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Today, the government is more criticized than ever before for suppressing democracy in Georgia. This means that either it will be democratically replaced with a more democratic government or the people in power will resort to radical measures to widen democratic freedoms in order to adjust them to social expectations. In any case, this shows that despite the numerous problems the democratic process in Georgia is moving ahead.
Stanislav CHERNIAVSKIY
D.Sc. (Hist.), Director of the Post-Soviet Research Center, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow, Russian Federation).
RUSSIA AND AZERBAIJAN: THE SPECIAL FEATURES AND MAIN VECTORS OF INTERSTATE COOPERATION IN THE POST-SOVIET PERIOD
Abstract
This article takes a retrospective look at the development of Russian-Azerbai-jani relations and at the special features of their current state. The main obstacles preventing the establishment of bilateral relations include the consequences of the collapse of the union-wide economy, the events in Chechnia, the search for a new route for exporting Caspian oil, and the
Armenian factor. The author is of the opinion that both the Russian political leadership and the country’s business community understand the importance of a genuine strategic partnership with Azerbaijan. He also believes that this year we should expect significant progress in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem and in the talks on the Caspian’s legal status.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
Russian-Azerbaijani relations today are an important component of the multilayered structure of the world community. Despite the seemingly regional nature of cooperation between the two countries, it is having a considerable influence on the resolution of not only energy, but also military-political security issues at the global level. Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, each of which is distinguished by a high level of instability, are geographically close to Azerbaijan. This determines the special role Russian-Azerbaijani cooperation is called upon to play in resolving their problems.
Problems of the First Decade: The War in Chechnia, the Choice of Export Route for Caspian Oil, and the Armenian Factor
In the first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia, which was busy establishing order inside the federation, did not take any active political steps in the Southern Caucasus, viewing it as a zone of its irrefutable influence. Its military presence in Georgia and Armenia, enforced by intergovernmental agreements, gave rise to the hope that Tbilisi and particularly Erevan would follow obediently in the wake of Russia’s policy. However, the political configuration in the region was rapidly changing; the new ruling elites declared other development priorities oriented toward extra-regional nations and underpinned their choice with specific interstate documents that created a legal basis for filling the Russian vacuum.
Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia in the first years of independence were not friendly. They were predominated by mutual complaints and reproaches (usually extremely emotional). Moscow and Baku found it hard to change their old habits and way of living.
Taking into account the hostilities in Karabakh, the most difficult issues in the negotiation process between Azerbaijan and Russia proved to be defining the status of the Russian troops, divvying up the inventory of the Soviet army and Caspian naval flotilla, as well as the talks on border defense. Mercenary activities became an unexpected and very arduous problem, since many servicemen from the former Soviet army fought on both sides in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The situation around a major military facility, the Qabala Radar Station built in Soviet times 250 km from Baku, became a source of nervous tension.
By the time Heydar Aliev had returned to power in the summer of 1993, both states were in a state of confrontation. Mutual accusations and reproaches, as well as an exchange of messages and notes of protest went on without end.
On 5 September, 1993, Heydar Aliev left for Moscow to hold talks with the leadership of the Russian Federation. Before takeoff, he said that he did “not consider the republic’s independence to be a reason for breaking off political, economic, cultural, and purely human relations with Russia. The current level of relations between the two states is in need of serious adjustments, and more than that, I am convinced that they should be given a higher status. This is primarily in the republic’s interests, which is experiencing serious difficulties at present because of the breakdown in inter-economic relations.”1 In Moscow, Heydar Aliev met with Boris Yeltsin and held a series of talks with the Russian leadership. His meeting with Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Ruslan Khasbulatov had positive repercussions. During this meeting, Heydar Aliev gave him the text of a resolution by the Milli Mejlis consenting to hand over six Russian servicemen, five of whom had been sentenced to death by the Military Collegium of Azerbaijan.
The sides signed an intergovernmental agreement on settling legal successor issues regarding the external state debt and assets of the former Soviet Union. According to the document, Russia pledged to pay Azerbaijan’s share of the former Union’s external state debt as of 1 December, 1991. At the same time, Azerbaijan handed over the share of its assets of the former Soviet Union to Russia.
