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THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Volume 5 Issue 3-4 2011
Rovshan IBRAHIMOV
Ph.D. (Political Science), Associate Professor, Vice Principal for Foreign Affairs, Head of the International Relations Chair at Gafgaz University (Baku, Azerbaijan).
TURKISH-AZERBAIJANI RELATIONS AND TURKEY'S POLICY IN THE CENTRAL CAUCASUS
Abstract
This article evaluates the factors determining Turkey's policy in the post-Soviet Central Caucasus. It focuses p articular attention on Turkey's relations with the
regional states (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia), especially on how the development of Turkish-Azerbaijani relations is influencing the regional policy of official Ankara.
Introduction
Turkey's policy in the Central Caucasus in the post-Soviet period has been taking shape in the context of the practical development of its relations with the regional states. Whereas relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan are strategic in nature, Turkey essentially has no official relations with Armenia, while its relations with Georgia are quite strong and developing on a mutually beneficial basis.
We will note that Turkey's ties with Azerbaijan have a strong influence on the development of its relations with Georgia and Armenia. For instance, the energy and transport projects initiated by Azerbaijan, and particularly its corresponding cooperation with Turkey, are boosting the development of Turkish-Georgian cooperation. At the same time, the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is seriously hindering the development of Turkish-Armenian relations.
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Relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan in the Post-Soviet Period
Immediately after the newly independent states emerged in the Central Caucasus, Turkey placed priority on its relations with Azerbaijan. This was primarily prompted by the ethnic and historical communality between the peoples of the two states. And it stands to reason that Turkey was the first country to recognize Azerbaijan's independence as early as 9 November, 1991.
It is common cultural roots that have prompted all the governments in power in Azerbaijan to strive primarily for establishing and then strengthening relations with Turkey. Good relations with this neighboring country have been a priority for all the presidents of Azerbaijan. As early as the beginning of1992 (23-24 January), President Ayaz Mutallibov paid an official visit to Turkey, during which the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation between the two countries was signed.1
Turkey also places high priority on its relations with Azerbaijan. An unspoken tradition has appeared in this country, according to which new presidents, prime ministers, and ministers of foreign affairs usually pay their first official visits to Baku. One of the first of these visits took place on 2 May, 1992, when Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel paid an official visit to the capital of Azerbaijan. During his visit, the sides signed agreements on cooperation in the economic and transportation spheres.2
After Abulfaz Elchibey's government came to power, Azerbaijan's foreign policy turned toward the West, relations with which were supposed to evolve by adopting Turkey's state development model. President Elchibey did not hide his clearly pro-Turkish foreign policy course. Turkey was granted most favored nation conditions in Azerbaijan and Turkish businessmen were offered privileges.
Azerbaijan's obvious pro-Turkish foreign policy orientation under Abulfaz Elchibey, and particularly his vehement pan-Turkic statements, led to a severe deterioration in the republic's relations with its other close neighbors, Russia and Iran. However, President Abulfaz Elchibey misjudged Turkey's capabilities, which since the time of Atatürk had been striving to maintain the status quo and avoid any active involvement in international conflicts. Moreover, Turkey was not ready for the new geopolitical situation that formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
On the whole, the Abulfaz Elchibey government's attitude toward Turkey was built more on romantic stereotypes of the idea of pan-Turanism than on a pragmatic assessment of the real situation in Turkey itself and on the international arena.
The gross blunders in foreign and domestic policy, which caused a deep crisis in the country, led to a change in power in Azerbaijan. The government of the National Front was replaced by Heydar Aliev, who had immense experience in state governance, having occupied various high posts in the Soviet government and Politburo of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party.
Some ruling circles in Turkey were skeptical and at times even apprehensive about his advent to power in Azerbaijan. These fears were also confirmed by the fact that immediately after Aliev came to power, Azerbaijan joined the CIS again. Moreover, other steps were taken to improve relations with Russia, which Turkey perceived as a change in Azerbaijan's foreign policy course toward Russia.
