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language and culture. It is necessary to lower the impact of conflict-provoking factors, carry on timely monitoring, and reveal controversial problems, but not ignore them.
It is important to optimally combine general civic identity with the preservation of ethnic group identity, historical and ethno-cultural traditions, which stem from the mentality and values of people's culture necessary for maintaining stability along with the preservation of the historically-formed traditions of mutual respect and friendly relations between ethnic groups, and sound ethnic rivalry.
The poly-ethnic character of the republic, plurality and contradictoriness of interests, territorial disputes, activity of ethnic leaders, errors of Soviet nationalities policy and unpreparedness for compromise hamper solution of current problems and become obstacles to stable development, the expert concludes.
Author of the abstract - Valentina Schensnovich
RUSLAN SULEIMANOV. COUNTRY BETWEEN TWO FIRES: HOW AZERBAIJAN BALANCES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND IRAN // The article was specially written for the bulletin "Russia and the Moslem World."
Keywords: Trans-Caucasian republic, Sunni Turkey, Azerbaijani-Iranian Relations, Azerbaijani-Israeli Relations, Iran, South Caucasus.
Ruslan Suleimanov,
Post-Graduate Student,
World Politics Department of Moscow State University
After gaining formal independence in 1991 and the opportunity to pursue its own foreign policy Azerbaijan, just like other former republics of the Soviet Union, stepped on a difficult path of searching for its own place on the geopolitical map of the world. The establishment of relations with different countries has
not always been based on the historical and cultural past of this young Trans-Caucasian republic. Apart from the traditional ethnic and religious components, which are important for foreign policy, Azerbaijan was guided by pure pragmatic considerations. Partnership and even allied relations were sometimes established with countries whose historical past or ethnic and confessional features were at variance with those of Azerbaijan. As a rule, pride of place was given to economic interests and the current geopolitical situation in the region.
For example, in the 1990s the Azerbaijani leadership pursued a course at drawing closer to secular Sunni Turkey, but not with the Shia Islamic Republic of Iran, although most Azerbaijanis are Shia Muslims. Apart from that, in the past Azerbaijan was part of the unified state of Persia (now Iran) and was waging uninterrupted wars with the Ottoman Empire. The foreign-policy choice of Baku in favor of Ankara has been prompted, first and foremost, by the secular character of Azerbaijani society at the time,1 the ethnic and linguistic closeness of the two Turkic peoples,2 and also Tehran's position on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which was close to that of Armenia. At the same time Azerbaijan positioned itself as a secular state in the Muslim world. In 1991 the young republic was accepted to the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).3 In that situation Azerbaijan had no problems in the development of close relations with Israel at the time, although the latter has very strained relations with the Muslim world to this day due to the still unresolved Palestine problem.4 Friendly contacts between Baku and Tal Aviv have largely been established due to the fact that tens of thousands of people from Azerbaijan now live in Israel, as well as there is a numerous Jewish community in this Trans-Caucasian republic.
Economic and military contacts have successfully been developing between the two countries which coincided in time with the exacerbation of Iranian-Israeli contradictions in the Middle East. The hostile rhetoric of Tehran and Tel Aviv at the
end of the 1990s - beginning of the 2000s began to seem quite dangerous, especially when the two sides resorted to direct threats to use crude force against each other, and down to nuclear weapon. Against this background Azerbaijan is forced to balance between its southern neighbor - Iran, whose interests it is bound to take into account, and one of its closest ally in the entire Middle East - Israel, which is one of the biggest importers of its oil and suppliers of arms for the Azerbaijani military forces.
We shall now look more closely at the young Republic of Azerbaijan, which has recently marked the 25th anniversary of its independence, namely, at how it manages to preserve a balance in relations between two hostile states.
Azerbaijani-Iranian Relations
The classics of neo-liberalism Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye in their well-known work "Power and Interdependence" (1977) wrote that relations between neighboring countries are always more complex than between countries which are at a considerable distance from one another.5
As it has already been noted, Azerbaijan cannot disregard the interests of Iran, with which it has the longest border -689 kilometers. Apart from that, Iran is inhabited by about 30 million ethnic Azerbaijanis, or there are more of them than in Azerbaijan itself. The present situation is a heritage of the time of the Russian Empire and Persia. By the Peace Treaty of Gulistan (1813) and Peace Treaty of Turkmenchay (1828) Northern Azerbaijan (about the entire territory of present Azerbaijan) was included in the Russian Empire; Southern Azerbaijan, Eastern Azerbaijan and Western Azerbaijan remained parts of Iran.