After the country joined the CIS on 26 September, 1993, the Azerbaijani leadership counted on Russia helping it, on honorable conditions, to stop the war in Karabakh, which was preventing order from being established in the country, political stability from being reinforced, and urgent economic undertakings from being carried out. But the passivity of the Russia leadership in the summer and fall
1 Azerbaidzhan-Rossiia: novye otnosheniia, novye gorizonty, Baku, 2002, p. 6.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
of 1993 in putting an end to the Karabakh war, followed by the Armenians seizing more Azerbaijani territory, significantly dampened these hopes, which was one of the reasons Baku began moving toward the West.
A certain role was also played by the fact that Russia, with its ruined economy, could not render any real assistance to Azerbaijan’s economic revival or, what is more, compete with the West’s offers in developing the oil fields of the Caspian shelf. It should also be admitted that the Russian side did not have a precise strategy at this time regarding the Transcaucasus, making vague, often half-baked, and unjustified decisions that only made its position in the region even more precarious.
On 12 December, 1994, the Russian army began making active moves to establish constitutional order in Chechnia, and on 19 December, the Russian government adopted resolution No. 1394 On Measures to Temporarily Restrict Crossing of the Russian State Border with Azerbaijan and Georgia, which resulted in the Russian border with Azerbaijan being unilaterally closed. Rail, sea, and road traffic was halted in the northern direction. Russia had reasons for taking this action. It accused Baku of rendering military assistance to Chechnia by allowing foreign fighters and cargoes of weapons and ammunition to pass through its territory, supplying Azeri fighters, and permitting the unhindered treatment of Chechen fighters in Azerbaijani field hospitals, thus providing permanent residence for many Chechen families.
Official talks were held with the Chechen leadership on the joint building of an oil pipeline through the Caucasian Mountain Range to the Georgian coast of the Black Sea. The Ichkerian leadership carried out its foreign political contacts through Azerbaijan.
This pro-Chechen position on the part of Baku was largely explained by the struggle that had begun over guaranteed, unrestricted export of Caspian oil, the only source of currency acquisition for stabilizing the socioeconomic situation in the country and rebuffing Armenia’s military advance in Karabakh.
The active moves “to establish constitutional order” in Chechnia led to Western companies investing large amounts of money in the Caspian fields, having become disillusioned once and for all in the northern route (Baku-Grozny-Tikhoretsk-Novorossiisk), on the exclusive use of which Russia insisted. Although Russia and Azerbaijan signed an interstate treaty on transit of Azerbaijani oil through the Russian Federation in Moscow on 18 January, 1996, it became clear that the route of the main export pipeline would bypass Russia. The powers interested in undermining Russia’s position in the Caucasus had no qualms about playing the Chechen card.
The Russian side tried to put the blame for non-fulfillment of its obligation to transit oil through the Chechen section of the pipeline (153 km) on the Azeri side, which, naturally, was not guilty.
Moreover, during the discussions between the Azeri and Russian delegations about transporting Azeri oil through Chechnia, it was revealed that the Russian leadership was not of a unanimous opinion on the status of the Chechen side. Russia was unable to ensure the oil pipeline’s security.
The armed conflict in Daghestan in 1999, along with the antiterrorist operation in Chechnia that was revived the same fall, only enforced the unfavorable situation for Russia and provided additional arguments for those in favor of isolating the country in pipeline matters. Largely due to these circumstances, the U.S. and Turkey succeeded in reaching a political decision at short notice to finish building the new Baku-Supsa oil pipeline. It became clear that Azerbaijan needed another oil pipeline passing through Turkey to the Mediterranean Sea.
A constant irritant in Russian-Azerbaijani relations was and remains Moscow’s military cooperation with Erevan, which Baku regards as an attempt to destabilize the situation in favor of Armenia. To be fair, it should be said that the Russian side has repeatedly given grounds for such suspicions.
On 14 February, 1997, Russian Minister of Cooperation with the CIS Countries Aman Tuleev said that between 1994 and 1996 Russia secretly gave Armenia large amounts of weapons and military hardware.
The Azerbaijani side reacted very sensitively to this information. It was particularly concerned about the fact that these deliveries, including of heavy armored tank hardware, as well as of SKAD short-range attack missiles, were being carried out after the cease-fire agreements of 12 May, 1994 had been reached.
