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2017.02.014. ROBERT LANDA. LEBANON AND "THE ARABIAN POLITICAL SPRING" // "Ekonomicheskie, sotsialno-politicheskie, i etnokonfessionalnye problemy afro-aziatskih stran. Pamyati L.F. Pakhomovoi", Moscow, 2016, Institute of Oriental Studies of RAS, P. 17-32.
Keywords: Lebanon, "the Arabian political spring", Islamic-extremists, the Sunni, the Shias, the Salafists.
Robert Landa,
Dr.Sc.(Hist.),
Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS
Lebanon being an integral part of the Arabian and Moslem world couldn't but stay on the sidelines of the mass protests of the youth in Egypt and Tunisia and then in Libya and Syria which have spiraled into street riots and attempts to conquest power by the Islamists. The same attempts found place in Algeria, Morocco, Jordan and Yemen but without a success. Having had the upper hand in Libya the Islamists broke back in Egypt and Tunis but they could dictate a severe long-standing struggle for the Syrian people. From Syria they reinforced and extended combat operations in Iraq and Kurdistan. Using a fellowship of the Islamic-extremists of Lebanon they periodically left for its territory to have a rest, to recruit personnel, to reequip and to prepare the new actions mainly beyond Lebanon but sometimes at its territory. But Lebanon itself wasn't a goal for the extremists as the country with the unusual living conditions in the mountains for the Arabian majority and but the main thing -the country having the Sunni minority.
Nevertheless, military clashes, incidents, assassination attempts, acts of terrorism have emerged at the territory of Lebanon again. The political situation is characterized by the claims of communities to each other, as well as contributing to this fact mutual disbelief, mistrust and unresolved many of the problems. In spite of the official civil war termination a true
peace didn't come in Lebanon. The government of Fuada as-Sin'ory being supported by the parliamentary majority and also by the West couldn't cope with the internal political situation in the country where there was no status leader after a death of R. al'-Khariri but the president Lakhud pretending to this place wasn't popular in the eyes of a great many of people. At the same time the Moronite's dissatisfaction who have played a key role in the country for a long time caused the Moslems and the Druses rise, especially the Islamic radicals not pulling together as the Shia "Khizbulla" began predominating by its influence not only over the Shia "Amal" but also the extremists-Sunni associated with" Al'-Kaida.
The situation in the country wasn't calm in spite of R. al"-Khariri's efforts and the following efforts of the government and his followers in the parliament ("Alliance Khariri"). It emerged by May 2007 that practically there was no national background of conflicts as a staff of the groupings was sometimes different ethnically: not only the Lebanese but the Syrians, the Palestinian Diaspora, the Saudi Arabians, the Yemenites, the Moroccans and the natives of Bangladesh. It was explained by both the relative weak position of the radical Sunnism in Lebanon and the reinforced activity of organizations in Lebanon sharing the ideological orienting points of "global Jihad" from 1980-ss having the units to destabilize the situation in the country. They were increased with the ultra-Islamists from Palestine, Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. From 2003 many of them were shifted in Iraq and the wounded and the retreated were taken from there. Emissaries of "Al'Kaida" appeared in Lebanon at that time paid a special attention to the Palestinian refugees primarily with a war experience in Iraq or clandestine experience in Israel. However, the Sunni extremists didn't manage to consolidate the position in Lebanon because of increasing of the numerical advantage and a political good organization of the Shias, the Druses' independence and anti-Islamic position of the Christian communities.
It isn't worth of ignoring the existing old roots of the Islamic traditionalism in Lebanon, in particular, the Salafism (following the ideas of "purity" faith return - "salaf", that is, "ancestry, precursors"). The regions Akkar and Duniiya near Tripoli are the center of Salafism distribution more than a half of century. Till 1980 the Salafists were peaceful being loyal to the other Islam trends. But when the radical "Arabian Afghans" returned in the country the situation had changed. Some Salafists were for a state establishment of "pure Islam" as far back as in 1980 having united in the rows of "Nuvat al"-Jaish al"-Islamii" (core of the Islam army). The Salafists began confronting with the Lebanon army in 1999. In 2007 there began conflicts with the army of the organization "Fatakh al"-Islam". Besides, the Salafists gradually expanded their sphere of influence. Some part of them began learning the works of the Moslem philosophies and especially the Salafism ideologists. There is also a trend where the followers of the Salafism triumph are included by special military methods. There are the less organized groups of "neo-jihadists" acting spontaneously, from time to time, under influence of antipathies for the West or the Shias.
