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Foreign Affairs S. Lavrov (he had a talk with him in a raised voice in Moscow), he asserted that the proposed by them direction was "anti-Dagestani and anti-state" and that he would not be able to agreed with it. It is unknown, whether the present president of Dagestan M. Magomedov will defend in the same way the interests of Russia, speaking against policy of Moscow and Baku, taking into account close relations between the families of the presidents of Dagestan and Azerbaijan?
Nevertheless, one matter is clear that, irrespective of all problems and discords on the two sides of the state border, they should be solved in the course of negotiations in the interests of the peoples of Russia and Azerbaijan, first of all, in the interests of all peoples living in the region. (The people in Dagestan hope that it will be done not at the expense of infringements of interests of Russian Dagestanis and Dagestanis living in Azerbaijan.) We should not lose our positions in Azerbaijan, since Russia takes the risk by Azerbaijan to weaken its influence on the Caspian region. The return of Azerbaijan into the vector of Russian foreign policy remains quite urgent.
"Voprosy natsionalnyh i federativnyh otnosheniy", Moscow, 2011, pp. 193-204.
Rasim Musabekov,
D.Sc. (Phil.) (Azerbaijan)
AZERBAIJAN BETWEEN TURKEY AND RUSSIA
Throughout many centuries the geopolitics of South Caucasus had been determined by rivalry between Turkey, Iran and Russia. However, other actors came into being there in the 19th - 20th century. First, it was Britain, which boasted global influence in the epoch of the thriving of its empire. Then, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union
the United States and the European Union made their appearance in the area. Iran's influence has now diminished due to its international isolation and specific features of political and ideological regime. This is why, in analyzing the regional vectors of strategic attraction and repulsion in the South Caucasus it would be necessary to have a closer look at Turkey and Russia. Azerbaijan experiences tension most acutely in connection with its national, historical, geopolitical and cultural features.
Azerbaijan was part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union during the last two centuries and as such it felt their enormous cultural and civilization influence. Both the tsarist administration and Soviet officials restricted in every way possible Azerbaijan's contacts with its close neighbor - Turkey. The situation has changed radically after the restoration of state independence of Azerbaijan in the early 1990s. Turkey was the first foreign country which recognized this act, opened its diplomatic mission in Baku and began to develop all-round cooperation with Azerbaijan actively.
This process, which started at the time of the first post-Soviet administration of President Ayaz Mutalibov, acquired an all-embracing character during the rule of the Popular Front of Azerbaijan (PFA) under President Abulfaz Elchibei. Azerbaijan adopted a course to Turkism and, moreover, Turkey was proclaimed the only ally and sample of state construction. Turkish advisers and consultants appeared at almost all offices and administrative bodies of the republic. Everything connected with the former U.S.S.R. and Russia was regarded the heritage of the old colonial past to be destroyed or eliminated. President Elchibei publicly called himself the "soldier of Ataturk" and ostentatiously distanced himself from everything Russian. Azerbaijan was the first of the newly-independent states to secure the withdrawal of the units of the former Soviet, now Russian, army, air
force and navy from its territory. Trade and economic relations were drastically curtailed. Azerbaijan did not ratify the treaty on friendship and cooperation of the newly-independent states and froze its participation in it. The short-term rule of Elchibei and PFA in the 1992-1993 was a period of boundless preponderance of Ankara and noticeable weakening of the influence of Moscow in Azerbaijan.
The West in the person of the United States and the European Union was worried over the smooth withdrawal of the Soviet armed forces from the former Warsaw pact countries and was not in a hurry to invade the sphere of influence of Russia - the post-Soviet area which included Azerbaijan. As to Iran, the PFA and President Elchibei did not conceal their negative attitude to the Islamist regime in Tehran which was regarded as the oppressor of more than 20 million Southern Azerbaijanis living in the north-western part of Iran.
Following an acute political crisis in the summer of 1993 the PFA government fell down, Abulfaz Elchibei left his post and the highly experienced and authoritative figure - Geidar Aliyev was invited to head the state. He renounced the one-sided orientation to Ankara and laid the foundation of the present multi-vector foreign policy of Azerbaijan. The country returned to the CIS and even joined the Organization of the Collective Security Treaty set up under the aegis of Moscow up to 1999. A Treaty on friendship, cooperation and mutual security between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan was signed. After prolonged negotiations the conditions of the use by Moscow of the Gabala radar station were agreed on, which was an important part of the strategic system of tracking and early warning.
