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one - ethnicity, and the existing forms of life, thinking, worldview, which are characteristic of each individual nation.
The author examines the question of the relationship of Islam as a universal religious message, on the one hand, and on the other one - ethnicity, and the existing forms of life, thinking, worldview, which are characteristic of each individual nation.
The author points out that ethnicity does not play a significant role on the position of Islam - Islam is beyond ethnicity, therefore, ethnicity of a person does not matter, the main thing is his belonging to the Ummah.
The second part of the article deals with the specifics of the Russian Islam as a social and cultural reality.
The author writes that one of the most important tasks of the Russian Muslims is to show on the basis of historical and religious analysis that the Russian Islam is a distinctive practice of Islam, which has the specificity of the cultural, philosophical, social and domestic terms.
The author concludes that the main intellectual and spiritual task for the Russian Muslims is to understand their own existence and their place among the other Muslim cultures.
The author of the abstract - N. Ginesina
2016.10.009. A. VAVILOV, YU. ZININ, A. KAZANTSEV, A. KRY-LOV, A. ORLOV, A. FEDORCHENKO, A. CHECHEVISHNIKOV, A. YARLYKAPOV. "ISLAMIC STATE": PHENOMENON, EVOLUTION, PROSPECT // "Analytical reports (Institute of International Studies) Moscow State Institute of International Relations (U) of the MFA", Moscow, 2016, Vol. 1 (45), P. 5-44.
Keywords: Middle East, Iraq, Syria, "Islamic State", caliphate, Abu Bakr al-Bagh-dadi, the Prophet Muhammad, the "Arab Spring", "Hezbollah", "Moslem Brotherhood", "Al-Qaeda", "Taliban", religion, fundamentalism, terrorism.
The analytical report submitted by the writing team headed by A. Orlov (Institute of International Studies of Moscow State
Institute of International Relations (University) of the MFA) provides a scientific rationale for the phenomenon of the "Islamic State" and its prospects. Undeveloped state institutions are typical for the Middle East The unexpected increase of popularity of the "Islamic state" (IS) should be studied in the context of the search for alternatives to the traditional state system in the Middle East. The IS has adopted not a real model of a state in the Moslem world, but the concept, which was developed in the writings of Moslem jurists. It depicts the ideal "fair state" according to Quran and proposes to consolidate in a national state not a nation but an Ummah, a community of believers. That is why, according to the researchers, it makes no sense to consider the IS as a state in the modern sense. The IS is a "Daula" (the Arabic word for a state). In the classical period of Islamic history Daula meant above all a dynasty, not a territory, and sovereignty is not its characteristic feature.
Thus, the IS has found the best formula of legitimization among the Sunni population of the Middle East and some other regions, because another tool of political influence of the IS is fidelity to the "caliph" (at the moment this title belongs to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi). How long will this model be able to exist? Politicians and scientists, and the general public around the world are trying to answer this question.
The authors of the report are examining theoretical models of the "Islamic State." The use of the phrase "Islamic State" bring forth the associations with such concepts as fundamentalism and integrism, supposes referring to the sources of sharia, and the "golden age" of the reign of Muhammad and the first caliphs. In fact, Islamic fundamentalists base their ideas on the fact that the classical Islamic state is theocratic by nature, and the rulers, straying from this principle, are proclaimed the "infidels." Over the past 150 years there have been three waves of Islamic fundamentalism. The first one in arose the XIX century. within the framework of anti-colonial expansion in the Middle East. The new rise of Islamism fell on the period of the struggle of the Asian and
African peoples for independence and self-determination in the middle of the twentieth century. It was marked by the appearance of prominent Moslem theorists of this trend. The most important of them were Abul Ala Maududi (1903-1979), who lived in India and then in Pakistan, his organization "Jamaat-e-Islami" enjoys great influence even now; Egyptians Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) and Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949), the ideologists and creators of the "Association of Moslem Brotherhood" (AMB) in the Arab world. They rejected the "imported" ideas of nationalism, capitalism and socialism and put forward the Islamic ideal as the only true alternative of development for achievement of equality, brotherhood and prosperity of the people. The AMB, a charitable and educational organization in the past (1928-1936), has developed into a political organization, using terror as a means of struggle.