The antipathies for the West in the Lebanon society, especially among the Moslems didn't grow weak. There were many reasons. From 2004 one should note the USA initiative concerning "The big Middle East" stipulated political, democratic and economic reforms implementation in the region countries of Pakistan up to the Northern Africa in exchange of the West financial assistance. The USA insisted on the regime restructuring of the Middle East countries with "democracy" (according to the American pattern), "free election" and "informed society". These words were sounded as abstract unreal formula in the countries where democracy was realized as a life in accordance with patriarchal customs and canons of clans, tribes, deep-affined, territorial and religious communities and sects and freedom of choice came down to not to express individual opinion of an
elector but to represent the interests of clans, tribes, communities, ethnos and confessions, more correctly, the interests of their elites.
A political situation in Lebanon was always complex. But after 2004 it was especially complicated. There were also so-called "deserters" together with pro-governmental forces and opposition which changed their position in dependence of the situation. There also emerged "a third force" - a grouping of the former ministers and other politicians both the Christians and the Moslems (it testified confessionalism principle dilution) at the head of ex-prime minister S. al'-Khuss. Their goal was to maintain the national and the Lebanese state unity which to their opinion the endless disputes of opposition and regime threatened to. Different "moderate oppositionists" added a varied picture of political Lebanese spectra and also "Khizbulla" which has been seemingly in opposition but has avoided a confrontation with the president Lakhud and considering the Christian part of opposition as its main opponent. For the first time "Khizbulla" got an appointment of a minister in the government of N. Mikati, 50-years old Harvard-educated, a follower of al'-Khariri. Mikati being a personal friend of the president of Syria, B. Asada, was considered to be, nevertheless, "moderate pro-Syrian" figure and he was supported by both the regime followers and the opposition among the deputes owing to this fact. Mikati himself considered his regime to be "transient" and its members promised not to put up their candidatures at parliamentary election in 2005 and their tasks were only to organize elections, to assist the international investigation of R. al'-Khariri's murder and to stabilize the Lebanese economy. Election in June 2005 gave an advantage to the Sunni, the Shias and the Druses (80 mandates against 33 of the Christians) and it didn't meet views of the USA and the West as a whole as the Lebanon stopped to be frankly pro-western state orienting for NATO.
No doubt that the outside interference is a negative point for the Lebanon situation. First of all, it concerns the Sunni position. Firstly, they lost their leader R. al'-Khariri being capable
of flexible orienting in a complex kaleidoscope of the Lebanese political life. Secondly, only 20% of the Sunni are involved in the Islamic extremists activity but the rest are disoriented in many respects because their political elite having been powerful previously is quickly losing both the power among the adherents and its place in the administrative structure at all the levels. All that promotes to increase a dissatisfaction of the most part of the Sunni and to distribute the extremist sentiments among them which are brought by the rebels outside from Syria, Iraq, Palestine and other countries.
In winter 2006-2007 after the collisions of the army with the Islamic extremists in Nakhr al'-Barid there were many acts of terrorism all over Lebanon organized to destabilize the Lebanon society and to take attention off the Palestinian camps. One can suppose that the extremists tried to bring the inhabitants of the camps on their side to recruit their adherents from them and to join the ranks for the new battles in Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Yemen and also to prepare the new acts of terrorism in Lebanon itself. At the end of 2006 and the beginning of 2007 the figures of the ruling camp and also the deputies V. Ido and P. Zhaime, were the victims of the acts of terrorism. On the threshold of the presidential election these actions were emphasized including an attempt to "weaken the parliamentary majority", "run off the government" and even "liquidate the parliamentary majority". The presidential election complicated a very confused situation in Lebanon. To some political analysts' opinion the end of 9-year tenure of the general E. Lakhud (being illegal and going against the constitution in the eyes of many Lebanese) and the necessity to substitute him caused an acute political crisis. Many deputies fought for a post of the president (they elected a president in Lebanon but necessarily a Maronite) supported by a government at the head of the prime minister-Sunni and by the minority of the retiring president Lalkhud's followers. "The majority" and "the minority" coalitions particularity was explained not so much by internal political-ideological contradictions as the foreign -
