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ISLAM IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES
2017.04.005. SERGEY IVANOV. ARMED CONFLICTS IN SYRIA AND IRAQ: PROSPECTS FOR THEIR SOLUTION / /
"Obozrevatel - Observer," Moscow, 2017, No 3, P. 14-24.
Keywords: Syria, Iraq, armed conflict, Kurds, Islamists, Sunnites, Alawites, ISIS.
Sergey Ivanov,
PhD (Hist.),
Leading Research Associate
of Center of International Security Institute
of World Economics and International Relations, RAS
By the beginning of 2017 Syria and Iraq remain in the throes of prolonged civil wars, which have assumed the clearly confessional character. In Syria the ruling Arab-Alawite minority (close to the Shia trend of Islam) has been at war with the Arab Sunnite armed opposition since 2011, and in Iraq the ruling Arab Shia majority provoked an uprising of the Arab Sunnite minority by harsh reprisals at the end of 2013. Tens of thousands of Sunnite Arabs closely connected with the ruling Baathist regime, Christians and representatives of other ethnic and religious minorities are on the side of Damascus.Taking advantage of the weakening of the central authorities in Syria and Iraq the radical Islamist groupings in the region have stepped up their activities. The most militant of them are ISIS, "Jabhat an-Nusra" and Muslim Brotherhood." The jihadists established their control over vast areas of these two countries and several big cities (Mosul,
Rakka) and even to create their own "pseudo-state" - Islamic caliphate. Both countries are distinguished by the fact that the Kurdish minorities living there adhere to neutrality in inter-Arab wars (10-12 percent of the Syrian population and 15-17 percent of the Iraqi population). Moreover, the Kurdish minutemen rebuffed all attacks of the militant Islamists and played an important role in the stabilization of the situation in the region.
Nevertheless, a bitter struggle for power, territories and resources in Syria and Iraq continues. Initially, foreign forces took an active part in these armed conflicts. Men and officers of the Corps of the warriors of the Islamic revolution of Iran, militants of the Lebanese military-political grouping "Hezbollah," Shia volunteers from Iraq, Yemen, Pakistan and Afghanistan are taking part in the hostilities in Syria. The numerical strength of the foreign fighters can be compared with that of the Syrian armed forces (up to 80,000 men). The armed Sunnite opposition and bands of Islamists were supported by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan and Sunnite Arabs of Lebanon.
Iran and the international coalition headed by the United States support Baghdad, and the Iraqi Sunnite Arabs and Islamists are supported by the Persian Gulf monarchies and Turkey. By the end of 2016 Russia succeeded to persuade Turkey to stop its aid to the jihadists in Syria and Iraq and join the common struggle against terrorism in the region. Although Turkey regards B. Asad and the Kurdish Syrian party of Democratic Union as terrorists, formally Turkey has joined the common front of the fight against radical Islamist groupings. But there are no grounds to exclude support of the Islamists in Syria and Iraq by the Turkish special forces and non-governmental organizations. The ruling Turkish Party of Justice and Development and Turkish Islamists groupings are ideologically close to the extremists Sunnite trends of Islam (Salaphite and Wahhabite).
The ceasefire agreement between the Syrian government and the armed opposition reached due to mediation of Russia,
Turkey and Iran, which went into force on December 30, 2016, was a turning point in the situation in Syria. Although this agreement does not cover the territories controlled by the ISIS militants and "Jabhat an-Nusra," fighting has stopped, in the main, and a greater part of Syrians, who have been hiding in shelters for several years, were able to emerge in the open and tackle certain problems of the humanitarian nature. Ankara and Tehran, along with Moscow, mediated in Syrian negotiations in January-February 2017 in Astana and Geneva. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, and representatives of the foreign and domestic Syrian opposition oriented to them remain outside the negotiation process so far, and this may lead to failure of peace negotiations and the use of ceasefire for regrouping and redeploying armed units of the opposition and more deliveries of more arms and ammunition to them. Besides, representatives of Turkey and Saudi Arabia during the ceasefire may enter into a deal with the jihadists for expanding the territories controlled by the opposition through voluntary redeployment of the ISIS and "Jabhat an-Nusra" units, or join with part of their militants the ranks of the "moderate opposition." Ankara wishes to expand the Syrian districts controlled by it and prevent their return under control of Damascus.
The numerical strength of the Syrian army by the beginning of the armed conflict reached 320,000 men and officers, and by now there are not more than 80,000. As a result, it is difficult for the Syrian armed forces to wage offensive operations and keep liberated territories under control. This is why Russia's help to Syria is so important for its fight against terrorist groupings, fighters of the Lebanese Shia grouping "Hezbollah," Iranian "Islamic revolution warriors," and volunteer Shia units from Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan and Pakistan. After ceasefire came into force, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and some other Arab states continue to help the Islamist militants openly along the line of special services, non-governmental organizations and Wahhabi foundations.
The Kurdish ethnic minority holds a special place in the Syrian conflict. Prior to the Civil war in Syria there were up to three million of them in the country, living mostly in its border districts with Turkey. By 2012 the government forces and official bodies were forced to leave the Kurdish districts; the Kurdish local authorities had to set up their own self-defense forces to rebuff the Islamists' attacks. With the help of their fellow-compatriots in Iraq, Iran and Turkey, and with support of the U.S. airforce the Syrian Kurds were able to contain the onslaught of the Islamists and then to liberate practically all districts of their compact living. They established control over districts situated up to 900 kilometers from the Syrian-Turkish border. By the beginning of 2016 they proclaimed the creation of an autonomous (federative) district in the north of Syria under the name of "Rojawa" (Western Kurdistan). The Syrian Kurds would like to be the third party in the peace negotiations on settling the conflict in Syria. However, neither the Asad government nor the opposition leaders wish to see a Kurdish delegation at the negotiation table. Nationalist ideas continue to prevail in the minds of the leaders of the Arab majority in Syria.
