Yurtaev believed that the materialized factor of "triple accord" of India, Iran and Russia, due to objective circumstances, was able to restrain China's geo-economic and geopolitical expansion in Central Eurasia [25, c. 19].
India, in contrast to China's construction of the neighboring Pakistani port of Gwadar, is actively involved in the development of Chabahar, also pursuing the goal of having land access to Afghanistan and playing a more important role in trade and security of Afghanistan and CA [79]. Indian consulting company IRCON has pledged
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to provide all services and funding for the Chaba-har port project, which is estimated at approximately US $ 1.6 billion [27],14 and approved a US $ 150 million development plan to begin building up the investment zone stipulated by the initial agreement in May, 2016. However, Pakistan has established a transit blockade for Indian goods going to Iran and beyond. Afghanistan responded by banning Pakistani freight transit through its territory, which was a bad sign of growing hopes for regional rail links between Tajikistan and Pakistan via Afghanistan [69].
The Chabahar port development project includes five phases. Only one phase has been developed with the participation of India. Iran invited other countries like Australia and Japan to invest in the port, while India was working there [52]. Japan is also considered a potential investor in Chabahar to strengthen ties with the 80 million Iranian market, and to turn the territory of Iran and the port of Chabahar into an important channel for more cost-effective access to CA and Afghanistan [31]. After completion of missing links construction in the path on the borders with Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran will turn into the main corridor for the delivery of goods to these countries [21].
At stake is also container trade along the China-Pakistan-Iran-Turkey line, the hub of which is the port of Bandar Abbas in Iranian Baluchistan [20]. The construction carried out by a subsidiary of the CNPC (pending the lifting/or easing of U.S. and United Nations sanctions against Iran as a result of an international agreement limiting the Islamic Republic's nuclear program) was to include an already partially constructed link between Iran and Pakistan. But the 2018 U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal and the resumption of sanctions froze the pipeline project. However, in 2019, Pakistan and Iran, in order to revive the project, agreed that Iran, having completed its section of communication between the two countries, would withdraw
from the arbitration procedures, which forced Pakistan to pay a fine for not fulfilling its part of the deal. According to the agreement, Pakistan must complete the construction of the pipeline section by 2024 [61].
Worth noting that the Iranians have long viewed Pakistan — a historically strong and close ally of Saudi Arabia — with suspicion, and Islamabad is concerned about the development of the Chabahar port as a possible alternative to its own China-funded project, Gwadar [34]. CPEC is a major development project aimed at building energy, industrial and communications infrastructure throughout Pakistan, with the port of Gwadar as a pillar. Since China intends to showcase CPEC as the earliest and most successful of the six BRI corridors, CPEC has been called the "flagship project", "pilot project", and "icon" of the BRI [28]. Pakistan hoped the projects, if completed, would generate enough revenue to pay off China's US $ 60 billion debt. To this end, Islamabad is laying a land corridor — a series of railways and highways — to Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other countries that can benefit from faster trade routes to and from China. This land route from Gwadar, a city on the coast of the Arabian Sea, to China's western Xinjiang Province would be much faster than shipping goods by sea [46].
Iran's participation in the CPEC provides more opportunities for establishing and forging bilateral relations with Pakistan, where cross-border skirmishes on the Sistan-Baluchestan and Balochistan border, as well as unit-pricing issues over the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline have been the subject of disputes between the two states [50]. China will finance a long-stalled pipeline that will connect Iran and Pakistan, supplying natural gas from first to last and covering the 485-mile stretch of the so-called "peace pipeline" that runs from the coastal city of Asalue on the Persian Gulf to the southern border of Balochistan between Pakistan
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and Iran [35].15 Connecting the pipeline to the BRI will allow China to receive Iranian gas not only by sea on its eastern coast, but also in its landlocked, troubled northwestern province of Xinjiang. The joining of the Iran-Pakistan pipeline to the CPEC will increase Iran's importance to the success of China's Eurasian infrastructure game, and the development of the Chabahar port and the Iran-Oman -India undersea pipeline as a potentially alternative energy corridor from Asia to Europe will provide Iran with a key role in the transatlantic community's efforts to strengthening relations with India as opposed to China's rise [63].