On 21 February, 1997, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a statement in which it drew the attention of the world community and the Russian leadership to the fact that “such illegal actions are contrary to the corresponding resolutions of the U.N. Security Council and OSCE decisions on the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict that prohibit military deliveries to the states involved in the conflict as promoting its escalation and continuation of the occupation of Azerbaijani territo-ries.”2 It was also pointed out that Russian military deliveries to Armenia being carried out in violation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe were undermining Russia’s authority as a mediator in the settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs insisted on the need for conducting a comprehensive investigation of the presented facts in order to clarify the degree to which Russian officials were involved in the illegal activity and punish the guilty.
But the Russian side, while officially denying the accusations against it, continued to reveal facts to the contrary. For example, soon thereafter Aman Tuleev publicized a letter from Russian Defense Minister Igor Rodionov of 28 February, 1997 which essentially admitted that unsanctioned deliveries of Russian military hardware to Armenia were made in 1994-1996. The Russian Federation State Duma conducted an investigation, entrusting its committees on defense, security, and CIS affairs to carry out a careful inspection of the presented facts.
On 5 March, 1997, Heydar Aliev sent Boris Yeltsin a message which expressed “particular concern” about the statements on deliveries of Russian arms to Armenia and contained a request to “deal with these facts and take effective steps regarding them.” On 14 March, Heydar Aliev sent another message to Boris Yeltsin about this, while a statement also came from Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Azeri side expressed the hope that as a result of the investigation conducted, the officials involved in illegal deliveries of Russian weapons to Armenia would be exposed and punished, and, most important, the relevant steps would be taken to confiscate and remove these weapons from Armenia.
On 28 March, Heydar Aliev raised the question of the weapons deliveries at a meeting of the Council of Heads of CIS States, and the next day, 29 March, this problem was a topic of discussion at a personal meeting between the presidents of Russia and Azerbaijan. As a result, a compromise agreement was reached about carrying out a thorough inspection of all the circumstances related to this incidence, as well as about the sides refraining from public statements on this subject until the inspection had been completed (the Azerbaijani side was later to repeatedly violate this agreement). The Russian leadership entrusted the Main Military Prosecutor’s Office of Russia with carrying out a thorough investigation of this case, while the Russian State Duma created a special commission.
On 11 April, after listening to a report by Chairman of the Defense Committee Lev Rokhlin at a closed sitting about the illegal deliveries of weapons, military hardware, and military property to Armenia for a total of $1 billion, the State Duma adopted a resolution On Measures to Adhere to Russian Federation Legislation Regarding Deliveries of Weapons and Military Hardware to Foreign States. The deputies asked Boris Yeltsin to take the necessary political and diplomatic steps to prevent possible interstate complications regarding the illegal deliveries of weapons and military hardware to Armenia, as well as carry out exhaustive measures to prevent similar violations of the law when delivering weapons to other countries and bring the people involved in these violations to personal account.
2 Bakinskiy rabochiy, 22 February, 1997.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
In these extremely unfavorable circumstances, on 2-4 July, 1997, President of the Azerbaijan Republic Heydar Aliev made his first official visit to the Russian Federation.3
Preparations for the talks were made in a tense atmosphere. In order to downplay the negative influence of the Armenian factor, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs drew up drafts of almost identical treaties on friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance, which were to be signed by both Azerbaijan and Armenia. But on the insistence of the Azerbaijani side, the obligations on mutual assistance were removed from the treaty draft, and the treaty itself was given a different name.
On 3 July, Heydar Aliev and Boris Yeltsin signed the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Security between Russia and Azerbaijan. In contrast to a similar document of 1992 (which was never ratified by the sides), the updated Treaty envisaged in particular mutual steps to maintain security in the event of threats to one of the sides and to prevent regional conflicts. The document calls for not employing any military, financial, or economic measures aimed against the other side. The Treaty was to be in effect for 10 years, and with the mutual consent of the sides can automatically be extended for another five years. At the same time, the sides signed an impressive set of intergovernmental agreements.
Some time later (29 August, 1997), Russia, as planned, signed the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with Armenia. The Azerbaijani side assessed this document as an attempt to “establish a military alliance between the two states.” Among the accusations against Russia there were also assertions that its obligations “ensuing from the documents signed in one case with Armenia and in the other with Azerbaijan are contradictory to each other.” In the document signed with Azerbaijan, Russia declares its willingness to be guided by the principles and regulations of international law during settlement of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, while in the document signed with Armenia, it pledges to be guided by a search for a mutually acceptable decision. Azerbaijan assessed this as failing to correspond to Russia’s status as co-chairman of the OSCE Minsk Group.
