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key area in the geopolitical confrontation that began as soon as the world lost its bipolarity. The external actors are fully aware of both factors.
America’s post-Soviet policy in the Caspian is obviously suggested by the above, the geopolitical factor being much more functionally important; the people in Washington are looking at the region’s energy resources through the prism of the geopolitical processes going on in Eurasia.
The Russian-Georgian conflict of 2008; the “resetting” of American-Russian relations launched by the Obama Administration; the mounting Islamic sentiments in Turkey, which have moved it away somewhat from Western geopolitics; the still suspended issue of energy security of America’s allies in Europe; as well as the continued and even greater tension in Washington’s relations with Tehran mean that America will probably become even more involved in the Caspian region. The region’s dynamics and the rapidly changing geopolitical and geostrategic processes around it will force the United States to adjust its tactics and strategies accordingly.
Farkhad HUSEYNOV
Doctoral candidate at the Chair of International Relations,
Baku State University (Baku, Azerbaijan).
AZERBAIJAN IN THE GEOPOLITICAL STRATEGY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Abstract
This article analyzes the special features of the European Union’s geopolitical interests in the Caucasus, particularly in Azerbaijan. The problems in the relations between the EU and the Azerbaijan Republic are interpreted as a long civ-ilizational process. The author analyzes the role of EU-Azerbaijani relations in ensuring the energy security of the region and the EU. He notes that the EU is interested
in creating a European civilizational expanse in the region and particularly in Azerbaijan. This would promote the creation of a fragment of Europe in Azerbaijan with a view to establishing closer cooperation, which would make it less urgent for the republic to become an official member of the European Union. The author is convinced that this is the crux of the European Neighborhood Policy.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
International organizations perform different activities in Azerbaijan, ranging from humanitarian aid, various educational projects, and assistance to nongovernmental organizations to the devel-
opment of joint economic projects, and so on. As a rule, the activity of each of these international organizations is carried out under slogans of globalization, democratization, and liberalization. After the collapse of the socialist system, which was perceived in the world as a victory of liberal values, the same processes have been going on throughout the post-socialist expanse, which can be described in the most abstract and generalized way as integration into the world economic, political, and cultural expanse. And what is usually understood as integration into the world community does indeed presume the victory of globalization, democratization, and liberalization.
An analysis of the current political and public-journalistic discourse on the concepts of “globalization,” “democratization,” and “liberalization” clearly shows that its participants have rather vague ideas about the corresponding phenomena. Sometimes the opinions are diametrically opposite. For example, some regard globalization as a positive phenomenon, while others see it in a negative light. One way or another, the civilized world, as our model of stability and prosperity, has several reference points which are perceived as a relatively ideal embodiment of the ideas of globalization, democratization, and liberalization. Without a doubt, the European Union is one of, if not the main, ideal reference points of the civilized world.
The EU serves as a model for Azerbaijan in all the indicated parameters, so cooperation between Azerbaijan and the EU is legitimate and important from the perspective of the country’s integration into the world economic and cultural expanse. As Head of the European Commission Office in Baku Alan Waddams noted: “For the past 200 years, Azerbaijan has been moving toward Europe, but in recent years this movement has greatly accelerated.”1 This article highlights the geopolitical aspects of cooperation between the European Union and the Azerbaijan Republic.
On the Concept of Geopolitics and Geopolitical Interests
The term and concept geopolitics was first coined by Johan Rudolf Kjellen, a Swedish scientist of the beginning of last century, who defined geopolitics as “science about the state as a geographic organism embodied in space.”2 In Rudolf Kjellen’s teaching, geopolitics was not at all absolute. For example, Pavel Tsygankov shows that emergence of the term “geopolitics” is associated with Swedish professor and parliamentary deputy Rudolf Kjellen (1846-1922). When studying the system of governance aimed at creating a strong state, he came to the conclusion in 1916 that an intrinsic combination of five closely interdependent elements of politics was necessary: economopolitics, demo-politics, sociopolitics, cratopolitics, and geopolitics.3 So geopolitics occupies a legitimate place in this paradigm of elements and is in no way a self-contained concept.
The fact that geopolitics has become more pertinent in our day and age seems to be associated with an understanding that spatial-temporal factors should legitimately dominate in all spheres of human activity. The thesis that nothing exists in the world outside space and time (the most objective existential indices) can be considered the methodological foundation of this dominance of geopolitical interests. Consequently, the objective description of any phenomenon or object should correlate with an explanation of their spatial-temporal parameters. Since any state as a political phenomenon is realized within specific spatial and temporal boundaries, its interests should be defined in strict correlation with the specifics of its spatial-temporal boundaries. Any other understanding of the tasks
1 F. Teimurkhanly, “Soglashenie mezhdu ES i Azerbaidzhanom budet prodleno,” Zerkalo, No. 220, 29 November,
2008, p. 3.