The new Azerbaijani authorities also understood the need to alleviate the fears and maintain close relations with Turkey. During a visit by Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Hikmet Qetin to Baku on 19 September, 1993, President Heydar Aliev confirmed that Azerbaijan intended to choose Turkey as the main route for exporting the oil produced at the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli oil fields. In
1 See: A. Aslanli, 1. Hesenov, Azerbaijan's Foreign Policy under Heydar Aliev, Platin, Ankara, 2005 (in Azerbaijani).
2 See: "Azerbaijan-Turkey," available at [http://www.analitika.az/browse.php?sec_id=22], 7 November, 2011.
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addition to this, military specialists were to continue training Azeri servicemen, as had been the practice under President Abulfaz Elchibey.3
On 8 February, 1994, President Heydar Aliev paid an official visit to Turkey, during which several important documents were signed, one of which was the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation. In addition, President Aliev spoke in favor again of supporting the building of the Baku-Tbilisi-Cey-han oil pipeline. The friendly relations between Heydar Aliev and Suleyman Demirel also helped to improve relations between the two countries.4
In so doing, the development of relations not only affected the political sphere, but also the economic, which in time became the main catalyst of mutually advantageous relations between the two countries.
In 1996, Azerbaijan increased the share of Turkey's TPAO Company in the consortium created to operate the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli oil fields in the Azeri sector of the Caspian Sea from 1.75% to 6.75%.5 A strategic partnership was established between the countries in transporting energy resources from the Caspian region and in developing the transport sector. For this purpose, Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz paid an official visit to Baku on 28 December, 1997. During his visit, the building of a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline from Turkmenistan along the bottom of the Caspian to Azerbaijan was discussed, as well as the possibility of building the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline. Later, on 18 October, 1999, Turkish President Suleyman Demirel also paid a working visit to Baku to discuss the deadlines for signing the documents on building the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline.6
Turkish-Azerbaijani Relations in the Energy and Transport Sphere and Regional Cooperation
On 29 October, 1999, the presidents of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, as well as the Prime Minister of Turkey and U.S. Energy Secretary Bill Richardson, signed the Ankara Declaration expressing these countries' support of building the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, as well as regulating the transportation of Caspian energy resources to the international markets via this route.7 Less than a month later, at the OSCE summit in Istanbul, an agreement was signed on the transportation of crude oil through Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. The agreement was signed by presidents Heydar Aliev, Eduard Shevardnadze, and Suleyman Demirel. In order to support the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project and draw Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan into the oil project, the U.S., Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan signed the Istanbul Declaration on Building the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Main Export Pipeline.8
As economic relations (mainly in the energy sector) develop between Azerbaijan and Turkey, a certain regional alliance has appeared that also includes Georgia. All three countries are cooperating productively in building transport routes for exporting oil and natural gas from Azerbaijan to the world markets. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline projects
3 See: Sh.T. Hunter, The Evolution of the Foreign Policy of the Transcaucasian States, Crossroads and Conflict, Security and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia, ed. by Gary K. Bersch et al., Routledge, New York, 2000, p. 43.
4 See: K. Kasim, The Caucasus after the Cold War, Usak, Ankara, 2009, p. 437 (in Azerbaijani).
5 See: Ibid., pp. 438-439.
6 See: "Azerbaijan-Turkey."
7 See: Ibidem.
8 See: "Kontrakt veka," available at [http://www.azerbaijan.az/_Economy/_OilStrategy/oilStrategy_04_r.html], 7 November, 2011.
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have been successfully implemented. Another example of cooperation among the three countries is the building of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad. This project is distinguished by the fact that its participants developed and financed it without the support of international financial institutions and third countries. The consortium built the 105-km railroad, 29 km of which pass through Georgia and 76 km through Turkey, using its own funds. Turkey intends to finance the section of the railroad that runs through its territory. Azerbaijan has taken on funding of the Georgian segment. The total amount of freight to be transported will reach up to 15 million tons a year. After the tunnel that is to pass under the Turkish straits to Istanbul has been finished, trains will be able to travel unimpeded from China to Europe, even all the way to London.
