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and for the great majority of Tatars in RT. As was mentioned, the consolidation of the role of state-civil identity continued not at the expense of regional identity but side by side and in correlation with it.
At the same time, a high level of subjective significance of ethnic identity of Tatars remains intact and the essential actualization of ethnic identity of Russians goes on. This tendency also does not hinder the growth of all-Russian identity, which is proved by the opinion, expressed in scientific literature, about a feasibility of their organic correlation.
"Sotsis: Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya", M., 2011, N 5, p. 71-77.
Stanislav Chernyavsky,
doctor of historic sciences, director of Center for Post-Soviet studies MGIMO RUSSIA AND AZERBAIJAN IN THE POST-SOVIET PERIOD
At present, the Russian-Azerbaijani relations represent a significant component of the versatile structure of the world community. In spite of seemingly pure regional characteristic of bilateral cooperation, it has an essential influence on solving problems of not only of energy but also f military-political security at the global level. Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan - all these countries marked by higher level of instability are located near Azerbaijan in terms of geography. Hence, the special role in solving the connected problems is urged to play the Russian-Azerbaijani reciprocal action.
For the first years following disintegration of the USSR, Russia was occupied with introducing proper order in the Federation, did not take political measures in the South Caucasus regarding it as its
undisputable zone of influence. The military presence in Georgia and Armenia, fixed by inter-governmental agreements, allowed hope that Tbilisi and all the more Yerevan would submissively follow lead of Russia. Meantime, the political configuration in the region changed quickly, the new ruling elites declared other priorities of development, oriented to the extra-regional powers and supported their choice by special inter-state documents creating the legal basis for filling "the vacuum left by Russia". For the first years of independence, the relations of Azerbaijan with Russia were not characterized by friendly atmosphere. Mutual claims and reproofs (as a rule, extremely emotional) prevailed in them. Moscow and Baku with difficulties accustomed themselves to live in a new way. With due account of military actions in Karabakh, the most complicated part of the negotiation process between Azerbaijan and Russia turned out to be the issues of the status of Russian forces, the division of military stores of the Soviet army and the Caspian navy, as well as the negotiations on the procedure of border protection. The mercenaries unexpectedly created a rather painful problem, since many former servicemen of the Soviet army took part in military actions in Nagorny Karabakh conflict of both sides. The tense situation was shaped in connection with the big military object - Gabalin center of warning against rocket attack, built in Soviet time in the place located 250 km from Baku.
By G. Aliyev coming back to power (summer 1993) the two states were in the stage of confrontation. The reciprocal accusations and reproaches as well as exchange of notes of protest were not ceased. On 5 September 1993, G. Aliyev came to Moscow for negotiations with the leadership of the Russian Federation. Before his departure he declared that he did not consider obtaining independence to be "the pretext for severance of political, economic, cultural and pure human relations with Russia". The existed level of relations between two states was in
need of significant corrections and a higher status. It was primarily in the interests of the republic, experiencing significant difficulties due to the brake of inter-economic connections, stressed G. Aliyev. G. Aliyev had a meeting with B. Yeltsin and R. Khasbulatov; he presented to the Russian leadership the statement of Milli Majilis with agreement on extradition of six Russian servicemen, including five of them sentenced to capital punishment, to the Russian law enforcement bodies. The parties signed the inter-governmental agreement on regulation of succession relating to the external state debt and assets of the former USSR. According to the document, Russia assumed the obligation on payment of the share of Azerbaijan in the external debt of the former Soviet Union by 1 December 1991. At the same time, Azerbaijan assigned to Russia its share of assets of the former USSR.
