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THE MOSLEM WORLD: THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS
IGOR DOBAEV. DAISH: IDEOLOGY, STRUCTURE, POLITICAL PRACTICE, FINANCING CHANNELS // The article is written for the Bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World"
Igor Dobaev,
Dr.Sc.(Phil.), Professor,
Expert of the Russian Academy of Sciences,
Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don
It is for several decades already that the attention of scientists has been focused on the study of non-governmental religious-political organizations (NRPO) of Islamist orientation, producing religious-political extremism and terrorism under the guise of Islam. Researchers of modern terrorism and related issues, are primarily interested in the dynamics of the changes, caused by formation of ideological doctrines of radical Islamists, their organizational structures, forms and methods of exercising their specific political practices, as well as the issues of financial support of terrorism1. In this connection we will analyse the four spheres supporting modern terrorism in the world in relation to DAISH (ISIL), which, translated from Arabic into Russian, sounds like "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant". Today this group is known as the "Islamic State" (IS).
The IS emerged in 2006 in the period of occupation of Iraq by the USA forces and its allies. At that time this Sunni Islamist group was called "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL) and
as its goal was to struggle against the occupation forces (the Levant is the Latin translation of the Arabic geographical name al-Sham, the territory including modern Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and part of Jordan). After the outbreak of the civil conflict in Syria in 2011, part of the ISIL forces entered the Syrian territory and joined the actions of the armed Syrian opposition against the government army. The ISIL militants captured in the territory of Syria a part of the distant province of Raqqa, and announced imposition of Sharia law there. It is characteristic, that the actions of the ISIL and other opposition forces, were at the time supported by NATO members and the Gulf monarchies advocating the overthrow of the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad2.
In August 2014, the ISIL militants, taking advantage of discontent of some Sunni tribes in Northern Iraq caused by domination of the Shiites in the country's administration and infringement of the rights of the Sunnis, intervened in the conflict between the Sunni community and the government of Nouri al-Maliki, launched a successful offensive deep into Iraq and occupied a number of cities, including the second largest Iraqi city of Mosul. In the occupied areas the ISIL began to practice repression and terror against ethnic and religious minorities (Kurds, Shiite Moslems, Yazidis, Christians). The ISIL militants even sought to expand there offensive to Lebanon, threatened Jordan. After some time, this terrorist group declared in the occupied territories of Iraq and Syria the "Islamic State" (IS), the headed by the leader of the ISIL Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi3.
Seeking to develop their military success, the IS militants launched an offensive in the direction of the Kirkuk oil fields in Iraqi Kurdistan, but were stopped by Kurdish armed groups "Peshmerga". The leading NATO countries headed by the USA announced their support for the Kurds in the confrontation with the IS and began to supply military equipment to Iraqi Kurdistan, which, after the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime, received broad autonomy and de facto (but not de jure) is an independent
state formation. At that time the USA, EU and Israel actually encouraged the Kurds to independence, planning to transform the future independent Kurdish state in an influential ProWestern force in the region. The political and military Western support for the Kurds in their confrontation with the IS was also due to the fact that the IS offensive threatened the oil-rich area of Kirkuk and the city of Erbil, the capital of Kurdistan, hosting representative offices of many Western companies.
As a result, Washington and London announced beginning of bombing the territories controlled by the IS as well as forming a coalition of 40 countries (participation of Iran and Syria in the coalition was excluded by its initiators) to fight this group. At the same the USA is still bombing the IS positions not only in Iraq but in Syria too, without the consent of the official authorities of these countries. Thus, it is clear that all the USA actions in the plane of the fight against the "Islamic State" confirm the immutability of the objectives of the American policy in the region: the overthrow of the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, bringing to power in Iraq the forces hostile to Tehran and Damascus, maximum weakening of Iran and the Shiite movement Hezbollah in Lebanon, and in future promotion of Jihad to the borders of Russia.