A new wave of politicization of Islam rose in the last quarter of the XX century - beginning of the XXI in the course of mass movements in the whole Afro-Asian world. The authors attribute this to the influence of the Islamic revolution in Iran, which stimulated the rise of fundamentalist ideas and the Islamic boom in the Middle East, the radicalization of the Palestinian movement, "Hezbollah" and other religious groups in the Arab world, as well as in some other parts of Asia. The rise of political Islam in the Arab region - a part of the Islamic world - did not mean the automatic and general radicalization of this movement. The political Islam is heterogeneous, depending on the region where it has originated and is promulgated, and bears the imprint of the specifics of each country.
Next, the researchers analyze the evolution of the "Islamic State" (IS). This terrorist organization, known before proclamation of the "caliphate" in June 2014 as "Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (Levant)" (ISIL), originated in 2003 amid the invasion of the NATO coalition forces led by the United States in Iraq. The intervention destroyed by the state structure that existed under the regime of Saddam Hussein, including its armed forces.
Furthermore, it broke the already delicate balance between the major religions of the country - Shiites (about 60%) and Sunnis, most of whom were the Kurds (about 20%). Natural reaction in the current contradictory situation was the formation in 2004 of several branches of "Al-Qaeda", which also included some former members of the Army of Saddam Hussein.
After the death of al-Zarqawi in June 2006, the Iraqi branch of "Al-Qaeda" was headed by Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, and at the time more than a dozen disparate Sunni jihadist guerrilla groups were consolidated into a single structure. The new entity was called the "Islamic State of Iraq."
Prior to the events of the "Arab Spring" in 2011 the group consisted of no more than 4 thousand members. Its activities were primarily funded by the oil-producing Gulf states of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait. The militants of the "Islamic State of Iraq" maintained a series of successful operations against Iraqi soldiers fighting on the side of the NATO occupation coalition. But by April 2010 the American troops based in Iraq had managed to liquidate the leaders of the new Islamic group, which resulted in its considerable weakening.
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the commander of a small detachment of jihadi "Mujahideen Shura Assembly" who replaced the liquidated ringleaders (February 2011), in a few years became the head of the most powerful terrorist organization of the beginning of the XXI century, posing itself as a state-legalized system. After the aggravation of the situation in Syria and Iraq in 2011 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi changed his tactics, and shifted to self-reliance and self-financing by means of looting, racketeering, reallocation of fiscal flows, capturing of profitable enterprises, hostages for ransom, and so on. The tactics proved to be efficient. Now, according to Russian and Western sources, the "Islamic State" numbers about 80 thousand people: 50 thousand terrorists in Syria and 30 thousand in Iraq. As of November 2015 more than 25 thousand foreign terrorists-militants, including those from the Arab countries, Europe, Russia and other CIS countries fought
under the banner of the IS. Thus, the IS has become a center of attraction for the jihadists migrating between the countries of the Middle East, North, West and East Africa.
The group has developed the reputation of one of the most violent Islamist organizations. The IS terrorists are responsible for numerous terrorist attacks against the NATO forces on the territory of Iraq, mass executions of Iraqi and Syrian soldiers, genocide of adherents of other faiths and involvement of children in criminal activities. The immediate aim of the organization is to create an Islamic Sunni state, living under Sharia law, at the territory of Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. Outside the territory of Iraq and Syria the IS extends its presence by focal method.
On the first day of the month of Ramadan, July 29, 2014, the IS announced the creation of a "caliphate" on the controlled territory of Iraq and Syria. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was proclaimed the "Caliph" under the name of Ibrahim Baghdadi. a "caliphate" has some formal attributes of the state. It controls the territory, comparable with the territory of the UK. It has its own capital, the city of Raqqa. It is believed that the Sunni population at this territory principally supports the new government.
