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THE MOSLEM WORLD: THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS
I. DOBAYEV. EVOLUTION OF IDEOLOGICAL DOCTRINES OF TAQFIRI-JIHADISTS // The article is written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."
Keywords: jihad, ideology, Islamism, radicalism, taqfiri, terrorism, extremism.
I. Dobayev,
D. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor,
Expert of the Russian Academy of Sciences,
Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don
Abstract. Terrorism is a complex socio-political phenomenon consisting of an ideological doctrine and based on specific political practice of unrestricted violence. This concerns all types of terrorism including religiously motivated one. In recent decades this type has been the Islamic terrorism of taqfiri-jihadists. The importance of determining its nature and mutations lies in the fact that it is not possible to do away with modern terrorism without conquering it in the ideological and information war unleashed by radical Islamists. In other words, it is necessary to fight not only terrorists but terrorism as such. This fight can be crowned with success only in case of the complete debunking and compromise of terrorist ideology.
An important component of modern terrorism is the ideological doctrines of radical Islamists, according to which specific practical activity, including the terrorist acts of suicide assassins, becomes so widespread nowadays.1 It is theoretically
substantiated that Islamism consists of two wings - moderate and extremist.2 Both of them have the ultimate aim of building an "Islamic state" based on the Sharia law. However, there are certain essential differences between them: the former is striving to reach the coveted goal by evolutionary, peaceful means based mainly on "Islamic call" (daawat, that is, information and propaganda work among people), whereas their extremist fellow-thinkers are ready for forcible capture of power, including armed violence and terrorist attacks.
The extremist wing of Islamic radicals consists of organizations, groups and individual leaders who use armed struggle, including terrorist activity, as the main means to reach their aims. Propaganda work is a subsidiary means for them in order to draw more supporters. Among the most well-known theorists of this wing of Islamists are Sayyid Qutb, Abd as-Salam Faraj, Abbud al-Zumr, Tariq al-Zumr, Aiman al-Zawahiri, and others. These theorists of radical Islamism rely in their writings and speeches on works by such authoritative ulemas of the Muslim past as Ibn Hanbal, Ibn Taimiyya, Ibn Qassir, Al-Qurtubi, an-Nawawi, M. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, and others.3
Ibn Hanbal and his followers - Ibn Taimiyya, Ibn Qassir, Al-Qurtubi, an-Nawawi, and others called for returning to Islam of the "golden age" of the life and activity of Prophet Mohammed and the four al khilafa al rashida (610-661), which was the period of life of the first three generations of Muslims. During that period (the "golden age") Islam was uniform and there were no splits, different interpretations, ideological currents, Sufi brotherhoods, etc. In this connection Ibn Hanbal qualified all changes in Islam after the "golden age" as sinful innovations and demanded that Islam be "purged" from them. In other words, their ideal was "pure" Islam and they insisted on Islam returning to this fundamental ideal of Muslimism. In this connection, true, considerably later, western opponents began to term them "fundamentalists." They called themselves "Salaphites," which term originated from the Arabic words "as-salaf as-salihun"
(righteous ancestors), which coincided in time with the life and activity of the first three generations of Muslims, or the life and activity of Prophet Mohammed and al khiilafa al rashida, or the "golden age" of Islam. Today, the terms "Salaphite" and "Salaphism" are widely used not only in the Muslim East, but also in the West and Russia.
The creation of Islamist political parties in the form of Salaphite renovation in the 20th century exerted a strong influence on the radicalization of the modern Islamic movement in different parts of the world. Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) founded "Al-ikhwan al Muslimun" ("Muslim Brotherhood") organization in Egypt in 1928 and Maulana Abu al-Ala Maududi (1903 - 1979) set up "Jamaat-e-Islami" ("Islamic Society") in India in 1941. Both of them had similar convictions, especially concerning unification of Islam as the all-embracing teaching in the life of the Muslim Ummah. They emphasized the need to create a genuinely Muslim state by the introduction of the Sharia, which they regarded not only as the Law based on the Koran, but also as the way of life of the Salaphites.