However, the dislike for Geidar Aliyev felt by the Russian President Boris Yeltsin prevented the strengthening of trust between them, which had a negative effect on the Russian-Azerbaijani relations.
All the more so since Moscow took the side of Armenia in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh and even rendered economic and military support to Armenia. As a result, Azerbaijan has not returned to the sphere of Russian influence and began to draw closer gradually to the European Union and the United States. President Aliyev also succeeded to revive to some extent a dialogue with Iran.
The trust-based and close personal contacts between Geidar Aliyev and his Turkish colleague Suleyman Demirel lent a priority character to the partnership of Baku and Ankara. The formula of Azerbaijani-Turkish relations was aptly expressed in President Aliyev's words "One nation - two states." Baku insistently pursued the course to equality, without dividing the nation into the "elder and younger brother." Soon Azerbaijan renounced the services of Turkish advisers and consultants in many spheres, including the army. In the big consortium on the Caspian shelf of Azebaijan ("Azeri - Chirag -Gyuneshli" (oil) and "Shah Deniz" (gas)) Turkey, just as Russia, received a modest 10-percent share, whereas the main stockholder and executor of the project was the Anglo-American BP.
The completion of the presidential rule of Suleyman Demirel and his successor Ahmet Necdet Sezer and the establishment in Turkey of the long-term rule of moderate Islamists from the Party of justice and development headed by President Abdullah Gul and Premier Recep T. Erdogan have noticeably influenced the Turkish-Azerbaijani relations. They are now marked by less trust and warmth, but more pragmatism. The Turkish statist-nationalists in the high echelons of power and the army were more adequate as partners for the secularly-oriented Azerbaijaini leadership than the moderate Islamists from the Party of justice and development.
A reverse evolution has taken place in the relations with the leadership of Russia. Boris Yeltsin was succeeded by Vladimir Putin, a former KGB man, who did not conceal his respect for President Geidar Aliyev, a former KGB general and member of the CPSU politburo. Good personal contacts have also been established between the new presidents of Azerbaijan and Russia, Ilham Aliyev and Dmitri Medvedev. Both are of the same age, well educated, modern in thinking and habits, and oriented to modernization of their countries on the basis of a strong vertical of power.
Although the personal factor has played a no small role in the relations of Baku, Moscow and Ankara, a change in the situation of Azerbaijan itself became more important. Beginning from 2000 the country has received great oil incomes, which enabled it to reach the fantastic growth rates of the economy and a sharp rise in the living standards of its population. The country, which previously needed foreign financial and technological assistance, political and diplomatic support, and recommendations and advice, has transformed into a stable, self-confident and rapidly developing state. Such change in Azerbaijan's economic and geopolitical situation has thoroughly been reflected in its relations with all foreign partners, including Turkey and Russia.
Baku and Ankara: Dialectics of Relations
Strategic partnership with Turkey has been preserved. After Azerbaijan has distanced itself from the Georgian-Russian war in 2008, Baku insisted on signing a "Treaty on strategic partnership and mutual assistance between Azerbaijan and Turkey." Article 2 of the Treaty says that in case of an armed attack or aggression of a third state or group of states each party will render all possible assistance to the other party. Article 3 envisages close cooperation in defense and military-
technical policy. Joint actions are also presupposed for eliminating threats and challenges to national security. In accordance with the joint statement adopted by the presidents and ratified by both parliaments a high-level Council of strategic cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkey has been set up.
Trade-economic and transport-communication relations between Baku and Ankara have been developing steadily. Contrary to skeptical predictions, the projects of building the strategic oil pipeline Baku -Tbilisi - Ceyhan (with the annual capacity of 50 million tons and a prospect of growth) and the Baku - Erzurum gas pipeline have successfully been realized. The construction of new railway lines and reconstruction of old ones is underway. The Interconnector Turkey -Greece - Italy, Trans-Adriatic gas pipeline and Nabucco pipeline are being elaborated.
Turkey shares first and second place with Russia in Azerbaijan's import and is its first foreign investor in the non-oil sector of its economy. Thousands of Turkish businessmen have opened their small and medium-sized enterprises in Azerbaijan. In turn, the latter, using its financial resources, often comes out as a big investor in Turkey through the state-owned oil company (SOCAR). There are also many private Azerbaijani investments.