2 Ir.A. Vasilenko, Geopolitika sovremennogo mira, Gardariki, Moscow, 2006, p. 29.
3 See: P. Tsygankov, Teoriia mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii, Gardariki, Moscow, 2004, p. 202.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
facing a specific state will be of a romantic, rather than pragmatic nature. It will proceed either from idealization of the past or from more or less abstract ideas of the future.
In the definition of geopolitics offered by Vladimir Kolosov and Nikolai Mironenko, the concept “geopolitics” is very justifiably taken beyond the framework of state policy. For example, the researchers note that “geopolitics can be defined as some problematic scientific sphere, the main objective of which is establishing and forecasting the spatial boundaries of different force fields (military, economic, political, civilizational, environmental) primarily at the global level. States, interstate groups, and several non-state entities, particularly those of transnational significance, act as the generators of these fields, while geopolitical interests, understood in one way or another, such as pursuing imperial strivings, guaranteeing state security, and preserving the state’s cultural uniqueness act as the mechanism by which these fields interact.”4
■ First, in this definition, such concepts as “force field” and “global level” draw attention to themselves.
■ Second, I notice that pursuing imperial strivings is correlated with guaranteeing state security and preserving cultural uniqueness.
This understanding of the gist of the term geopolitics indeed gives the concept real content. For example, the concept “geopolitics” is normally associated today with the policy of large nations. There are standard ideas about how, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and socialist camp, the large world nations began divvying up the spheres of influence in the world anew. It is commonly thought that the U.S. is striving for world hegemony, the European countries are joining together to play a key role in world politics and distributing the spheres of influence together, and China, which is competing with the largest world powers in the economic sphere, is gaining strength. Whatever the case, the concept “geopolitics” is associated with aggression, which in this case should be understood not only as military intervention. Aggression is also manifested in the economy, demographic policy, and even in culture. For example, there is talk about cultural expansion. One way or another, geopolitics is perceived as the enlargement of a particular sphere of influence.
Vladimir Kolosov and Nikolai Mironenko, as can be seen from the above definition, include a “defensive” component in the content of geopolitics, that is, it becomes understood that not only large powers claiming world leadership can have geopolitical interests, but also small states striving for self-preservation.
In this way, the term geopolitics can be broken down into two differential concepts: “aggression associated with economic, demographic, linguistic, and ultimately cultural expansion” and “activity aimed at territorial, economic, demographic, linguistic, and cultural self-preservation.”
Most of the definitions of geopolitics evaluate it as a scientific sphere or topic of scientific research, leaving aside the understanding of geopolitics as a certain process. For example, the Oxford Illustrated Encyclopedia points out that geopolitics is an area of political science based on the fact that international state policy is predetermined by its physical and geographical conditions. This term is often used to identify the interrelation between geographical and political factors in international relations, and particularly applies to strategically vulnerable regions of the world.5 In Encyclopedia Britannica, geopolitics is described as research: “Geopolitics is an analysis of the geographic influences on power relationships in international relations.”6
Only a few definitions indicate that geopolitics also includes political practice that takes account of geographical factors. But even these definitions do not place special emphasis on the practical aspect, either mentioning it along with the theoretical significance or as a secondary element after it. For example, “geopolitics is the theory and practice of contemporary international relations
4 V.A. Kolosov, N.S.Mironenko, Geopolitika i politicheskaia geografiia, Aspekt-Press, Moscow, 2005, p. 18.
5 See: Oksfordskaia illiustrirovannaia entsiklopediia, INFRA-M, Ves mir, Moscow, 2000, p. 51.
6 D. Deudney, “Geopolitics,” available at [www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/229932/geopolitics].
and the prospects for their development taking into account the widespread systemic influence of geographic, political, economic, military, demographic, environmental, scientific-technical, and other factors.”7
Finally, the correlation between geopolitics and not only theory, but also practice shows that the term means not only scientific reflection on a fact, but also the fact itself, and not only reflection on the experience of how geographic factors influence politics, but also the experience itself as it is manifested in time and space. Moving ahead, it can be noted that in the report on Azerbaijan within the framework of the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument, Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 specifically mentions the practical aspect of geopolitics: “Azerbaijan’s political and security situation is heavily influenced by its geographic position, squeezed as it is between the Russian Federation and Iran.”8
Understanding geopolitics as a political strategy based on geographic location makes it possible to talk about the natural and inevitable, i.e. entirely objective, determinism in this sphere, as well as about the aggression generated by geopolitical interests. The first trend can also be designated as subconsciously objective in the sense that politics generated by geographic location might not even be understood at the level of reflection. Nevertheless, geographic location in itself acts as a natural stimulator that guides the state as an organism structured in geographic space.