Back in the day the author of this article proposed classification of Islamist NRPO according to the stages of their evolution, which appear to clearly label the organizations of different generations according to the degree of radicalization of their ideological doctrines and escalation of practicing violence aimed at achieving power on the scale of an enclave, an individual country and at the regional or even global level. On the basis of the proposed evolutionary approach we have identified four generations (waves, stages) in the development of non-governmental religious-political organizations, and, as the result, the following typology4 was proposed:
• NRPO of the first generation: the Egyptian Moslem Brotherhood (MB) the branch network in other Moslem countries
formed on its basis and the organizations that have fallen away from the MB, but adhere to the ideological principles of the Brotherhood;
• organizations of the second generation which appeared during the struggle of the Arabs against the Zionist expansion in the Middle East under the influence of the ideas of "Islamic Revolution" in Iran (e.g., the Palestinian Jihad Islami, the Lebanese Hezbollah);
• NRPO of the third generation, which emerged in the course of the events in Afghanistan since April 1978 up to the present time (the most striking example is the religious-political movement the Taliban);
• structures of the last, the fourth generation - international radical Islamic groups seeking to consolidate, monitor and control virtually all the extremist NRPO of "the Moslem world" (such organizations as Al Qaeda and the Global Jihad Front , founded by Osama bin Laden).
Of course, all modern Islamic NRPO "trace their ancestries" from the Egyptian Moslem Brotherhood. DAISH is no exception to this rule. Its ideological doctrine was borrowed from takfirists-jihadists of Al Qaeda, because the underlying categories of this NRPO are two notions interpreted in a special way: the notion of Takfir (the accusation of "Kufra", i.e., unbelief) and Jihad (Holy war for the faith)5. In this context, radical Islamists are often called takfirists-jihadists.
The concept of "Takfir" is based on pinpointing of the so-called "enemies of Islam", which group, according to the ideas of modern Islamist theorists, includes, first, all non-Moslems ("Kafirs" - the infidels), and, secondly, the Moslems who do not share ideological views of the Islamists ("Murtaddun" - the apostates from Islam, and "Munafiqun" - the hypocrites, i.e., those whose belief is wrong or disingenuous). As far as to the concept of Jihad is concerned, it, as opposed to Moslem Orthodoxy, is now regarded solely as the war against the
"enemies of Islam", and the radical Islamists allow an offensive, aggressive nature of this struggle.
Thus, Ayman al-Zawahiri , who became the leader of Al Qaeda in June 2011, after the liquidation of Osama bin Laden, in connection with the aggression of the USA and its allies against the Taliban Afghanistan published in his book "al-Walaja -wal -Baraa" a kind of fatwa proclaiming that a Moslem is forbidden to get close to infidels, should keep under wraps any secrets of the Moslems. It is forbidden to conduct any business with the infidels. It is forbidden to accept any theories or ideas of the ungodly. It is forbidden to help the infidels in their war against the Moslems and to justify the "crusaders" in any way. Moslems are ordered to wage Jihad against the godless aggressors, apostates and hypocrites (the latter two imply the Arab regimes, which provided their territories for the anti-terrorist campaign, as well as Ulemas, bribed by the authorities, issuing false fatwas,)6.
In his turn, Abu Musaba al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian terrorist, liquidated in June 2006 in Iraq, the leader of a local cell of Al Qaeda (it is on the basis of this organization that DAISH emerged later - I. D.), in his lecture entitled "Who knows more, you or Allah?", posted on many sites7, stated that "Jihad is an obligatory war against the infidels." The term "civilian population", asserted al-Zarqawi, is "false", since Islam does not divide people into civilians and servicemen: it knows only the division of people into the Moslems and the infidels. And if "the blood of a Moslem is forbidden, whatever he may do and wherever he may be ", "the blood of an infidel is permitted, whatever he may do and wherever he may be , if no treaty was made with him or if he was not spared". Al-Zarqawi divided people into three categories:
1. the Moslems;
2. the infidels, who regard Islam amicably, i.e. those who are under the protection (zimma) of the Moslems, who concluded with them a truce (hudna) or enjoying the mercy (aman) given to them;
3. all the other people. Al-Zarqawi declared the latter a "belligerent party": Sharia, he reminded, denies them protection and gives the Moslems the right to kill them, making an exception only for certain categories (primarily women and children). On this basis, al-Zarqawi considered, "disbelief in Allah is sufficient grounds for assassination of an infidel, whatever he may do and wherever he may be.