Decolonization in the middle of the 20th century gave a hope to the Salaphites to create genuinely Islamic states. However, the new Muslim leaders have chosen the road of simulation reforms. Their ideas about secularism, public sovereignty, nationalism, women's rights and constitutionalism have led to a direct conflict with the Salaphites, who put to doubt their legitimacy as Muslim leaders, which led to an explosive situation. As a result, many regimes began to pursue inconsistent policies, fluctuating from compromises to reprisals.4
A new group of Salaphite theorists has emerged in this situation, which began to elaborate modern ideological doctrines of radical Islamists. Among them, the Egyptians S. Qutb, M. Shukri, M. Faraj, A. al-Zawahiri, and others. As the authoritative Russian scholar of Islam A. Ignatenko noted, the ideological doctrines of Islamists are based on the two categories - taqfiri (accusation of infidelity) and jihad (sacred war for faith).5
In this connection the radical Islamists are often called "taqfiri-jihadists."
The concept of "taqfiri" presupposes, according to modern Islamist theorists, the need to single out all non-Muslims ("Kafirs" - infidels) and Muslims who do not adhere to the ideological views of Islamists (apostates, or "Murtaddun"), as well as hypocrites, or "Munafiqun", that is, those who are wrong or hypocritical in their faith. As to the concept of jihad, it was now interpreted, contrary to Muslim traditional interpretation exclusively as the war against the "enemies of Islam," which should always be offensive.
S. Qutb, a theorist and ideologist of the Egyptian association of "Muslim Brotherhood," wrote a whole series of works in the 1950s - 1960s, in which he expounded various aspects of the ideology of "Islamic revival." His concepts divided society into two types: Islamic society which recognizes the power of Allah and is based on the Sharia law, and "jahiliyyah" society (pre-Islamic heathendom, where people establish laws themselves and violate the main principle of tawhid (the sole rule of Allah). According to this conclusion, most modern societies are heathen, including those which regard themselves Islamic, but do not live by the Sharia laws. And this means apostasy and infidelity. Islam and jahiliyyah are absolutely incompatible, they cannot coexist peacefully, and there cannot be even gradual transformation of the latter into Islam. The power of Allah over this Earth of ours can only be restored after jahiliyyah is destroyed by force, and each Muslim must take part in this fight.6
However, in the 18th century, two hundred years before S. Qutb, the concept of jahiliyyah was actualized by Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1791), preacher from Arabia, who denounced widespread people's beliefs and customs of the Arabian Peninsula tribes for depravity, asserting that they had returned to the state of jahiliyyah, become idolaters and therefore had to be executed for apostasy. He preached a very harsh form of Islam based on a strict interpretation of the Koran and the
cleansing of Islam from later accretions. The basis of his doctrine was "tawhid" ("unity of God") denouncing any possibility of mediation in contacts with God as idolation. The conclusion by al-Wahhab of an alliance with the head of one of the Arabian tribes Mohammed ibn Saud had been a prelude to the formation of a new state on the territory of the Arabian Peninsula, which was named the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932.
Ibn Abd al-Wahhab based his interpretations of the Koran on fetwahs of the Syrian theologist Taki ad-Din Ahmad ibn Taimiya (1263-1328), who lived in one of the most difficult periods of Muslim history when Islamic countries had been conquered by Mongolians converted into Islam, but who continued to live by their own legal system. In this connection Ibn Taimiya was faced with the problem whether it was legal to proclaim jihad against other Muslims (Mongolians). In his famous "Fetwahs about Tatars" he said that inasmuch as Mongolians continued to adhere to the legal standards established by Genghiz Khan, but not the Sharia, they were not true Muslims, but apostates who should be killed. Jihad against them was not only a right, but a duty of Muslims. 7
In his works Maududi, a moderate Islamist from Pakistan, has revived the concept of jahiliyyah as an abstract notion for describing the system of beliefs and ideas in India. However, his works do not contain even a hint on his intention to use it for justifying an armed uprising. As to the hard radical S. Qutb, he took Taimiya's premise about the duty of jihad against apostates and Maududi's concept of jahiliyyah, combined them, and thus gave broader interpretation of Abd al-Wahhab's ideas. Proclaiming the existing Muslim societies jahiliyyah, S. Qutb calls for isolating and fighting them, but trying to avoid civil disturbances. In his version, faithful Muslims do not fight other Muslims, they fight idolaters. Soon after the publication of his main work called "Milestones on the Road" the Nasser government of Egypt arrested him for incitement to uprising, and
on August 29, 1966, he was executed in one of Cairo's prisons. Qutb's martyrdom gave his ideas more truth and weight. 8
Qutb's ideas made a great influence on Shukri Mustafa, who brought to the logical maximum the premises of the jahiliyyah doctrine, having founded in Egypt the sect "Jamaat al-Muslimin" ("Muslim Society"), whose main principle was motivated isolationism of its members from the evil jahiliyyah society. However, his group became an object of mockery in the press, which depicted it as a crowd of fanatics or criminals crazy about the dual concept of excision and banishment (at-Taqfir waal Hijrah); it was under this name that M. Shukri's community became part of the history of the Islamist movement. In 1977, after persecution by the ruling regime of Egypt, this sect disappeared, but its ideas were not forgotten by the later generations of radical Islamists.