Special Features of the Geopolitical Interests of the European Union in the Southern Caucasus
The EU’s policy in the Southern Caucasus is very obviously structured in keeping with geopolitical motives. It is clear that the EU is trying to draw the region into its civilizational structure. In so doing, Europe is proceeding from the “European appearance” of the Caucasians. It is no accident that European documents on the Southern Caucasus make particular mention of its European identity and European strivings.9
Europe is trying to create a single European civilizational expanse, counting on the fact that the stability of this expanse outside Europe proper will mean stability and prosperity for Europe itself. A civilized and genuinely democratic Southern Caucasus will give Europe another non-European Europe on its borders. This new Europe, which, without joining the EU (something it has not been promised), will for all intents and purposes be a fragment of Europe on the borders of Europe proper and Russia, is playing a vitally important role in the current political alignment of the EU. This, in our opinion, is the gist of the EU’s geopolitical strategy. As Russian scientist L. Klepatsky notes, “having its own sphere of influence that also includes non-member countries and creating a belt of friendly neighbors is what the EU’s policy is all about.”10 This is evidently one of the main reasons for the significant financial assistance the EU is rendering its Eastern partners.
The EU is not hiding its intentions by not explaining its strategic motives. For example, EU Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner
7 Geopolitika: Antologiia, Compiled by N.N. Ashenkampf, S.V. Pogorelskaia, Akademicheskiy proekt, Kultura, Moscow, 2006, p. 3.
8 Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013. Azerbaijan, European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument, p. 9, available at [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_azerbaijan_en.pdf].
9 See: “Evrokomissiia podpishet s Azerbaidzhanom dogovor ob assotsiatsii,” available at [http://www.day.az/news/ politics/ 138059.html].
10 L. Klepatsky, “Strategiia otnoshenii Rossii i Evrosoiuza,” Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn, No. 4, 2008, p. 93.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
said that “we are strategically interested in there being a stable political and economic situation in these countries,”11 implying the South Caucasian countries.
In response to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the EU formulated a new type of agreement that comprised a legal framework for cooperation with the CIS countries—a partnership and cooperation agreement. This kind of agreement was signed with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia in 1996. In 2004, protocols were signed to these agreements that extended their terms.
The main objective of these agreements was to render assistance to the South Caucasian countries in establishing strong ties with the European structures. In so doing, Europe made it unequivocally understood that this would only be possible if the regional conflicts were settled peacefully. In 2004, the three South Caucasian states were included in the European Neighborhood Instrument. Within the framework of this instrument, Five-Year Action Plans designed to carry out cooperation with the EU were drawn up in 2006. At the moment, keen attention is being paid to another EU initiative, Eastern Partnership. The main vectors of cooperation within the framework of the project are creating a free trade area and gradual liberation of the visa regime.
One of the priorities of cooperation set forth in the Action Plan is to bring legislations into closer harmony with each other. In our opinion, the EU’s requirements and its recommendations associated with a change in the legislation of the three South Caucasian republics directly reflect Europe’s geopolitical strivings. The very fact that legislation is being amended to meet the European model means Europe’s geopolitical enlargement to the East. In so doing, it is worth noting that Europe is enlarging without incorporating the countries it is assimilating into its own space and without making promises to do so. To draw historical parallels, this kind of European enlargement to the East is reminiscent of the historical expansion of the Greek culture to the East and creation of the Hellenic world. It is important to note that a very specific cultural area was created in the East, which, despite Greek influence, could not be identified with the culture of Hellas. This is why it is customary to talk about the Hellenic culture in which Eastern motifs are also clearly represented.
