CC BY
14
alliance. The main problem is connected, naturally, with the different mentality of representatives of both countries. Naturally, Iran will always cooperate with Russia, because the Russian Federation is in the Iranian vector of its geopolitical direction. However, it should be remembered that the Iranians will never sacrifice their interests and will always protect their rights. It is necessary to bear in mind that Iran is very cautious in choosing its partners and any expression, even the slightest, of disrespect toward its sovereignty or imposition of alien rules will lead to breaking up relations. S. Klepikov writes that in 2017 Russian-Iranian partnership reached a new level, however, relations between the two countries cannot be called allied ones. There is no doubt that 2017 will be the year of adoption of cardinal decisions in the sphere of international relations. That year the election of Iran's President should take place, and its result is bound to influence the further development of ties between the two countries.
Author of the abstract - Elena Dmitrieva
2018.04.007. VLADIMIR AHMEDOV. RELIGIOUS FACTOR OF ARMED UPRISING IN SYRIA: SOCIAL, IDEOLOGICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS // "Trudy Instituta vostokovedeniya RAN. Vyp. 4. Ehkonomicheskie, socialno-politicheskie, ehtnokonfessionalnye problemy afro-aziatskih stran," Moscow, 2017, P. 197-209.
Keywords: Syria, "Arab spring,"
Islamists, jihadism, Salaphites, Bashar Asad.
Vladimir Ahmedov,
PhD (History) Senior Researcher, Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS
The specific feature of the Syrian conflict and the difficulty of its solution, in the researcher's view, lie not only in its unprecedented duration, as compared to uprisings and conflicts in
other Arab countries, but was also largely determined by the role of the national armed forces and the geostrategic position of Syria. The Syrian crisis has brought to the political limelight new social forces, having revealed acute social, ethnic, and local conflicts. Previously, the unified Syrian society in the conditions of the exacerbation of the crisis began to split rapidly, radicalizing Islamists tendencies in the country and the entire Middle Eastern region as a whole. As a result, the Arab national movement, which has revived on the crest of the wave of the "Arab Spring" became dominated by the religious motives of a radical nature. Its secular component was practically brought to naught. During the period between 1940 and 1960, the secular forces played the leading role in the Arab peoples' struggle for national independence, and their ideology served as the foundation for forming political systems and state institutions of modern countries in the Arab East. It is necessary to take into account that Islam is much slower than other religions in abandoning the idea of a religious war. Despite the outwardly secular character of state power in many Arab countries of the Middle East, it retains strong elements of Islamic fundamentalism. In these conditions a danger emerged of undermining the existing military-political balance in the region. This was connected with the exacerbation of the struggle for a change of power and escalation of tension in the region in connection with the continuing Palestine-Israeli conflict, attempts of the Islamists to penetrate the army, and also the interference of outside forces in the regional processes.
There is a new situation in the Syrian society today. The mentality of many social groups of the population, which stand in the vanguard of the armed struggle, is now dominated by the assessments of the ruling regime as one of "occupation," which has entered into a criminal deal with Iran, a number of influential world powers, and Israel with a view to subjugating the Arab people and subordinating them to foreign domination. Such views serve as a motive for the struggle to overthrow the present ruling regime. These sentiments have been used by all and sundry
internal and external forces, which under the guise of religion were striving to realize their real aims in Syria and the Middle East as a whole. In this situation the opposing forces have become hostages of the Islamist ideas and sentiments themselves and were forced to act in line with this ideology. As a result, the political aims of the struggle in Syria were submitted to this ideology, which has gradually spread further and gripped the regional and international forces involved in the Syrian conflict. A vast and acute religious war has unfolded in the Middle East, which placed the region on the brink of a territorial split and seriously exacerbated the internal situation in other regions of the world, primary in Europe.
Although jihad is mainly directed against one's own ruling elites who submitted to foreign influence, and secondly - against the infidels, the main motive of this idea in the Arab-Muslim world is as strong now as previously. All this shows that today, too, the idea of war as the continuation of religion, especially in its extremist forms, is still popular. On the other hand, in the conditions of the "Arab spring" going on in the Middle East since the end of 2010, the Syrian authorities relying on the special services and the army represented mainly by the Alawite minority (12 percent of the entire population) will hardly be able to control effectively the actions of the Islamic factor in a multi-confessional and poly-ethnic country,, without resorting to open violence against its population.
