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religious leaders and having communications to the state apparatus, are the result of its activities.
The author notes that the feature of current conflicts in the Middle East is their rather rapid transformation from the local to the regional and sometimes international. Relations between Riyadh and Tehran, as well as the situation in the region as a whole will only escalate in the near future. Their further aggravation makes illusory any hopes for a diplomatic resolution of the old Middle East conflict. Both countries are in a phase of fierce struggle for regional leadership, and a defeat in this confrontation could be fatal for each of them.
The author of the abstract - E .Dmitrieva
2016.12.009. A. KUZNETSOV. CONFESSIONAL POLARIZATION IN POST-SADDAM IRAQ AND THE PROBLEMS OF SUNNI-SHIA RELATIONS // "Islamovedenie", Makhachkala, 2016, № 1. P. 24-35.
Keywords: Iraq, Iran, Shiism, Najaf, Karbala, Saddam Hussein, Nouri al-Maliki, Moqtada al-Sadr, religious disagreements, extremism, civil war, Islamic state.
A. Kuznetsov,
Ph. Sc. (Politics), Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration
The author notes that the Sunni-Shia conflict is a major threat to stability and security in the Middle East. One of the countries most affected by the Sunni-Shia conflict is Iraq. The case study of the Iraqi conflict is of great practical and scientific value for identifying mechanisms and causes of religious conflicts in the modern Middle East. In addition, this article presents the analysis of the situation with the purpose to find out whether the religious conflict conceals deep socio-political contradictions of religious overtones.
Iraq is the birthplace of Shiism. It is on the territory of the country that the main shrines of the Shia Esnaashari are to be found: Najaf with the Imam Ali's tomb and Karbala with the tomb of Imam Hussein. According to demographic data, the Shias make up about 62.5% of the population of Iraq and the Sunnis about 20%. However, this proportion was not always like that. Historical research shows the predominance of the Sunnis until the XVIII - beginning of XIX century. Demographic changes in Iraq were due to several factors. First, the period of chaos and instability in the history of Iran , which began after the overthrow of the Safavid dynasty in 1722 caused migration to Iraq of many members of the Shia clergy and representatives of the Iranian culture. Respectively, the possibility of the Shia propaganda and religious education in Iraq increased. Second, in the XVIII-XIX centuries there was observed an influx of funds from the Shias of India and the sultans of the state of Avadh (1722-1859) to this country that raised the economic potential of the Shia community. Third, in the nineteenth century in Iraq, large-scale migrations of Bedouin tribes and their transition to residency were changing the demographic balance. In the course of this process Shia preachers of Najaf and Karbala managed to proselyte many Arab tribes.
Despite the numerical superiority before the beginning of the XXI century the Shias has a subordinate status in Iraq and were not admitted to power in the country. During the Ottoman era, this was due to the commitment of the Turkish administration to the Sunni Orthodoxy. The British who turned Iraq into their colony under the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, placed a bet on the Sunni dynasty of the Hashemites and Bedouin tribes and clans of Northern Iraq supporting it. After the overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq in 1958, the situation did not change. Officers of the Iraqi army came to power, and military service in that period was considered the prerogative of the Sunni.
The situation has not changed radically after the Baath party came to power in the result of the July revolution of 1968. However, the period of the Baathist reign should not be treated as the era of suppression of the Shias by the ruling Sunni minority, as some of the Western scholars represent it. Representatives of the Shia community accounted for almost half of the Baath party. Among the party leaders there were a few bright representatives of the Shia community. The Shias were not subjected to any particular discrimination in Iraq. The only exception was the Iraqi force structure: army and security forces, where immigrants from the Sunni community, especially from Tikrit clan, the one Saddam Hussein belonged to, dominated among generals and senior officers. Not only Shia activists were subjected to political repressions in Iraq, but also Communists, Liberals, and even sheikhs of the Sunni tribes not enough loyal to the Baathists. At the same time, the Baathist regime, being totalitarian, did not allow strengthening the position of the highest Shia clerics and Shia political parties. Control over them was intensified after the Islamic revolution of 1979 in Iran, which Saddam Hussein considered a threat to his rule. The fear of "exporting the Shia revolution" from Iran was the main reason for the war against Iran unleashed by Bagdad (1980-1988). In MarchApril 1991 the Shia uprising flared up in the southern provinces of Iraq. It was caused mostly not by religious, but rather socioeconomic reasons. After the hardships of the Iran-Iraq war, the masses of the Iraqi people were waiting for improvement of living conditions and political liberalization. The uprising was suppressed by the Republican guard.