Since 1991, the EU has allotted more than €1 billion to the three South Caucasian countries from the Community’s funds, which correlates to the assistance rendered the EU member states.12 Since 2004, the EU has become the main trade partner of each of the South Caucasian countries. Since January 2006, all three South Caucasian countries have been provided with preferences from the EU’s Generalized System of Preferences. Armenia and Azerbaijan have been included in the standard arrangements, while Georgia falls under the expanded preferences that are offered to countries which apply the internationally recognized standards of good governance and sustainable development (so-called GSP+) and that provide preferential access to the EU market. Since 2008, two other countries have also been included in this system. Incidentally, as researchers note, providing preferential access to the largest capitalist market in the world is a unique and strong tool in the EU’s set of foreign policy instruments.13
After singling out the TACIS, TRACECA, and INOGATE programs as their main areas of cooperation, during the first ten years, the European Union countries allotted the region financial aid totaling €970 million.14 As of today, TRACECA has financed 62 technical assistance projects totaling 105 million and 14 investment projects totaling 52 million.15 Up until now, the funds for developing TRACECA have all come from the EU budget (within the framework of TACIS budget funding).
11 “Gruzia, Armeniia i Azerbaidzhan iavliaiutsia vazhnymi dlia Evrosoiuza stranami: Komissar ES,” available at [http://www.regnum.ru/news/1128591.html].
12 See: The European Union and its Neighbours, ed. by S. Blockmans, A. Lazowski, T.M.C.Asser Press, The Hague, 2006, p. 601.
13 See: J. McCormick, The European Superpower, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2007, p. 111.
14 See: T. German, “Corridor of Power: The Caucasus and Energy Security,” Caucasian Review of International Affairs, Vol. 2 (2), 2008, p. 17.
15 See: Action Plan for 2008-2009 to Implement the Strategy of the TRACECA Intergovernmental Commission on the Development of the International Europe-Caucasus-Asia Transport Corridor (TRACECA) until 2015, p. 3.
The EU’s assistance has made a significant impact; the EU’s obligations to the TRACECA region have made it possible to increase investments from international financial institutions such as the EBRD and World Bank. Every year, 4-5 projects are implemented within the framework of the TRACECA program with an overall budget of €14-15 million, which are financed by the European Commission and cover all 13 participating states in the project.16 They include such beneficial projects as Coordination and Analysis of Traffic Flows along the Corridor, Security and Safety of Sea, Air, and Land Transport, and Regulation on the Transport of Dangerous Goods along the TRACECA Corridor.
The EU is particularly active in the Caucasus with respect to maintaining control on the borders. The EU has been taking steps to prevent the Chechen conflict from spilling over into Georgia. During the second half of 2000, the EU rendered assistance to the Georgian authorities to support the OSCE Monitoring Mission on the Georgian-Chechen border. The assistance consisted of €1 million for equipping Georgian border guards.17 In 2002, the EU decided to render assistance to the Georgian authorities and the OSCE Monitoring Mission for ensuring control on the Georgian-Ingushetian border and to continue rendering assistance on the Georgian-Chechen border. After publishing a declaration on its willingness to play a more active role in the Southern Caucasus (February 2001), the EU joined the OSCE mechanisms for settling the Ossetian conflict. The EU mission on law regulations in Georgia was the first mission of its kind to appear in the context of Europe’s defense and security policy and pursue the goal of ensuring support of the Georgian authorities in coping with challenges in the criminal legal sphere.
Since they gained their independence, the EU has been rendering the South Caucasian countries significant financial aid. Between 2007 and 2010, there were plans to allot Georgia €120.4 million, Azerbaijan €92 million, and Armenia €90 million in aid.18 This aid is being rendered within the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy.
The EU is interested in resolving domestic conflicts, which is a condition for sustainable social development. The EU’s growing role in resolving conflicts means an increase in its authority in the region and consequently its stronger geostrategic position in the Caucasus as a whole. In so doing, the EU is reacting sensitively even to the smallest changes in the status quo in the Caucasus. For example, the U.S. and the EU countries welcomed the political changes in Georgia. In 2004, international donors from 31 countries and 12 organizations met at a joint conference of the European Commission and World Bank in order to coordinate aid to Georgia for 2004-2006. It was decided to allot Georgia 850 million to support budget and investment needs.19 Between 1992 and 2006, the EU Commission rendered Georgia a total of €506 million in aid.20
After the conflict with Russia, the EU allotted Georgia €9 million in immediate humanitarian aid. Then a conference of donors was organized at which Georgia was promised aid totaling €3.44 billion. A number of projects are already under implementation such as humanitarian assistance, support to internally displaced persons (€61.5 million) and the European Security and Defense Policy mission of EU observers.21
The EU’s Caucasian policy became active at the beginning of 2003 when the South Caucasian countries were included among Europe’s neighbors in the draft of “A Secure Europe in a Better
16 See: A. Mustafaev, “TRASEKA nuzhdaetsia v krupnykh investitsiiakh,” Azerbaidzhanskie izvestiia, No. 100 (1087),
7 June, 2008, p. 1.
17 See: The European Union and its Neighbours, p. 605.
18 See: M. Ilinsky, “Vostochnoe partnerstvo: protsess poshel, no resultat neiasen,” Novaia Europa, No. 2, 13 May,
2009, p. 4.
