CC BY
18
S. Luzyanin,
doctor of historic sciences
RUSSIA AND CHINA IN THE CENTRAL ASIA:
COMPETITION OR COOPERATION?
Preceding the main subject, it seems to be feasible to explain the widely used term "classic Central Asia". The notion "Central Asia" has not yet acquired the unified interpretation in contemporary political science. Big countries and international "players", possessing their political and economic interests in the whole world and/or in its many regions (RF, China, the USA, European Union, India and a number of Islamic states) often define in a different way the limits of the Central Asia. The world political and scientific definitions contain: a) "classical" Central Asia, the North-West situated near the borders of the USSR/Russia with China and Mongolia, in the east the region is located to Great Khingan, Ordoss curve of river Huang He and Sino-Tibet mountains in China, in the south it reaches upper Indus, as well as, - b) "new" or post-Soviet Central Asia composed of Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The term "Central Asia" was put into the world political circulation in 1993, when at the summit of the heads of the member-states of the USSR it was proposed to name in this way the region, consisted of five countries.
The growth of influence of China in "classical" Central Asia is evident. The development of strategic relations with PRC in this region ensures for Russia both present and future priorities and needs of cooperation; therefore, as is understandable, great interest is paid by the RF to different mechanisms and projects of Asian cooperation, where China has stable positions and great experience. Obviously, the rise of political influence of China is not supported by the USA and its allies; on the contrary, through various structures they try to deter this
process, applying not always correct means. China regards Russia in the Asian space as a natural ally against the rise of hegemony and dictate of one country. The views of two countries on problems of strategic security in the CA, cooperation and its development in the region are near or coincide.
The international-legal level of relations between two countries, as it is known, is based on the fundamental basis of Chinese-Russian cooperation, including thousands of documents and ensured by work of dozens of inter-official commissions and structures. The key document is the signed on 16 July 2001 in Moscow the treaty on good neighbor relations, friendship and cooperation. This document reflected the realities of bilateral relations - the joint urge of the RF and the CPR towards formation of multi-polar world, efficient counteraction to international terrorism as well as to the destructive world financial-economic crises. Russia has determined its attitude to rapidly developing China as to a long-term strategic partner.
For the XXI century the following factors raise their significance: dependence of China on Russian energy resources and of Russia on Chinese investments and technologies, experience of integration in world history, wise combination of liberal and state approaches to economy. The significant task of systemic interpenetration of two cultures and civilizations was achieved. The Year of Russia in China in 2006 and the Year of China in Russia in 2007 were celebrated and showed that the shaped structure of non-formal, people's relations is being improved. Actually, the leaders of the RF and the PRC have raised the process of Russian-Chinese rapprochement to the higher level.
The post-Soviet Central Asia.
The comparative analysis of the RF and the PRC.
Under conditions of impact of the world financial crisis on the region of the post-Soviet Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kirghizstan and Turkmenistan), the role and significance of Russia and China in rendering assistance to implementation of anticrisis national programs assumes a special interest. The comparative analysis of Russia and China examples shows an appreciable evolution in perception of the RF and China in the region. The political elites and the public circles of the CA countries think that in terms of security and economic cooperation Russia and China objectively come to the forward positions as the most efficient states, capable to provide a wide specter of services and chances both at the level of bilateral cooperation and the multi-lateral formats, within the frameworks of ODKB, EvrAzES. Besides, against the background of western discussions on alleged subversive actions and existence of "dangerous and perfidious" Chinese strategies relating to the Central Asia, Russian and Chinese initiatives actually contribute to the support of underdeveloped countries of the region, to the development of their economics, infrastructures, rise of the social level of the population's living, deepening the positive perception of two countries in the Central Asia.
At the same time, the process of shaping images of the RF and China in the CA is marked by certain specification, connected with both the historic basis of Russian (Soviet) and Chinese presence in the region and the present realities of bilateral reciprocal actions of the RF and China with each of the CA states. In general, the historic basis of Russian positions, primarily the whole Soviet past, despite the remained negative feelings of the population and of the political elites of the region relating to ideology of the CPSU and its national policy, promote to a larger extent just the positive image of Russia. The CA countries mainly have preserved the basis of industry and infrastructure, as well as the cultural-language basis, formed in time of
the USSR, which today promotes successfully modernization of independent states.
