CC BY
14
3. Komanduy uschiy ISAF grozitostavitvoennyh SShAvAfganlgshistane. 2014. Access: http: //www.rosbalt.ru/main/2014/03/13/1243516.html (tested 02.15.2015). R. Sayfullin. 2013 Expert: Chego ozhidat ot novoy politicheskoy strategii SShA v Afganistane? [Expert: What to expect from the new political strategy of the US in Afghanistan?] Access: http ://www. 12news.uz/news/2013/03/ekspert-chegoozhidat-ot-novoj-politich/ (verified 02.09.2015.)
4. Yu. Severov. 2014. The United States failed to win the drug mafia in Afghanistan. - All-Russian information resource. Access: http://inosmi.ru/world/20140304/ 218169732.html (tested 02.09.2015.)
5. O. Chuvakin 2014. "Novyy shelkovyy put" - plohaya amerikanskaya doroga . ["New silk road" - a bad American way.] Access: http://topwar.ru/21736-novyy-shelkovyy-put-plohaya-amerikanskaya-doroga.html
"Vlast", Moscow, 2015, № 6, pp. 212-215.
A. Frolov,
D.Sc (Politics)
TURKEY - SYRIA: METAMORPHOSES
OF MIDDLE EAST POLICY
«The best is the enemy of the good»
September 17, 2009, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said at a solemn reception in honor of the Syrian delegation headed by President Bashar al-Assad "that Syria is more than just a friend of Turkey, it is a brother Turkish-Syrian relations have reached their historic climax by that moment, and anyone could hardly assume that the two countries would be on the brink of war soon and Turkey would be ready to interfere in the civil war of Syria as the most likely external force.
I. Shaky Ground
Turkish-Syrian antagonism is rooted in the imperial colonial past. Turkish-Syrian relations have always been very complicated and
often been settled by non-peaceful means, because of the territorial disputes first of all. In 1921, France gave Turkey part of the territory of Cilicia after the war (which Syria is still considered its own territory), leaving behind the Sanjak of Aleksandretta. Furthermore, France transferred Turkey the Sanjak of Aleksandretta on the basis for the mandate of the League of Nations, which became the Turkish vilayet Hatay. Relatives have lost the right to see each other and celebrate religious holidays. Syria has not accepted this decision, and the matter was subsequently often the reason for many of strife.
The second problem relates to the water management. Turkey controls the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, and can use water resources as a means of pressure against Syria and Iraq2. Syrians feared that Ataturk Dam, built in 1989 by Turkey, will be used as a possible lever of pressure. 850 cubic meters of water per second flowed in Syria, before the construction of the dam. The Turks took the obligation to supply a minimum of 500 cubic meters with the beginning of its construction. It significantly reduced the flow of water, and has caused many economic and agricultural problems in Syria. In 1988 there were reports of sending a special squad of Syria to undermine the dam.
The third problem relates to Turkey's membership in NATO, and even earlier in the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). That is what makes it possible for Syrians to speak of Turkey as a "seat-belts" of America in the Middle East, considered as a potential rival and opponent.
But the most significant issue in the relations between the two countries was the Kurdish issue, and more specifically, the support of the Kurdish movement by Syria, which was especially manifested after the establishment of the Kurdistan Workers Party (the PKK) in 1974. This support was motivated by a desire to have a lever of pressure on
Ankara in resolving territorial issues. The most difficult time in relations between Syria and the PKK has become since the early 1980s, when the Kurds started to get weapons, logistical support, financial and diplomatic cover. Turkey accused Syria if not in the direct participation, but at least in encouraging the smuggling of drugs, marijuana and hashish from the Bekaa Valley across the border. Turkey built protective constructions along the border to limit smuggling. In 1998, the two countries were on the brink of armed conflict. Ankara accused Damascus of harboring the PKK militants, that used the Syrian banks to finance their activities in Turkey. Ankara deployed additional troops to the Syrian border and made the border strip mining. The parties settled the controversy in the same year, they signed an agreement in the border city of Adana. Syria closed several bases of the PKK, blocked accounts of its functionaries, and Turkey demined border strip, according to the agreement. It was decided to develop cross-border trade and simplify crossing of the border during religious holidays. Then, the sides signed a number of agreements that were entered into the legal framework of their relationship - about the fight against terrorism, protection of investments, avoidance of double taxation, customs cooperation, as well as in health care, rail, air and maritime transport, as well as in the energy sector , housing, tourism, and cargo transportation. Syria was the first Arab state, which has signed an agreement on creating a free trade zone with Turkey3. In December 2003, Syria has given Turkey the persons involved in terrorist acts in Turkish cities, which was highly appreciated by Ankara.