Having joined the CIS on 26 September 1993, the leadership of Azerbaijan expected that Russia would render it assistance on deserved conditions to terminate war in Karabakh, which prevented to put the situation in order in the country, to consolidate political stability and realization of urgent economic arrangements. However, the passivity of the leadership of Russia in summer and autumn of 1993 relating to the cessation of the war in Karabakh and further new seizures by Armenians of Azerbaijani lands to a large extent damped these hopes, which became one of the reasons of Baku orientation to rapprochement with the West. Of certain significance was the circumstance that Russia with its stagnated economy was unable to render real assistance to economic renaissance of Azerbaijan and all the more compete with the prepositions of the West concerning development of oil fields on the shelf of the Caspian Sea. It should be recognized the for the given period the Russia party lacked a fixed strategic line in relation to the Trans-Caucasus and took the indeterminate, often thoughtless and
ungrounded decisions, which contributed to weakening of its positions in the region.
In December 1994, the Russian army started activities aimed at "installation of constitutional order" in Chechnya, and on 19 December the government adopted the decision N 1394 "On the Measures for Temporary Limitation of Crossing the State Border of the RF with Azerbaijan and Georgia", and as a result of it the border of Russia with Azerbaijan was closed in the unilateral way. The functioning of the railway, maritime and automobile transportation was stopped in the northern direction. As the reason of "the blockade" was the accusation by Russia of Baku rendering military assistance to Chechnya as follows: transportation via the territory of Azerbaijan foreign fighters, of cargoes with arms and explosives, recruiting Azerbaijani fighters and free accommodation of wounded Chechen fighters in Azerbaijani military hospitals granting numerous Chechen families permanent residence. The official negotiations were conducted with the leadership of Chechnya on the joint construction of an oil pipeline via the Caucasian mountain ridge to the Georgian shore of the Black Sea. The external political contacts of the leadership of Ichkeria were conducted via Azerbaijan.
The "pro-Chechen" position of Baku to a large extent was explained by the unleashed struggle for the guaranteed and unimpeded export of Caspian oil - the sole source of getting hard currency to stabilize the social-economic situation in the country and to repel the military offensive of Armenia in Karabakh. The activities aimed at "the installation of the constitutional order" in Chechnya resulted in the following: "the northern route" (Baku-Grozny-Tihoretsk-Novorossiysk) proposed by Russia as an exclusive option lost finally its attractiveness for the western companies, which made big investments in Caspian oil fields. Although Russia and Azerbaijan signed in Moscow on
18 January 1996 the agreement on transit of Azerbaijani oil through the territory of the RF, it became clear that the route of the main export pipeline would go round Russia. The forces interested in weakening positions of Russia in the Caucasus with impudence used "the Chechen card".
The Russian party aspired to lay the blame for its failure to fulfill its obligations for oil transit through the Chechen part of the pipeline (153 km) on the Azerbaijani party, which, obviously, was not guilty. And what is more, in the course of discussion by delegations of Azerbaijan and Russia of the issue of transportation of Azerbaijani oil through Chechnya it was found out that the Russian leadership lacks the united meaning concerning the status of the Chechen party. Russia was unable to ensure security of the pipeline.
The military conflict in Dagestan in 1999, side by side with the resumed in the same autumn anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya fixed the unfavorable position of Russia and provided the supporters of its "pipeline" isolation with additional arguments. Greatly thanks to these circumstances the USA and Turkey succeeded to adopt the political decision and soon to terminate construction of new oil pipeline Baku-Supsa. It became evident that Azerbaijan needed the other oil pipeline laid though Turkey to the Mediterranean. The constant irritation in the Russian-Azerbaijani relations was and is the military cooperation between Moscow and Erevan, which is considered by Baku as an attempt to destabilize the situation for the advantage to Armenia. For the sake of justice it should be said that the Russian party repeatedly gave cause for Baku to such suspicions.