The historic experience of mutual cooperation of China with peoples of the region is mainly connected with the attempts the Empire's dynasties to consolidate dependence of this region, to transform the CA peoples in the vassals of the Empire. The Kazakhs, the Kirghiz, the Tajiks, the Uighurs and many other ethnoses keep in their consciousness the negative historic stereotype of China, perceived as a threat to independence. On the other side, the contemporary experience of mutual cooperation of the PRC with the CA countries changes this (traditional) stereotype, creating a new, positive image of China as an economically powerful state, capable to render assistance to weak economies of the CA states.
The Chinese-Kazakh model. Evidently, Kazakhstan remains the main priority for China in the CA region in terms of bilateral cooperation's development. According to experts of the Chinese institute of international relations, the cooperation of China and Kazakhstan in the energy sector is the starting point and the guiding direction of extending mutual actions of China in economic and trade spheres with the CA countries. The share of Kazakhstan in the trade turnover of China with the CA countries, members of ShOS, makes 80%. Kazakstan exports to China energy resources (oil and gas), which account for 63% of the whole export, non-ferrous and ferrous metals (mainly as scrap), steel - 24%. In exchange Kazakhstan receives products of engineering and metal-working industries (72%), food products (11%) and other goods of muss consumption, a lot of which might be produced in Kazakhstan. The rise of the trade turnover goes on mainly thanks to the trans-border free trade zone, opened in 2006. It is evident that a certain quality change took place in the relations between two countries; it became systemic and comparable with
"great" Euro-Asian powers (India, Russia). Thus, the image of the PRC in Kazakhstan is connected with shaping of some "investing model" of the rich state, making big investments in the fuel energy complex and greatly surpassing Russia in this sphere. Apart from positive aspects of this phenomenon, public opinion and mass media of Kazakhstan show dissatisfaction (concern) about massive Chinese participation in development of oil and gas resources of Kazakhstan.
Tandem Russia-Kazakhstan at present ensures stability in the Central Asia, drawing a different image (distinct from Chinese) of Russia as a state partner for affairs of security in the region. And not only bilateral projects but also joint participation in ODKB contribute to it.
The following events were significant in principle for Astana and Moscow, which took place in 2006: 1) ratification by the parliaments of the agreement, concluded in 2005, on the Russian-Kazakh border; 2) in January signing in Astana of documents on creation of the Eurasian bank of development (EBD) with the authorized capital of $ 1.5 billion (2/3 - Russia, 1/3 -Kazakhstan). It was decided that on the territory of two countries (and in future of probable new members) the bank shall be not liable to pay any taxes, fees and duties.
The policy of Russia in relation to Kazakhstan is characterized by a new quality of political confidence, diversification of Russian projects (energy, chemical industry, investments, cosmos, banking), rise of bilateral trade turnover at the expense of Russian export.
On 20 December 2007, Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan signed the three-lateral agreement on construction of the Caspian gas pipeline. In May 2007, the four-lateral agreement on extension of capacity of the gas pipelines system Middle Asia-Center (MAC) was signed by Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The signed documents clearly show that the issue of Kazakh gas transit will
become significant for Russia, China and Kazakhstan itself in the nearest time. In perspective, the annual amount of 80-100 billion cubic meters of gas may be shipped through Kazakhstan, which will become the cross-roads, where Turkmen and Uzbek gas will turn either to Russia or to China.
Comparing "image" specific features of the two regional cooperation's models (CPR-Kazakhstan and RF-Kazakhstan), one should note not only some (objective) lack of convergence of interests within these two pares but also the probability to liquidate the rising contradictions, if cooperation of these states (particularly, in the energy sphere) is carried out at the three-lateral level (RF-PRC-RK).
The Chinese-Kazakh agreements (achieved at the negotiations in 2003 and 2004) on construction of the oil pipeline to China and on development of the Chinese investment activities in the oil and gas sphere of Kazakhstan were not positively commented by all experts in Russia. Some experts considered them as certain hidden anti-Russian steps on the part of Astana. Other experts regarded that China had intensified its policy related to Kazakhstan because Russia had postponed implementation of Datsin project. On the contrary, some analysts considered intensification of Chinese-Kazakh cooperation in the oil industry as the wish of Beijing to create the energy "corridor" in the direction of China, alternative to western companies, and stressed that it does not create any challenges and threats.