Syria had its own reasons to establish relations with Turkey. Its conflict with Israel remained unresolved actually. Syria was able to maintain some kind of delicate balance in Lebanon. The Americans overthrew Saddam Hussein in neighboring Iraq, and there was no
common border with Iran supporting it. The breakthrough in relations with Turkey looked good in such a hostile environment.
In early 2004 there was the first visit of the President of Syria to Turkey4. A year later, Turkish president Ahmet Sezer went to Syria for a return visit and was awarded an unusually warm reception. Syrian media especially noted that the visit was carried out against the will of Washington preventing such contacts. The two leaders noted the unity of positions of Turkey and Syria on issues related to postwar reconstruction of Iraq, the preservation of its territorial integrity, the Middle East peace process and the assessment of the situation in Lebanon. Both presidents stressed the need to implement UN Security Council resolutions by Israel, the liberation of the occupied Arab territories, preparation of a basis for the creation and proclamation of an independent Palestinian state as soon as possible. Turkish Culture and Tourism Center was opened in Damascus.
Turkish leaders were not afraid of sharp criticism from the Syrian opposition in the United States requiring help the Syrian people, not the Syrian regime. One can not deny the evolution of the Syrian regime towards democratic transformation, though slow, but evident. It is evident in the spread of the dosage of freedom of speech in the newspapers, on radio and television, the emergence of the country's exchange currency items, Internet, mobile phone and so on. The internal causes of change the vector in the policy of Turkey and the bias towards Islam is well studied, particularly in the works of V. adein-Rajewski5. It is necessary to focus on the foreign policy dimension of these processes in detail.
2. Neo-ottomanizm from test
of strength to route actions
In 2001, Ahmet Davutoglu, a professor at Bilkent University, published the book "Strategic Depth", which formed the basis of Ankara's foreign policy. In fact, the work proposed to adopt the theory of Neo-Ottomanism - the dominant role of Turkey within the former Ottoman Empire. A prolific professor was noticed, and his book became published for mass circulation. It found a response among ordinary Turks believed that their country was worthy to play a greater role in the world. In 2003 A. Davutoglu was given the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. In 2009 he became Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey and had the opportunity to realize his foreign policy concepts in practice, as the main neo- ottomanist in the country. His ideas resonated with R. Erdogan. Experts believe that the next demarches of Turkish foreign policy can be explained by the implementation of the theory. 6 In August 2014 A. Davutoglu became the prime minister of the country, strengthening his influence even more.
Since then, the book has been republished more than 70 times, but not been translated into foreign languages. Perhaps Turks were well aware that these concepts could alienate the neighbors of Turkey. Neo-Ottomanism has spread in Turkey due to the fact that pan-Turkic ideas did not have considerable resonance. In the 1990s, Turkey actually failed their "peaceful offensive" in Central Asia and the former Soviet Muslim republics. The patronage of Turkey has not been realized on these countries, since it was necessary to provide funding, but the possibility of Turkey were limited in this regard (especially in comparison with the Asian superpower like China, for example). As a result, only the Turkish cultural centers remind of the former ambitions of Ankara.
Contacts between Turkey and the Arab world were developed both in theory and in political practices, appropriate funds were allocated for this purpose. At the same time Turks carefully avoided to mention the word "Ottomanism", although the Informative part of their policy corresponded to it more and more.
Rapprochement of Turkey and Syria was not only an obstacle to Iran (an old competitor of Turkey), but also influenced the reorientation of the ruling political regime in Damascus. It was extremely difficult to implement in another way, as Syria has been strongly linked with Israel through a solution of the Golan Heights. Syria was the only Arab country at that time, where the Turks had at least some chance to succeed.
Turkey allowed sharp aggravation of relations with Israel for the sake of deepening relations with Arab countries. In May 2010 the "Freedom Flotilla" consisting of 6 vessels and 600 people went with humanitarian aid for the Palestinians, locked in the Gaza Strip in defiance of a ban by Israel. Turkey allocated a military boat to escort the humanitarian convoy. 16 people were killed in an Israeli strike on the convoy. Turkish Foreign Ministry announced this action a flagrant violation of the foundations of the international law and that it would have irreparable consequences for relations between the two countries7. Thus, Turkey has joined the Arab countries, bringing relations with Israel to the lowest post-war level.