19 See: The European Union and its Neighbours, p. 601.
20 See: “The EU and Georgia: Bilateral Relations,” available at [http://www.delgeo.ec.europa.eu/en/eu_and_ geor-gia/bilateral_relations.html].
21 See: “European Neighbourhood Policy—GEORGIA,” available at [http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction. do?reference=MEMO/09/184&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en].
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
World: European Security Strategy,” prepared by Javier Solana. The main accent of this document was placed on creating a security zone neighboring on the EU. In July 2003, the Council of Ministers of the European Union appointed a special representative for the Caucasus, who became a key figure in implementing the plan for the EU’s participation in settling the conflicts in the region.
The key tasks of the EU special representative in the Caucasus was helping to restore peace in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia, returning refugees, and ultimate settlement of the conflicts. But in reality the mandate of the EU special representative boiled down to assisting the U.N. and OSCE missions in the region. In order to directly strengthen the EU’s role, in 2006, the mandate of the special representative was extended to include participation in the talks between the conflicting sides, monitoring the situation, and exercising control over the borders and the movement of refugees, drugs, arms, and psychotropic substances.
Brussels thinks that the EU should participate in conflict settlement by applying the levers of influence enforced in the European policy on security and defense, as well as within the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy with the South Caucasian countries.22 These levers include using humanitarian, economic, and administrative-legal mechanisms and tapping the potential of the European police corps and European Rapid Deployment Forces. But as practice has shown, between 2003 and 2008 the mission of the EU special representative was limited to supporting the talks between the conflicting sides and promoting the OSCE’s efficient activity in the Southern Caucasus.
After the Russian-Georgian war, in accordance with the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan, on 1 October, 2008, the Russian military subdivisions in the so-called buffer zones next to South Ossetia and Abkhazia were replaced with the European Union’s Monitoring Mission. This began a new stage in the EU’s participation in the conflict settlement process in Georgia. The European Union also took the initiative regarding international discussion of the future status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and subsequent efforts to ensure stability and security in the region. These consultations began in Geneva as early as the end of last year and have already passed through several stages. Nevertheless, there can be no talk yet about any specific results of this international discussion.
So when talking about the mechanisms for realizing the EU’s geopolitical interests in the Southern Caucasus, it should be noted the Union is using every possible lever it can and not missing a single opportunity to take real part in shaping the political and economic situation in this region.
Europe’s strivings are indeed promoting peace in the region, since if there is stable peace in the Caucasus all the advantages of a pro-European lifestyle will most likely be manifested. Europe’s economic, sociocultural, political, and ultimately civilizational predominance in the present-day world is utterly clear. And its geopolitical strategy is aimed at “spreading” Europe, or the contemporary West European civilization, to the Southern Caucasus in a civilized way.
Cooperation between the EU and Azerbaijan Republic in the Context of Realizing Europe’s Geopolitical Interests in the Southern Caucasus
Relations between the European Union and the Azerbaijan Republic are taking shape within the framework of the Union’s overall relations with the South Caucasian republics. From this it follows that the EU has a certain standard approach to cooperation with new democracies, which does not
22 See: E. Kotelyants, “Na Kavkaz ... cherez Briussel,” available at [http://www.tiras.ru/evrazija/6931-na-kavkaz...-cherez-brjussel.html].
change from country to country. Europe either does not have the opportunity, or does not deem it necessary to establish strictly individual relations with each of its eastern neighbors striving for close cooperation. Europe is well aware that all of these countries have little to give, but have high demands. So tight control is being kept over the integration of the new pro-European democracies into the European civilizational space. Europe has no intentions of doing anything to its detriment, understanding very well that forming a single political and cultural space with a weakly developed periphery, which has a totalitarian past to boot, could create new and unexpected problems for it at home. Relations with Azerbaijan are no exception.
The history of interrelations between the EU and Azerbaijan began in 1993 when Azerbaijan expressed its interest in establishing relations with the European Union and started planning ties with it in different spheres. The regulatory and legal framework of relations between the EU and Azerbaijan was created on 22 April, 1996, when a bilateral partnership and cooperation agreement between the EU and Azerbaijan was signed in Luxemburg.