It should be mentioned that, projecting this discussion to the present realities, all reciprocal suspicions of the 1990s have gone to the past. The RF, the PRC, the RK have justified their rights for diversification of energy export without any detriment to each other. In 2003, Kazakhstan raised the issue of the chance for Russia to participate in shipment of oil to China in combination with Kazakhstan's projects. Many experts in Kazakhstan expressed doubts
that Kazakhstan would be able simultaneously to fill all pipelines by oil, including the principal pipeline to China. In this connection the perspectives of new cooperation between Astana and Moscow appear. Some companies of Kazakhstan proposed Russian colleagues to consider a chance to enlarge to 30 million tons the annual amount of Russian oil for pumping through under-loaded oil pipeline Atyrau-Samara and other transit oil pipelines with the perspective of Russian oil export by the principal pipeline to China. The participation in such project may have a rather good perspective for Russia, since shaping of a kind of Russia-Kazakhstan oil cartel might enforce the position of Moscow and Astana as sellers in the world oil markets.
Chinese-Turkmen relations are based on the commissioned in December 2009 new gas pipeline Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan-China and the further development of energy cooperation. The decease of S. Niyazov in December 2006 and election in February 2007 as new leader of Turkmenistan of G. Berdymukhamedov made some accents in the Chinese-Turkmen relations. Beijing was concerned about probable political destabilization in Ashghabad and deviation of the new leader from traditional neutrality to greater rapprochement with the West, which might negatively influence the stable relations between two countries. The change of leadership made Beijing intensify preparation of gas project on the planned import of Turkmen gas. The implementation of the gas project started in August 2007. The mutual trade turnover between PRC and Tukmenistan for the period of 19972008 increased almost by 19 times - from $ 19 million (1997) to $ 453 million (2008). The main items of Turkmen export to PRC - energy bearers and products of oil-chemical industry (85%), cotton oil and other types of cotton raw materials, produce of textile and light industry. China exports to Turkmenistan production of industrial-
technical devices and construction materials (60% of Turkmen import), consumption goods (over 30%).
The present format of relations between Turkmenistan and Russia in the gas sector is connected with the perspectives of Tukmen gas deliveries to Russia. The pipelines, existed since Soviet times (Asia-the Center), do not cope with the amount of gas shipment. In case of greater deliveries, construction of new pipelines and consecutive rise of Russian or other (Chinese, Iranian, Kazakh) investments will be needed for implementation of projects. Russia and China confront each other in eastern part of Turkmenistan. Russia intends to rise greatly import of Turkmen gas by the MAC system. In the course of implementation of Chinese-Turkmen gas projects Turkmenistan may arrange an auction on the prices for its gas. "Gasprom" was traditionally oriented to keeping monopoly and low import prices. However, it will be rather difficult for Russia to keep monopoly for purchase of Turkmen gas.
The Caspian problems directly influence Russian-Turkmen relations. The potential sphere of cooperation is their reciprocal interest in mutual development of Caspian resources. The main hindrance for all Caspian states is determination of the legal status of the sea. In its turn, this problem "disintegrates" into separate bilateral "options" relating to five Caspian states - Russia, Kazakhstan, Iran, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. The known position of Russia is as follows: "water" is a common property, the ground should be divided into five sectors. The agreements on division of the ground have been signed already between Russia and Kazakhstan, Russia and Azerbaijan. The problems relating to the Caspian Sea are still not solved between Iran and Turkmenistan.
CPR - Kirghizstan. The so-called tulip revolution in Kirghizstan on 24-25 March of 2005 was a difficult test for Chinese-
Kirghiz relations. Chinese experts expressed their concern in this respect, related to the aggravation of trans-border Uighur separatism, probable change of attitude to ShOS by the new leadership of Kirghizstan. China enforced its trade presence in Kirghizstan. Its export surpasses import from Kirghizstan by 32.5 times. The share of China in trade turnover of Kirghizstan accounts for almost 90%. Beijing, aspiring for better relations with new leadership of Kirghizstan, increased its credited import from Kirghizstan. Creation of the free trade trans-border zone between two countries accelerated this process. Since both countries are members of the WTO, the access of Chinese goods to markets of Kirghizstan is easier than to other countries. The export from Kirghizstan includes textile raw component (leather and wool- about 25%), ferrous and non ferrous scrap (about 60%). The components of Kirghiz import are as follows: machines and equipment (6%), foods and other items of mass consumption goods (about 85%). In other words, the image of China for the Kighiz people at present is the following: the state, which maintains trade with Kirghizstan, being for it "the elder trade brother".
Russia-Kirghizstan. Kirghistan in time both of the first president A. Akayev and the second president K. Bakiyev was always one of the outposts in the Central Asia. The collective emergency forces' detachment located in Kant was an integral part of the structure - ODKB. In September of 2003 the ministers of defense of Russia and Kirghizstan signed the treaty on the status and conditions of location of the Russian air base in Kirghizstan, which was officially grounded on 23 October 2003.