The value of the Arab direction of Turkish politics increased with its slowdown in the European direction. In 2010, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Ali Babacan said that Turkey's relations Arab world had huge potential8. In 2011, Turkish Prime Minister R. Erdogan appealed to the Arab audience, saying that the Turks and the Arabs would determine the formation of the world in the future, if they could create an alliance on the basis of Islam. Erdogan suggested that the Arabs forget the
differences of 19th and 20th centuries, when Arab nations revolted against the rule of the Ottoman Empire, and remember the historical community, linking the Arabs and Turks. This community was based on the joint fight against the aggressors, according to Erdogan9. The Turkish prime minister said that Turkey did not have any claims to the Arabs. A. Davutoglu, who accompanied him, said that Turkey was the gravitational center of attraction for the Arab world10.
Erdogan's speech made dual impression on the hosts. Moreover, he opened the secret thoughts of Arab leaders, voicing their main enemy - Iran (citing leaks "Wikileaks"), but said that Turkey will maintain a special relationship with Iran, without explaining the nature of these relationships11. It was evident that kings and sheiks of the Gulf listened to the honored guest out of politeness, because they possessed enormous financial resources and and were already "center of gravity" of the Arab world. On the other hand, the Arab rulers were clearly concerned about the fact that Erdogan was able to win the sympathy of the "Arab street", and his trips to the Arabian Peninsula, as well as in other Arab countries, were not quite so harmless.
As a result, there was only one perfect partner for Turkey in the Arab world, to which it could extend its influence - a neighbor Syria. But B. Assad feared on such a rapid rapprochement with Turkey, especially Ankara openly imposed its values, including in the field of political culture and ideology.
However, there has been progress in relations between the two countries. In 2008 the Turkish-Syrian Joint Energy Company was founded. Further, the countries agreed on the need for the creation of the Interstate Council for Strategic Cooperation. The Council included the collaboration of the ministries of foreign and internal affairs, defense, economy, oil, electricity, agriculture and health. The struggle against terrorism was among the objectives of the Council12.
In 2009 it was canceled visa regime between Turkey and Syria. In 2010, the joint Turkish-Syrian military exercises were carried out on the territory of Syria, near the Turkish border13. In 2011 Ceremonial laying of the first stone in the dam on the Orontes River on the border of the two countries, their leaders, was the last splash of the Turkish-Syrian friendship.
Two questions remained fundamental in the relations with the neighboring country for the Turks. Firstly, they realized that the armed forces of Syria were in need of modernization, which could carry out only with the help of Russia under the circumstances, and here the influence of Turkey, was limited. Secondly, Ankara a priori considered Syria as a junior partner. Both of these considerations formed the basis of the subsequent deviation of Turkish policy.
3. Looking back to the factor
of "Arab revolutions"
Turkey has seen the new opportunities of rapprochement with a wide range of Arab countries in the process of "color revolutions" that swept across a number of Middle Eastern states. R. Erdogan went to the biggest Arab country - Egypt in early 2011. He was met by the head of the Council of the Armed Forces Mohammed Tantawi and Prime Minister Isam Sharif. Radicals from the organization "Muslim Brotherhood" particularly happily met Erdogan (later, in March 2014, the Egyptian authorities sentenced more than 500 members of the organization to the death penalty). Then the Turkish Prime Minister visited two more countries of victorious revolution - Tunisia and Libya, becoming a kind of "hero of the Arab street." As noted by some experts, Erdogan made a step toward his dream - the resumption of the Ottoman Empire disintegrated in 191714.
The Syrian Revolution occurred later than the other Arab revolutions: the Alawite clan firmly held the reins of power. In 2011 the first protests began. In the beginning they were quite peaceful, but tough confrontation happened a month later, after the involvement of Islamist groups in the process, developed into a civil war. Turkey started to think about changing a friendly but uncontrollable Assad's regime to another, weaker and more controlled. However, these calculations were wrong in the sense that the Arabs would go the way of the formation of political systems similar to the Turkish - first, and that a new alternative to Assad regime in Syria would be more controlled - Second.