To balance India's role in Chabahar and to develop trade and commerce in the region, in May 2019, Iran proposed to connect Chabahar with the Pakistani port of Gwadar with its railway system, from Iran to the Northern Corridor, through Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, as well as through Azerbaijan, Russia and through Turkey [57]. Iran's proposals were met in Pakistan, as the two countries were already discussing a new ferry service that would link ports in Gwadar and Karachi with Iranian ports of Chabahar and Bandar Abbas [53].
While China attaches equal importance to its relations with states such as Saudi Arabia, an arrangement on the CPEC that would allow Iran to benefit economically and could simultaneously challenge the regional and ideological hegemony of Saudi Arabia, serves Tehran's interest [50]. It is notable here that Pakistan has refrained from fully engaging with the Saudi Arabian Islamic Counter-Terrorism Alliance, which is believed to be partly directed against Iran, while the Pakistani parliament has rejected Saudi Arabia's request for military support in the Yemen war. Anyway, Saudi Arabia and Iran had little chance of a successful mediation, and the kingdom hopes that tougher U.S. policy toward Iran will broaden the window of opportunity in the battle against Iran [63].
IRAN AS A KEY NODE IN CHINESE MSR FOR ESTABLISHING NAVAL BASES
As mentioned above, the new agreement includes China's plans to develop several ports in Iran, such as Bandar-e-Jask (strategically located east of the Strait of Hormuz), which will become the country's main transshipment point and give Beijing control of one of seven major sea bottlenecks in the world. The presence of a foothold in Bandar e Jask would allow China not only to control the Fifth U.S. Navy based in Bahrain, but together with a presence in the ports of Djibouti and Gwadar (Pakistan) could increase China's positions in the Indian Ocean region (IOR) [27]. It is about building a model of multi-purpose infrastructure of "strategic strongholds", including Sri Lanka (Hambantota port), Pakistan (Gwadar port), Bangladesh (Chittagong port), Myanmar (Kyaukpyu port) and Cambodia (Kahkong port, as well as military Ream Naval Base), which are "more designed as hybrid commercial and military logistics points than a collection of traditional military bases" [23]. Analysts said a comprehensive strategic pact with Iran could allow China, which already has a base in Djibouti, to establish a military presence on the Iranian-Pakistani coast. The PLA could even help set up a network to monitor U.S. and Indian naval activities in the region. With the help of Chinese support and an oil terminal beyond Hormuz, Iran can also strengthen its position within the Persian Gulf [29].
Thus, the interconnected network of industrial parks and ports created by Chinese companies in some Gulf countries could further challenge the U.S.' dominance in the region surrounding the strategically important Strait of Hormuz [2]. For China, the deal not only opens up the opportunity to control Chahbahar and monopolize trade routes to CA, but also for the development of naval facilities in the Gulf of Oman. And as the U.S. is about to leave Afghanistan, a partnership with Iran will give China a near stranglehold over a strategic corridor
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stretching from CA to the Arabian Sea [79]. Iran's attempts to shift its geostrategic focus from the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, relying on the development of the two strategic ports of Jask and Chahbehar, will allow it to avoid tensions in the Persian Gulf region, shorten the routes of tankers carrying Iranian oil, and also allow Tehran to close the Strait of Hormuz if necessary [2].
But U.S. sanctions are pushing India out of Chahbahar and upsetting Iran, which is already pushing India out of a rail project to bypass Pakistan, another competitor in trade with CA [79]. And indeed, days after the details of the proposed Sino-Iranian deal of 2020 were made public, information was leaked to the Indian press about Iran's decision to exclude India from an extensive rail project that would connect the Iranian port city of Chabahar to Zahedan, a city near the border with Afghanistan [27].16 There is an opinion among Indian experts that, perhaps India has lost Iran forever, because contrary to expectations, to complete the development project of the Chabahar port as soon as possible, India did not do it because of the pressure from the United States. Indian firms that had dealings with American firms were slow to proceed with the project, while Iran urgently needed to develop its economic infrastructure given its growing population [52]. According to statements by Iranian officials, the main reason Iran excluded India from the Chabahar Zahedan project was India's delay in fulfilling its funding commitments for the project, as well as the fact that India chose to be part of Donald Trump's campaign of maximum pressure on Tehran after the U.S. withdrawal in 2018 from Iran's nuclear deal and re-imposition of unprecedented sanctions, and also stopped oil purchases from Iran in April 2019. However, in November 2018, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo officially announced that the Chabahar port project would be exempted from U.S. sanctions [73].