The "caliph" has two deputies (emirs): Abu Moslem al-Turkmani (responsible for Iraq) and Abu Ali al-Anbar (responsible for Syria). 12 governors (wali), of the regions of Syria and Iraq, controlled by the "Islamic State" and the cabinet are subordinate to him. Currently, there are six ministries: the Military Department; General Security; Finance; Ministry for Prisons and Prisoners; Transport and Communications; Ministry of Work with Foreign Mercenaries. Representation and advisory functions are the prerogative of the Advisory Council of the "Islamic State" (Shura), consisting of 11 warlords and Moslem theologians, who inspect every decision of the governors and the ministers for their compliance with Sharia.
A special role in the governing bodies of the IS is given to the Council of Muftis, consisting of three religious authorities who resolve the matters relating to Shariah and Shariah Court. The
Council of Muftis directs the activities of the Islamic police (al-Shurta al-Islamiya), a kind of morality police. This establishment holds the key to markets, schools, mosques, catering, filling stations and so forth. The Council of Muftis of the IS also controls the network of religious schools, which are at the same time the centers for propagation of the ideology of jihadism, and recruitment of new levies for militias.
The information department is an important link in the organizational system. The central figure in the multidivisional media structure of the IS is Mohammed al-Adnani al-Shami. It is usually him who makes official video appeals, he is in charge of a powerful propaganda machine, comprising four divisions: «Al-Furqan Institute for Media Production» - the basic information bureau of the "Islamic State"; "Al-I'tisam Media Foundation", a studio for production of films and other video products; «Al-Hayat Media Center» publishing printed materials in foreign languages designed for foreign customers, including the large-circulation magazine "Dabik" and "Al-Ajnad Media Foundation", specializing in dissemination of Islamic songs, music and poetry, acceptable from the point of view of Shariah norms and morality to a Moslem audience. Local information offices functioning in various provinces of Syria and Iraq, provide propaganda and psychological impact on the public consciousness in print or electronic format.
The "Islamic State" is a very flexible, relatively viable and quickly recovering structure having a horizontal network configuration and able to move beyond the present borders of the "caliphate". It is difficult to give a clear definition of the ideology of the IS because of its eclecticism. Most experts define the ideology of the IS as Salafist, Salafi -jihadist, or as Sunni Islamism. At the same time the majority of Salafi groups do not recognize the IS not only a Caliphate, but even considers this draft anti-Islamic.
There is a version, according to which the IS ideological roots can be traced in the ideology of Wahhabism. This version is not groundless: the earlier groups which later formed the core of the IS
made up the branch of "Al-Qaeda" in Iraq, and "Al-Qaeda" was created by the immigrants from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, brought up in the Wahhabi ideology. To understand the Wahhabi roots of the IS ideology it should be taken into consideration that in the KSA there appeared signs of mutation of the contemporary Wahhabism, and now it is not as whole as before.
The IS adheres to the extremist interpretation of Islam, justifies violence on religious grounds, declares the infidels and apostates all those who do not accept its interpretation of Islam. The group advocates return to the orders of the first centuries of Islam, which is reflected in the IS symbols. Modern Moslems, which, in the opinion of the ideologists of the IS, have forgotten the Divine Law and follow the law of the secular nation-states, are unbelievers. The IS attributes to the same category both the current Saudi royal family and the government of the KSA.
The ideas of the IS were widely publicized thanks mainly to the propagandist establishment of the organization, especially the use of technological innovations in the field of multimedia network, proven during the "Arab spring". The rhetoric of the propagandists features high emotional intensity. It convinces people of their superiority over other faiths, warms up the hatred to dissenters.
To justify their ideology and practice the IS officials constantly refer to the Quran and other sources sacred to Moslems. They artfully snatch quotes, distorting them, deliberately ignoring the other suras and hadiths.
The Islamist elite is also clever in conspiracy explanation of its mistakes or errors, laying the blame for all failures to external forces. Their rants are filled with references to the schemes of organizers of the plots which are devised in the world, especially in the West. The main thesis is as follows: the IS is chosen as the defender of Mashreq (Arab East) from external and internal enemies. The external enemies are "America, Shia and the Arab regimes." The internal enemies are the "unsteady" Moslems infected with the virus of secularism that threatens the very nature
of the faith. Thus, the organization adheres to the concept of jihad against the two evils: the "close enemy" and the "distant enemy". The close enemy is represented by corrupted local governments and renegades, and the distant one by the West and Israel. The purpose of the fight against the close enemy is to intimidate all the dissenters, to make them obey and recognize the power of the IS.
