religious and political figures. Among them were Ahmat Kadyrov and A. Panarin.
It should be borne in mind that different political forces can interpret "Eurasian concept" differently. Naturally, it should be modified and revised by Muslim thinkers on the basis of Muslim values.
To conclude, it should be said that the politicization of Islam in the North Caucasus will continue to increase and become stronger and hence, it will continue to determine the character and dynamics of political life. It should be admitted that the existing situation in the North Caucasus seriously threatens the national security of Russia and requires new approaches with due account of the socio-economic and spiritual-ideological character of the problem. A struggle against religious-political extremism and terrorism is also a struggle against the further politicization and radicalization of Islam and it is a must for the stabilization of ethno-political life in the North Caucasus.
"Mir cherez yazyk, obrazovaniye i kulturu: Rossiya - Kavkaz -Mirovoye soobshchestvo," Pyatigorsk, 2011, pp. 105-113.
M. Kolesnichenko, Political analyst (St. Petersburg) AZERBAIJAN IN THE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The "march-past of sovereignties," which took place in the late 1980s - early 1990s in Russia resulted in the complete remake of the geographical and political map of Eurasia, on which new independent states appeared that took up an independent development path in the international arena proceeding from their own interests and requirements. Each state was striving to establish multifarious, multi-
vector ties, sometimes contradicting their previous historical and ideological foreign-policy course, or, to be more exact, the course pursued by the government of the former federal state. This concerns not only global relations, but also regional integration.
It was such processes that began in the 1990s, and continue to this day, in the South Caucasus, particularly, in Azerbaijan, which started to tackle the problems of its integration in the world community practically from scratch. The national interests of a newly-independent republic were now based on new laws, presupposing orientation to outside forces. The latter were represented by regional and world powers, primarily Russia and the United States, as well as Turkey. Apart from them, other republics of the South Caucasus and the Middle East, namely, Armenia, Georgia and Iran, due to their historical and ethno-confessional closeness, have also become an inalienable part of Azerbaijan's political development. However, taking into account the role and place of these countries in the priority direction of the national foreign-policy strategies of the United States and Russia, and also the degree of their influence in the region, their relations with Azerbaijan should be viewed in the context of precisely Russian and American regional and global interests. Thus Azerbaijan has been, and remains, an arena of the rivalry of stronger and more influential powers.
It so happened that the internal and foreign political situation around Azerbaijan has largely been determined by the events in Nagorno-Karabakh since 1988. Prolonged differences between Armenia and Azerbaijan around the territory have led to a conflict between the two nations which turned into a full-scale war and thus considerably aggravated the relations between the three Trans-Caucasian republics and their close neighbors. As a result, a situation has emerged in which the bilateral ties of Azerbaijan with its neighbors were largely determined by the latter's attitude to this conflict.
The prolonged military hostilities on the territory of Azerbaijan formally ended on May 12, 1994, when the Bishkek agreement went into force, which brought about ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, the conflict has not been resolved and lives on in a frozen state: the two neighboring states have no diplomatic relations, there is no cooperation between them, and one self-proclaimed republic, which is not recognized by any country, exists between them. From a legal point of view, the situation is as follows: Armenia has occupied up to 20 percent of Azerbaijan's territory, and there is no way out of it, inasmuch as the interests and demands of both sides are diametrically opposed. There is the view that the conflict in itself is not so important, but it is a reflection of more complex problems touching on the interests of Russia, the United States, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Turkish Republic, which are interested not so much in resolving the Karabakh conflict as in reaching their own aims.
It should be said that Azerbaijan holds an important place among its neighbors which it has taken as a result of the foreign-policy activity of the political elites and their ideologies that have proclaimed diametrically opposite priorities and orientations, which could ultimately be reduced to two global directions - northern and western. Of course, the "surrounding medium" of Azerbaijan should not be confined to the exclusive bounds of Russia and the United States, the role of other important geostrategic actors should also be considered, primarily Turkey and Iran.
In the first half of the 1990s the foreign-policy course of the young republic was rather uneven and unstable. The first president of independent Azerbaijan, A. Mutalibov, paid much attention to international activity: contacts were established with the close neighbors, Iran and Turkey (the latter was the first country to officially recognize Azerbaijan's independence on November 9, 1991), the
Russian Federation, the United States, and many European countries. Azerbaijan has become member of the CIS, OIS, OSCE, and other international organizations. Baku has begun negotiations with representatives of foreign oil companies for the development of oil deposits on the Caspian continental shelf. This diplomatic activity pursued concrete aims, namely, to strengthen the country's international position and emphasize its importance on the local scene, and also to influence the world public with a view to favorably resolving the Karabakh conflict.