The main driving force of the Arab national movement has been people believing in Islam of Sunna trend. And Syria, where the three quarters of the population are Sunnites, is no exception. Initially, Islam of Sunna trend contained many elements which can conditionally be called secular and democratic. In this lies the main difference between Sunna and Shia Islam. The latter is based on a sort of the vertical of power in the person of the imamate. In the conditions of a revolutionary upsurge a road has opened for the transformation and renovation of Islam both as an ideology and a social order. In this case transformations could take different
forms, depending on the domestic political situation and foreign influence. New post-modern Islam is a product of local big cities, the "culture of new urban dwellers" who demanded the overthrow of power which came to rule the roost from far-off mountain settlements more than half a century ago, seized towns, created their own culture there and established their own order. The "new city dwellers" wished to establish a type of power different from the previous regime. The Syrian revolutionaries actively used the Internet. They displayed the bodies of their killed fellow-countrymen and portraits of deserters, which is categorically banned in Islam. Perhaps, the author of this article writes, this new habit could become widespread, if the Syrian regime refused to apply forcible methods against the protesters and did not invite Iran, the Lebanese "Hizballah, and the Shia militia units, which number more than sixty combat detachments.
Despite the fact that today Syria is dominated by "jihadist" ideas expressed in the actions of the "Islamic state" and other extremist and terrorist organizations, it would be wrong to believe that the post-modern Islam born of the revolution has disappeared completely and has no chances to revive. The researcher emphasizes that it has to be studied along with militant Islam, inasmuch as it can, under certain political conditions, make a positive influence not only on Syria, but on other parts of the Arab East and also on Europe, where many Muslim residents have become radicalized. If it is to be assumed that post-modern Islam is a product of the new urban culture, it should have inevitably imbibed the spirit of liberalism characteristic of many Arab cities and democratic sentiments. In the Syrian conditions post-modern Islam can become a major element in the formation of a new ideology of social order.
Periphery has played a definite role, as compared with that of towns at the initial stages of the Syrian revolution, by exerting a specific influence on the religious aspects of the revolt, which had a Bedu rural character and which explained the spreading of Islam of the Salaphite trend. Salaphite ideas have become widespread
primarily in the conditions of provincial urban centers. The contribution of the so-called civilized Islam inherent in the urban sections of the bourgeoisie, traders, intellectuals, and military elite had a modest character among the civil and military participants in the revolutionary movement. This became evident on the example of an insignificant presence of the Sufi elements in the units of armed and civil opposition. As a result, the Islamist phenomenon of the revolution had a strong provincial component and was of a potentially temporary character. In the researcher's view, it would be too early to consider the situation stable ideologically. The financial factors continue to exert influence on the formation of ideological orientation and political agenda of these groupings. The researcher emphasizes the need to follow the change of the religious-ideological preferences of the bellicose Islamists. The "Islamist phenomenon" of the Syrian uprising has changed during the past several years, especially due to specific conditions of the Syrian revolution. It cannot be excluded that in the event of a stop of the military hostilities in Syria and a gradual return of the country's life to a peaceful course the "Islamist phenomenon" may gradually disappear, inasmuch as its vital foundation is the bitter armed struggle in the country.
The reasons that caused the revival of jihadist Salaphism in Syria began to mature gradually in the 1990s, and along with the exacerbation of the armed struggle only contributed to its emergence and development on the surface. The policy of privatization adopted by the ruling regime in the mid-2000s led society to acute social polarization, impoverishment and marginalization of the considerable masses of the population in the rural areas. Simultaneously, the regime's policy of supporting the Islamic resistance in Palestine and Lebanon increased conservative religious sentiments in depressive districts of Syrian provinces. This resulted in the population of these districts becoming very sensitive to the most radical ideas. As a result, the role of moderate Islam in Syrian society has diminished, which tended to increase the extremist aspects in government policy and ideology, and in
public sentiments. The situation proved very favorable for the growth of jihadist Salaphist ideas, and the subsequent actions of the authorities after the beginning of the Syrian uprising have only bolstered up its positions. Such sentiments in society have contributed to spreading jihadist ideas of local origin, as well as those coming from abroad.
Units of the most evident jihadist groupings directly connected with al-Qaeda, such as "Jabhat an-Nusra," ISSL, "al-Muhajiria," can be referred to the most radical militant groups. There were other groups of bellicose Salaphites and supporters of the jihadist trend of "political Salaphism." They were closely connected with the Islamic Front of Syria (IFS) and its units. Another group was represented by traditional; Salaphite jihadists. There were various groupings of armed Islamists of Salaphite orientation, like "Faruk al-Islamiya." Another group was the Islamic Front for Liberation of Syria (IFLS) Its ideology was based on common Islamic identity combining the ideas of Salaphism, "Muslim Brothers," as well as various Islamic schools of liberal trend. Most groups supported the ideas of an Islamic state as the future political regime in Syria. In their view, this political regime should be based on the Islamic Sharia laws,
Today, V. Ahmedov asserts, it is rather difficult to forecast the prospects of the Salaphite movement in Syria. They will rather be determined by the development of the concrete situation in the country and the changes which await Syria in a not-too-distant future. In the event of the continuation of the civil war we may observe the further growth and spreading of jihadist Salaphism. In case of the change of the regime and return to peaceful life, the chances for moderate reformist and political Salaphism are growing and it will at first begin to develop in rural areas, and then in big urban centers.
Author of the abstract - Valentina Schensnovich