The only foreign TV channel in Azerbaijan is the Turkish TPT-1. Turkish educational establishments (institutes, lyceums, kindergartens, etc.) take second place in Azerbaijan after those with teaching in the Russian language, but in contrast to the latter they tend to grow in number. Thousands of young people enroll in universities and institutes in Turkey under a government program.
Azerbaijan and Turkey closely interact in the political and military spheres. Ankara is on the side of Baku in the matter of Nagorny Karabakh, and Azerbaijan invariably supports the Turkish
position on the question of the so-called Armenian genocide. Both countries coordinate efforts at the level of government bodies, public institutions and their diasporas. The heads of state, government and parliament, as well as ministers and high-rank military officers hold regular meetings. Azerbaijani officers study at Turkish military academies. Close cooperation is established in the production of arms and ammunition. Ankara and Baku are the most active supporters of the policy of rapprochement and integration of Turkic nations. An Azerbaijani representative has for a long time headed the organization of cultural cooperation TURKSOI. Baku is the venue of the residence of the Parliamentary assembly of the Turkic states.
However, the close strategic partnership of Azerbaijan and Turkey does not exclude a certain difference of interests. Thus, Baku has declined Ankara's intentions to become the exclusive seller of Azerbaijani gas on the markets of third countries. Arguments are still going on concerning the price of gas supplied to Turkey (about six billion cubic meters within the framework of the "Shah Deniz" project) and its transit to third countries.
Turkey (just as Iran) has unilaterally repealed the visa regime for the citizens of Azerbaijan. However, Baku is in no hurry to do the same.
There are certain differences on a number of international issues. For example, Baku has not recognized the independence of Kosovo and remained in solidarity with Serbia, whereas Ankara has unquestionably sided with the Kosovo Albanians. Baku has supported the United States in Iraq and even sent a small military contingent to the coalition forces, whereas Turkey has ostentatiously refused to comply with Washington's request to let its troops pass through its territory.
The signing of the Zurich protocols on normalizing the relations of Turkey and Armenia in 2010 has been a real test for Azerbaijani-
Turkish partnership. The United States which sponsored these documents has not been able to convince the Azerbaijani leadership of the fact that the normalization process of Armenian-Turkish relations and a settlement of the Karabakh problem could proceed separately. Baku insisted on its point of view. And Ankara stated that the border with Armenia would open only after the Armenian forces started to withdraw from the occupied Azerbaijani territories.
Turkish public opinion is also on the side of Azerbaijan. The recent poll carried out by the Turkish foundation of economic and social investigations ((TESEV) in 81 regions of the country has shown that 39 percent of respondents are for the opening of the border with Armenia and 44 percent are against it. Official Ankara has not enough strength to influence the political forces and public opinion in Azerbaijan, in contrast to the latter.
The ruling party of Turkey has no authoritative party-partners in Azerbaijan. During the past years Turkey has distanced itself from the political life of the fraternal neighboring country. Assessments of official Turkish observers at elections in Azerbaijan are much closer, as a rule, to those of the loyal assessments of the CIS representatives than to the critical position of observers from the United States and the European Union.
The differences of interests of the two countries cited above, as well as certain difficulties in the relations of their leaders cannot undermine their strategic partnership, which is based on ethnic and religious closeness and friendly feelings binding these nations. According to the sociological poll conducted by the Foundation of political, economic and social investigations (SETA) in 2011, Turkish citizens feel greater sympathy and trust for Azerbaijanis than for their NATO allies (82 percent of those polled). Similar picture can be observed in Azerbaijan. According to the monitoring of public opinion
carried out by the sociological service Puls-R during several years, Turkey is regarded the most friendly to Azerbaijan by up to 90 percent of all respondents.
Baku and Moscow: Tortuous Rapprochement
According to the monitoring just mentioned, Russia holds second place among Azerbaijan's friends. Its indices are more modest than those of Turkey (from 17 to 25 percent). Simultaneously, 10 to 15 percent of respondents regard Russia as an unfriendly state. These sympathies and antipathies are a product of history and the relations which have taken shape after the restoration of independence.