However, the domestic political situation in the country was far from stable, and soon another leader, with a harsher ideology, has come to power. A. Elchibei adhered to nationalist views and emphasized the historically strong ties between the Azerbaijani and Turkish peoples. His foreign-policy course considerably differed from that of his predecessor. Having proclaimed Turkey a strategic ally of Azerbaijan and the United States and NATO partners in the struggle against the "communist empire" and Iran, which were considered enemies, Elchibei and his team have taken an openly anti-Russian and anti-Iranian position. The new Azerbaijani leadership was striving to discontinue all political, military and economic relations with Russia. Elchibei demanded that Russia immediately withdraw all Russian troops from the territory of Azerbaijan and refused from maintaining any ties with the CIS countries. Being an ardent follower of Ataturk, Elchibei believed that complete orientation to Turkey would be a beneficial development model for Azerbaijan. It should be noted that Turkey was not against such developments. In August 1992 the first bilateral agreements on cooperation in military training were signed in Ankara. Apart from that, Turkey expressed unreserved support to Azerbaijan, especially in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and in all linguistic and ethnic ties. In 1992 Turkey severed all economic ties with
Armenia and a year later completely closed the Turkish-Armenian border.
Apart from a sharp deterioration of Azerbaijan's relations with Russia, the policy of the Azerbaijani leadership has led to a considerable worsening of its relations with Iran. Repeated statements of the leaders of the Azerbaijani political elite about the "need" to annex Southern Azerbaijan and join it to Northern were received in Tehran as provocative propaganda of separatism and encroachment of Iran's territorial integrity. Besides, in the conditions of a noticeable increase of Turkish influence in Azerbaijan, and especially more intensive interference of western states in its financial-economic sphere, Iranians began to be driven out of all spheres of life of the republic. Moreover, after the introduction of transport-economic blockade of Armenia by Azerbaijan in 1992, a small section of the land border with the Islamic Republic of Iran remained the only outlet for Armenia's access to the outer world.
As a result, pan-Turkism as a reaction to the previous Russian influence and everything connected with it, has contributed to Azerbaijan's increasing isolation in the region. Evidently, such onesided nationalist course could hardly exist for a long time. And so, a new president took power in Azerbaijan in 1993, Geidar Aliyev, who succeeded in achieving internal stabilization in the country and even continuity of his political course, which is now pursued by his son Ilkham Aliyev.
With Geidar Aliyev coming to power, the country's foreign policy has radically changed and ceased to be narrowly-oriented. G. Aliyev exerted no small effort to developing cooperation of his country with as many states as possible.
Among the first foreign-policy acts of the new president were a number of measures to improve his country's relations with Russia.
However, the No 1 problem was, as before, solution of the armed conflict with Armenia. In this connection Baku took part in various negotiations and meetings initiated by Russia and other countries. The Azerbaijani leadership hoped to get support from Russia on the Karabakh questions and end the war on worthy terms. However, peaceful initiatives of the new president during the first months of his staying in power brought no results. The passivity of the Russian leadership in rendering assistance to the new leadership of Azerbaijan was one of the reasons for "transfer of Baku on to the line of drawing closer to the West." A certain worsening of bilateral relations took place in 1994 after the beginning of the military operations in Chechnya, when Russia actually closed the border with Azerbaijan and stopped all transport communications, suspecting that it helped the Chechen militants.
After President G. Aliyev's official visit to Ankara in 1994, Azerbaijan has pursued the course of strategic cooperation with Turkey. Military-political cooperation took pride of place, because Baku regarded Turkey as a "mediator in its rapprochement with Washington and NATO." The president of Azerbaijan did not agree to the Russian military presence in his country, rejected the offer for jointly guarding state borders, and then curtailed military cooperation with Russia.
We should note that 1994 was a decisive year in Azerbaijan's destiny. On September 20, 1994, the "oil strategy" worked out by President G. Aliyev, scored a major success: the so-called contract of the century was signed with a consortium of foreign companies for the development of the oil deposits of the Caspian Sea. This event was the turning point in Azerbaijan's relations with the outer world. The country proclaimed itself as an active actor in regional and global relations.