policy orientations difference. The "majority" wanted, by all accounts, to release Lebanon from Syria's and Iran' s patronage having expanded its impact not only in Lebanon but generally in the Arabian world, in many respects owing to "Khizbulla" success. The "majority" as well as the government tried to use a massive protest of the Lebanese against R. al'-Khariri's killing and also the anti-Syrian demonstrations commonly of hundreds of thousands of the Sunni and the Maronite so named as the Cedar Revolution and the Movement on 14 March. Opposed to them "the minority" concentrated on a struggle against the USA's interference in the Lebanon affairs and the unity of all the Lebanese to resist Israel. Faulting the government for "anti-patriotism" the "minority" party demonstrated, first of all, the Shias and a part of the Maronite under the anti-western and anti-American slogans. By that "Khizbulla" used its achievements in the war with Israel in 2006 and faulted the government and the "majority" for the reluctance to cooperate with opposition in all-Lebanese interests including defense and economy. That is to say both the majority and the minority were self-contradictory coalitions of the different forces what testified the unsteadiness and instability of the social situation in the country. Any candidate could win under such conditions including not the most popular and powerful inside the country but leaning on a real military potential and support outside. The former commander in Chief of the Lebanese army, the general M. Sleiman, happened to be such candidate who only 9.3% of the Lebanese took a stand in favor for in October 2007. However, the "majority" officially proposed at last a candidate of Sleiman after the great debates. After F. Shikhab and E. Lakhud it was the third general in the history of Lebanon (also the commander in Chief, this fact is important) proposed as a compromise figure win-win for everyone. On the 25-th of May 2008, a 60-year general became the twelfth president of Lebanon having won 118 votes among 127 supported by the Maronite patriarch N. Sfeir and a general secretary of "Khizbulla" KH. Nasrallaa. The unity of the Maronite
and the Shias leaders turned out to be critically important though it was achieved with great difficulty.
The Maronite patriarch appealed the Lebanese to be unitied, suggested to adjust down the age of a body of electors up to 18 years it was a gesture towards the Moslems where the youth was more numerous) but after the parliamentary elections on the 7-th of June 2009 he advised the Lebanese not to interfere to form a government at the head of the leader of the Sunni S. Khariri. The elections were a success for the governmental majority which had won 71 mandates against 57 of opposition. However, in 2009, a tradition of gradual informal "deconfessionalization" of a political life of Lebanon was continued. The Maronite including immigrants who lived outside the country (more than 100 thousands) and where the Maronite prevailed had taken an active part in the elections. A contradictory social reality, livid with drive state and forced from outside couldn't but gave rise to more and more new crisis situations. A war with Israel in 20006, struggle of the Lebanese army against "Fatakh al'-Islam" and "Jund ash-Sham" in 2007 and other operations resulted in the army authority and at the same time the Maronite strengthening always hold key positions in the army owing to closer connections with the West, its general staffs, military academies, spy agencies and educational institutions in comparison with other communities. Not by coincidence some sort of "political renaissance" of the Maronite took place at this time. Though many their leaders were killed in internecine quarreling of the previous centenaries they preserved their impact on both economics and policy of the country.
In 2006 one tried to unite all the forces of the Maronite at "the meeting in Kedry" (in town Bsharr). However, one didn't manage to do it: the Maronite part supported S. Jaaji having accused M. Aun being eligible for the all-Lebanese leadership but the other part - tended to Aun rejecting ambitions of Jaaji having strengthened his positions very quickly -to their opinion. Thus a rift on the Maronite was preserved. A resignation of the Lebanese government on 12 January 2011 mobilized Aun's position after
11 ministers designation who resisted to appoint S. a;'-Khariri as a prime minister and insisted on a resignation of ex-prime minister N. Mikati.
Though Lebanon didn't turn out to be involved in the events of the "Arabian political spring" as a whole nevertheless it had experienced many specific events. Firstly, the refugees from the adjacent countries, first of all, from Syria rushed in Lebanon trying to leave a terrain of attack. By that a level of a migration of Syria exceeds 3 millions of people and negatively impacted on economic, social and political situation of the neighbors of Syria, especially Lebanon, Turkey and Kingdom of Jordan. Secondly, the existing official democratic institutions don't work in Lebanon. The parliament hasn't been elected since 2009 because of impossibility to provide the corresponding procedures. A new electoral law was never adopted. The presidential elections are turned into endless marathon for candidate revision.
Author of the abstract - V. Schensnovich
2017.02.015. KONSTANTIN TRUEVTSEV. DISINTEGRATION OF LIBYA AS A FACTOR OF TENSION IN AFRICA AND MEDITERRANEAN // "Azia i Afrika segodnya", Moscow, 2016, № 10, P. 12-20.
Keywords: Libya, terrorist danger, political instability, radical Islamists, ethnic separatism, jihadism, illegal migration.
Konstantin Truevtsev,
PhD (Phil.),
Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS
The author notes that the events unfolding on the African continent are in the shadow of the world attention on the background of the Middle East war. However, the whole vast