And the killings of civilian Europeans, which they call "Crusaders", contribute to the widespread growth of Islamophobia. This is in line with the intention of the IS: to make the Moslems living outside the Islamic world a sort of hostages. The IS is interested in ghettoisation of the Moslem diaspora. Then it will be easier to put them under control, to make a kind of an incubator to spread its doctrine there, to train personnel. The tactic of the IS is obvious: to create the bloody image of Islam to intimidate Europeans, to "privatize" Islam to manipulate it for their own purposes. The "Caliphate" continuously issues categorical statements about the future victory of Islam over Europe and the United States, the imminent arrival of "hegemony over the entire planet."
Excessive politicization of Islam, observed in recent decades has been caused by the fact that the modern national states deprived the traditional theologians of the function entrusted to them - the reform of Islam. The resulting gap has been filled with various Islamic movements, which often acted illegally. The results of such politicization hit Islam itself, weakened it, opened the gates to return to the confessional and sectarian discrimination, for the elevation of some communities over others.
Today, the media, the academic circles of the Middle East countries, are debating about the roots, ideological origins, threats of the IS, the ways of confronting it. The dispersion of estimates and opinions of the Arab political scientists and analysts about the prospects of duration and existence of the "caliphate" is very broad. Some of them believe that this entity is doomed to disappear, because it acts contrary to the logic and regional mainstream. It is believed that the current coalition of the "Islamic
State" will fall apart because of the contradictions existing between its diverse components.
Considering the financial and economic foundations of the IS existence, the authors of the report note that this quasi-state does not require large-scale financial injections from abroad, as the "Al-Qaeda", "Dzhabhat en-Nusra" and the "Free Syrian Army", the opposition to the Syrian regime. The self-proclaimed caliphate became self-financing: it receives billions of dollars by robbing banks, seizing the property of the infidels, exchanging hostages for ransom, slave trade, control of drug trafficking and illegal channels of oil supplies. Now the "Islamic State" is the richest terrorist organization with a budget of approximately 2.3 billion dollars. The leaders of the "Caliphate" base their policy on the fact that financing of social programs for the population may become a no less effective means of ensuring loyalty and support than mass repression. The authors conclude that the IS is a new type of terrorist organization, where financial security plays the key role, and in a rather organized and controlled form, a kind of the budget process.
The main objective of the IS in the industrial sector is oil production and refining industry, which, as the jihadists plan, is to ensure a high and stable level of income for their regime. The proceeds from the sale of oil from fields controlled by the extremists make up the main part of the income.
The IS entrusts trusts the sale of oil and petroleum products to dealers - traders who buy crude oil directly from fields, deliver it to processing plants, supply petroleum products to the population, power plants, combat units and administrative services of the IS, other terrorist groups. but for these traders, who usually buy from the IS a barrel of oil for $ 25-30, and sell it to refinery companies for $ 60-100, the "Caliphate" would not be able to orient the captured fields to replenishing of its budget. High oil prices (until the sharp fall on the world markets) attracted to oil refining, transporting and smuggling large numbers of Syrians,
Iraqis, Turks, seeking to obtain their share of the profits from the "oil pie", seized by the IS.
The authors, however, indicate that despite the importance of this source of income, it cannot be considered stable and reliable in the long term. First, the IS has no resources and technical capability for effective management of these assets. The "Caliphate" is experiencing an acute shortage of sophisticated technologies and qualified specialists in this field and for this reason only a part of the potential volume of production can be extracted. Primitive technologies give limited amounts of oil and oil products of poor quality. Second, the world prices for oil have fallen. Third, the strikes of the Russian aviation and the Western coalition are destroying production capacities and disrupting the system of products delivery to intermediaries and final consumers. The air strikes destroyed several oil refineries that forced the IS to shift to the use of modular refining units which resulted in dramatic quality decrease of the final product.