The reaction of the Russian side to the above-mentioned accusations was just as sensitive. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reminded everyone that during preparation of the updated Treaty between Russia and Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijani side did not agree with its proposals to expand relations in the military-political sphere.
The intensity of the exchange of notes and the pitch of the mutual accusations reached such a peak that on 7 October, 1997, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Evgeni Primakov came to Baku. However, he was unable to defuse the tension.4
On 2 April, 1999, Heydar Aliev made an official statement at a session of the Council of Heads of the CIS States about the weapons delivered to Armenia. According to him, one of the main reasons preventing full-fledged and effective cooperation within the Commonwealth is the unsettled armed conflicts in the territories of the CIS participating states, which create an atmosphere of distrust and tension and block efficient cooperation and interaction in all other spheres. “In these conditions,” stressed Heydar Aliev, “the actions of the Russian Federation governmental structures to militarize Armenia are entirely impermissible. I also deem it necessary to note that the situation that has developed in the Transcaucasian region entirely contradicts the provisions of the CIS Collective Security Treaty of 15 May, 1992.”5
By the fall of 1999, Russian-Azerbaijani relations had ultimately reached an impasse. The mutual accusations and notes of protest continued. Azerbaijan kept close tabs on Moscow’s contacts with Erevan and reacted severely to the injudicious, to put it mildly, statements by high-ranking Russian military officers about Russia’s contribution to Armenia’s defense capability. Moscow, in turn, justifiably pointed out that several hundred Chechen militants were being treated in Baku’s hospitals
See: Azerbaidzhan-Rossiia: novaia vekha v razvitii otnoshenii druzhby i sotrudnichestva, Baku, 1997.
See: Bakinskiy rabochiy, 8 October, 1997.
Bakinskiy rabochiy, 3 April, 1999.
and health centers, and field commanders and foreign envoys were flying to Western Europe and the U.S. through the capital’s airport.
It is no secret that at that time anti-Azerbaijani moods were widespread and the idea that the Azerbaijani mafia had taken over the whole retail trade network had become firmly ensconced in the minds of the Russian public.
The question of introducing a visa regime with Azerbaijan became of practical significance— on 5 November, 1999, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested beginning talks on introducing a visa regime for citizen trips and sent a corresponding delegation to Baku. According to unofficial data, at the time approximately 2 million Azeris (up to 30 percent of the adult male population) worked in semi-legal conditions in Russia. Annual money transfers home amounted to between $2.5 and 4 billion (the volume of Azerbaijan’s export for 2002 was no higher than $2.16 billion).
Aggravation of the political climate also had an effect on the reciprocal trade turnover indices. In the summer of 1999, the volume of Russian-Azerbaijani trade turnover compared to the same period for 1997 dropped by 33%, while Russia’s share in Azerbaijan’s trade turnover decreased to 18%.
Azerbaijani-Russian Relations as a Model of Pragmatic Cooperation in the Post-Soviet Expanse
January 2001 can by rights be considered the beginning of a new stage in the development of relations between Russia and Azerbaijan. This was when, during the Russian president’s first official visit to Baku during the entire post-Soviet period, Heydar Aliev and Vladimir Putin managed to remove many irritants that had accumulated in bilateral relations.6
The talks, which were friendly and constructive, became an important stage in establishing a regular political dialogue at the highest level. The dynamics bilateral cooperation was imbibed with in 2001 are undergoing a new boost today.
It is no secret that the nature of the contacts between the leaders is also largely determined by the level of cooperation between the countries. As President of the Azerbaijan Republic Ilham Aliev said at a meeting in Moscow on 17 April, 2009 with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, “It is gratifying that the presidents of Russia and Azerbaijan also enjoy the same friendly relations that are currently seen between the two countries. We use every meeting to its fullest advantage and discuss in a very open and sincere atmosphere everything that needs to be discussed. And each time we see for ourselves that the issues requiring immediate intervention are becoming fewer and fewer. There are no problems between our countries, and the issues that need to be discussed and resolved are dealt with rapidly.”7
The Declaration on Friendship and Strategic Partnership adopted by the presidents of both countries in Baku on 3 July, 2008 forms the legal foundation of the current stage in Russian-Azerbaijani relations. It notes that both sides, based on previously signed documents, will continue comprehensive development of equal, mutually advantageous, and constructive bilateral relations that are of a strategic nature.8
At present, more than 80 interstate and intergovernmental agreements have been entered between the sides.