In March 1997 G. Aliyev directed to B. Yeltsin the message expressing "a particular alarm" in connection with information on delivery of Russian military equipment to Armenia and asked "to investigate these facts and to take effective measures in this
connection". Further, G. Aliyev directed a new message on this matter, while the ministry of foreign affairs of Azerbaijan made a corresponding declaration. The Azerbaijani party expressed a hope that as a result of the investigation the officials involved in unlawful activities related to delivery of Russian military equipment to Armenia would be discovered and punished, that above all the corresponding measures would be taken to withdraw this equipment from Armenia. On 28 March, G. Aliyev raised the question on delivery of military equipment at the sitting of the Council of state heads of the CIS, and on 29 March this problem was subject to discussion at the meeting of the presidents of Russia and Azerbaijan. As a result, the compromise agreement was achieved on a thorough verification of all connected circumstances and on abstention up to the final investigation from public declarations by the parties on this theme (further the Azerbaijani party repeatedly violated this agreement). The Russian leadership charged the Principal military attorney office of Russia to carry out a thorough investigation of this matter, while the State Duma created a special commission.
In April, having discussed at the close meeting the report of L. Rokhlin, chairman of the committee for defense, on the unlawful delivery of military equipment for the sum of $ 1 billion to Armenia, the State Duma adopted the decision on measures for compliance with the legislation of the Russian Federation in delivery of military equipment to foreign states. The deputies asked B. Yeltsin to take the necessary political and diplomatic measures to prevent probable interstate complications in connection with unlawful delivery of military equipment to Armenia as well as to take all measures to prevent the similar facts of violation of legislation in case of delivery of military equipment to other countries and to institute proceedings against the persons liable for these violations. In these very unfavorable
circumstances, on 2-4 July 1997, the first official visit of president of Azerbaijan G. Aliyev to the Russian Federation took place.
On 29 August 1997, Russia, as was planned, signed with Armenia the treaty on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance. The Azerbaijani party considered it as an intention to make legal the military union between two states. One of the accusations of Russia was the assertions that its liabilities arising from the documents signed in one case with Armenia and in the other case with Azerbaijan contradict each other. The document signed with Azerbaijan declares the readiness to be guided by the norms of international law in regulation of Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, but the document signed with Armenia bounds Russia to be guided by the search for a mutually acceptable decision. It was regarded by Azerbaijan as discrepancy with the status of Russia as a co-chairman of the OSCE group of Minsk. The reaction of Russian party to these accusations turned out to be not less strongly-worded: the ministry of foreign affairs of Russia recalled that in the process of preparation of the renewed treaty between Russia and Azerbaijan the Azerbaijani party did not agree with its proposals to extend connections in the military-political sphere. The intensity of the exchange of notes and "the temperature" of reciprocal accusations achieved such degree that on 7 October 1997 E. Primakov, minister of foreign affairs of Russia visited Baku. However, he did not succeed to alleviate this tension.
By autumn 1999, the Russian-Azerbaij ani relations finally reached a deadlock. The reciprocal accusations were repeated, and exchange of notes of protest did not cease. Azerbaijan with great attention registered the contacts of Moscow with Yerevan and in a rigid form reacted to, mildly speaking, "ill-considered" statements of high military Russian officials about the contribution of Russia in defense potential of Armenia. On its part, Moscow with justification pointed out
that several hundred Chechen fighters were treated in hospitals and sanatoria of Baku and that field commanders and foreign emissaries visit by air through the capital's airport the Western Europe and the USA. It was a common secret that at that time the anti-Azerbaijani feelings and the thesis about "Azerbaijani mafia", which captured the retail trade, deeply penetrated the Russian society. The question of introduction of visa regime with Azerbaijan was raised on 5 November 1999 by the Ministry of foreign affairs of the RF, which sent its delegation to Baku. According to unofficial information, by that time about 2 million Azerbaijanis (30 percent of the male population) worked in Russia half-legally. They made money transfers to Azerbaijan, which accounted for several billion US dollars (from $ 2.5 to $ 4 billion) annually (the size of Azerbaijani export for 2002 did not surpass $ 2.16 billion).
The aggravation of the political climate was reflected also in the indexes of mutual trade turn over. In summer 1999, the amount of the Russian-Azerbaijani trade turn over comparing with the same period in 1997 reduced by 33%, while the share of Russia in the trade turn over of Azerbaijan fell down to 18%.