Azerbaijan was part of a unified state - the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union - for almost two centuries. The two nations were connected by thousands of threads. Many of them broke during the disintegration of the U.S.S.R., especially those in the sphere of industrial cooperation. However, today too, the parties are still important economic partners to each other. Their mutual goods turnover amounted to $1.8 billion in 2010 (a slump due to the crisis as against the record $2.4 billion in 2009). Import from Russia comprised $1.56 billion (first place among foreign trade partners of Azerbaijan), and Azerbaijan's export to Russia was $385.6 million (increase by 23.8 percent). Supplies of gas from Azerbaijan to Russia will exceed one billion cubic meters in 2011. In 2011 the goods turnover volume should exceed $2.7 billion.
There is the biggest Russian community in the South Caucasus living in Azerbaijan; it numbers about 170,000 people. In turn, the number of Azerbaijanis living in Russia on a temporary or permanent basis reaches one million (by unofficial estimates, it is around two million). There are big entrepreneurs among them possessing multimillion assets.
Azerbaijan has preserved the biggest area of the Russian language and culture in the South Caucasus. There are more than 200 secondary schools and a great number of higher educational institutions which have Russian sections or tuition in the Russian language. About 6,000 Azerbaijan's citizens study at Russian institutes and universities; up to 900 of them study on government programs, the rest do it independently. Dozens of newspapers and magazines in the Russian language are printed and distributed in Azerbaijan, and there are a Russian drama theater and a Russian cultural center functioning in the republic.
In contrast to economic and cultural ties, there are problems and essential contradictions in the interests concentrated in the political and military spheres. They are partly due to the fact that Russia regarded the sovereignty of Azerbaijan, just as that of other CIS countries for that matter, as something inferior. The newly-independent states, naturally, wished to develop economic and political and military relations with world and regional powers, which Moscow regarded as a manifestation of ingratitude and disloyalty. Such reaction of Moscow was regarded in Baku and the capitals of other newly-independent states as a manifestation of haughtiness, diktat and caused very negative reaction.
An additional irritant was the fact that Moscow supported Yerevan in the conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh and, what is more, rendered it economic, political and military assistance. Subsequently, Russia has somewhat corrected this stand, taking upon itself a mediator's mission for the cessation of military hostilities and peaceful settlement of the conflict. However, the allied relations between Moscow and Yerevan and the presence of a Russian military base on the territory of Armenia continued to cause suspicion and distrust in Azerbaijan concerning the real intentions of Moscow and its unbiased position in mediation.
At first, there were serious contradictions between Azerbaijan and Russia on the problem of the Caspian area. Moscow was against Baku's intention to develop marine deposits and construct pipelines with the help of western companies to transport energy resources bypassing Russian territory. However, compromises have been found in this matter. The Russian "LUKOIL" concern was given a 10-percent share in the big projects "Azeri - Chirag - Gyuneshli" and "Shah Deniz". Now, Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have agreed on the demarcation of their national sectors on the basis of the so-called modified medium line and taken a consolidated position on the status of the Caspian region.
Positive changes have occurred in the process of settling the Karabakh conflict. Due to the rupture of relations between Georgia and Moscow, the Russian military base in Gyumri became cut off from communication lines. In order to preserve its positions in the South Caucasus and open a corridor with Armenia Moscow should step up the settlement process and thus bolster up its geopolitical positions. After signing the Meiendorf declaration Russia has assumed the functions of the chief moderator of the negotiation process on the Karabakh issue with the participation of the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan. In the past three years there were eight tripartite meetings with the direct participation of the Russian President Dmitri Medvedev. Moscow declares its readiness to undertake resolute efforts to achieve endorsement of the so-called Madrid principles by the conflicting parties and adopt a decision to start work on a framework peace agreement.
However, the main task to be tackled by all powers - cochairmen of the Minsk group of the OSCE, and primarily the Russian leadership, is to prevent a new war between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Given the present level of the arms of both parties it could not only become
destructive and bloody, but also turn into a large-scale regional conflict which could draw Russia and Turkey in the confrontation, which is
contrary to the will and desire of both Ankara and Moscow.