The other source is the income from criminal business which the IS does not even try to conceal. We are talking about expropriation of cash stored in banks, property, stock, vehicles, hostage-taking for ransom on the territory of the "Caliphate". In the field of financial services the IS became the owner of the cash resources available in the state banks, it confiscates the funds of the non-Sunni refugees who left "the territory of the IS", as well as those of the private banks depositors who were unable to provide information about the origin of their savings and the purposes of their future use acceptable for jihadists. The houses abandoned by refugees, the shops deprived of their owners are leased and bring the IS the monthly income of $ 3 million in the form of rent payments. In the agrarian sector the "Islamic State" established control over the granaries, captures farmers' agricultural machinery for subsequent lease of the same to the former owners. Water resources are used after the same pattern. Smuggling of cultural relics is also a profitable criminal business. The IS profits from this in two ways: selling trophy artifacts and collection of fees
from smugglers transporting them through the occupied territory. The "Islamic State" occupied over 4,500 archaeological sites, some of which are world heritage sites of the UNESCO. 90% of cultural monuments of the country are located in war-torn regions which creates conditions for embezzlement on a large scale.
Human trafficking is another source of income. At the "slave auctions" of the IS people are sold and re-sold for ransom. The IS also profits from the stream of refugees bound for Europe: terrorists collect money for illegal transport to the EU. At the end of 2015 commercialization of the "channel of refugees" enabled the IS to get more than $ 300 million.
"Direct" money transactions from abroad are also kind of reserve. Transfer of different types of funds, including charitable funds, conspiratorial financial investments of security services and other state authorities of Qatar, KSA, Turkey is in the first place This money is not meant only for the purchase of arms. So, Turkey pays for treatment and rest of the militants arriving from Syria in Turkish military hospitals. Turkish territory houses Islamist military training camps. Qatar is also involved in financing of the IS volunteers heading from Turkey to Syria , as well as of supplies coming via this route of supply is involved and Qatar. The second place belongs to traditional Islamic taxes, donations in the form of regular voluntary contributions of the believers. It fits into the legal framework: the collection of donations, their distribution to the poor, spreading the idea of Islam around the world. This is the situation, when the money legally collected in different countries become illegal. According to reports, the IS received through this channel about 400 million rubles only from Russia,. The third source is fundraising in social networks. The transfer of money is simplified due to modern banking technologies. "Crowdfunding" as a way of attracting donations from large groups of people, helps raise a significant amount while maintaining the anonymity of the donors. There also exists the traditional Islamic money transfer system, known under the name of hawala.
Nevertheless, the authors say, in the long term, the question of the economic viability of the "Caliphate" is not clear. It is difficult to imagine at what account economic revival of the occupied territories could be effected. It can be assumed that on the stage following the period of expropriation and racketeering they are planning to announce the building of the Islamic type economy.
The IS is attractive for some young Moslems because of the promises of social justice, which they were desperate to see in their homeland. Corruption, cronyism, lack of social mobility and the prospects are pushing young people to seek the way out in the Islamist ideology, in utopian projects of introduction of Sharia law to resolve all the problems of modern society. Some years ago young extremists were looking for their place in the ranks of the militants of the "Caucasus Emirate" (CE), the rise of the IS in 20132014 gave them a new idol. On the territory of Syria and Iraq they saw a really controlled territory where the Islamic rule was declared and Islamic laws were allegedly successfully operating. The IS is important to them as a socio-political experiment in which they are given a chance to find what they did not expected to get in their own countries and regions, the opportunity not only to try to make a career, but also to participate in building a "fair" society, based, as they believe, on the laws of the Lord.