Another feature of "Akayev" period of Russian-Kirghiz relations was as follows: the Russian leadership after the known "color revolutions" in Georgia and Ukraine with restrain regarded the course of A.Akayev, directed to open relations with the West, democratization
in the country, which in reality resulted rather to corruption and shadow business. For A. Akayev period, the American military base was located in Kirghizstan (airport Manas), commissioned in December 2001 within the framework of anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan. In autumn of 2003 the agreement between the USA and Kirghizstan on activities of the base in Manas was extended for other three years. The remaining "parallelism" of military presence of Russia and the USA in Kirghizstan had negative impact on bilateral relations between Russia and Kirghizstan.
The gradual growth of Russian capital's presence in Kirghizstan is marked in the economic sphere. The size of investments of the RF in economy of the republic grows annually by 30%.
The RF - Uzbekistan. In the end of the 1990s, president I. Karimov, as it is known, tried to shape the strategy of rapprochement with the USA. Russia was apprehended in a cool and sometimes unfriendly way. The Russian economic growth since 2000 (against the background of economic stagnation in Uzbekistan) objectively raised interest of Uzbekistan to Russia. Keeping in mind the significance of the economic factor and its influence on evolution of Tashkent's policy relating to Russia, the complex of security issues seems to play the main reason of development of relations with Russia. Uzbekistan, having signed with Russia on 16 June 2004 the treaty on strategic partnership, actively participated in the summit of the heads of member-states of ShOS (17-18 June 2004), which becomes more and more the counterbalance to the American influence in the region. Uzbekistan entered this organization 2001. In 2006, I. Karimov insisted that Americans should leave this base in Uzbekistan, and following the long-term negotiations Washington had to submit to the demand of Tashkent and to leave the base in Uzbekistan. Moscow and Beijing made the impression on the Uzbek president, since they did not lectured
him how to govern and develop the state, society and democracy, were interested exclusively in affairs of security and economy, preservation of the general status-quoin the region, which coincided completely with the interests of Karimov. But in the beginning of 2009 Tashkent, having recalled about advantages of economic assistance of the West, suspended its membership in EvrAzES, which caused the negative reaction in Moscow.
China-Tajikistan. For the years of civil war in Tajikistan (19931997), China, confining itself to the principles of peaceful coexistence and non-interference in internal affairs, did not support any of the parties, limiting itself to rendering to the republic of humanitarian and technical assistance. The amount of trade turnover accounted for $157 million in 2005, $323 million in 2006, $482 million in 2007. The main items of export of Tajikistan to China are the raw resources: aluminum, other non-ferrous and rare earth metals, cotton fiber; the Tajik import from China consists of not complicated produce of engineering industry, mass consumption goods. Within the framework of ShOS, Tajikistan got from China the preferential credit in the amount of $600 million, which is used mainly for construction of electric power line 500 "South-North" and electric power line 220 in Khatlon region as well as for construction of tunnel under the mountain pass Shar-Sharon the route to Dushanbe-Kulyab. China gives great support to the Tajik light industry (production of cotton and silk fabrics).
In view of prominent economist Khajimakhmat Umarov, just the flow of cheap (at the prices 2-3 times lower than average world prices) mass consumption goods, delivered by China, helped Tajikistan to realize its program of struggle against poverty. For the last two years, the share of the poorest stratum of the population decreased from 83.4% to 64%. The following projects are being implemented with assistance of China: reconstruction of the cement enterprise in
Dushanbe, production of sodium hydroxide, deliveries of equipment for pits and of mining equipment for development of tin and tungsten deposits. Of special importance for the republic are deliveries of light agricultural machines and lift linkage for them, as well as aggregates for small hydroelectric stations and windmills for mountainous districts. For the period of 2006-2007, the support, given by China to construction of the first hydroelectric station of the cascade of such stations in Zeravshan valley demonstrates a firm decision of the PRC to raise in terms of quality its investment activities.
The RF - Tajikistan. The relations between Moscow and Dushanbe passed hard tests for the period of civil war in Tajikistan (1992-1997) and for the years of restoration of peace in the republic. The specifics of contemporary Russian-Tajik ties are determined by a number of contradictory factors.
First, it is necessary to take into account the problem of Tajik labor migration (mainly illegal) in Russia. The annual flow of Tajik migrants to the RF in search for work makes from 300 to 500 thousand people. The Russian authorities try to put this process under the legal and administrative control, but de facto migration and further migrants' activities are kept under a weak control.