* * *
The gigantic geopolitical shifts which have taken place as a result of the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. and the disbandment of the Warsaw pact have essentially changed the atmosphere of the relations between Ankara and Moscow, as well as the attitude of both countries to the newly-independent republics of the South Caucasus. There has been no bloc confrontation in which Turkey could have played the role of a front-line state for two decades already. An intensive dialogue has been going on between the leaders of the two countries, the volume of mutual trade and humanitarian contacts has been rapidly growing.
Russia has become the main trade partner of Turkey, and the latter holds fifth place among trade partners of Russia. Turkey purchases up to one-quarter of all oil and more than half of natural gas it consumes. Mutual investments are on an increase. Millions of Russian tourists visit Turkey's famous health resorts annually. All this gives ground to the Russian President Medvedev to say that "Russia and Turkey are strategic partners". In turn, the Prime Minister of Turkey Recep T. Erdogan says that the Russian-Turkish dialogue has a positive influence on peace and security in the region.
Both countries, which have found themselves in the periphery of post-industrial development, feel the egoism of the self-righteous West. They confront similar problems connected with the catch-up character of the modernization and development of the economy and dual Eurasian position, that is, their belonging to different cultural and geopolitical matrices. Both Russia and Turkey are facing the need to strengthen democratic institutions and neutralize ethnic separatism.
Moscow and Ankara are displeased with the fact that the United States and the leading western nations regard them as an instrument of their global policy and do not wish to consider their national interests. The restoration by Russia and Turkey of their old traditional position as great powers is not to the liking of the liberal West. The campaign of the recognition of the so-called Armenian genocide, the indirect support of Kurdish separatism and delay in admitting Turkey to the European Union are typical features of this scheme.
It is extremely important to resolve the existing regional problems which can become aggravated and not only put to risk peace and security in the region, but also draw Moscow and Ankara in a dangerous confrontation, which will naturally exclude the full-fledged strategic partnership of Russia and Turkey. Rivalry between Moscow and Ankara will undermine their relations and erode their forces.
Turkey understands this full well. On the eve of the June 2011 parliamentary elections Premier Recep T. Erdogan, who heads the ruling Party of justice and development, published its election program. It is indicative that there was a section entitled "Turkey - Russia and the Caucasus", that is, Ankara regards its relations with the countries and peoples of the Caucasus (both North and South) in direct connection with Russia. It is noted that the development of Russian-Turkish relations has led to the formation of the foundation for new cooperation in the Caucasus, Central Asia and other regions.
Georgia and Armenia, do not conceal their worry over the growing strategic partnership of Russia and Turkey. For the entire foreign, and partly economic, policy of these countries is based on using contradictions and rivalry between the West and Russia and between Turkey and Russia. Azerbaijan has a different attitude to the deepening Turkish-Russian cooperation. In contrast to its South Caucasian neighbors, Azerbaijan had nothing to gain from Russian-
Turkish rivalry, on the contrary, it suffered from it. Being a natural ally of Ankara due to the ethnic, historical, cultural and religious factors, Baku has seen and felt a suspicious, and sometimes negative, reaction of Moscow. A thaw in Russian-Turkish relations relieves Baku from the need to choose between the two partners and can create conditions for resolving old conflicts, primarily the Karabakh conflict.
As a country with considerable natural and financial resources and advantageous geographical position, Azerbaijan has much to offer to Turkey and Russia. Baku needs peace, cooperation and normal competition based on diversification, economic attractiveness and efficiency to be able to realize its own large-scale projects. The building of strategic oil and gas pipelines via Georgia and Turkey has freed Azerbaijan from its one-sided dependence on Russia. The use of the pipeline system built in Soviet times, which connected Azerbaijan with Russia and Iran, makes it possible to diversify the supply of fuel and energy, which is beneficial to all parties. Considerable financial resources gained from export, knowledge and ability to orient to the Turkish and Russian markets give Azerbaijani business great advantages in organizing and implementing large-scale tripartite projects in the sphere of transporting and processing hydrocarbon raw materials, in petrochemistry, as well as in tourist business, transport and communications.
Partnership between Russia and Turkey does not at all mean the partition of the South Caucasus into the spheres of influence. In the conditions of globalization such plans are doomed to failure. Neither Russia nor Turkey is able "to isolate" the region from the world. But together they are able to prevent turning the South Caucasus into a geopolitical battlefield of alien forces.
"Rossiya v globalnoi politike", Moscow, 2011, vol. 9, No 3, May-June, pp. 194-204.