Some experts consider that the Syrian-Turkish armed confrontation began with the first days of the riots in Syria. R. Erdogan welcomed the revolution, first calling Assad to step down, and then the opposition to overthrow him (though he called Assad a close friend of his recently). In September 2011, R. Erdogan announced of Turkey accession to the US sanctions against Syria during a meeting with US President Barack Obama in Washington, as Damascus, in his words, has launched a campaign of anti-Turkish propaganda.
Of course, the problem of refugees created additional difficulties for Turkey, but it was as a result of Turkey's policy to encourage opponents of the regime. The West, represented by the United States, France, and some of their allies believed that the closure of airspace over Syria was necessary (as it has done over Libya), as well as a military operation, the importance of which was assigned to the Turkish armed forces. Soon the reason for the closure of airspace was presented -Turkish spy aircraft was shot down in June 2012. In early October 2012, in Ankara, there were calls to avenge the blood of the dead after Syrian shelling of Turkish border areas and the deaths of five Turkish military. Apologies from the Syrian president did not affect the
situation. It was assumed that the situation with the shelling looked like a provocation on the part of the Syrian rebels, possibly carried out with the support of the Ankara16.
Turkey called on NATO to defend NATO member state, the Turkish parliament at an extraordinary session gave the government extraordinary powers in the course of the year unilaterally, including the right to carry out air strikes and ground operations in Syria without the participation of the Arab countries or NATO partners.
Ankara has opened its doors to the Syrian opposition, forums and congresses have been held to discuss options for confrontation to Assad. Turkish authorities coordinated action of ethno-confessional and clan groupings, aimed at overthrowing the regime.
At the beginning of September 2012, R. Erdogan named B. Asada a political corpse17, and advocated the establishment of no-fly zone in the north of Syria. Assad called his former partner "new Ottoman sultan," which "seeks to impose its rule the region as it was in the days of the Ottoman Empire."
Commenting on the situation at the border, the Turkish Minister for EU Affairs, E. Bagis said that Turkey could level Syria with land after the incident with the downed spy aircraft. But Turkey had no problems with the people of Syria19.
Turkey, having the most powerful army among the states of the Middle East at the time of the confrontation, spent almost 15 times more for military purposes than Syria. It had an overwhelming advantage in the navy, and a significant advantage - in the number of personnel, aircraft, ground troops. Syria has maintained an advantage in artillery guns and tanks. The collision with Turkey to Damascus, mired in armed conflict with the rebels, was unpromising and unprofitable in all respects. However, the possibility of any conflict is determined with not only quantitative parameters and quality of weapons. In addition,
the transfer of responsibility for a ground operation in the hands of the armed opposition is threatened the protracted nature of the armed
conflict20.
Another important factor is the experience of warfare. The Syrian army regularly participated in the war from the beginning of its formation in the 1940s. The last major conflict involving Syria was the war in the Persian Gulf. Turkey was at war last time in Cyprus in 1974. It is obvious that the Syrian armed forces and the high command were better prepared. Accordingly, Turkey lost Syria in terms of combat experience21. There is another internal factor: this war is more familiar to Syrian society, rather than for Turkey. It would be a precedent of participation of Turkish troops in the conflict on the territory of the Arab State in the case of direct military support for Syrian rebels by Turkey for the first time in decades.
May 9, 2013 Turkish Prime Minister made a statement on the use of chemical weapons by Assad regime. The next day, a similar statement was made by US Secretary of State John Kerry22. The situation began to resemble the one that preceded the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. In August, Washington said that the US was preparing to attack Syria even without the support of allies.
Promotion of Turkey in the Arab world was braked on this background where the country continued to be considered a foreign element. R. Erdogan's shuttle diplomacy stopped to be welcomed in the region. In August 2013, the Egyptian authorities gave R. Erdogan understand that they were not satisfied with his arrival in Egypt because of his support for the Muslim Brotherhood.
In September 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed to Barack Obama during a meeting of "twenty" to deliver military-chemical potential of Syria under international control. This proposal
was accepted by the United States. The threat of direct military intervention in Syria was pushed back.
The Turkish invasion of Syria did not take place for several reasons: apprehensions of Washington due to the possibility of unpredictable course of events, Russia's tough stance, a certain level of combat capability of the Syrian army. However, the principal obstacle to Turkish intervention arose in Turkey itself - about 80% of Turks were against military intervention into the internal affairs of Syria23. B. Assad took into account this fact by saying in an interview with Russian television in 2012 that the Syrian-Turkish war was unrealistic, since the most of the Turkish people do not want war24.