The most well-known follower of S. Qutb was Muhammed abd al-Salam Faraj (1954-1981), who was the head of the Cairo section of "Tanzim al-jihad" ("Organization of Jihad") which masterminded the assassination of the President of Egypt Anwar Sadat in 1981. Faraj formulated his ideas in a pamphlet entitled "The Forgotten Duty" ("Al-farida al-gaiba"). In it he wrote, among other things, that "the establishment of an Islamic state is the duty of Muslims: something without which the necessary thing cannot be achieved becomes necessary itself. If such a state cannot be founded without war, then the latter becomes necessary...The laws guiding the life of Muslims today are based on unbelief (ilhad), they have been created by infidels who dominate Muslims. After the disappearance of the caliphate, evidently, in 1924 and renunciation of Islamic laws in their entirety and their replacement with the laws introduced by infidels, the position of Muslims became like what they had been under the Mongolian rule." 9
Faraj emphasized that Islam had been spread with the sword, and that jihad in Islam was not defensive. To substantiate
his position he cited "The Verses of the Sword" from the Koran calling for capture and execution of polytheists (kafirs).
Faraj also denounced a dangerous modern innovation of differentiating "great jihad" (efforts aimed at self-improvement of a Muslim and fight with bad habits) from "small jihad" (fight against the enemy), because it belittled the value of the fight by the sword. Similarly, in his view, the absence of a caliph is not justification for postponement of jihad. Jihad is all the more important for bringing back Islam to the Muslim peoples. Renunciation of jihad is tantamount to "baseness, humiliation, division and factionalism in which Muslims live today." 10
The general strategy of jihad, in the view of Faraj, is determined by ideas about the "close enemy" (Muslims who do not share the ideological premises and practices of radical Islamists) and the "distant enemy" (non-Muslim enemies of the radical Islamists, primarily representatives of western Christian civilization), and about jihad as an individual duty of each Muslim (fard ain). In the view of Faraj, jihad becomes also obligatory if the ruler of a Muslim state rejects the Sharia as the guiding line. In that case this ruler must be overthrown, and jihad becomes the individual duty of each Muslim. To wage it there should be no special permission of Ulemas, jihad becomes a must just as a fast or prayer. 11
Thus, Salaphite jihad is a renovated movement justifying violent overthrow of local Muslim governments as the "close enemy" with a view to establishing an Islamist state.