Russia (together with Georgia and Azerbaijan) faced network terrorist Islamist organizations in the late 1990s - early 2000s. In 2007, on the ruins of the "Chechen Republic of Ichkeria", the terrorists announced the establishment of the "Caucasus Emirate", which became a division of "al-Qaeda" in the North Caucasus, receiving funding from this organization. The beginning of the civil war in Syria in 2011, interpreted by the extremist propaganda as "the revolt of the Sunnis against the oppressive Shiite government", agitated the radical Islamists around the world. Some of them called to move to Syria to join the ongoing civil war, which thereby transformed from a domestic problem to an international one. This movement also affected the Russian
citizens, primarily from the regions of the North Caucasus. The number of people joining the fighting in Syria was growing every year, and in 2013 reached such level that the "Caucasus Emirate" operating on the territory of the North Caucasus lost most of its fighters. The percentage of the Caucasians who joined the IS and fought on its side, is disproportionately large: at the end of 2014 it amounted to 7-10% of combatants, according to the accessions given in social networks by Salafis themselves. Most of these Caucasians were immigrants from the Russian North Caucasus.
All these facts are the result of the change of the IS policy in the North Caucasus: if earlier the IS regarded the IC as a source of "cannon fodder", now it regards it as its own branch. This is evidenced by the announcement of July 24, 2015 of foundation of the "the Vilayat of the Caucasus Islamic State."
The threat of "trickling down" of the IS terrorists to Central Asia is also obvious. In this regard, one of the key problems is the migration of militants and their subsequent return from Syria and Iraq. Another major problem is that the neighboring Afghanistan is actually a "failed state" whose government does not control its territory. Afghanistan has long been a base for international terrorists. Currently in Northern Afghanistan directly bordering Central Asia, the process of penetration of new terrorist groups is going on actively.
There is a threat that the international community will concentrate too much on the situation in Syria, Iraq and Libya and forget about Afghanistan, where the danger is also significant. In this context is the problem of penetration of militants into Afghanistan and their further distribution in Central Asia is particularly acute. Both Afghanistan, and Central Asia in the IS belong to the new territorial unit - "the Khorasan Vilayat". On the whole, the rising threat of militants returning from the Middle East and intensification of threats from Afghanistan coincided with the rise of extremist organizations, in particular in the IS, and in Central Asia itself.
In conclusion, the authors of the report say about the prospects of the "Islamic State" development. Its legitimacy, sovereignty, territorial integrity and many other attributes of statehood in the modern sense appear to be unattainable. At the same time, even in case of circumstances favorable to for the forces opposing the IS, there is a possibility of preserving the vitality of this model of terrorist activities, pretending to gradual formation of a new (with a strong admixture of old medieval) state type. This gives the impression that state-building is not the main goal of the IS leaders. By the end of 2015 due to significant intensification of the multilateral opposition of the anti-terrorist coalition to the "Islamic State" the territory controlled by the Islamic State had reduced in Iraq by 40% and by 20% in Syria. As a result of it the IS was forced to move from offensive to defensive tactics. However, the researchers agree that the top of the "Caliphate" is still able to attract and mobilize a large number of foreign jihadists to strike everywhere and to maintain manageability of the entity.
The nutrient medium for survival of the "Islamic State" is created by the fact that the tangle of contradictions and many political, ethno-religious, socio-economic problems that fostered the growth of Islamism in the early twenty-first century is still existing. Against the background of Islamization of the region one may see the deepening of splitting along confessional, racial, ethnic, tribal and other lines, both at the national and at the subregional and regional levels.
The authors note that a kind of "Weimar syndrome" is gaining strength in the region: the feeling of loss to the civilizations that are successfully adapting to competition in the new global world, the feeling of injustice of the outside world, especially the West.
Islamization is seen by many in the Middle East as a kind of a new model, the third way, the Islamic version of democracy and renaissance. Using the weakness of state power and the acuteness of inter-ethnic, inter-tribal conflicts, its bearers hope to increase the number of their supporters and strengthen the influence. But their
power is insufficient, so they seek to destroy the system of public administration and in the chaos and power vacuum to stand at the helm of a new, as they believe, hybrid entity.
The fight against radical Islam in general and against the IS in particular will give the desired results, the researchers conclude, if, first, the territory under their control continually shrink, and secondly, if a consolidation of the opposing forces, including those in the camp of the so-called moderate Islamists takes place , thirdly, there occur significant changes in improving living conditions in the countries where the radicals are mobilizing the bulk of its human and other resources.
The author of the abstract - V. Schensnovich