The documents on cooperation between the EU and Azerbaijan have always reflected the objective state of affairs, while hopes for progress were always precisely hopes underpinned by real substance and not illusions. For example, the Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013. Azerbaijan. European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument indicates that the principal objective of cooperation between the EU and Azerbaijan is to develop an increasingly close relationship, going beyond past levels of cooperation to gradual economic integration and deeper political cooperation.23
In 2006, a document was signed on adoption of the EU-Azerbaijan Action Plan for the next five years within the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy. It sets forth the following priorities: contributing to a peaceful solution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; strengthening democracy in the country, including through fair and transparent electoral process; strengthening the protection of human rights and of fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, in compliance with international commitments of Azerbaijan; improving the business and investment climate, particularly by strengthening the fight against corruption; improving functioning of customs; supporting balanced and sustained economic development, with a particular focus on diversification of economic activities, development of rural areas, poverty reduction and social/territorial cohesion; promoting sustainable development including the protection of the environment; further convergence of economic legislation and administrative practices; strengthening EU-Azerbaijan energy bilateral cooperation and energy and transport regional cooperation; enhancing cooperation in the field ofjus-tice, freedom and security, including in the field of border management; and strengthening regional cooperation.24
According to European legislators, it was not possible to talk about a clear and coordinated EU strategy in the region until after 2006.25
At the moment, another EU initiative, Eastern Partnership, is drawing keen attention. The main fields of cooperation within the framework of the project are creating a free trade area and gradual liberalization of the visa regime.
Interrelations between Azerbaijan and the EU are developing quite intensively. The sides continue to express their willingness for even greater rapprochement. As Azerbaijan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Elmar Mammadyarov writes, “The Caspian is part of Europe, and the EU is at the heart of our transformation and development.”26
23 See: Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013. Azerbaijan. European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument, p. 3.
24 “ENP EU-Azerbaijan Action Plan,” available at [http://www.delaze.ec.europa.eu/pdfs/enp/EU_Azerbaijan_ AP.pdf].
25 See: S. Tamm, “Weakness as Opportunity: EU Policy in the South Caucasus,” Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 3, Fall 2007, p. 72.
26 E. Mammadyarov, “A New Way for the Caspian Region: Cooperation and Integration,” Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 3, Fall 2007, p 43.
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Contacts in the economy and particularly in energy sphere occupy a special, if not the most important, place in EU-Azerbaijani relations. In keeping with the tasks of this vector, on 7 November, 2006, a Memorandum on Mutual Understanding was signed between the EU and Azerbaijan aimed at creating energy partnership between the EU and Azerbaijan. According to the Europeans, implementation of the memorandum will promote Azerbaijan’s greater integration into the European energy market, enhance the EU’s energy security by means of deliveries from the Caspian Basin, and promote the development of more efficient energy demand in Azerbaijan. On 8 May, 2009, the European Union signed a joint declaration with Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and Egypt on a project to build the Nabucco gas pipeline. Building of this 3,300-km pipeline will begin in 2011 and end in 2014. The estimated cost of Nabucco amounts to €7.9 billion, while its throughput capacity will amount to 31 bcm of gas a year.27 The signing of this declaration was preceded by a long chain of talks called upon to convince the sides, both gas importers and exporters, of the project’s expediency.
Azerbaijan is not only important for Europe as a source of energy resources. Nor would it be right to limit Azerbaijan’s significance for Europe to political considerations regarding the weakening of Russia’s levers of influence on Europe. In my opinion, these are all parts of a larger civiliza-tional process. I do not think it correct to use the word “game” in this context, so I’ll not say that these are “parts of a single political game.” An objective analysis of what is going on shows that the EU’s geopolitical objectives coincide with Azerbaijan’s integration policy. That is, Azerbaijan has always revealed its European identity and European strivings. But whereas in Azerbaijan these strivings have basically always been humanitarian, the EU, with the pragmatism inherent in Europeans, is carrying out several programmatically significant and strategically important geopolitical measures. These measures can very legitimately be called “geopolitical” since all of Europe’s tactical steps are underpinned by geopolitical interests. I am deeply convinced that all the energy processes and participation in them by Azerbaijan, on the one hand, the EU, on the other, and, finally, Russia, on the third, should be interpreted in the context of a titanic struggle to truly draw Azerbaijan into the European civiliza-tional space.
