CC BY
98
82
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Volume 6 Issue 4 2012
Saadat RUSTEMOVA-DEMIRZHI
Ph.D. (Political Science), Coworker at the Chair of International Relations, the University of Qankin Karatekin (Ankara, Turkey).
STRATEGIC GAMES OVER THE CASPIAN
Abstract
T
his article examines the struggle over the legal status of the Caspian related to conflicts of interests about the
division, exploitation, and transportation of energy resources, as well as the geopolitical strategies of the leading world nations.
Introduction
The problem of the Caspian arose along with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Five actors immediately appeared on the scene, each of which strove to position itself in the geopolitical game over the Caspian. The main bone of contention is the still unresolved problem of the Caspian's legal status, which is the key to resolving the division and use of its energy and biological resources. When the main world power centers joined the struggle over the Caspian, the status issue went international and is being keenly watched by the entire world community. The problem of the Caspian entails not only its subsurface and energy supplies, but primarily its geostrategic position, this being the crux of the matter for the powers that be in the region. The unresolved nature of the Caspian's legal status is aggravating many issues relating to the use and development of resources. It is also leading to a global crisis, the consequences of which are fraught with ethnic conflicts and clashes among the countries rivaling for a primary position in the Caspian.
The International Legal Status of the Caspian Sea
The geopolitical situation in the world, which dramatically changed after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, brought the question of which states have claim to the Caspian Sea and, consequently, definition of its international legal status into sharp relief. All of the sovereign post-Soviet Caspian states, with the exception of Russia, immediately declared that they did not recognize the validity of the Soviet-Iranian treaties (1921-1940) regarding the Caspian. The existing status of this water basin sharply contradicted their national interests and infringed upon their legal rights to ownership of corresponding parts of the sea.1
1 See: R. Mamedov, "Sovremenny mezhdunarodno-pravovoi status Kaspiyskogo moria: politika, diplomatiia i pra-' available at [www.lawlibrary.ru/author.php?author...%D0], 13 July, 2012.
Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 PÜWOTVPWPPIMQVVVVmViPQM 83
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
The legal status of the Caspian Sea was first reflected in the Treaty of Rasht between Russia and Iran of 1729 on demarcation and the cession to Russia of certain territories, which provided for freedom of commerce and navigation through the Caspian Sea and the Arax and Kura rivers. Later, under the Treaty of Gulistan of 1813 signed between the Russian Empire and Iran and the Treaty of Turkmanchay of 1828 that supplemented it, Russia was provided for all perpetuity with the exclusive right to have a naval fleet in the Caspian Sea. Persia only retained the right to commercial navigation. This meant full subordination of the Caspian Sea to Russian jurisdiction. In 1941, the Soviet Union abandoned complete monopoly in the Caspian, which led to the Soviet Union and Iran signing treaties in which the Caspian Sea was declared a common internal basin of both countries and could be used equally only by these two states.2 Apart from the status, which gave these states the right to free navigation and fishing within the limits of a 10-mile zone, there was no other mention in the agreement about division of the Caspian's waters. There was only the unofficial Gasan-Kuli (Turkmenistan)-Astarachai (Azerbaijan) line recognized in 1935. Despite the unofficial status of this line, both sides adhered to it both in the water and in the air; it was a regulation that both countries observed.3 The agreements entered between the Soviet Union and Iran envisaged the Caspian as an internal sea, which was later confirmed by the world community, as well as in the doctrine of international law.4
The first crisis regarding the status of the Caspian occurred in 1994 when the Contract of the Century between Azerbaijan and 12 large Western oil companies on the joint development of three oilfields (Azeri, Chirag, and Gunashli) was signed. Russia was against this agreement, declaring that it could not be valid because the Caspian is not an open sea, so the regulations of the international law of the sea cannot apply to it. Russia was the first to address this matter by requesting that the U.N. General Assembly hold a meeting on the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Since then, the status of the Caspian has become even more complicated. The indeterminate nature of the Caspian's legal status essentially suited Russia, which hoped, relying on its former status as an internal sea, to limit the access of Western companies to it, as well as maintain constant control over the exploitation and distribution of oil with the assistance of Russian companies.5 Azerbaijan was against this posing of the question since, according to Baku, when the Soviet Union disintegrated all the agreements entered by the Union lost their legal force. However, keeping in mind the fact that the Soviet Union signed all the agreements on behalf of all the Union members, this statement is not quite correct. The collapse of the U.S.S.R. does not mean that the treaties entered by the Soviet Union became invalid. Russia, as the Soviet Union's successor, continues to be a member of the U.N., and the countries that have acquired sovereignty today under the relevant acts are obliged to continue executing the international treaties entered by the Soviet Union. In 1995, the U.N. confirmed Russia's position, and not one of the countries was left with the legal power to withdraw from the agreements signed earlier by the Soviet Union and Iran. Russia's insistence on adhering to the agreement on the general use regime, which is not subject to unilateral revision, has forced the Caspian countries to look for new ways to divide the borders.