In subsequent years this pro-Turkish and pro-western position of Azerbaijan headed by Geidar Aliyev has strengthened and was continued later by his son, President Ilkham Aliyev.
In view of the fact that integration in the EuroAtlantic bodies is one of the priorities in Azerbaijan's foreign policy, an important place in the present policy of the country is cooperation with Turkey. The latter is a major regional partner of Azerbaijan in the economic and energy spheres. Several pipelines pass through Turkish territory supplying Europe with Azerbaijani oil and gas. A ramified network of pipelines on its territory can turn Turkey into a major transit state which would give it political and economic levers for greater influence in the South Caucasus, as compared to Russia and Iran.
It is very important for Azerbaijan that Turkey fully supports it in the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, also insisting on the territorial integrity of the country.
Moreover, Turkey claims the role of the regional guarantor of security, putting forward initiatives and taking steps for the creation of a collective security system in the Caucasus within the framework of "the five" regional states (Russia, Turkey, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan). In 2000 the president of Turkey put forward the idea of the "Caucasian Stability Pact," which would be open for signing by the countries of the South Caucasus, its neighbors and all OSCE countries. However, the pact was not signed at the time due to the position of Armenia, which declared that first the Turkish-Armenian relations should have been normalized; Russia adhered to a similar position. After the "five-day war" in 2008, Turkey proposed the creation of the Caucasian platform of stability and security. However, the future of this project remains rather dim, inasmuch as cooperation between Armenia and Azerbaijan and Russia and Georgia is not possible.
Another achievement of the Aliyevs was that the political course they pursued contributed to the development and improvement of the relations with another neighbor of Azerbaijan - Iran. The present-day relations between the two countries develop intensively enough, but there are still certain problems which somewhat complicate them. First of all, Iran is worried over the close cooperation of Azerbaijan with NATO and a possibility of deployment of American military bases and U.S. military contingents on its territory.
Another problem is the absence of the proper regulation of the legal status of the Caspian Sea, which concerns not only Iran and Azerbaijan, but also all countries of the Caspian region. The relations between the two countries have also been aggravated by the fact that Iran does not take part in transporting hydrocarbon raw materials and commodities, because it is outside the bounds of the existing Caucasian transport and energy systems.
However, despite these contradictions and problems the relations between Iran and Azerbaijan have begun to improve in recent years. Iran's anxiety over the possible deployment of American military bases in Azerbaijan and a threat of a military attack by the U.S.A. has forced its leadership to step up its contacts with Azerbaijan. In February 2007 the Minister of foreign affairs of Azerbaijan E. Mamedyarov stated that the question of using his country for possible American military strikes against Iran "was not even discussed." Since 2002 Iran, jointly with India and Russia, has participated in a major alternative transport project called "North - South," in which Azerbaijan also takes part.
Despite Iran's close cooperation with Armenia developing since the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Iran declares its support of Azerbaijan's position and calls for its territorial integrity and the liberation of the territories occupied by Armenia.
Cooperation between the two countries develops not only in the energy sphere, but also in other fields. The Treaty "On principles of Relations of Friendship and Cooperation" has been in force since 2002, high-level meetings are regular, and the two countries have good prospects for closer cooperation.
And so, Iran and Turkey are the two countries which have exerted a strong influence on the development and foreign policy of Azerbaijan for a long time. Although the relations between the peoples and governments of these countries have not always been good-neighborly, Turkey and Iran have always regarded the Trans-Caucasian states as the zone of their interests. In the early 21st century it became evident that the closest relations exist between Azerbaijan and Turkey, and the latter has achieved what she was dreaming of for a long time, namely, the closest interaction with the kindred Azerbaijani people. As to Iran, the development of Azerbaijan's relations with it was influenced by Iran's political isolation on the part of the United States. Despite this, Azerbaijan, striving as it does to develop cooperation in several foreign-policy directions in order not to draw too much attention on its evidently pro-American course, has consolidated its interaction with Iran in the past few years. However, Azerbaijan's desire to develop evenly its cooperation with all countries of the region can be regarded as somewhat declarative, inasmuch as the degree of the U.S. involvement into its policy is rather high. And if a close, even fraternal, Turkish-Azerbaijani cooperation is quite natural and well substantiated, because Turkey is a partner of the U.S.A. and NATO and an active participant in the distribution of the Caspian energy resources and transport arteries of the region, for its part Iran, on the contrary, is a hostile state for the United States and does not take part in transporting hydrocarbon raw materials and commodities.