Many considered removing India from the railway project (which ultimately extended to Zaranj on the Afghan side of the border) as a serious setback to its plans to create an alternative trade route to Afghanistan and CA bypassing Port Gwadar in Pakistan. So, the inclusion of Iran in the BRI structure could lead to India losing the leverage that its close ties with the U.S. provide against China, also lead to the fact that India will cede its position to China in Afghanistan [27]. Beijing could use its influence in Iran and Pakistan to encircle Afghanistan, creating problems for American interests [30].
There is speculation that Iran's search for other regional alliances and a new partnership agreement between Iran and China may have been facilitated by New Delhi's refusal to buy Iranian oil in 2019 to please Washington and further strengthen its military-strategic ties with its adversary, Israel, also news of New Delhi's interest in participating in the Israeli-led Trans-Arab Corridor (TAP), aimed at connecting India with Eurasia through Israel and several Arab states hostile to Iran [27].
In any case, China's participation in Iran and the full integration of Tehran into the BRI structure could weaken Pakistan's main rival, India, and open up a strategic space for Islamabad to effectively counter political and security threats. Better relations between Tehran and Islamabad with Beijing's support could help pacify the armed uprising of ethnic separatists in Baluchistan by the two countries. China's presence in Iran would mean that the Iranian port city of Chabahar will not compete with Pakistani Gwadar, and India's expulsion from Iran would mean that transit trade from Afghanistan and Central Asia will continue through Pakistani ports [27].
IMPLICATIONS OF THE SINO-IRANIAN PACT FOR THE U.S., CHINA AND IRAN
Implications for Washington. The Sino-Iranian pact implies that for the U.S., the ME and
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China, as two theaters of military operations, are in no way separated, and by increasing pressure on China and Iran, the U.S. encourages these two countries not only to create a common front, but also to create a new axis [79]. The deal may cast doubt on Trump's plans to isolate Iran, since the tandem of two powerful states, considering this agreement not only as a strategic cooperation, but also as a joint confrontation with the U.S., will oppose American-Israeli policy [17]. A new strategic partnership between Iran and China could jeopardize the possibility of a Republican victory in the U.S. presidential election in 2020, as the Trump administration's strategy of maximum pressure not only failed to contain Iran and change its behavior in the region, but also pushed Tehran into the arms of Beijing [2].
The military aspect of the treaty is of serious concern to the U.S., as is the unprecedented naval exercise last year in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Oman by the navies of Iran, Russia and China [2]. Great concern in the U.S. is the projection of Chinese military power into the Gulf region, since the treaty includes agreements on the exchange of intelligence and security data, and issues of joint military activities. Throughout the World Ocean, in particular from the South China Sea to the Suez Canal, the PRC is consistently placing its strongholds in the port of Hambantota (Sri Lanka), in the port of Gwadar (Pakistan), having built a chain of ports and refueling and supply points for the fast-growing Chinese fleet. And although these points are declared as civilian objects, their military purpose is undoubtedly, and there is already a Chinese military base to fight sea pirates on the shores of the Gulf of Aden in Djibouti (built in 2015 under the pretext of supporting its forces involved in anti -piracy operations off the coast of Somalia) — just a few miles from the American military base Camp Lemonnier. Now this chain will continue with Chinese ports in FTZ on the Persian Gulf coast [17].
A military base in Djibouti creates a rear for Yemen in the southwest, allowing it to encircle Saudi Arabia in the south, supporting the "Yemeni rebels" [24].
Implications for Beijing. Beijing did not confirm that the deal was concluded in July 2020, but announced its support for traditional friendship and readiness to work with Iran to steadily advance practical cooperation [6]. Beijing's caution may indicate that the PRC does not want to escalate tensions with the U.S., grossly violating the tough U.S. rules of sanctions against the Islamic Republic, nor does it want to upset the balance in relations with Tehran's regional rival, Saudi Arabia [61].