In the attempt to rally the people of Iraq around themselves and to improve relations with the conservative monarchies of the Persian Gulf, the Baathist leadership of Iraq in 1994 initiated the campaign of "cultural Islamization". It included compulsory study of the Koran in schools, clubs for increasing Islamic literacy among the members of the Baath party, construction of new mosques. However, the "Islamic revival" touched only the Sunni
Iraqis. Shia mosques and religious education were not encouraged for fear of disloyalty of the Shia clergy. During this period the ideas of the Wahhabi and Salafi preachers began to spread in Iraq
The American occupation of Iraq in 2003, radically changed the socio-political situation in the country. The politics of Washington is responsible for the emergence in Iraq of the sectarian conflict which grew into a civil war. After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein by the Americans all the government institutions in Iraq including the army, the police and the Baath party were dismantled. In the conditions of absence of the civil society and secular opposition in the country self-organization of the Iraqis began to concentrate around religious centers. In the case of the Shia community the "assembly point" was the highest Shia clergy residing in Najaf and Karbala, in the case of the Sunnis - the Association of Muslim Ulema, becoming more and more radicalized, and extremist organizations.
Consolidation of the Iraq Shias was going on around several religious parties closely related to clerics. These were "Dawa" ("the Islamic Call Party"), the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the movement of "Ahrar" of Moqtada as-Sadr. The Islamic Call Party originated in Iraq in 1957 as a response to the spread of leftist sentiments in the country and the growing popularity of the Communists and Baathists. In 19801981, the party was banned and repressed in Iraq. After that, the party operated mainly abroad. Its various factions operated in Syria, Iran and the UK. In 2003-2004 they returned from exile to Iraq. The leader of the party was the future Prime Minister of Iraq Nouri al-Maliki. "Dawa" owed its growing popularity to the alliance with the leader of the Shia clerics Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Like A. Sistani, the party did not share the Iranian concept of velayat-e-faqih, according to which the authorities in the country should belong to the Islamic clergy. The Islamic Call Party
advocated the system of the Islamic Republic, but without the "mullahtariat".
Another party of the Shia Islamists, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). was associated with the family of Shia clerics, the al-Hakim. The party was founded in Iran in 1981 by Ayatollah Abdel Aziz al-Hakim who fled Iraq. With the help of the IRI leaders, Hakim managed to create in Iran a network of Iraqi Islamist organizations. After the death of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim in 2009 his son Ammar al-Hakim headed the party.
The third of the largest Shia groups was the Movement of Moqtada as-Sadr. Especially popular M. as-Sadr became with the poorest of the Shia population. In 1999, he was killed by Iraqi intelligence services. After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the son of the late Ayatollah Moqtada organized in Saddam city, the poorest district of Baghdad, a system of social security and self defense. Unlike other Shia leaders, he had never been in emigration, sharing the oppression of the dictatorship with their compatriots.
With the elections of 2005 coming up, the Shia Islamist parties consolidated in the "United Iraqi Alliance". By the results of the elections in January 2005, the Shia party got the majority in the Parliament. This was partly due to the boycott of the elections in the Sunni provinces. The dominance of Shia parties in the new government manifested itself in purge of the state apparatus. About 150 thousand people: officers, officials, doctors, teachers, university professors who were former Baathists (mostly Sunni) were dismissed from the public service. The new Shia elite, composed of former emigrants and rebels, announced their intention to deprive the Baathists of power and property. In addition, the new government in Iraq enjoyed the open support of the two geopolitical rivals - the USA and Iran.
The dissatisfaction of the Sunni community was used by terrorist organizations promoting infiltration of foreign jihadists to Iraq. The most dangerous of the jihadist organizations was
headed by A. Zarqawi, a Jordanian. Explosion of the tomb of Imam Hassan al-Askari in February 2006, effected by his fighters, was the signal for the outbreak of the civil war between the Shias and the Sunnis. The civil war in Iraq led to sectarian division of the country. Until the American occupation recurring tensions between the Shia and the Sunni communities had never acquired the features of a political-military conflict. The split took place on other lines: between the right and left, the Baathists and the Communists, the Arabs and the Kurds. The period of 2006-2007 was marked by separation of the two communities to the point of purges on religious basis. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the Shia radicals were supported by the power structures of the state.