The bilateral relations of Baku and Tehran have become rather difficult due to several reasons.
By the mid-1990s the leadership of Azerbaijan became greatly worried by the growing Iranian Shia influence in the republic. Indeed, a great many missionaries were very active in
the country reading lectures and giving sermons at universities and institutes and mosques. To counter this the authorities of the Republic of Azerbaijan gave more opportunities to religious organizations from Sunnite countries. The most active was the Turkish "Hizmet" movement headed by Fethullah Guelen, which unfolded broad activity, building schools and lyceums and developing the mass media in that Caspian republic. One way or another, the influence of clerics from Iran began to wane, and in 1996, by an order of the then President of Azerbaijan Geidar Aliyev, any missionary activity in Azerbaijan was banned.
Another obstacle is the unsettled legal status of the Caspian Sea. Iran and Russia regard it as a sea.6 Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan consider it a lake.7 Contradictions on the demarcation of frontiers of the Caspian Sea have gone so far that in July 2001 the Iranian naval forces undertook an armed operation against several Azerbaijani sea-exploration vessels. This incident has brought the two neighboring states to the brink of an open armed confrontation, but due to persistent diplomatic efforts the conflict was quenched, and by 2010 Iran and Azerbaijan began to reestablish and increase their economic and political contacts. Both countries displayed interest in implementing joint projects, especially in the oil sector of the economy. In 2016 trade turnover between Baku and Tehran reached about $1.1 billion.8 The interaction of the two countries within the Azerbaijan - Iran -Russia format seemed quite promising. In the course of a meeting of the leaders of these three states in Baku in August 2016 the foundations of the implementation were laid down of such projects as a "North - South" transport corridor and a "Great Energy Bridge of Russia - Azerbaijan - Iran."
Despite a relative stabilization in Azerbaijani-Iranian relations in the past several years and elimination of certain contradictions, official Baku is still worried by the dual position of Iran on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. On the one hand, the spiritual and political leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran speak out in support of Azerbaijan from time to time, appealing
to Islamic solidarity between the two countries, on the other hand, friendly political, economic, humanitarian and other contacts between Tehran and Erevan cause serious concern in Baku. As Thomas de Waal notes, it was Iran that became Armenia's main partner in the period of the armed confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1991-1994. "If Armenia had not have trade ties with Iran, it would have been unable to live through the hardest winters of 1991-1992 and 1992-1993," the expert believes.9 And by estimates of G. Nadzhafov, the continuing Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is necessary for Iran's leadership in order to contain the negative influence of Baku in Southern Azerbaijan - part of Iran where a big Azerbaijani community lives comprising about 30 percent of the country's population.10 S. Chernyavsky is convinced of the fact that Tehran regards the existence of the state of Azerbaijan as a direct threat to national security and stability.11
As we see, the bilateral relations of Baku and Tehran develop quite ambiguously. Due to the presence of mutual claims the two sides are engaged in a cautious game against each other. And friendly relations between Armenia and Iran enable the latter to give real tests for Baku's. reliability. In turn, Azerbaijan resorts to the same tactic, using its contacts with Israel, the sworn enemy of Iran.
Azerbaijani-Israeli Relations
It is believed that the initial point in relations between Baku and Tel Aviv was a visit of Israeli Premier Binyamin Netanyahu to Baku in August 1997. The development of bilateral contacts between the two countries at the time was prompted by several reasons. First, in the late 1990s Israel was greatly interested in Caspian hydrocarbon raw materials and the construction of transport routes Caspian basin to the Mediterranean region across Turkey's territory. Secondly, Tel Aviv had great hopes for building a military-political axis Baku - Ankara - Tel Aviv with a
view to bolstering up its positions in the region. For one thing, Israel regarded it quite profitable and promising to have a partner or ally in the Caspian region.12
Tehran looked at the rapprochement of Tel Aviv and Baku with a certain apprehension, especially in the context of the worsening of Azerbaijani-Iranian relations at the time. Being aware of the beneficial character of the Israeli factor in its foreign policy (especially for bringing pressure to bear on Iran), nevertheless, Azerbaijan did not want to enter in an open confrontation with its southern neighbor. For instance, the Azerbaijani leadership did not agree to give permission for the opening of Israel's Embassy in Baku.13 Tel Aviv showed full understanding of this fact.