A strategic partnership with Iran is not entirely safe for China, as continued trade with Iran, investment in the country's infrastructure, and deepening ties could cause discontent in the United States. It could expose Beijing to sanctions and the risk of losing some access to the U.S. market (which is much larger than the Iranian market), as well as disrupting their regional partnerships with Israel or Saudi Arabia, each of which is currently engaged in proxy wars and covert operations. against Iran [79]. Regarding to Sini-Iranian oil contract, although Iranian oil supplies to China hit a 20-year low in March 2020, reflecting a drop-in demand amid the coronavirus pandemic, China's oil imports from Russia and Saudi Arabia have not declined. In addition, a trade agreement signed between the U.S. and China earlier this year could provide for the export of US $ 50 billion in oil, liquefied natural gas (LNG), and coal from the U.S. to China, strengthening the Washington's role in China's energy security and competition, since Beijing is unlikely to sacrifice its U.S. trade market to trade with Iran [45]. Under the pressure of U.S. sanctions and the demand sagging due to the coronavirus, imports of Iranian oil to China decreased from 630 thousand barrels in 2017 to 100-200 thousand barrels in 2020. But even for China, US $ 280 billion is a fairly large amount. Moreover, Iran remains a risky
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investment, as it is under sanctions, because of which China can buy oil and gas facilities cheaply, since there are no more willing ones [7].
By the way, some Chinese companies have already paid a huge price for violating U.S. sanctions on Iran and cut their ties with Iran prior to the pandemic to avoid violating U.S. sanctions, which the Trump administration has been tightening against Tehran since May 2018. Avoiding secondary U.S. sanctions on Iran-related businesses has allowed these companies to retain their access to the much more lucrative U.S. market [66]. Thus, the state company CNPC, which planned to participate in the development of the 11th stage of the South Pars field, withdrew from the deal, and the China National Machinery Import and Export Company did not complete the electrification of the Tehran-Mashdad high-speed railway under a US $ 2.4 billion contract [7]. CNPC withdrew from a US $ 5 billion natural gas project in Iran last year due to difficulties in finding banking channels to transfer funds to Iran. The U.S. also sanctioned the Chinese company Zhuhai Zhenrong last year for transporting Iranian oil. Since the coronavirus pandemic began, anti-Chinese sentiment in Iran has risen [6]. In 2017, ZTE, the giant Chinese telecommunications company, was fined US $ 1.19 billion for violating U.S. sanctions on Iran and North Korea. In 2018, Huawei's CFO Meng Wanzhou was detained in Canada for violating sanctions against Iran [74].
Implications for Tehran. The strategic rapprochement between Tehran and Beijing causes discontent among many in Iran, both among representatives of the reformist camp and among radical conservatives. Critics of the agreement include former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, as well as the son of the last Iranian monarch, Reza Pahlavi, who lives abroad. The reason for such hypotheses was the peculiar debt policy of the PRC, which, as is commonly believed in the research en-
vironment, inevitably entails Beijing's encroachment on the military and economic sovereignty of its debtors [18]. M. Ahmadinejad even stated that it is unacceptable to conclude a secret agreement with foreign parties without taking into account the will of the Iranian people and contrary to the interests of the country and the nation. Prince Reza Pahlavi, criticizing the authorities in Tehran, said that agreements with China could lead not only to the loss of control over natural resources, but also to the emergence of a Chinese army in Iran. Some analysts are convinced that the top Iranian elite, dominated by the IRGC and religious foundations closely related to it, are interested in a strategic financial, economic and military alliance with China. Indeed, oil and gas, infrastructure, the military component - that is, those areas that are declared as objects of investment and cooperation, are almost completely controlled by the IRGC [16].
However, on July 13, the head of the presidential administration, Mahmoud Vaezi, commented on the "deal of the century" on the air of the state TV channel, saying that no one can secretly accept anything, the document will definitely go through parliament, it enjoys the support of Ayatollah Khamenei, and there will hardly be parliamentary approval before the end of the year due to outbreak of coronavirus [24].