Turkish-Armenian Relations and Azerbaijan
Armenia is the only country in the Central Caucasus that Turkey does not have diplomatic relations with. Turkey was one of the first to recognize Armenia's independence, however, during the subsequent 20 years diplomatic relations were never established between the countries. This was mainly due to the fact that Paragraph 11 of the Declaration on Armenia's Independence adopted by the Armenian Supreme Council on 23 August, 1990 stated that "the Republic of Armenia supports international recognition of the 1915 Armenian genocide in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia."9 In so doing, Armenia raised the events of 1915 in the Ottoman Empire to the international level and made territorial claims by calling part of Turkey's territory "Western Armenia." The Armenian diaspora, which was scattered throughout the world and had extensive capabilities, made such claims even before Armenia acquired its independence. Therefore, these claims became a kind of additional megaphone for voicing the interests of the diaspora. Naturally, Turkey had no intention of reconciling itself to this situation and demanded that Armenia withdraw its claims.
The relations between the two countries came to a full halt after Armenian troops occupied the Kelbejar district of Azerbaijan in April 1993. This caused Turkey to close its borders with Armenia until it withdrew its troops from Azerbaijan.10
This situation continued right up until 2008, when Turkey began looking for ways to improve its relations with Armenia. Turkey's new foreign policy doctrine constituted the main change in the paradigm of its foreign policy as a whole and toward Armenia in particular. This doctrine was based on the country's Zero Problem policy regarding neighboring states and on establishing multilateral relations with them.
The change in Turkey's foreign policy regarding the Central Caucasus and Armenia in particular is related to the change in the geopolitical situation after Russia's military interference in Georgia in August 2008 and its recognition of the independence of runaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Immediately following Russia's interference, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Russia, where he first expressed the idea of a Platform of Stability and Cooperation in the Caucasus. After receiving support from Russia, Turkey again voiced this idea. This event paved the way to establishing relations between Turkey and Armenia.11
The coincidence that the national football teams of both countries found themselves in the same qualifying group at the 2008 European Football Championship helped to mend their relations. In
9 Deklaratsiia o nezavisimosti Armenii, 6 January, 2010, available at [http://constitutions.ru/archives/2910], 8 November, 2011.
10 See: K. Kasim, op. cit., pp. 101-102.
11 See: R. Ibrahimov, "Regional Evaluation of the Georgian Crisis," in: Turkish Foreign Policy at the Current Stage, ed. by O. Dincher et al., USAK, Karadeniz University, 2010, pp. 342-343.
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September 2008, Turkish President Abdullah Gul attended the match of both teams in Erevan, in response to which Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan came to the match in Bursa.12 Following this, contacts between the two countries began to multiply, and there were plans to open the border and establish diplomatic relations. Everything might have gone as planned had it not been for Azerbaijan's severe reaction. The Azerbaijani side reacted negatively to the possibility of rapprochement between the sides without any progress being made in settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Azerbaijani side insisted that the border be opened at the same time the occupied territories were liberated, since the border between the countries was closed precisely due to Armenian military contingents seizing the territory.
It is interesting that this disagreement was not the only one that arose between Turkey and Azerbaijan. In addition to the political differences in opinion regarding relations with Armenia, the disagreement also affected the economic sphere, in particular the energy sector. It should be noted that, keeping in mind its geopolitical position, Turkey is trying to develop a new strategy that could turn the country into an energy hub, through which the main routes for transporting oil and gas could pass.
In so doing, Turkey counted on purchasing Azeri gas at a reduced price and reselling it to Western countries. The price of Azeri gas for Turkey amounted to only $120 for 1,000 cu m, while the price in the West was several times higher. This development of events could in no way suit Azerbaijan, which refused to sign a new gas delivery agreement with Turkey.13 It should be noted that Turkey characterized this refusal as a lever of pressure on it in its rapprochement with Armenia.
This was the first tense situation of its kind in the relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan. But despite the disagreements, both sides clearly understood that a worsening of relations would not meet the interests of either side. Turkey also understood that improving relations with Armenia by falling out with Azerbaijan was not a price it was willing to pay. Turkey subsequently assured Azerbaijan that further development of relations with Armenia might be possible only if this country began settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and liberation of the occupied territories.
On 10 October, 2010 in Zurich, when Turkey and Armenia signed two protocols on establishing diplomatic relations and opening borders, Azerbaijan's reaction was much more restrained. Turkish and Armenian foreign ministers Ahmet Davutoglu and Edvard Nalbandyan signed the Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations and the Protocol on the Development of Bilateral Relations.14 As expected, these protocols were not subsequently ratified, failing to go through the necessary procedure not only in the Turkish parliament, but also in the Armenian. As a result, after the new legislative body was reelected in Turkey in keeping with the parliament's charter, the protocols were removed from the agenda. Draft laws that are not approved at a specific legislative stage are declared null and void.15
The disagreements between the sides led to a re-examination of the relations between the two countries. This situation forced the sides to rethink their relations and raise them to a higher level, whereby it was decided to create a new format of relations between them.