Thus, thanks to the efforts of foreign, especially Egyptian Islamist theorists in the XX - early XXI centuries there formed a well-grounded ideological doctrine of takfirists-jihadists, which became the ideological basis of the modern terrorism, hiding behind the Islamic faith, and also justification for violent political practices of radical Islamists and terrorists. Nearly all modern radical Islamist groups, including DAISH, use the provisions of this doctrine broadly, and therefore there is no question of the ideological autonomy of this structure.
With regard to the organizational structure of the modern NRPO, the history of the last century clearly shows that the activities of the organizations of religious extremist nature often depend on the attitude of the ruling regimes to them. In the conditions of diverse pressure and military impact, they usually go underground, organizing decentralized network structures8. In case of benevolent attitude of the authorities, involving them in parliamentary and economic activities, they, on the contrary, often valiantly integrate into political systems of their countries. This can be fully attributed to, for example, the first organization of this kind, the Egyptian Moslem Brotherhood, founded by Sheikh Hassan al-Banna in December 1928, which at times acted legally, and at times, for example at the present time, was in hiding.
It should be emphasized that most of numerous religious-political extremist groups formed on the ideological and organizational basis of the Egyptian Moslem Brotherhood are far from integration into political systems of their countries, and are committed to the fight against regimes of "Taghuts" (the
usurpers), using all means, including those of terrorist nature. Of course, the authorities strike cruel blows to such groups, so that they often go into hiding.
However, in the 90-ies of the last century, the world was watching processes of consolidation in the radical Islamist movement. The extremists at that time controlled Afghanistan, Sudan and partly Chechnya, hoped to expand the foothold of their power, kept talking about re-establishment of the Caliphate and Islamization of the world, etc. In 1998, they even managed to create the so-called "World Front for Jihad", which consolidated the most notorious extremist groups of the "Islamic world". A hierarchical network structure on a global scale, with claims to world domination, headed by the leader of Al Qaeda at that time -Osama bin-Laden - was being created firmly and steadily.
However, after the events of September 11, 2001 and as a result of the outbreak of the anti-terrorist campaign under the auspices of the USA decentralization of the structures of radical Islamists began everywhere. Their distinctive feature was a high degree of adaptation to the realities of the modern world. Although strictly hierarchical groups were still operating, the majority of them still obtained "fuzzy" governance mechanisms, there appeared structures organized according to the "spider web" pattern, and also fully independent ones.
The network principle of organization gives terrorist groups the following important features:
• compatibility of transnational terrorist groups, illegal arms dealers, transnational crime syndicates, drug lords, fundamentalists, ethno-national movements of extremist ideology, information pirates, smugglers9 ;
• high-speed receipt and transfer of information10;
• unified information infrastructure11;
• speed of command (reducing the speed of decision-making)12 ;
• "self-synchronization" (the possibility of action in the autonomous mode);
• "power distribution" (maintenance of point operations; occupation of vast areas; possibility of concentration of a large amount of force; strengthening of the interaction.);
• decentralization;
• secrecy, a robust security system13;
• deep integration (involvement) of the elements of the system;
• mobility (almost invulnerable target);
• effective use of modern features;
• ability to work effectively under the command of an extraterritorial centre.
Besides, as international experience shows, the decentralizing radical Islamist structures have enhanced abilities to regenerate, and, in addition, their composition is constantly receiving new blood.