The period in January 2001 rightfully is considered as a starting point for a principally new stage in development of relations between Russia and Azerbaijan. Exactly at that time, in the course of the first visit to Baku of the president of the RF for the post-Soviet period, G. Aliyev and V. Putin succeeded to eliminate many difficulties accumulated in the bilateral relations. The negotiations carried out in friendly and constructive way became a significant stage in consolidation of the regular political dialogue at the highest level. The dynamics given to the bilateral cooperation in 2001 acquires new acceleration at the present time. The characteristic of contacts between the leaders to a large extent determines the level of cooperation
between the countries. President of Azerbaijan I. Aliyev at the meeting in Moscow on 17 April 2009 with president of Russia D.A. Medvedev said that it was gratifying that the friendly relations between Russia and Azerbaijan characterize as well the relations between the two presidents. They use each meeting maximum efficiently and in the candid atmosphere discuss all needed issues. They are convinced each time that the number of the issues in need of urgent interference reduces more and more. There are no problems between the two countries, and the issues in need of discussion are being settled in operative way, said D.M. Medvedev during the meeting.
The declaration on friendship and strategic partnership adopted by the presidents of two countries in Baku on 3 July 2008 represents the legal foundation of the contemporary stage of Russian-Azerbaijani relations. The declaration points out that the two parties on the basis of the signed documents will continue the multilateral development of legally equal, mutually beneficial and constructive bilateral strategic relations. Over 80 inter-state and inter-governmental agreements have been concluded by the two parties.
The integral part of political reciprocal action is the military and military-technical cooperation. On 27 February 2003, the intergovernmental agreement on military-technical cooperation was signed in Baku, and on 4 December 2006 the inter-governmental agreement on mutual protection of the rights for the results of intellectual activities used and obtained in the course of bilateral military-technical cooperation. On 29 July 2008, the second sitting of the Russian-Azerbaijani commission on military-technical cooperation was held in Moscow. The proposal made by president of the RF V. Putin on 8 June 2007 at the summit of Big Eight concerning the use of Gabalin rockets location station in cooperation with the USA working out anti-rocket system was supported by the Azerbaijani leadership as a specific input
in consolidation of stability and security in the region. The border protection cooperation is a significant component in Russian-Azerbaijani relations.
The mutual activities of law enforcement bodies and judicial authorities are carried out at a high level. The following agreements have been signed and are fulfilled between the law enforcement bodies, the border guards organs for the sake of implementation of the memorandum on mutual action in the struggle against terrorism as well as the protocols on cooperation, including mutual action between the corresponding organs of Russia and Azerbaijan in the sphere of protection of transit cargoes. Analyzing the present state of bilateral political cooperation, one can not help mentioning a rather significant growth of the Russian party to solving the conflict in Nagorny Karabakh. The conflicting problem in Nagorny Karabakh is one of the most complicated problems for regulation primarily due to the quite different approach to its solving on the part of Armenia and Azerbaijan. It is impossible to combine the positions of the two countries without significant deviation from their initial directions. Therefore the regulation of the conflict will be possible, if the heads of the conflicting parties find out the formula of coexistence, which satisfies both of them.
Of no sense are all deliberations that the West or Russia because of oil, location of the military base, participation (or non-participation) in a military operation against Iran, by raising blockade of the Turkish-Armenian border or by getting any other benefits will "as a gratitude" "give" to Azerbaijan Nagorny Karabakh. In this context it is significant to note that, unlike many Azerbaijani experts and political scientists, who consider that Russia should "finally decide" what country, Armenia or Azerbaijan, is more important for it, the leadership of Azerbaijan understands that Moscow is unable to construct its relations
with Azerbaijan to the detriment of its relations with Armenia and vice versa.
The high level of political reciprocal action has a positive influence on development of trade-economic relations. Russia is the main exporter to Azerbaijan of technical equipment, construction materials, wood, roll products of ferrous metal, chemical products - all making over 90% of Russian export. The Russian party expects in future the growth of Azerbaijani export connected with deliveries to the Russian market of food products, which traditionally are in great demand and correspond to the standards of quality.