Two versions of the Caspian's status have essentially been put forward: the first—the status of a sea, and the second—the status of a "border" lake. As of today, neither version has been able to gather enough votes to be finalized. If the Caspian is given the status of a sea, the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea will apply to it. In this version, each of the Caspian countries will have the right to a 12-nautical-mile area of territorial waters (continental shelf) and a 200-mile exclusive economic zone. Since the sea is no wider than 200 miles at any point, it is proposed that the median line
2 See: A. Butaev, "Kaspiy: more ili ozero? 2. Status Kaspia," available at [http://caspiy.net/knigi/kaspij-more-ili-ozero/24-kaspij-more-ili-ozero-2-status-kaspiya-.html].
3 See: Z. Gabieva, "Pravovoi Status Kaspia," Obozrevatel, No. 8 (175), 2004, pp. 100-109.
4 See: A. Butaev, op. cit.
5 See: G.G. Kona, "Kafkasya Cografyasinda Yajanan Gelijmeler: Bölgesel ve Global Aktörlerin Bölgeye Etkisi," available at [www.turksam.org], 26.11.2007.
84 HVIWimVSPMQVWmWmM Volume 6 Issue 4 2012
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
be used to determine the boundaries of the economic zone. This also makes it possible for other states that do not have access to the sea to freely navigate, fly over, and lay cables and pipelines in the exclusively free economic zone, as well as be able to carry out scientific research work. It also gives the Caspian countries the freedom to invite the companies of the states that do not belong to the Caspian region to develop their resources.6 In this version, the waters of the Caspian can be divided into five national sectors, as Azerbaijan suggests. But the same U.N. Convention sets forth that a fundamental principle of a sea is that it must be connected to the high seas. Consequently, due to its geographical location far from the high seas, the Caspian cannot be called a sea. If the state of affairs takes a different turn and the Caspian acquires the status of a lake, the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea cannot apply to it. Division of the water area must be carried out according to the principle of the median line, which also permits dividing the Caspian into separate national sectors. This will give the littoral countries more sovereignty, since a lake belongs to the internal waters and sovereign territories of separate states and, consequently, the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of these states will be in effect. However, despite extensive talks, the littoral states have still not reached a common opinion. The commission on Caspian affairs held 15 meetings before 2004 alone with no results to speak of. The problem of the Caspian has long gone beyond the framework of discussing its status, and the actors concerned have moved on to another more important matter—division of the bed and development and exploitation of the Caspian's energy and bio resources.
Division of the Caspian
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the sovereign Caspian states began to claim their rights to separate parts of the Caspian. Iran took a particular stance by proposing that the Caspian be given the status of a lake, since otherwise it would acquire the areas with scant resources. If the Caspian is given the status of a lake, Iran proposes dividing it so that the boundaries of its section comprise a 20% sector of the sea, including the Araz-Alov-Sharq territory, where the greatest resources are concentrated.7 Not only is Azerbaijan actively against this division of the sea, but also Kazakhstan and Russia. Azerbaijan justifies its opposition by the fact that when the 1921 and 1940 agreements were signed between the Soviet Union and Iran, the latter was designated only 13% of the Caspian's water area. Russia and Kazakhstan are also against this approach, since if the Caspian is given the status of a lake, these two states will receive almost half of the waters.
Azerbaijan, in turn, is proposing the principle of dividing the Caspian into national sectors, pursuing the goal of affirming sovereignty in its national sector as soon as possible. Kazakhstan supports it, which also wants to determine its boundaries in order to begin developing oil in Kashagan. This division would give Kazakhstan 29.6%, Azerbaijan 19.5%, Turkmenistan 18.4%, Russia 18.7%, and Iran 13.8% of the water area. But this division infringes on the interests of many of the Caspian states that will lose their common boundaries. Russia will lose its boundaries with Turkmenistan and Iran, Turkmenistan with Russia, Iran with Kazakhstan and Russia, and Kazakhstan with Iran; only Azerbaijan will retain its common boundaries with all the Caspian states.8
Turkmenistan put forward another alternative of division, based on the status of a sea, claiming that each of the littoral states has the right to a 12-mile area of territorial waters and a 35-mile exclusive economic zone. The rest of the Caspian, according to Turkmenistan, should be under common use and management. So each of the countries has been putting forward its own version of the Caspian's status and its division, but not one of them has received the full support of all the states.
6 í
7 See: M. Gokge, "Sovyet sonrasi Donemde Hazar Qevresinde Yajanan Rekabet," available at [www.sosyalarastirmalar.
' See: A.M. Butaev, "Kaspiy: more ili ozero," available at [www.bname.ru/analysis/caspiy.net], 28 June, 2012.
com/cilt1/sayi3/sayi3_pdf/gokce_mustafa.pdf], 17.07.2012.