This format was the Council of Strategic Cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan. The first sitting of the Council was held on 25 October, 2011 in the Turkish city of Izmir. During the sitting, approximately 15 documents were signed, one of which was an agreement on the sale of natural gas
12 See: Q.C. Yilmaz, "Turkey-Armenia 'Football Diplomacy' Scores One for Peace," 15 October, 2009, available at [http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkey-wins-the-big-game-in-bursa-2009-10-15], 11 November, 2011.
13 See: R. Ibrahimov, "Cooperation between Azerbaijan and Turkey in the Energy Sphere: Present State and Prospects," Analitik baxish, No. 4, September-October 2010, Center for Strategic Research under the President of the Azerbaijan Republic, p. 20 (in Azerbaijani).
14 See: Podmisany turetsko-armianskie protokoly, 12 November, 2009, available at [http://www.mediaforum.az/ rus/.html], 30 October, 2011.
15 See: "V obozrimoi perspektive turetsko-armianskiy protsess vpered prodvigatsia ne budet," 28 September, 2011, available at [http://www.panarmenian.net/rus/news/79473/], 1 November, 2011.
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from the Shakh Deniz field beginning in 2017 under the development of the second phase of this field. Another important agreement concerns the transit of Azeri gas from the Shakh Deniz field between 2017 and 2042 through Turkey via the pipeline network of Turkey's Botaj Company.16 The signing of these agreements put an end to a dispute between the sides that had been going on since 2008. This, along with other things, strengthened Turkey's position in its strivings to turn the country into a regional energy hub. On the other hand, Azerbaijan guaranteed itself transit opportunities for transporting its natural gas both to the Turkish markets and to the markets of third countries.
So it can be said that mutual economic relations are still the main factors in the development of strategic relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan. This is confirmed by the ceremony for laying the foundation of the oil refinery in Izmir that took place during the meeting of the Council of the two countries. Let us remind you that the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic is the main investor, which, along with Turkey's Turgaz Company, privatized the Petkim petrochemical complex a few years ago. The cost of the refinery is estimated at $5 billion. The new refinery will reduce the import of raw chemicals needed for the Turkish economy by 30%. It is expected that after the production of petrochemical products increases to 6 million tons a year after 2015, the volume of the company's sales for this period will reach $20 million.17
Conclusion
As Azerbaijan's and Turkey's economic capabilities develop, the quality of relations between the two countries also changes. Formats are being sought for creating stronger relations between the sides. The new reality in the political and economic sphere is creating conditions for institutionalizing bilateral relations.
The expansion of economic relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey will also have a huge influence on shaping Turkey's geopolitical vision of the region as a whole. As a result, relations between the two countries will continue to improve. At the same time, ties with Georgia, as a natural component of these relations, will also expand. This country is a geographical link between Azerbaijan and Turkey, which will also stimulate its development as regional projects are carried out.
It can be boldly ascertained that a regional economic zone is being formed among the three countries, in which major energy and transport projects being implemented at the initial stage could create a basis for developing relations in other spheres of the economy too.
As for Armenia, as strategic relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan expand, it is unlikely that talks will be renewed on normalizing this country's relations with Turkey until settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict begins. Armenia is a hostage of its own policy regarding its neighbors, which is increasingly leading to its isolation in the region.
16 See: "Analiz: Osobye i strategicheskie otnosheniia—(2) Azerbaidzhán i Turtsiia: Odna natsiia, dva gosudarstva, ot-delnye chekovye knizhki," 28 October, 2011, available at [http://commonspace.eu/rus/links/6/id1024], 11 November, 2011.
17 See: "V Izmire s uchastiem prezidenta Azerbaidzhana i premiera Turtsii sostoialas tseremonia zakladki fundamenta neftekhimicheskogo predpriiatiia," 25 October, 2011, available at [http://ru.apa.az/news_206013.html], 11 November, 2011.