In these conditions, the situation is objectively developing in such a way that there are forces in the world that promote this, but there are also forces that prevent it in every way. The logic of history and the logic of events show that only the country on which Azerbaijan has historically depended and which in no way wants Azerbaijan to acquire real independence can prevent this. Nor does this country want Azerbaijan to actually become part of the civilizational space of the great European culture. For until now, European “information” reached Azerbaijan indirectly and communication noise, as cybernetics has it, distorted this information in every possible way. The logic of communication is such that it does not want to lose its functional significance. This stands to reason, and it would be naïve to think otherwise. But today Azerbaijan has the unique historical chance of directly communicating with Europe. Politicians both in Azerbaijan and the EU should have enough goodwill and energy for Azerbaijan to become a part of Europe. The problems of energy security cannot be examined separately from the general civilizational problems.
Security Problems in Bilateral Relations
The EU’s geopolitical strategy toward Azerbaijan is aimed primarily at ensuring the region’s security. In this respect, a general mechanism has been launched regarding the EU’s foreign policy in
27 See: “V Sofii predstavlen proekt stroitelstva gazoprovoda ‘Nabukko’,” available at [http://www.vesti.ru/ doc.html?id=26818].
the Southern Caucasus, which is designated as part of the European Neighborhood. That is, concern about Azerbaijan’s security, as about the security of the Southern Caucasus as a whole, is being shown in keeping with the scenario “the EU’s stability depends on stability in the Caucasus.”28 The EU is also interested in Azerbaijan’s security as the security of a region that is a source and transit zone of energy resources. As researchers note, Europe’s direct participation in energy and security issues is required for Azerbaijan to become more fully integrated into the EU.29
Within the framework of the European Neighborhood Policy, an Action Plan between the EU and Azerbaijan was adopted in 2006 which stipulates several priority areas. The document notes that the EU may invite Azerbaijan on a case-by-case basis to align itself with the EU’s positions on regional and international issues; and conduct consultations on sanctions issued by the EU, including arms embargoes.30
Within the framework of cooperation, accession to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court may be initiated, the implementation of which will require the necessary legislative and constitutional amendments.
The EU and Azerbaijan are to cooperate in the fight against international crime in accordance with international law.
It is proposed that they further develop cooperation in addressing common security threats, including non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and illegal arms exports. The EU and Azerbaijan pledge to strengthen efforts and cooperation in the fight against terrorism. And finally, the EU and the Azerbaijan Republic pledge to reinforce the fight against organized crime, trafficking in human beings, illicit drug trafficking, and money-laundering.
As we can see, all of these cooperation issues are nothing out of the ordinary and are par for the course in today’s world. But for Azerbaijan, settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a vital issue that is directly related to its state security. As for the EU, it has made a whole slew of identical statements that confirm Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and call for a halt to the aggression, withdrawal of troops and peaceful settlement of the conflict. These include documents of 1992, 1993, and 1994 which criticize the aggression, as well as a statement of 2 August, 2002 condemning the presidential elections in the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.
It is clear that both in security and in cooperation between the EU and Azerbaijan as a whole, the priority area for Azerbaijan is peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The EU-Azer-baijan Action Plan in security regards settlement of this conflict as the most important priority area. In this matter, the EU and Azerbaijan pledge to do the following: increase diplomatic efforts, including through the EU Special Representative for the Southern Caucasus; increase political support to the OSCE Minsk Group conflict settlement efforts on the basis of the relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions and OSCE documents and decisions; encourage people-to-people contacts; and intensify the EU dialog with the states concerned with a view to acceleration of the negotiations toward a political settlement.
The Action Plan also envisages implementing de-mining initiatives; promoting measures to assist IDPs and refugees; and promoting the active involvement of civil society in resolving this problem.
All the EU documents regarding Azerbaijan’s security show that the European partners are taking the Russian factor into account and, consequently, that they are being cautious, which the Azerbaijani side could evaluate in different ways. For example, A. Babaev, a researcher at the Center for European Social Research at the University of Manheim, believes that the Karabakh conflict has always been on the periphery of the European Union’s foreign policy. “The only thing that interests the
28 “Sarkozy: stabilnost ES zavisit ot stabilnosti na Kavkaze,” available at [http://www.novopol.ru/text51469.html].
29 See: Europe’s Energy Security. Gazprom’s Dominance and Caspian Supply Alternatives, ed. by S.E. Cornell, N. Nilsson, Central Asia—Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies Program, Stockholm, 2008, p. 12.