As a result, to date, for example, Al Qaeda is a network of regional organizations poorly connected with each other with weakened central leadership. The leaders encourage separate organizations to carry out terrorist attacks, sometimes helping them with money and advice, and training their fighters in such fields as production of explosive devices or combating in urban environments. However, the modern terrorist movement is today more appropriate to be spoken about as an extensive decentralized network structure, or even a movement of the same kind.
The same can be said about DAISH: on the territories controlled by the group its units are of a hierarchical structure. In other cases, for example in North Caucasus, where a number of gangs of the former Caucasus Emirate have sworn allegiance to the IS, Islamist networks are recorded14. In the case of the final military defeat of DAISH in Syria and Iraq, there is no doubt that, like Al Qaeda, the group will eventually become a network one, moving its activities deep underground. Hence, it proves that in the area of institutional building the leaders of DAISH use the scheme, already developed by their predecessors without introduction of any significant innovations.
As for the forms and methods of implementation by the DAISH militants of their practice, the range of their activities like that of other radical Islamist groups, is quite wide: from the implementation of the so-called "Islamic call" (ideological propaganda and information activities), to the most sophisticated methods of subversive and terrorist activity, including promotion of suicide bombing (the so-called "shahidism"). But in any case it can be argued that in the sphere of forms and methods of implementation of their specific practices the activists and militants of DAISH have not invented anything new in comparison with the practice of their colleagues in the Arab and wider - Moslem East, but are just consumers of the inventions of the "pioneers", from the Moslem Brotherhood and up to Al Qaeda.
Financing of any terrorist group is an extremely essential issue for the reason that it is impossible to carry out any activity without monetary funds. For DAISH a developed financial system is an important system element, determining, to a large extent, the possibility of realization of the far-reaching plans to recreate the so-called "Caliphate". Currently funding of the IS, its individual regional clusters, including the one in North Caucasus, is multi-channel. The scale of funding, the structure of its sources and their correlation are constantly in motion. However, at any specific time the financing structure of DAISH and its supporters may vary significantly for individual territories, controlled both by the organization and by its foreign network structures. At the same time, in the course of the transition from centralized structures which seems almost inevitable in the case of military successes of the Syrian army supported by the Russian Aerospace Forces, to polycentric (network) organization of the underground, sources of financing will continue to differentiate, to break up, as well as the number of possible recipients of this funding.
To date, the funding sources of DAISH can be broken down into two main groups: external and internal ones. The external sources include support from states-sponsors; religious
institutions; commercial and non-profit organizations; individuals, population and diasporas; as well as from various terrorist cells. The sources of internal financing of DAISH include revenues received from extraction and sale of crude oil, appropriation of funds as the result of capturing banks and other financial institutions, legal and illegal business (slave trade, arms and drugs trafficking etc.), and other income, for example, the help of rich terrorists who may occur among the members of a terrorist organization and racketeering.
So, currently the actual structure of financing of DAISH and its followers in other countries is a complex network, permanently changing its geography and structure, the total amount of circulating assets, the equity ratio of different sources. However, all these sources of financial-economic feeding of the IS radicals can hardly be regarded as some novelties, invented by the activists of DAISH, they all were known before in the practice of other modern radical Islamist groups.
However, DAISH significantly differs from other structures, proclaiming the same objectives and based on the same ideological principles. Among these main differences, we believe, the following ones should be pointed out:
• Speed of development of the group (in 2003 - Al Qaeda in Iraq, in 2013 - DAISH (ISIL), in 2014 - the IS, occupation of a part of the territory of Iraq and Syria).
• The scale of action (the IS was close to occupation of Baghdad and Damascus, announcement of recreation of the Caliphate, the spread of its influence in the territories that once were part of the Abbasid Caliphate).
• Creation of a quasi-state in the controlled territories (the signs: laws, land, tax and monetary system etc.).
• Availability of controlled network groups in Algeria, Afghanistan, Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, North Caucasus).
• The use of new technologies and mechanisms for ideological and informational work, especially among young people.