8 See: A.M. Butaev, "Kaspiy: more ili ozero," 28 July, 2012.
Volume 6 Issue 4 2012 85
Caspian Oil
According to geological studies, the Caspian Sea is the third main oil-and-gas-bearing basin in the world. Precise data are not currently known; only the analyses of Western and Russian experts are available, the data of which do not coincide with each other. Western experts believe that Russia's estimates are artificially low, since their data are much higher. The U.S. State Department noted that Caspian oil could become an important player in the oil market. Division of Caspian oil depends on the status the sea acquires. If it is designated as a lake, both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan will have an advantage, accounting for the main share of Caspian oil. If, on the other hand, it is given the status of an enclosed sea, each of the littoral states will receive its share of the 10-mile sovereign zone and the right to develop oil deposits there. This alternative should logically give all the Caspian states equal shares of Caspian oil, although studies show that different sectors of the sea have different amounts of oil. For example, Russian experts have presented data showing that oil reserves in the Russian zone of the Caspian are 100 million tonnes more than the reserves in the Azeri sector.
Interests of the World Powers
The U.S.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, the formerly peripheral Caucasian-Caspian region turned into a zone of vital interests of the major world powers. For example, the U.S. openly declared the Caspian region a zone of its interests, not only due to its rich reserves of energy resources, but also because of its important geopolitical position. The Caspian region has acquired the status of a functional region that is also an energy storehouse, transport corridor, and zone of instability requiring a well-considered security policy. The U.S.'s interest in the Caspian is defined in three vectors—energy reserves, democracy, and security.9 Ethnic conflicts and drug trafficking, which are the main problems of the Caspian zone, give the U.S. a viable reason for bringing its forces into these territories. After the operations to combat terrorism and inculcate democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Caspian region became the next target of the U.S.'s energy policy, the Caucasus and Central Asia being of even greater strategic importance than the Caspian itself. Repeatedly emphasizing the significance of these regions, the U.S. is planning to pursue a policy aimed at establishing control over Caspian resources using Afghanistan as a bridge for pumping energy resources. America is striving to occupy its niche, primarily in the southern part of the Caspian region, in order to transport Turkmen gas through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the world market. These strategies justify all the military-political operations both in Afghanistan and, in the near future, in Pakistan, with Central Asia and the Caucasus likely to be the next in line. The Caucasian zone itself is very important for the U.S., where it is placing its main stakes on Georgia. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Supsa projects, which are outside the zone of Russian control, are another trump card for the U.S. in the energy struggle.
The European Union
Caspian oil is of particular interest for the European Union, the oil consumption of which is growing with each passing day. Due to this, the EU, just like the U.S., is trying to occupy its niche in the region by advancing educational, scientific, economic, and cultural projects and grants, as well as
9 See: A. Cohen, "Advancing American Interest in Central Asia," available at [http://www.heritage.org], 17 January, 2007.
86 HVIWimVSPMQVWmWmM Volume 6 Issue 4 2012
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
spreading European values there (the protection of human rights, liberal democracy, and so on). Both the policy of penetrating strategically important zones and gaining control over the Caspian's energy resources are equally important for the EU.
China
China as the main consumer of Central Asian gas has also been pursuing an active policy of penetration into Central Asia and the Caucasus. In addition to the economic aspects, China sees the Caspian as an important zone in terms of security. China, which has an ongoing conflict in its Xin-jiang-Uighur Autonomous Region, needs partners in this zone in order to be able to control the intrusions of Uighur separatists. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, of which China is a member, acts as the main cover for implementing this policy of security and reinforcement of its boundaries.
For China's fast-growing economy, the Caspian zone is an essential storehouse for ensuring its energy needs. In this context, China is planning to lay gas pipelines through Kazakhstan to transport Turkmen and Uzbek gas. China has already occupied its niche in this region by becoming Kazakhstan's main economic and trade partner, gaining an even stronger foothold when the Almaty-Urumqi-Beijing railroad line was opened. Today, China is the U.S.'s main rival in this zone.
Iran
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran was destined to play an important role both in Central Asia and in the Caucasus. However, for the time being, Iran, which does not need the Caspian's resources, has been pursuing a unilateral policy, which is in no way conducive to resolving the acute problems arising around the Caspian. Referring to environmental problems, it is trying to hinder the energy project between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan that plan to lay a Trans-Caspian pipeline through the region for exporting gas to Europe. Iran is resolutely against Azerbaijan's idea of dividing the Caspian into national sectors, which is explained by its fear that its possession of Caspian energy resources will give Azerbaijan more power. Moreover, Iran, in the territory of which more than 20 million ethnic Azeris live, is worried about Azerbaijan possibly supporting its fellow countrymen. All of this put together predetermines Iran's position regarding the status of the Caspian and division of its resources.
In Lieu of a Conclusion
In my opinion, the geographic characteristics of the Caspian suggest that giving it the status of a "border" lake is the most acceptable solution. Its physical and geographical features indicate that it is a lake, which is scientifically confirmed by many leading researchers. Definition of the Caspian's status will make it possible for the littoral states to reach a consensus about the development of its resources. This can only be achieved with effective cooperation among the countries of the Caspian region and their complete consensus in defining the rules and limitations for exploitation of the Caspian's energy and bio resources, as well as their transportation. So talks among the Caspian countries should form the basis of partnership and concurrence in all disputes. Only this approach will guarantee that none of the sides' interests are infringed upon, while all the littoral states will share responsibility in resolving the Caspian's environmental issues.