At the same time it should be borne in mind that like other sacred books the Koran is open to different, sometimes opposing, interpretations. It contains calls for love, as well as calls for hatred and violence, and it would be an illusion to try to interpret canonic texts exclusively as calls for peace. All the more so today, when certain Islamic theological schools and leading Muslim dignitaries openly preach hatred to the "infidels," deny the right of other religions to exist, and bless terrorism. Using excerpts from the Koran and other sacred books of Islam (as, for example,
the call "kill them wherever you find them and pull them out from wherever they hide themselves"), Islamic theologians justify the seizure of alien land, enslavement and murder of nonMuslims. Modern Muslim schools proclaim the "worldwide jihad" against the "infidels" and demonstrate their contempt of Jews whom they call "descendants of pigs and monkeys."12
In the 1980s - 1990s the new leader of "Al-Jihad": Abbud al-Zumar enriched the ideological doctrine of the organization with new concepts. Apart from him, there was another prolific author and leader of the movement - Tariq al-Zumar. The concepts of these figures practically do not differ from the ideas of A. Faraj. In the view of Abbud al-Zumar, jihad is fard ain, that is, the duty of every Muslim who must take part in it to the best of his abilities.13 Tarik al-Zumar maintained that the best form of jihad is armed struggle. He sharply criticized those Islamic radical leaders who confined to ideological struggle.14 Moreover, he claimed that jihad should have an offensive character and it was not necessary to wait for an attack of the "infidels." "Suffice it to see that they have traits of the people who should be fought and killed."15
By the end of the 1990s one of the leaders of the "Al-Jihad" -Aiman al-Zawahiri, who became the chief ideologist of "al-Qaeda" and the "World Front of Jihad" in June 2011, after the murder of Usama bin Laden, put forward new ideas. First of all, he substantiated the idea of global jihad against the "distant enemy," that is, western countries, primarily, the United States and Israel. Now this list includes Russia, which joined the criminal alliance of the world kufr. A. al-Zawahiri writes that "it is not to be considered that the struggle for the creation of an Islamic state is a regional war. The alliance of the Crusaders and Zionists headed by the United States will not allow the Muslim forces to come to power in any Muslim country. We should be prepared for a war not just in one region. It will be waged against the internal enemy - the apostates and the external enemy - the alliance of the Crusaders and Zionists."16 In his view, jihad
against the "distant enemy" should not be postponed. This is why this war should be waged beyond the boundaries of the Islamic world, on enemy territory. He also spoke in favor of waging successful jihad for the liberation of Muslims not only in Afghanistan and Chechnya, but also in the very center of the Islamic world. 17
On the eve of the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, in his book "Knights under the Banners of the Prophet" A. al-Zawahiri wrote that the new jihad was the struggle between Islam and the hostile world forces: world powers and Russia which use the following means: " 1) The United Nations Organization; 2) Friendly rulers of Muslim peoples; 3) Transnational corporations; 4) International communications and data exchange systems; 5) International information agencies and satellite information channels; 6) International aid organizations, which are used as a cover for espionage, proselytism, preparation of coups and arms transportation. This enemy is confronted by the new Islamist fundamentalist collation consisting of jihadist movements in various lands of Islam. "It is a growing force acting under the banners of jihad in the name of God." Al-Zawahiri described the new phenomenon of "young mujahids, who left their families, countries, wealth, studies and jobs for the battlefields of jihad in the name of God." In his view, there is no other solution of the current problems without jihad. "The treachery of the peaceful Algerian fundamentalist movement has shown the meaningless nature of all other methods which tried to avoid the adoption of the burden of jihad." 18
Al-Zawahiri declared that jihad should demonstrate the treachery of Muslim rulers and their apologists which is due to their lack of faith and support of the infidels. This is why the Islamist movement should establish an Islamic state in the very center of the Islamic world from where it will enter into fight for the restoration of the caliphate based on the traditions of the Prophet. "If successful operations against the enemies of Islam
and serious losses suffered by them do not help achieve the ultimate aim of the creation of the Muslim nation in the heart of the Islamic world, they will be nothing more than a violation of the habitual order which can be tolerated, even if they last for some time and cause definite losses." 19
In order to achieve success, al-Zawahiri demanded that his followers come closer to the masses of common Muslim people, do more charity and educational work among them, and share their cares and concerns. 20
There should be a strong and efficient leadership in order to mobilize the popular masses, a leadership whom they will trust and understand. There should also be a quite definite enemy who should be fought mercilessly and defeated without fear in the hearts and minds of its opponents. Al-Zawahiri describes the main goal of the Islamic jihad as follows: "The liberation of the Muslim nation, opposition to the enemies of Islam and the beginning of jihad against them demand Muslim power established on Muslim lands, which will raise the banner of jihad and gather the masses of Muslims under it. Without this our actions will be nothing more than simple and repeated disorders, which will not lead to the coveted goal, that is, the restoration of the Caliphate and banishment of the invaders from the land of Islam." 21
After the terrorist acts in the United States and the beginning of the anti-terrorist operation al- Zawahiri in his book "Al-Walaya wa-al-baraz" emphasized that nowadays every Muslim must actively oppose the occupants. He included in his book a fetwah, which forbade Muslims to draw closer to kafirs, demanded that Muslims keep their plans secret from infidels and have no business with them. Muslims must not accept or agree with any theories or ideas of infidels. Kafirs should not be helped in any way in their wars against Muslims, and it is forbidden to justify Crusaders. Muslims must wage jihad against faithless aggressors, apostates and hypocrites (the latter two are the Arab regimes which have granted their territory for the anti-terrorist
campaign, and also the ulemas who issue mendacious fetwahs paid for by the authorities). 22
In turn, the Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarkawi killed in Iraq in June 2006, who was the leader of the local al-Qaeda organization, said in one of his lectures that "jihad is the war against the infidels and each Muslim must take part in it." 23 He asserted that the term "civilian population" is wrong, because Islam does not divide people into civilians and military, it divides them only into Muslims and infidels. And if the blood of a Muslim is sacred no matter what he does and where he is, the blood of an infidel can be spilled no matter what he does and where he is, if there is no special agreement with him or his life was not spared."