Second, Russia has drafted some big investment plans for Tajikistan. In its time, RAO "EES of Russia" in its time signed an agreement with the government of Tajikistan on the conditions of share participation of the RF in implementation of the project aimed at termination of construction of Sangtudinskaya hydroelectric station with the planned investment of $250-300 million. Before 2007, Russian company "Rusal" prepared some projects on construction of Rogunskaya hydroelectric station and concluded the agreement on reconstruction of aluminum enterprise in Regar and construction of the second in the country aluminum plant with projected capacity of 200
thousand tons per year. The company was able to make investments in the size of $1.2 billion in economy of Tajikistan. Due to the exaggerated technological demands of the Tajik side concerning the height of the Rogunskaya hydroelectric station's dam and due to other claims, "Rusal" withdrew from this project, giving the chance for other aspirants to participation in Tajik projects.
Third, one should take into account functioning of the Russian military base in Tajikistan. The motorized infantry division N 201 was used as a foundation of the base; its detachments were located in Dushanbe, Kurgan-Tyube and Kulyab. The Russian base in Tajikistan became one of the mightiest links in the security system of ODKB in the Central Asia. With due account of the Russian-Tajik agreement on the working regime of Russian mountainous station "Nurek" ("Window"), which has for Moscow the strategic significance in the sphere of cosmic tracking, it is possible to put this factor into the positive outcome of this partnership.
Fourth, it is necessary to mention the problem of Tajik-Afghan border and security of Russia. On 16 October 2004, the border services of Russia and Tajikistan signed a special agreement on the gradual passage of border guarding from Russian to Tajik detachments of border guards, which terminated in 2006. Regretfully, the service of Tajik border guards did not promote strengthening of the struggle against narcotics traffic, which was increased by 3.5 times by 2006. Local residents joke with regret that today the border is "divided" among relatives and chiefs of Tajik (Afghan) tribes, living on the opposite sides of the border, where each tribe has fixed its price. The certain "tribal privatization" of the main trans-border channels and routes of narcotics transportation took place. It is a significant question, who benefited and who lobbied on the Tajik side the decision to replace Russian border guards by Tajik border guards. Probably, the negative
results of the border "reform" were taken into account by the presidents of Russia and Tajikistan at their meeting in Sochi on 26 May 2006, when they agreed on coordination of cooperation in the border region and approved a program of assistance to Tajikistan for formation of the border service of this republic.
It is possible to conclude that the relations between two countries are based on: a) the interest of big Russian business of state and nonstate companies in Tajik market of electric energy and aluminum; b) the significance of military component, which has for Russia both global
strategic (complex "Nurek") and regional meaning (the 4th base).
* * *
Summing up the review of the present existence and of evolution of the images of Russia and China on the "post-Soviet" territory (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan), it is possible to make the following conclusions.
The aggravation of the problem, related to maintenance of transborder security, the opposition to hegemony of the USA, and mainly the problem of ensuring economic interests becomes the mighty factor of giving positive images to Russia and the PRC in the CA space. Despite lack of convergence of Russian and Chinese particular economic interests and their certain disparity to aspirations of the CA states, there are no reasons to say that these differences determine shaping of "final" images of the RF and the PRC in the region at this stage. The key "image making" factor remains a mutual advantage of economic reciprocal actions of China with the region's states at the bilateral level, on the one side, and cooperation with Russia with the same countries (in the bilateral format as well), on the other side.
The comparison of the Chinese and the Russian images in the CA is characterized by the specific perception of Russia and China by the CA elites and by the peoples of the region. The peculiarities of Russian image are connected with: a) the common character of cultural-language traditions, which is being traced also today; b) greater (comparing with China) common historic and economic roots; c) stronger positions of Russia in the sphere of regional security. The peculiarities of the Chinese image in the CA are determined by: a) greater potentialities of the PRC economy at present stage comparing with potential of national economy of the RF, successful Chinese reforms and efficiency of the anti-crisis program of the PRC; b) availability for the nearest perspective of big financial-investment projects for development of infrastructure and other spheres of economy in the region's states as well as achievement of real positive results at the stages of implementation of these projects; c) finally, stronger positions of China in the sphere of economic cooperation.
As negative factors, having impact on shaping image of the PRC in the CA, should be mentioned the remaining concerns of weak states of the region (Tajikistan and Kirghizstan) about the uncontrolled extension of the Chinese presence in economies of these countries and about transformation of the latter into the raw resources addition to China, including complete "erosion" of national economies. The procrastination of the RF (in comparison with China) in submitting and implementation of economic projects has a negative impact on formation of Russian image.
Mir i politika", M, 2010, N 2, p. 24-36.