With this deal, the Iranian government could buy time to maintain the status quo until the U.S. presidential elections in November 2020, the outcome of which will determine the trajectory of U.S.Iranian relations and the fate of Iran's 2015 nuclear deal, known as the JCPOA and will also affect the presidential elections in Iran in June 2021 [79]. Perhaps Tehran is waiting for the outcome of the presidential elections in the U.S. and some other important foreign policy events, so it has prepared a grandiose Chinese plan "B" in case of the failure of plan "A". Plan "A" is to stake on negotiations
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with the U.S., and the Chinese roadmap for a period of 25 years is an argument for Washington to change its mind and return to the negotiating table on new conditions. If the Democrats win the U.S. elections, the chances of such an outcome are pretty high. If Trump wins, the situation is more complicated, but the "oppositionist" who opposes Rou-hani and the Chinese deal of the century, the IRGC hawk Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who plans to re-run (and win) the presidential elections in May 2021, has already been prepared for negotiations with him. It is possible that the criticism of the "secret plan to sell the Motherland" is a cunning idea of Iranian conservatives, who relied on the most vocal opponent of the deal with the PRC, Ahmadinejad, in the elections with the instruction to try to negotiate with the Americans when the rates have already been raised to historic highs. And the entire liberal camp is not a pity to set up personally as "lobbyists" of China, since their eight-year period on the Olympus of Iranian politics is already coming to an end. If it doesn't work out with the Americans, you can always say: I was not against China, I was against the secret deal led by Rouhani [24].
The announcement of the deal with China allows the Rouhani government to demonstrate that it is not putting all its eggs in the western basket, that Iran is not isolated and may even see economic improvements despite U.S. sanctions. Now that tensions between China and the U.S. are rising, Iran is hoping China will support its economy and balance the U.S. Closer ties with China will give Iran more leverage in future negotiations with the U.S. and Europe when it comes to revising or restoring the JCPOA, as well as in its dealings with regional rivals such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates [79].
For Iran, developing closer ties with China is also a way of irritating Europe. Tehran has repeatedly expressed its impatience with European countries over the lack of economic dividends promised
under an international nuclear deal that limited Iran's nuclear enrichment program in exchange for easing sanctions. Perhaps the Iranians would not have persecuted this policy so strongly if European business had supported the country [6].
Iran has so far managed to wriggle out, since it is now not alone on the battlefield with the U.S., but behind a powerful Chinese back, and this means that Tehran is trading with both Beijing and Washington [24].
CONCLUSION
In the face of ever-deeper confrontation with Washington, China's policy of non-interference in conflicts and disputes in the Middle East, avoiding a policy of controversy and remaining an equal trading partner for all oil and gas exporters in the region cannot last forever. If, until recently, Beijing did not seek competition with the United States, and it did not have to deploy its armed forces in the region to protect its assets, now it is difficult to predict how much Beijing is ready to escalate the confrontation with Washington over Tehran, to what extent China is ready to resist U.S. sanctions, which are likely to be introduced by the United States after the entry into force of the IranChina Treaty agreement. In addition, it is unclear how the difficult internal political situation in Iran will develop today, shortly before the presidential elections in May 2021. And it is impossible to predict how the results of the U.S. presidential election will affect this whole complex of problems.
It can be assumed that the Sino-Iranian deal could call into question the superiority of the U.S. in the Persian Gulf and strengthen China's international positions, since, by pursuing a hostile policy towards Iran, the U.S. itself can limit its strategic choices and become an object of manipulation by its regional partners - Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Meanwhile, a return to the "nuclear deal" and the lifting
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of sanctions will allow European and American companies to revive moderate forces in Iran and, in the long run, lead to better political relations.
On the other hand, the Iran-China deal is intended to show that both countries have alternatives to the West, even if many of the mentioned projects never come to fruition. While Sino-Iranian relations are still far from forming a new axis, recent talks show that by increasing pressure on China and Iran, the U.S. encouraged the two countries to form a common front.
NOTES
In July 1979, the Central Committee of the CPC and the Chairman of the State Council, Hua Go-fen, expressed their support for the Islamic Revolution led by Iran and Ayatollah Khomeini through the Pakistani Embassy in Tehran. They sent a verbal apology for a visit to Iran in August 1978.
These are agricultural and industrial product groups. Preferential import coverage is 49% of Iran's total supplies to the EAEU. The list of goods for which exporters of the EAEU countries will receive preferences includes meat and fat and oil products, certain types of confectionery and chocolate, as well as metals, cosmetics, and certain types of electronic and mechanical equipment. The Iranian side will be provided with tariff preferences on a detailed list of foodstuffs, primarily vegetables, fruits, dried fruits, as well as building materials, dishes, carpets, and some non-ferrous metal products.