6 See: New Stage in Azerbaijani-Russian Relations, Baku, 2001 (in Azeri).
7 Official website of the President of Azerbaijan [www.president.az].
8 Official website of the President of Russia [www.Kremlin.ru].
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
There are so many contacts at the highest level that they defy enumeration. We will mention just one—Dmitry Medvedev’s working visit to Baku on 29 June, 2009, during which the presidents signed joint statements on the Caspian Sea and on the fundamental principles for completing delimitation of the state border and distribution of the water resources of the Samur River, as well as the Main Conditions of a Buy-Sell Contract for Azerbaijani Natural Gas.
Similar dynamics at summit meetings are having a positive effect on interparliamentary and interdepartmental cooperation.
Over the past few years, Chairman of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly Sergey Mironov has visited Azerbaijan three times, there have been meetings with State Duma Chairman Boris Gryzlov, and Chairman of the Milli Mejlis of the Azerbaijan Republic has visited Russia.
Contacts between the ministers of foreign affairs and consultations between the two country’s foreign ministries are enjoyed on a regular basis. Russian Minister of Education and Science, Minister of Regional Development, Minister of Internal Affairs, and Minister of Defense go to Baku regularly. Working relations are maintained between the leaders of the security and defense structures.
Military and military-technical cooperation are an ongoing part of political cooperation. On 27 February, 2003, an intergovernmental agreement was signed in Baku on military-technical cooperation, and on 4 December, 2006, an intergovernmental agreement on mutual protection of rights to the results of intellectual activity used and obtained during bilateral military-technical cooperation.
On 29 July, 2008, the second sitting of the Russian-Azerbaijani intergovernmental commission on military-technical cooperation was held in Moscow. There is a regular exchange of visits between the leaders of the defense departments of both countries.
The proposal made by Russian President Vladimir Putin on 8 June, 2007 at the G-8 summit in Heiligendamm on using the Qabala Radar Station in the ABM system developed by the U.S. was supported by the Azerbaijani leadership, which viewed it as a specific contribution to strengthening stability and security in the region.
Border cooperation is an important component of Russian-Azerbaijani relations.
Regular contacts are maintained between the Russian and Azerbaijani border departments. On 25 January, 2002, an Interdepartmental Agreement on the Activity of Border Representatives was signed. The border services of both countries cooperate on the basis of annual joint action plans. An agreement on opening official representative offices of the respective border departments in the territory of both countries is at the coordination stage.
Work is continuing on delimitation of the state border with Azerbaijan. On 29-30 January, 2008, the 15th round of talks was held in Moscow. A 301.1-km-long stretch of the border, of a total of 336.5 km, has been coordinated and registered in working reports and cartographic and descriptive documents, that is, 90% of the border has been delimited.
There is a high level of cooperation between the law-enforcement and judicial structures of both countries. Agreements have been signed and are in effect between the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Azerbaijani Ministry of Internal Affairs on Cooperation of the Internal Affairs Departments of the Border Areas, a Memorandum on Interrelations in Fighting Terrorism, protocols on cooperation, and a Memorandum on Cooperation between the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Azerbaijani Ministry of Internal Affairs in Ensuring the Safety of Transit Cargo.9
When analyzing the current state of bilateral political cooperation, the noticeably growing interest of the Russian side in settling the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict cannot be ignored.
On 2 November, 2008, Russia initiated holding a trilateral meeting among the presidents of Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, during which a Declaration on Peaceful Settlement of the Nagorno-
9 For more detail, see the document “Rossiisko-azerbaidzhanskie otnosheniia” on the official website of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs [www.mid.ru].
Karabakh conflict was signed. The document implies legally binding international guarantees for settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. For the first time since 1994, the leaders of the two conflicting sides—Armenia and Azerbaijan—signed a document on political settlement of this conflict (here it is also appropriate to mention that after long and bloody fighting a cease-fire was reached on 12 May, 1994 in Bishkek with the mediation of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly).