The radical Islamists adhere to much harsher positions: they are waging war for the destruction of all ethnic and religious minorities, including Muslim-Kurds and Ezdi Kurds The governments of Iran and Turkey also come out against any form of the autonomy of the Syrian Kurds, fearing a flare-up of the Kurdish national-liberation movement in their Kurdish enclaves.
Against the backdrop of the dramatic events in Syria Iraq remained in the background for quite some time, and came to the fore again only after the beginning of a major military operations to liberate the country's second big city - Mosul, known for its rich oil deposits and water resources (the Tigris River) from the ISIS terrorists. This city in the north of Iraq was for two years under control of the jihadists, who proclaimed their quasi-state "Islamic Caliphate" on the captured territories of Iraq and Syria. The Iraqi government and its allies in Tehran and Washington
have prepared the operation for the liberation of Mosul for quite a long time, however, its start has been postponed several times due to the absence of unity among the internal and external forces interested in driving the Islamists away from the region.
It was only by the middle of October 2016 that Baghdad succeeded, with the help of Iranian and American military instructors, to gather a unit of land forces of about 40,000 men and officers backed by the Shia military-political groupings "Hashd ash-Shaabi" and "Badr Brigade" (in all, up to 8,000 men). These units were supported by Iranian "warriors of Islamic revolution" and army special forces. Another contingent operating at the approaches to Mosul and numbering up to 20,000 men was the Kurdish "Peshmerga" brigade. Its units liberated dozens of populated settlements and took hills to the north and east of the city. In the "Peshmerga" ranks there were advisors, instructors of special services of the United States, as well as servicemen from some other western countries. The third participant in the onslaught on Mosul was a 5,000-men contingent of Sunnite Arabs and Turks trained by Turkish instructors some 12 miles from Mosul.
The external centers of force differed in their plans and intentions in Iraq. The radical Shia groupings of the country and Tehran demand from the Iraqi authorities that they should completely expel the Turkish military from the country. In its turn, Turkey insists on the removal of the units of Shia volunteers and Iranian servicemen from the military operation. The U.S. administration adheres to a wait-and-see neutral position in the Turkish-Iranian disputes, formally calling for the preservation of the balance of forces around Iraq, but in actual fact preferring interaction with its partners in NATO - the Turkish military. Washington has come to a conclusion that flirting with radical Islamists of the ISIS and "Jabhat an-Nusra" type harms the image of the United States in the world arena and the region. Offensive on Mosul was destined to start the beginning of the struggle of
Washington and its allies against the forces of world terrorism in the person of radical Islamist groupings.
For a long time the variant of a possible deal of the Turkish authorities or other mediators (Saudi Arabia, Qatar) with the ISIS leaders or even an attempt to bribe the latter in order to make the militant jihadists leave Mosul along special corridors left for them in the west to other districts of Iraq or Syria (the city of Rakka, Palmira and Deiur-ez-Zor) has been examined. This variant could suit the United States and its allies, bolster up the positions of the central government in Baghdad, and at the same time brought more pressure to bear on the Asad regime in Syria.
Despite superiority in manpower, arms and air support the land forces attacking Mosul found it difficult to move forward. The battle for the city assumed a prolonged character and required more time to clear it from the ISIS forces. Eventually, much will depend on subsequent statements and actions of Baghdad and its ability to adopt decisions independently without diktat of Tehran or Washington.
The Shia civil war with Sunnites in Iraq can end only in case of a radical change of the internal and foreign policy of the Iraqi authorities. The creation of coalition bodies of the legislative and executive power of Iraq with the active drawing of Sunni Arabs, the latter's army service, work at government offices, special services, and the restoration of their positions in business could serve as a basis for stopping the prolonged interethnic and inter-Arab struggle in the country. Another condition of the normalization of the situation in Iraq is Baghdad's ability to establish relations with foreign allies of the Sunni Arabs: Ankara, Riyadh, Doha, Amman, etc.
If Baghdad cannot distance itself from Tehran and become equally distant from the radical centers of force, the civil war in the country may continue even after the liberation of the territories occupied by the jihadists. Moreover, the disintegration of the Arab part of Iraq into two enclaves is possible: Shiastan (the South and center) and Sunnistan (North-west). Iraq may turn
into a springboard of an armed confrontation between Iran and the Persian Gulf monarchies.
Author of the abstract - Natalia Ginesina
2017.04.006. URAL SHARIPOV. YEMEN: FRONTAL COLLISION OF SUNNITE AND SHIA POPULATION AND INTERFERENCE OF OUTSIDE FORCES // The 2"d decade of the 21st century - fresh blood in the Middle East (puppeteers, actors and victims). Moscow, 2017, P. 179-190.
Keywords: Yemen, Sunnites, Shia'ites, intra-religious conflict.
U. Sharipov,
D.Sc. (Politics),
Chief Research Associate,
Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS
Yemen is a country where numerous Shia and Sunna tribes have lived close by for centuries. Despite ideological and religious differences, their mutual contradictions were not acute. Throughout the 20th century the country, which was a feudal monarchy for a long time was drawn into a whirlwind of political changes. In 1962, as a result of a revolution the Zeida (trend of Shia Islam) monarchy was overthrown and the country became the Yemeni Arab Republic under the Sunnite rule. The Shia minority was pushed into the background. But after the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 the successes of the Shi'ites in the political arena of the Middle East in restoring their socio-political rights pushed the Yemeni Shi'ites to greater activity in promoting their rights.
As far as the state structure of Yemen was concerned, there were changes in the last decades of the 20th century: in 1967 South Yemen, which was a British protectorate, received independence and proclaimed the People's Democratic Republic