The situation in Iraq achieved a certain stabilization in 2008-2009, mostly due the creation of "Sahwa" (Awakening) groups, militias of the Sunni tribes of Anbar province in Iraqe. In general, representatives of these tribes retained the political loyalty to the governments of Syria and Iraq. In Iraq, a significant number of people from Bedouin tribes served in the army as officers. The American command in Iraq in 2007-2009 used the Sunni "Sahwa" armed groups in the fight against "al-Qaeda". The Sunni community of Iraq tried to defend their rights in the legal political field. In the parliamentary elections in March 2010, the liberal-patriotic bloc, "al-Iraqiya", headed by the secular Shia Iyad Allawi got a relative majority in the Iraqi Parliament (91 seats). The Sunni parties got the majority in the bloc. However, thanks to the intervention of the United States and Iran in November 2010 the bloc of the Shia religious parties came to power once again, The bloc included the "Law Coalition," headed by Nuri al-Maliki (89 seats in the Parliament) and the Iraqi National Alliance (70 deputy's seats).
Instead of reaching consensus with the Sunnis the Baghdad regime set the course for violent suppression of the Sunni political movements. The systematic marginalization of the Sunni community and the instability in the Northern provinces of Iraq
became a breeding ground for the growing influence of extremist and jihadist organizations, among which the "Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL) became especially active. Another factor playing in favor of the jihadists, was the civil war in Syria. In addition the USA and its NATO allies seeking in 2011-2013 to overthrow the government of Bashar al-Assad, at this stage encouraged the activities of all factions of the Syrian armed opposition, including openly extremist ones. There came about a paradoxical situation, where the United States simultaneously fought the Islamic radicals in Iraq and helped them in Syria. Currently, the main prerequisite for destruction of the terrorist organization "Islamic State" in Iraq is reconciliation of the Shia and the Sunni communities. The problem of the IS cannot be solved by military means solely. Without achieving interfaith harmony in Iraq, the extremists will retain a major base of support, contributing to recurrence of military-political conflicts and revival of jihadist organizations, even in case of defeat of the IS.
The analysis of the situation of interfaith relations in Iraq permits to draw some conclusions. First, the Shia-Sunni conflict in Iraq is caused by the reasons of not theological, but of political and socio-economic nature. The civil war, the two main confessional communities of Iraq were involved in, is being carried on for power and resources. Second, a significant share of responsibility for the aggravation of the inter-religious conflict in Iraq lies with the foreign players. To a greater extent this applies to the USA, having destroyed the Iraqi statehood in order to achieve their political objectives and brought to power the irresponsible political elite. To a lesser extent this applies to Iran encouraging sectarian politicians such as Nouri al-Maliki, inciting inter-religious hatred. Third, there can be no winner in this war. The Shias will not be able to destroy the Sunni community completely. At the same time, the Sunnis will not be able to achieve the degree of leadership in Iraq they had before the overthrow of Saddam Hussein government. Even in the case of association of Sunni provinces in Northern Iraq with Northern
Syria under the auspices of the Islamists, the new entity will be influenced by neighboring Turkey. An alternative to the current conflict, according to A. Kuznetsov, can only be the creation of a political system in which the Iraqi Sunnis would be able to get their share of power and property in the country.
The author of the abstract - V. Schensnovich
2016.12.010. A. ZINNATULLIN. THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD
IN THE U.S. // "Islamovedenie", Makhachkala, 2016, № 1, P. 16-23.
Keywords: Muslim organizations of the U.S.," Muslim Brotherhood", the structure of political opportunities, Islamophobia, political regime.
A. Zinnatullin,
a researcher at the Center for Islamic Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tatarstan, a graduate student of political science at Kazan (Volga) Federal University
The author analyzes the problem of the influence of the international movement The Muslim Brotherhood on the mobilization of the Muslim community in the U.S., considering the establishment of organizations protecting the interests of Muslims.
The author refers to the theory of political opportunity structure of by the authors Doug McAdam, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, representing an interesting sociological approach to the problem of political mobilization of ethnic, religious and other social groups, the important feature of which is emphasis on the relationship between the social movement and its environment, especially the political regime
The author examines how members of the Muslim Brotherhood took advantage of the relevant U.S. political context and comes to the conclusion that the U.S. political regime did not