On average, tariffs for Iranian products were reduced by 64%. For example, for fruits - by 50100%, vegetables - by 25-50%, and for nuts they were completely zero. In turn, Tehran pledged to reduce duties on 864 goods. Now the EAEU countries will be able to increase supplies to Iran of medicines, chemical products and the steel industry, paper, meat and fat and oil products, equipment, cars, etc. According to experts, the total export vol-
umes of the Union countries may increase by 73%.
In September 2015, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping in Moscow signed a Joint Statement on the Interconnection of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the SREB. A month later, a meeting of the Russian-Chinese working group took place, where the main areas of cooperation were determined, including large infrastructure projects and mutual investments.
In 2015, Iran signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with China to use BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS) technology to establish BeiDou ground stations in Iran.
They will deploy squadrons of bombers - Chinese-modified versions of Russian Tu-22M3 longrange bombers with a range of 6,800 km (2,410 km when fully loaded). Squadrons of supersonic fighters - medium-range bombers Su-34 and Sukhoi-57 will be deployed.
Chabahar plays a key role in the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a 7,200 km (4,473 mi) freight route linking Mum-bai to Moscow. INSTC envisions a network that will connect the ports and railway centers of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea, and then via the Russian Federation to St. Petersburg and northern Europe. For years, India has enthusiastically pushed for a project that aims to increase connectivity in Eurasia, in part because it believed it could help keep Iran outside the Chinese BRI and dampen any attempts at cooperation between Tehran and its main regional rival, Islamabad.
The North-South transit corridor, compared with the Suez Canal, reduces the time required to transport goods from Mumbai to Moscow by 20 days. The estimated capacity of this route for the exchange of goods is from 20 to 30 million tons per year.
For years, the 1.52-meter track standard adopted in CA has been a headache for logistics
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managers because it is not based on the 1.435-meter standard track adopted in China and most other parts of the world. Changing gauges at the border takes days for cargo and significantly cuts railway transport's competitiveness against shipping by sea.
The length of the railway linking China's Kashgar city with Afghanistan's Herat city would be 1,972 km. The length of the Tajik section of this railway, running from the Nizhny Panj to the border with Kyrgyzstan was planned to be 296 km. Iran expressed its readiness to finance the Kyrgyz section of the railway.
China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) is a subsidiary of China Communications Construction Company (CCCC).
The Kyrgyzstan section of the line would cover 268.4 km; China's section would span 165 km. The cargo transit capacity of the line was expected to be approximately 15,000 tons.
CREC is a Chinese construction company listed in Shanghai and Hong Kong stock exchanges. The major shareholder of the company is the state-owned China Railway Engineering Corporation. By revenue, CREC was the largest construction company in the world in the 2015 Engineering News-Record "Top 225 Global Contractors".
Chabahar plays a key role in the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a 7,200 km (4,473 mi) freight route linking Mum-bai to Moscow. For years, India has enthusiastically pushed for a project that aims to increase connectivity in Eurasia, in part because it believed it could help keep Iran outside the Chinese BRI and dampen any attempts at cooperation between Tehran and its main regional rival, Islamabad.
On the other side of the border, the pipeline will come into contact with the Pakistani port city of Gwadar. The pipeline will cost between US $ 1.5
billion and US $ 1.8 billion, or US $ 2 billion. Under the terms of the deal, 85% of the financing will be provided by a loan from China. The remaining 50 miles (80 km) from Gwadar to the Iranian border will be built by Pakistan.
After 9/11, India's political and economic influence in Afghanistan grew under the guise of U.S. security. However, after the February agreement between the U.S. and the Taliban in Doha, India's influence in the country is declining. India was not involved in the US-Taliban deal and does not play a significant role in the intra-Afghan peace process. After the withdrawal of the U.S., India's influence on the country will further diminish.
Литература
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Информация об авторе
Ph.D. (история) Арутюнян Агавни Александровна ведущии науч. сотрудник Отдела Международных отношении
Института Востоковедения Национальнои Академии Наук Армении
aghavni.harutyunyan1@gmail.com
Information about the Author
Aghavni A. Harutyunyan Ph.D. in History,
Leading Researcher at the Department of International Relations,
the Institute of Oriental Studies,
National Academy of Sciences of Armenia.
aghavni.harutyunyan1@gmail.com
Статья одобрена рецензентами: 30.04.2021 Статья принята к публикации: 11.05.2021
Reviewed: 30.04.2021 Accepted: 11.05.2021