Soon disagreements between the allies in the anti-Iraq coalition have arisen. In October 2013 R. Erdogan told Barack Obama about the decision to close the Turkish corridor for the supply of arms from the United States and NATO to Syrian rebels. The reason was Washington's support for the protest movement in Turkey. A year later, the US Vice President Biden, accused Turkey in the direction of hundreds of millions of dollars and tens of thousands of tons of arms to anyone willing to fight "against Assad - groups" "Al-Nusra", "Al-Qaeda " and jihadists who came from other parts of the world25' Turkish President responded to the accusation that there was no support to terrorists26.
4. Turkey and the "Islamic State"
Turkey received two opponents as a result of its policy in the southern direction, one is the Assad regime and the second - the Islamic State (ISIS). It has been indirectly involved in the creation of favorable conditions for the formation of ISIS as one of the main sponsors of the opponents of the Assad regime. Thus, there was one optimal solution from Turkey in this situation - to resist them both as to
restore normal relations with Syria would have already failed, and ISIS did not share ideologies of neo-Ottomanism.
As a result, Turkey found itself in a difficult position. On the one hand, the drift of the Turkish leadership towards Islamization of the country allowed to use the support of Islamists acting in different parts of the Muslim world. On the other, ISIS hostility towards the Western allies of Ankara and Ankara itself was not in doubt. There was a danger that militants of ISIS and other radical Islamist groups can shift their operations on Turkish territory, or to find a lot of supporters there in the case of support for the US military operations.
Observers noted that the meeting of Foreign Ministers of the United States, Iraq, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and the countries of the Cooperation Council of Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) in Jeddah in September 2014 and where the strategy for action against ISIS was developed, had a defective character as a result of the absence of representatives of Syria and Iran27.
Initially, the Turkish leadership informed its allies of non-participation in air and ground operations against ISIS directly. However, it indicated that it would participate in the joint actions, provide logistical support and reconnaissance data share with the coalition forces. The Turkish leadership did not detailed the results of the talks with the US emissaries purposely for their public its declaration was limited to general phrases about the need to combat terrorism in the region. Moreover, Turkey did not abandon plans for a no-fly zone near the border with Syria, as well as the idea to send troops into Syria, controlled by loyal radical groups, in order to cut them off from the radicals of ISIS and "Dzhabhad en-Nusra"28 However, the last idea was not supported by the Americans.
The situation in Turkey has changed after the capture of the hostages of the Turkish by Islamists in Iraqi city of Mosul, the approach
of combat units of ISIS to the Turkish border, and intensifying their action in the Kurdish areas. Turkish Kurds announced their intention to launch military action against Islamist militants on their own, and their leader Abdullah Ocalan threatened, that the truce of his party and Turkey would end if the Turkish Government allowed killing his brothers. Moreover, ISIS militants invaded the tomb of Suleyman Shah, grandfather of the founder of the Ottoman Empire Sultan Osman I, located in the Syrian province of Aleppo, and captured Turkish soldiers, guarding it.
ISIS itself does not intend to rely on Turkey, according to a statement of its head Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Besides, the leader of ISIS believes that the modern Turkish state should be wiped off the face of the earth as well, because it destroyed the caliphate in 192429.
As a result, Erdogan declared that ISIS radicals had nothing to do with Islam, it was not enough to eliminate them with airstrikes, and ground operation would be necessary30. In October 2014 the Turkish parliament in accordance with the request of the government authorized to carry out operations abroad, against militants of ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Accession of Turkey to the diverse coalition of the United States, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE allows Ankara to maneuver, as all the main actors are trying to turn the situation of ISIS and Syria in their favor.
Experts see the main motivation for actions of the Turkish leadership in preventing the creation of another Kurdish autonomy (like Iraq), with the help of the Americans, but in Syria now31. Two Kurdish autonomies at the borders of Turkey, will be perceived as a direct threat to its unity and national security. Turkish critics of the official policy believe that the Turkish government is trying to approach the problem of the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad on the other hand, by joining the
coalition, that this policy has no prospects for Turkey and will have extremely ambiguous consequences for her. In fact, Turkey has not been at war in the territory of a single Arab state, if a precedent is created, it can dramatically aggravate the relations with other Arab
countries, for which the idea of neo-Ottomanism is unacceptable.