Speaking of the degree of Azerbaijan's cooperation with its southern neighbors - Turkey and Iran - it should be noted that the historical closeness of the destinies of the Armenian, Azerbaijani and Georgian peoples within the framework of the single South Caucasian region should have presupposed their strong regional cooperation and integration, which would help the region to become a major actor of the world economic and political system. However, the existence of acute unresolved problems of both domestic and interstate character has prevented the strengthening of their cooperation.
The Armenian and Azerbaijani leadership are unable to find points of contact for any civilized solution of the conflict within the framework of international law and, consequently, for a stable political dialogue. Both countries search for allies (more influential and weighty in the region and the world) for resolving the situation in their favor. Azerbaijan intensively develops cooperation with the United States and NATO in the hope to create a counterbalance to the open support and current influence of Russia in Armenia. In its turn, Armenia, while accepting the priority character of its relations with Russia, is striving to speed up political integration with it. Besides, Iran is a historical ally and partner of Armenia in the region. In the conditions of a considerable isolation of both states, their cooperation is quite natural. This can well be seen in the development of the transport and energy infrastructure.
As to Georgia, it has succeeded to create a solid legal basis in its relations with Azerbaijan, Armenia, the Russian Federation, the United States and the leading western countries in a short time after gaining independence. Its relations with Azerbaijan became closer as both countries acquired an ever greater importance in the energy policy of the West. Georgian territory is quite convenient for transporting Caspian energy resources. As to the military sphere, the two countries
have similar interests in close cooperation with NATO, and they regard Turkey as a "guide" for their joining the alliance.
During the long period in the history of the people inhabiting modern Azerbaijan there has not been a strong and influential state. On the contrary, the neighboring stronger states, politically and economically, exerted a great influence on it. However, Azerbaijan, after gaining the coveted independence in the early 1990s, has not done much to overcome historical injustice and restore or acquire a high status, and began to rely on the authority of the neighboring states, having entrusted them with its foreign political development. The determining factor in the selection of a partner was ethnic, confessional, linguistic and cultural proximity, as well as the degree of political and economic stability.
Thus, it was Turkey which became the leader in partnership relations with Azerbaijan. That country is an attractive medium for political, military and economic contacts.
Iran is also a country close to Azerbaijan, however, the latter's cooperation with it is not as versatile and intensive as with Turkey.
Azerbaijan's relations with Georgia have reached a very high level. Certain aspects which united these countries in the past continue to draw them closer together at present and form a stable and reliable foundation for a productive dialogue.
Armenia is considered a hostile state by Azerbaijan. Although its inclusion in the uniform economic system of the region would have been advantageous to many countries of Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and Asia, the two sides do not even see any possibility of rapprochement.
A conclusion suggests itself that the countries which have solid positions in Azerbaijan and are able to influence the course of events are Russia and the United States. Each of them pursues its own
interests. However, the most tangible impact on Azerbaijan is now exerted by the most influential states of the region - Turkey and Iran.
"Vestnik SPbGU, Series 6, " St. Petersburg, 2011, issue 3, pp 63-69.
A. Shustov,
Scholar of Oriental Studies
TRANSFORMATION OF ETHNO-CONFESSIONAL STRUCTURE OF NEWLY-INDEPENDENT STATES OF CENTRAL ASIA
The transformation of the ethno-confessional structure of the population takes place under the impact of three factors: natural surplus determined by the birthrate-death rate ratio, migration flows, and assimilation processes. Inasmuch as the latter occurs, as a rule, during a long historical period and it is difficult to determine it quantitatively, the main factors of the transformation of the ethno-confessional structure of the newly-independent nations of Central Asia in the 1990s - the middle of the first decade of the 21st century are the natural and migration movements of the population.
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are referred to Central Asia. The peoples living on the territory of Central Asia since its inclusion in the Russian Empire are regarded as indigenous population, and non-indigenous population includes settlers of the pre-revolutionary and Soviet periods from other, predominantly European regions of the country. And they are called the "European population" in the article.
In the conditions of a profound economic crisis and an unstable socio-political situation which accompanied the disintegration of the U.S.S.R., the natural growth rates of the population of the former Union