30 See: “ENP EU-Azerbaijan Action Plan.”
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
EU is building the Nabucco gas pipeline. Europe has great hopes for it in terms of diversifying its energy resources.”31 Other researchers, on the contrary, believe that the conflict has always been in the center of Europe’s attention, and the EU has always been extremely supportive of Azerbaijan’s position on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.32 Azerbaijan still hopes that the EU can act as a mediator in the conflict settlement. Several Western researchers are also of this opinion, calling for the European Union to replace France as a co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group and believing that by doing so Europe will assume responsibility for resolving the conflict based on its adherence to “soft power,” its ability to ensure post-conflict restoration, and its positive image in the region.33 After Peter Semneby was appointed EU Special Representative for the Southern Caucasus, the EU placed top priority on the settlement of regional conflicts, extending the mandate of the special representative.34
But, according to several Azerbaijani experts, the EU, like the U.S., is not manifesting a steadfast position in this issue. For example, the same A. Babaev believes that the West is resorting to double standards: “While the West and the U.S. have been staunchly in favor of preserving Georgia’s territorial integrity, their appeals in a similar situation involving Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh do not sound so convincing.”35
On the whole, of course, the use of double standards is the most common phenomenon of our times. Evidently this is why so many problems are difficult to resolve. But it should also be noted that statements as such by the sides will change very little in the world and probably also have very little meaning. For example, all of the West’s statements about Georgia’s territorial integrity in no way prevented Russia from recognizing Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence and, more important, strengthening its military presence in the region. On the other hand, there are several EU documents that unambiguously show Europe’s position regarding Azerbaijan. For example, the statement by the leadership of the European Union on the presidential election in the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic categorically and unambiguously shows this by indicating that the EU again confirms recognition of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and again states that it does not recognize the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh (Brussels, 2 August, 2002). In our opinion, this kind of statement leaves no room for doubt about the EU’s position.
The European Parliament advocates the use of cross-border programs and dialog among civil societies as tools for conflict transformation.36 No matter how insignificant such steps may seem, they are strategic and geopolitical in nature since they provide access to the “closed zone” and objectively highlight the events.
This EU policy, if of course such an interpretation is legitimate, entirely corresponds to the strategy of drawing new democracies in the post-Soviet expanse into the European civilizational expanse. Security, if we are not talking about any urgent measures associated with defending a particular region, is strategic in nature, does not stand alone, and fully corresponds to the objectives posed in other spheres. In the economy and culture, as well as in security, the EU, in our opinion, is proceeding from the need to transform the current state of affairs in the civilizational respect. It is no secret that over the past 20 years, Azerbaijan has not only been subjected to aggression and occupation of its territory, as well as to significant human sacrifices, but has also been inflicted with incomparable
31 O. Evdokimova, “Karabakhskiy konflikt glazami azerbaidzhanskogo issledovatelia,” available at [http://www. dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4442360,00.html].
32 See: E. Eyubov, “Azerbaijan—EU: Partnership in Progress,” Azerbaijan in the World, ADA Biweekly Newsletter, Vol. 2, No. 13, 2009, p. 3.
33 See: S.E. Cornell, F.S. Starr, The Caucasus: A Challenge for Europe, Central Asia—Caucasus Institute, Silk
Road Studies Program, Washington, June 2006, p. 80.
34 See: E. Nuriyev, EU Policy in the South Caucasus: A View from Azerbaijan, CEPS, Brussels, 2007, p. 14.
35 Qouted from: O. Evdokimova, op. cit.
36 See: European Parliament Resolution of 17 January, 2008 on a More Effective EU Policy for the South Caucasus: From Promises to Actions, available at [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//
TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2008-0016+0+D0C+XML+V0//EN&language=EN].
moral damage. Lies have been spread very openly in the world about the country and its people, history, and culture. The victim has been described as a criminal. These moral wounds are unlikely to ever heal. Europe is absolutely right by believing that it will best be able to protect Azerbaijan by creating a “fragment of Europe” in the country. Historical experience has shown that it is very easy to squelch the rights of people living in a non-civilized space, but that this is impossible to do with people living in the space of the contemporary global civilization. This civilizational nature of today’s world is primarily manifested in the openness of the information space.
C o n c l u s i o n
The geopolitical interests of the EU in Azerbaijan include a broad range of issues, beginning with humanitarian culture and ending with economic issues, in particular energy resources. The very logic of the EU’s relations with the South Caucasian republics determines their content and nature.
European strategists are well aware that there are no means and no more or less long-term programs capable of creating a space of strong and stable peace and prosperity in the Southern Caucasus. So the EU is striving to create a cultural space in the region that duplicates Europe in the civilizational respect. This is why special efforts are being exerted to change the legislation of the South Caucasian countries in order to bring it into closer harmony with European standards.