Since 1 January 2010, Azerbaijan started to export its gas to Russia. In 2008 the Russian investments in economy of Azerbaijan accounted for $ 12.4 million, which shows the need to intensify the work in this direction. A rather perspective for Russian investors seems to be the following direction: formation of joint enterprises for production of oil industrial equipment, of medicines, processing and storage of agricultural products, as well as activities in the financial and banking spheres. Of strategic importance for Russia is cooperation with Azerbaijan in development of international transport corridor "North-South" to arrange direct railway transportation from Europe via Russia to Azerbaijan, Iran, India and the countries of South-East Asia. The implementation of this project will let member-states get rather big profits from transit of cargoes in the perspective amount of 1520 million tons per year. The investments in the non-ferrous metal industry of Azerbaijan, participation in privatization of small hydroelectric stations and enterprises engaged in storage and processing of agricultural products may be cited as interesting spheres of activities for Russian businessmen. The two criteria are recognized to the most important - pragmatism and mutual benefits - in economic cooperation of the partners at any level under conditions of the world crisis,
according to Russian minister E. Nabiullina. In the above mentioned case, probably, cooperation is needed in the spheres, where the final product is also in demand under conditions of crisis. As an example may be mentioned the fuel-energy complex: Azerbaijan is in need of deliveries of oil and gas extraction equipment, in services for drilling and capital repairs of production oil wells etc., while the Russian party is able to satisfy these needs. It is possible to discover other mutually beneficial spheres. For instance, it might be a fulfillment by Russian enterprises of the big project proposed by the Caspian Sea steamship line of Azerbaijan for construction of cargo steamers and tankers or the purchase of Russian special air equipment for the emergency ministry of Azerbaijan. Of certain urgency is creation of joint ventures in the light industry, in production of medicines, as well as leasing companies and service companies for repair of agricultural and road machinery. At the same time, both parties started to arrange cooperation in the sphere of nano-technologies.
The issues of humanitarian cooperation are also in the center of interests of the highest leadership of Azerbaijan and Russia, as well as the particular authorities and non-governmental organizations. Science and education are also the perspective directions of cooperation. At present, 5755 citizens of Azerbaijan study in higher education institutions, including 1420 students - at the expense of the federal budget of the RF. On 27 February 2008, the branch of M.V. Lomonosov Moscow University was opened in Baku; the number of students made 200 people for second year of functioning. More than 1200 people are students of the other Russian higher education institution on the territory of Azerbaijan - a branch of Moscow State Open University. As a whole, over 15 thousand students receive education in Russian in higher education institutions of Azerbaijan.
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Summing up the brief analysis of the current period of Russian-Azerbaijani cooperation, it is significant to stress its creative factor, its target to extension of mutual action in various spheres. The strategic lines are determined by the leadership of Russia and Azerbaijan, while diplomats of both sides not in the last instance have been charged with implementation of the agreed plans. Russia and Azerbaijan are united by common historic destinies of the peoples, by invaluable political, economic and spiritual potential. Life has proved that, like beforehand, Russia needs Azerbaijan as Azerbaijan needs Russia. The relations between two sovereign countries - Russia and Azerbaijan - acquired pragmatic, business like and mutually beneficial characteristic with due account primarily of national interests of each country.
"Kavkaz i globalizatsiya ", Azerbaijan-Shvetsiya, 2010, vyp. 1-2, p. 31-41.
Dina Malysheva,
orientalist
THE INTERNATIONAL-POLITICAL LINKS
OF CENTRAL ASIAN STATES
AND THE ISLAMIC FACTOR
The Russian-soviet civilized tradition -being spread by force before- had privileges in spiritual and cultural spheres of peoples in Central Asia to mid 1990-ss. In many respects owing to it the peoples of the region absorbed many elements of the European civilization in their culture so the Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan were radically notable from their neighbors of the Moslem world by the beginning of 1990-ss having got ahead of them in world outlook, education, political process development and ideology. It isn't accidentally that the new