Just as in the case of Iran, in its relations with Israel Azerbaijan is guided mainly by the purely economic interests. To date Azerbaijan is in fifth place by the volume of trade turnover with Israel ($3.5 billion), the world's biggest partner of Israel and the first among the countries of the former U.S.S.R. Israel imports about 50 percent of the oil it needs from Azerbaijan.14 Relations are rapidly developing between the two countries in such spheres as education, health service, pharmaceutical industry, tourism and agriculture. Transport connections between the two countries are well underway: there are regular flights between Baku and Tel Aviv. It should be borne in mind that the first Azerbaijani operator of the cellular communication system "Bakcell" was created by the joint project of Azerbaijan's Ministry of Communications and the Israeli Company GTIB in 1994.
Arms trade occupies a special place in relations between the two countries. Azerbaijan is one of the biggest purchasers of Israeli arms and military equipment. The contracts signed are worth $4.85 billion.15 Israeli drones, anti-vessel missiles, antiaircraft complexes, and radar stations are especially popular with the Azerbaijani military.
Israel adheres to an unequivocal position n the Nagorno-Karabakh problem: official Tel Aviv is in solidarity with Baku.
This was confirmed in 2009 by the ninth President of the State of Israel Shimon Peres. During his visit to Azerbaijan he said the following, among other things: "We are for the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. One state has no right to occupy the territory of another state. We support the desire of Azerbaijan's leader to take back his country's lands by political means."16 In 2016 Israel's Minister of Defense Avigdor Lieberman stated that the position of Azerbaijan in the course of April 2016 fighting was "quite justified." Moreover, he accused Armenia of provocation.17
As we have noted earlier, a considerable role in supporting friendly contacts between Tel Aviv and Baku is played a a great many people from Azerbaijan living in Israel today, as well as a large Jewish community in this Trans-Caucasian republic. Mention should also be made of close connections between the Azerbaijani and Israeli lobby in the United States which joined efforts in 2001 and achieved the repeal of the "amendment 907," which had limited Washington's economic assistance to Baku for quite a long time.18 In 2002 Israel tried to realize the project of installing radio-electronic equipment on the southern border of Azerbaijan to monitor Iranian territory. It was supposed that the equipment would be supplied by American companies, but the U.S. Department of State blocked the deal.19 It was largely due to the fact that during that period "the Iranian nuclear problem" was quite close to being resolved, and any exacerbation of the situation was undesirable for the entire international community.
On the whole, Azerbaijan is very cautious in using the "Israeli aspect" in its foreign policy, seeking to maintain a balance between the Jewish state and the Islamic Republic. When Tehran feels that a threat may be coming from the Azerbaijani-Israeli tandem, it always has an opportunity to remind Baku of its "Armenian resource." For example, a concealed signal of Tehran answering a visit of Israel's Premier Benjamin Netanyahu to Baku on September 13, 2016, was a trip of Iran's President Hassan Rouhani to Erevan a week later - on December 21, 2016.
Conclusions
An analysis of the bilateral Azerbaijani-Iranian and Azerbaijani-Israeli relations shows that in its foreign policy Azerbaijan often relies only on the current geopolitical situation in the region. The Israeli factor is beneficial to Baku for bringing pressure to bear on Iran, but the possibilities to use this instrument are rather limited. Similarly, Israel is not able to use the entire potential of its friendly relations with Azerbaijan for bringing pressure to bear on Iran due to a serious influence of Tehran on Baku's policy (mainly because of the "Armenian factor"). Besides, the situation is also influenced by the positions of the foreign actors with their own interests in Azerbaijan, Iran and in the South Caucasus as a whole.
In our view, Azerbaijan should be viewed from the point of view of political realism. As the classic of this trend Hans Morgenthau claimed, the only driver of all international processes is pragmatism and the cold-blooded calculations of international actors.20 This formula can well be applied to the policy pursued by Azerbaijan toward its partners.
Proceeding from the fact that Azerbaijan's policy is distinguished by pragmatism, its further interaction with Iran and Israel will depend on the alignment of the political and economic forces in the Caspian Basin and the Middle East. In the conditions of the existing confrontation between Tehran and Tel Aviv the greater interaction of Baku with one of the two sides will cause a more painful reaction of the other side.