In the Declaration, the presidents state that “they will promote improvement of the situation in the Southern Caucasus and ensure the establishment of stability and security in the region by means of political settlement of the conflict on the basis of the principles and regulations of international law and the decisions and documents adopted within this framework in order to create favorable conditions for economic development and comprehensive cooperation in the region.”
The declaration notes that the heads of Azerbaijan and Armenia “have agreed to continue working, including during further contacts at the highest level, on coming to terms regarding the political settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and have entrusted their ministers of foreign affairs to take further active steps in the negotiation process in cooperation with the co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group.” The final paragraph of the declaration says that the presidents “consider it important to encourage the creation of conditions for implementing measures to strengthen trust in the context of regulation efforts.”10
The Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been one of the most difficult issues to resolve primarily because Armenia and Azerbaijan have entirely different approaches to its settlement. The positions of both countries cannot be correlated without each of them making serious concessions and without a willingness to compromise, that is, to step down from their original precepts. In so doing, the conflict can only be settled if the leaders of the conflicting sides find a way to coexist that suits them both.
All the arguments that the West or Russia will “give” Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan “out of gratitude” for oil, deployment of a military base, participation (or non-participation) in the military operation against Iran, opening of the Turkish-Armenian border, or any other advantages are deprived of all meaning. In this context, it is important to note that the Azerbaijani leadership, in contrast to many Azeri experts and political scientists who believe that Russia should “ultimately determine” who is more important for it, Armenia or Azerbaijan, understands that Moscow cannot build relations with Azerbaijan to the detriment of its relations with Armenia, and vice versa.
The high level of political interaction is having a positive effect on the development of trade and economic cooperation.
Trade relations between Russia and Azerbaijan are regulated by the Agreements on Free Trade of 30 September, 1992 and 15 April, 1994. The interstate Treaty on Long-Term Economic Cooperation until 2010 and intergovernmental Agreement on the Fundamental Principles and Vectors of Economic Cooperation signed on 25 January, 2002 are important elements in forming a qualitatively new foundation for developing trade and economic relations between the two countries.
The Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation (IGC) is the working mechanism that regulates the resolution of specific issues of Russian-Azerbaijani trade and economic relations at the state level; Ministry of Energy Sergey Schmatko has been appointed chairman of the Russian side of the IGC, while First Deputy Prime Minister Yagub Eiubov represents the Azerbaijani side.
Both countries are traditionally concentrating on increasing the volumes of and diversifying reciprocal trade, in addition to developing a regulatory legal base of bilateral cooperation. Further improvement of the contractual-legal base of Russian-Azerbaijani relations plays a very important role in developing mutual cooperation. In this context, an intergovernmental Agreement on the Stimulation and Mutual Protection of Investments must be signed as soon as possible since its absence is having a negative effect on the level of Russian-Azerbaijani investment cooperation.
10 Official site of the President of Russia [www.Kremlin.ru].
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Since Russia is a leading exporter of machine-operated and technical commodities, building materials, lumber, rolled non-ferrous metals, and chemical products to Azerbaijan, which account for more than 90% of Russian export, a further increase in delivery volumes of these Russian items can be forecast.
The dynamics of trade turnover are positive—the volume of reciprocal trade turnover in 2008 increased to $2.4 billion, of which Russian export to Azerbaijan accounts for about $2 billion. Import from Azerbaijan has reached $411.4 million. The successful pre-crisis development of Russian-Azer-baijani trade and economic relations and increase in trade turnover was largely possible thanks to interregional and border cooperation. More than 30 documents on trade and economic and cultural cooperation have been signed at the interregional level, and another 9 regions intend to sign similar agreements. More than 500 branches and representative offices of Russian companies are currently operating actively in the Azerbaijani market.
The Russian side is expecting an increase in Azerbaijani export due to deliveries to the Russian market of foodstuffs that traditionally enjoy demand and meet the quality standards, primarily fresh vegetables and fruit, wines and cognacs, fruit and vegetable juice, animal and vegetable oils, nuts, tea, and many other commodities.
On 1 January, 2010, Azerbaijan began exporting gas to Russia.
In 2008, Russian investments in the Azerbaijani economy amounted to $12.4 million, which shows that efforts must be stepped up in this area. The creation of joint enterprises in oil machine-building, medication manufacture, the processing and storage of agricultural products, as well as in the financing and banking spheres appears very promising.