Summing up the above, it should be emphasized that during the XX - early XXI century hundreds of radical Islamist groups appeared in the world. In our opinion, the largest of these are three: the Moslem Brotherhood with its structures in many countries, Al Qaeda, which created network clusters in different regions of the world, and, of course, DAISH, which reached a kind of "success" in building a Caliphate. However, without external inspirations, the excitement of the "Moslem world" continues to gain momentum. Hence it would be too early to speak about the decline and stagnation of the radical Islamist movement.
References
Dobaev I.P. "Radicalization of Islam in modern Russia". - Moscow - Rostov-on-Don: "Sotsialno-gumanitarnye znania" [Socio-humanitarian Knowledge], 2014. - P. 133.
Dobaev I.P. The Black Sea-Caspian Region in the focus of the strategic interests of world powers // Orientir. - 2015. - № 12. - Pp. 10-14. Dobaev I.P., Dobaev A.I., Nemchina V.I. Geopolitics and terrorism in the postmodern era. - Rostov-on-Don: Southern Federal University, 2015. - P. 86. Dobaev I.P. Political institutes of the Islamic World: Ideology and Practice. -Rostov-on-Don: NCSC HS, 2001. - Pp. 17-18.
Read more about it: Ignatenko A.A. Endogenous Radicalism in Islam // Tsentralnaya Azia i Kavkaz[ Central Asia and the Caucasus]. - 2000. - № 2 (8). Dobaev I.P. Radicalization of Islam in modern Russia. - Moscow - Rostov on-Don, 2014. - Pp. 149-150. See, for example: http://www.short-link.de/2054.
See, for example: Anisimova N.A., L Dobaev I.P. Network structures of the terrorists in North Caucasus / Ed. by Dobaev I.P. - Moscow - Rostov-on-Don: Publishing house "Sotsialno-gumanitarnye znania" [Socio-humanitarian knowledge], 2016. - P. 143.
Bedritsky A.V. Evolution of the American Concept of Information Warfare / Analiticheskiye zapiski RISI [Analytical notes of RISS.] - Moscow, 2003. - № 3. -P. 13.
Bedritsky A.V. Realization of the Concept of Network War in the Leading Countries of the West. - Moscow, 2005. - № 3. - P. 67.
D. Alberts J., Garstka J., Stein P. Network Centric Warfare. Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority / / CCRP, 2000. - P. 91.
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12 Dugin A.G. Geopolitics of Postmodernism. The Times of New Empires. The Essays of Geopolitics of the XXI century. - SPb.: Amfora, 2007. - P. 322.
13 Libicki M. What Information Architecture for Defense // New Challenges, New Tools for Decision making, 2003. - P. 78.
14 See: Dobaev I.P., Umarov D.V. Terrorism in the North Caucasus: Influence of External Factors / Edited by Dobaev I.P. - Moscow - Rostov-on-Don: Publishing house "Sotsialno-gumanitarnye znania" [Socio-humanitarian knowledge, 2016. - P. 173].
2017.02.018. ALEXANDER KNYSH. REFORMATION THAT HAS NOT HAPPENED OR WHAT WOULD MUSA BIGIYEV SAY TODAY? // "II Bigievskie chteniya - 2015. Muslim Thought in the 21st Century: Unity of Tradition and Renewal," materials of the II International Scientific Conference. - educational conference, St. Petersburg, May 17-20, 2015 / Moscow: Publishing House Medina, 2016, P. 52-59.
Keywords: Musa Bigiyev, the decline of the Muslim civilization, the Reformation, Martin Luther, the simplified Ottoman, the Turks.
Alexander Knysh,
Professor of Islamic Studies, Department of Middle Eastern Studies, University of Michigan; Head of the laboratory of analysis and Modeling of social processes, Faculty of Oriental Studies, St. Petersburg State University
The author states that Bigiyev Musa (1875-1949), revealed reasons for the decline of Muslim civilization, suggested recipes for its revival, and also considered the concept of religious faith and the fate of the Turkish language and culture in his book "The Hulk Nazarinda bir Nitsche Mesele" [Some Questions for Public