* * *
The struggle of the US and its Western and Arab allies with ISIS is a completely new form of warfare, that does not fit in all the previous frame. The United States decided to set aside $ 8.8 billion for the current fiscal year, to fight against the Islamic state, carries a wide expansion of the territory of Iraq and Syria. Moreover the US strikes at the territory of both Iraq and Syria, without asking official permission from Damascus. Leaders of ISIS threaten with retaliation to Americans and their allies. This fight will be a serious challenge not only for Turkey, but also for its ideological concepts, including the theory of neo-Ottomanism.
In general, the era of the "Arab spring" has not become a period of major foreign policy successes and breakthroughs for Ankara, but created a lot of new challenges in the region. Turkey fails to strengthen its position in the Arab world as it was 100 years ago. It continues to be a foreign element for the Arab world.
References
Turkey and Syria establish contacts // Moskovskiy komsomol ets. Turkey. 17.09.2009. <http://mk-turkey.ru/politics/2009/09/17/turciya-i-siriya-nalazhivayut-kontakty.html>.
A. Frolov Water and conflicts // Path to peace and security. 2014. № 1 (46). p. 9. A. Guriev. On the Turkish-Syrian relations / Middle East Institute. 07.05.2005. <http://www.iimes.ru/?p=3651>.
Ibid.
4
See: B. Rajewski-Nadein. Turkey on the threshold of a difficult choice // International Affairs. 2014. № 3. p. 110-125.
A. Sargsyan. Turkish neo-Ottomanism policy towards its neighbors destroys the very Turkey // Caucasus policy. 06/10/2013. <http://kavpolit.com/tureckaya-politika-neoosmanizma-po-otnosheniyu-k-sosedyam-razrushaet-samu-turciyu>. Turkey has condemned Israel for the attack on the "Freedom Flotilla" // Right.
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14.01.2011. <http://inosmi.ru/asia/20110114/165626491.html>. Ibid.
Ibid.
Turkey and Syria have agreed to abolish visas // Pravda.ru. 13.10.2009. <http://www.pravda.ru/news/world/13-10-2009/327105-viza-0/>. <http://www.mignews.com/news/politic/world/270409_62456_14851.html>. Ulrich B. Erdogan in Cairo // IsraelReport.ru. 13.09.2011. <http://www. israelreport.ru/ context / 3524 / erdogan-v-kaire>. <http://www.kavkazchat.com/showthread.php?t=53570>.
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05.10.2012. <http://donmarker.org/strana-i-mir/turtsiya-i-siriya-pogranichnyy-kon-flikt-pererastaet-v-vooruzhennyy.html>.Erdogan called Assad's
political corpse // VIP.am. 6.09.2012. <http://vip.am/ interesnoe/yerdogan-nazval-asada-politicheskim-trupom. html>.
<http://www.yerkramas.org/2012/11/09/asad-erdogan-schitaet-sebya-novym-osmanskim-sultanom>.
Turkey can quickly win a war with Syria - Minister for EU Affairs // RIA Novosti. 05.10.2012. <http://ria.ru/world/20121005/767149871.html#ixzz3QfwBthto>. K. Ryabov. Turkey against Syria: the balance of power // National Security. 17.10.2012. <http://www.psj.ru/saver_national/detail.php?ID=72590>. Ibid.
Erdogan: Assad uses chemical weapons // Panamerican.net. 05/12/2013.
<http://www.panarmenian.net/rus/news/157879/>.
Information: B. Rajewski Nadein-wook. Op. 132
<http://www.yerkramas.org/2012/11/09/asad-erdogan-schitaet-sebya-novym-
osmanskim-sultanom>.
Op. by: Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 06/10/2014.
Ibid.
Turkey, "an Islamic state" and US // Military Review. 09/18/2014.
<http://topwar.ru/58422-turciya-isl.mskoe-gosudarstvo-i-ssha.html>.
Ibid.
6
7
8
9
17
18
19
20
29 Turkey as an ally ungrateful "Islamic State" // Islam Review. 09/24/2014. <http://islamreview.ru/politics/turcia-kak-soratnik-neblagodarnogo-islamskogo-gosudarstva/>.
30 Turkey enters the war with "Islamic state." What is behind this? // Day.Az. 03/10/2014. <http://news.day.az/world/524749.html>.
31 Ibid.
"Puti kMiru i Bezopastnosti. IMEMO RAN", Moscow, 2015, № 1 (48), pp. 119-132.