Cooperation with Azerbaijan in developing the North-South international transport corridor is of strategic importance for Russia in order to organize continuous rail transportation from Europe via Russia, Azerbaijan, and Iran to India and the Southeast Asian countries. Implementation of this project will make it possible for the participating states to obtain significant dividends from transit shipments, the volume of which will reach 15-20 million tons in the future.
More than 170 companies with 100% Russian capital and another 237 joint ventures currently operate in Azerbaijan, which proves that Russian businessmen are extremely interested in its market. The increase in the number of enterprises registered in Azerbaijan that have a share of Russian capital is largely due to the improvement in the investment climate in the country. In 2008, the Russian Bal-tika Company purchased the Baku-Kastel beer-brewing plant and invested $20 million in its modernization, which is a graphic example of the interest of Russian business in the Azerbaijani market. Russian companies would like to increase their share in the second stage of developing the Shakh Deniz gas field, which has natural gas supplies of up to 1.2 trillion cm.
Other promising spheres of possible interest of Russian businessmen are investments in Azerbaijani’s non-ferrous metallurgy, as well as participation in the privatization of small hydropower plants and enterprises for storing and processing agricultural products.
According to Russian Minister Elvira Nabiullina,11 two criteria become of vital importance in the context of the world crisis in economic cooperation issues between partners of any level. They are pragmatism and mutual benefit. In Russia’s case, it should cooperate in those spheres, the end product of which still enjoys demand even in a crisis. Take the fuel and energy complex for example, where the Azeri side needs deliveries of oil and gas equipment and implements, as well as drilling and well repair services, and so on, while the Russian side is able to meet these needs. Other mutually beneficial spheres can also be found. For example, implementation by Russian enterprises of a large contract by Azerbaijan’s Caspian Shipping Corporation for building dry-cargo freighters and tankers or purchasing special Russian-manufactured aviation technology for the Azerbaijani Ministry of Emergencies. It would be expedient to create joint enterprises in the light industry and medication manufacture, as well as licensing companies, and also the companies for servicing agricultural and road-
Interview of E. Nabiullina with the Azerbaijani Information Agency Trend Capital, 29 July, 2009.
building technology. Cooperation in nanotechnology would also be lucrative, and both sides are already looking at potential vectors of interaction in this sphere.
Both the supreme leadership of Azerbaijan and Russia and specific state departments and nongovernmental structures are also focusing their attention on humanitarian cooperation.
Relations at the interstate level are being coordinated within the framework of the Russian-Azerbaijani Program of Cooperation in the Humanitarian Sphere for 2007-2009.
Education and science are among the promising areas of cooperation. At present, 5,755 Azeri citizens are studying at Russian higher education institutions, while 1,420 of them have their education paid for from the Russian Federation budget. On 27 February, 2008, a branch of Lomonosov Moscow State University opened in Baku. Now in its second year, almost 200 students are attending it. More than 1,200 people are studying at another Russian education institution in Azerbaijan—a branch of Moscow State Open University. More than 15,000 students are obtaining an education in Russian at Azerbaijani higher education institutions.
C o n c l u s i o n
Summing up this brief analysis of the current period in Russian-Azerbaijani cooperation, it is important to emphasis its creative nature and striving to expand interaction in different spheres. The leaders of Russia and Azerbaijan have defined the strategies, while practical implementation of the coordinated plans is being entrusted to diplomats from both sides, among others.
Russia and Azerbaijan are united by the common historical destiny of their people and their invaluable political, economic, and spiritual potential. Life has confirmed that Russia still needs Azerbaijan, just as Azerbaijan still needs Russia. The relations between these two sovereign states, Russia and Azerbaijan, have acquired a pragmatic, business-like, and mutually advantageous nature that takes particular account of the national interests of each country.
Marina MUSKHELISHVILI
Deputy Head of the Center for Social Studies
(Tbilisi, Georgia).
GEORGIA IN A NEW WAVE OF TRANSFORMATION
Abstract
T
he twenty-year cycle of political transformation did not bring stability to Georgia; the country is still oscillating
between authoritarian rule and democracy. Initially, discourse that merged the Soviet legacies and Western liberal and democrat-