Al-Zarkawi divides people into three groups: 1. Muslims; 2. Infidels peacefully disposed to Islam, that is, under its protection (zimma), who concluded truce with Muslims (hudna) or those spared by them (aman). 3. All other people. Al-Zarkawi declared the latter "the belligerent side": he reminds that the Sharia deprived them of protection and gives Muslims the right to kill them, except women and children. On this ground, al-Zarkawi maintains, "non-belief in Allah is sufficient for killing the infidel, no matter what he does or where he is."
Thus, the efforts of foreign, above all, Egyptian Islamic theorists resulted in the emergence of a consistent ideological doctrine of Taqfiri jihadists by the beginning of the 21st century, which serves as the ideological foundation of modern terrorism under the guise of Islamic faith, as well as justification of cruel political practice of the radical Islamists and terrorists. All modern radical Islamic groupings, including the "Islamic state" practically use the premises of this doctrine.
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References
I. Dobayev. Ideologicheskoye obosnovaniye terrorizma v mire i na Severnom Kavkaze [Ideological Foundation of Terrorism in the World and in the North Caucasus] / / Russia and the Moslem World. 2015, No 12, pp. 69- 87. I. Dobayev. Islamsky radikalism: genesis, evolyutsiya, praktika [Islamic Radicalism, Evolution, Practice]. Rostov-on-Don. 2003. - 416 pp. I. Dobayev. Evolyutsiya radikalizatsii islama v Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Evolution of Radicalization of Islam in the Russian Federation] // Yurist-Pravoved. 2014. No 5(66), pp. 88- 89.
Sageman M. Network Structures of Terrorism. Moscow. Idea-Press. 2008, p. 16.
5 For more details see: A. Ignatenko. Endogenny radikalizm v islame [Endogenous Radicalism in Islam] / / Tsentralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz. 2000, No (8).
6 I. Dobayev. Ideologicheskiye konstrukty radikalnogo islamizma [Ideological Constructs of Radical Islamism] / / Gumanitary yuga Rossii. 2015, No 2, p. 124.
7 Sivan E. Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics - New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985, pp. 90-101.
8 Sageman M. Op. cit., pp. 18, 22.
9 Faraj. M. Al-Faridah al Chaibah, in Johannes Jansen. The Neglected Duty. The Creed of Sadat's Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East -New York: Macmillan, 1986, pp. 166-167.
10 Ibid., p. 205.
11 At-Turabi X. Al-Haraka al-islamiya fi as-Sudan (Islamic movement in Sudan), pp. 4-5.
12 Libler Isi. Gde naiti umerennogo islamista? [Where Can a Moderate Islamist Be Found?] Ekho (Russian-language weekly in Israel). 2011, March 7.
13 B. Erasov. Kultura, religiya i tsivilizatsiya na Vostoke {Culture, Religion and Civilization in the East]. Moscow. 1990. P. 73. Ibid., pp. 147-148.
Ruthven M. Islam in the World. N.Y., Oxford 1984, p. 308. Ibid., p. 89.
Enyat H. Modern Islamic Political Thought. Austin, 1982, p. 84. Al-Zawahiri. Knights under the Prophet's Banner. Serialized in eleven parts in al-Sharq al-Awsat (London).
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid..
I. Dobayev. Radikalizatsiya islama v sovremennoi Rossii [Radicalization of Islam in Modern Russia]. Moscow - Rostov-on-Don. 2014, pp. 149-150. See, for example: http://www.short-link. De/2054