Notes
1 In Soviet times, when religion was not welcome by the authorities, the number of believers in Azerbaijan had markedly diminished. That was why the secular experience of Ankara was much closer to Azerbaijan than the experience of Iran, where clericals came to power in 1979 and announced that from then onwards the supreme law in the country would only be the Sharia law.
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2 At the same time it's worth mentioning that Soviet Azerbaijani historiography was for a long time dominated by the theory of the non-Turkic origin of the Azerbaijani people, according to which the modern Azerbaijani ethnos originated from the ancient state of Media (8th - 6th century BC), which had been approximately within the bounds of modern Western Iran and populated mainly by Iranian-language tribes.
3 From 2011 the official name - Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).
4 Turkey, Egypt and Jordan with which Israel has diplomatic relations are the only exception.
5 Robert Owen Keohane, Joseph Nye. Power and Interdependence. 1977, pp. 165-220.
6 If the Caspian Sea is determined as a sea, its legal status should be regulated by the UN Convention on Law of Sea of 1982.
7 If the Caspian Sea is determined as a lake, it should be divided on the sector principle. As a result, the best sectors should be in possession of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
8 [Electronic resource] http://interfx.az/ view/681506/az Thomas de Waal. Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War. 2003. P. 205.
10 G. Nadzhafov. Iran i gosudarstva Yuznogo Kavkaza // Tsentralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz [Iran and Countries of South Caucasus / / Central Asia and Caucasus]. 2008. No 1 (58). Pp. 41-51.
11 S. Chernyavsky Azarbaijan: vybor kursa [Azerbaijan: Choice of a Course]. Moscow: Azer-Media 2003, 334 pp.
12 A. Veliyev. Treugolnik: Izrail - Turtsiya - Azerbaijan: realnost i perspektivy // Tsentralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz. 2000. No 2 [Triangle: Israel - Turkey -Azerbaijan: Reality and Prospects // Central Asia and Caucasus. 2000. No 2]
13 An Israeli diplomatic mission has been functioning in Baku since August 1993. A mission of Palestine in Azerbaijan emerged in June 2011.
14 [Electronic resource] http://xalqqazeti.com/az/news/politics/80590.
15 Israel - Azerbaijan - weapon aimed backwards - oil. [Electronic resource] http: / / stop-news. com / oryjie / izrail-azerbaidzhan-oruzhie-v- obratnom-napravlenii-neft.
16 Israil Prezident Simon Peres. [Electronic resource] http://anl.az/down/ meqale/azerbaycan/ azerbaycan_iyun2009/84444.htm
17 Avigdor Lieberman: Azerbaijan's position in Karabakh conflict justified [Electronic resource] https://en.trend.az//Azerbaijan/politics/ 2515494.html.
18 "Amendment 907" was adopted by the U.S. Senate in 1992 under pressure of the Armenian lobby. The document denounces the blockade of Armenia and the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic by Azerbaijan. In accordance with the amendment Washington sharply curtailed material assistance to Baku.
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19 In this connection it would be appropriate to mention the role of foreign actors influencing the positions in the Baku - Tehran - Tel Aviv triangle. Apart from the United States which has considerable economic interests in the Transcaucasus, Russia and Turkey, too, are traditional actors in the South Caucasus.
20 Hans J. Morgenthau. Polityica Among Nations. 1973, pp. 27-30.
2018.01.010. STANISLAV PRITCHIN. UZBEK TRANSIT FOR CENTRAL ASIA // "Russia in Global Politics," Moscow, 2017, № 1, Vol. 15, P. 150-159.
Keywords: Uzbekistan, Central Asia, elite, power, elections, president, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, history, Turkmenistan, reforms, investments, migration, China, Kazakhstan.
Stanislav Pritchin,
PhD (Hist.), Research Associate, the Center of Study of Central Asia, Caucasus and Urals-Volga Area, the Institute of Oriental Studies RAS, Head of ECED Analytical Center
On December 4, 2016, early presidential elections took place in Uzbekistan in connection with the death of President Islam Karimov on September 2. Four candidates from each of the registered political parties took part in the elections. But the indisputable favorite was Shavkat Mirziyoev, who held the post of prime minister from 2003. He gained the biggest number of votes - 88.61 percent. Having scored victory, he declared the priority targets of his five-year term, some of which look revolutionary enough, as, for example, direct elections of heads of regions and reforms of government service. Thus, Uzbekistan has entered into a new epoch, and taking into account its weight and importance in Central Asia, its neighbors will not be able to ignore the course of Uzbek transit.
