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This is why, apart from studying the essence and analyzing the sources, reasons and specific features of radicalism in the modern world, it is necessary to modernize society systematically and comprehensively, lending it new humanistic qualities.
"Islamovedeniye," Makhachkala, 2012, pp. 4-14.
C. Olimova, M. Olimov,
Heads of the "SHARKH" Research Center (Tajikistan) PROBLEM OF 2014: A VIEW FROM CENTRAL ASIA
Generally accepted, that Afghanistan is a major threat to security in Central Asia.
Experts contend that the Taliban will return to Kabul once again after the withdrawal of the NATO forces, and with the support of their collaborators will fight against the existing regimes of Central Asia. It is assumed that the increase of drug trafficking and export of religious extremism will lead to greater chaos and violence in Central Asian countries. Based on this premise, the U.S., Russia, the European Union and to a lesser extent China believe that it is necessary to bolster up Central Asian security.
However, it is necessary to examine the situation in Afghanistan. First of all, the immediate danger of the Taliban invasion does not threaten Central Asia, as NATO will keep its military presence in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of troops, scheduled for 2014. The new NATO mission, aimed at training the Afghan forces, will consist of a military contingent about 10-15 thousand people in 2014. A forthcoming Afghan-American security agreement will define the format of the deployment of the U.S. troops in Afghanistan.
On the other hand, Russia has strengthened its military presence in the region, having concluded agreements with Bishkek on the military base in Osh, and having prolonged the operation of the 201 military base in Dushanbe for 30 years. China has also intensified its military might in order to protect its investments in Central Asia.
As for the ability of the Afghan security forces to assume responsibility after the partial withdrawal of foreign troops, it is still low. The present numerical strength of the Afghan forces is 352,000, which corresponds to the needs of the country. (Kabul plans to reduce it to 230 thousand for financial reasons by the end of 2014).
According to the U.S. Department of Defense, only one of the 23 brigades is able to engage in military operations on its own (there are from 3,000 to 5,000 men in a brigade of the Afghan army). Others depend on the all-round support of the coalition forces. Transfer of responsibility to the Afghan structures for maintaining security in the country continues. The implementation of the "national reconciliation program" is still going on (although with great difficulty). It is more successful in northern and western Afghanistan, but eastern Afghanistan is still dominated by the Taliban.
Afghanistan will have presidential elections in 2014. Perhaps, the situation will worsen dramatically during the election campaign. A great many people have no trust in the regime of Karzai. The Government of Afghanistan has not been able to create a balance between various groups of Afghan society and, what is worse, Afghan public opinion could not cope with the task of protecting national interests in the face of the foreign military presence. Obviously, power struggle will increase in 2014 between factions of the political elite against the background of the extreme weakness of the state and the absence of proper governance at all levels. Afghanistan will become a more convenient place for drug trafficking, terrorism and organized
crime. Another key point is resumption of the negotiating process and a search of a place for the opposition, in particular, the Taliban. Probably, the Taliban will continue to dominate only in eastern Afghanistan, but many groups of different ethnic origin and political orientation are involved in a struggle for territory. The main issue is relationship between the Pashtun and Tajik elites in Afghanistan, which will be supported by certain outside actors. In recent years, the military elite of northern Afghanistan has gone through severe trials, although the Tajik positions in the national army and security forces are still strong. Thus, there can be no talk of the revival of the Northern Alliance and it will be difficult to create buffer areas in the north of Afghanistan for the countries of Central Asia - Uzbekistan and Tajikistan - although Tashkent has been actively working in this direction.
There should be a balanced foreign policy of Western countries in the region to ensure the continued sustainable development of Afghanistan. If the confrontation between Iran and the West results in an open conflict, it will be fraught with the development of a negative scenario for Afghanistan. Iran has been worried over the fact that strategic partnership between the U.S. and Afghanistan may be used against it, and these fears have been used by the Taliban for its advantage.
Pakistan-US relations are also important. Pakistan plays its game with the Taliban due to its the traditional confrontation with India.
Central Asian countries will erect barriers on the border with Afghanistan again if events develop in a negative direction. However, there is a positive aspect. The real danger will stimulate cooperation between the countries of Central Asia in the sphere of security, as it did in 1997-2002.
In 2002 Afghanistan and its neighboring countries signed the Kabul Declaration on Good-neighborly relations between Afghanistan
and Iran, China, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. This created a legal framework for cooperation in the sphere of security and reduced potential threats to it that might come from the territory of Afghanistan under any regime in Kabul.
The Central Asian countries, except Tajikistan, will not be subject to strong influence of Afghanistan if a new round of struggle for power begins there.
An analysis of the terrorist acts and activities of extremist organizations in Central Asia shows that security threats in Central Asia are internal. Religious extremism in Central Asia is a product of postSoviet developments and is indirectly connected with religious radicals in Afghanistan. As for the negative impact of Afghan drug trafficking, the use of drugs in Central Asia has internal reasons: a weak government, alienation of people from the state, and absence of prospects for young people. It is only the strengthening of state institutions, fight against corruption and better work of law enforcement and security agencies that will improve the situation in the Central Asian countries as far as the drug problem is concerned. As part of the immediate struggle, a regional program to combat drug production and trafficking in Afghanistan and neighboring countries for 2011-2014 has been adopted, which involves cooperation between antidrug agencies of Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Pakistan and Tajikistan. The Central Asian countries will face difficulties because of the Afghan factor in 2014. The need for additional safety measures, the strengthening of borders and adoption of Afghan refugees, who have already come to Tajikistan, are pressing issued of today.
The use of their geostrategic position and maximization of benefits from the buffer position between Russia, China, India, Iran,
and Pakistan, would have been very beneficial for the Central Asian countries nowadays.
However, the need to ensure their own security makes all Central Asian countries to strengthen not only the border with Afghanistan, but also all borders with other countries. So that it is not only an additional financial burden, but is also a factor preventing regional trade and economic development and worsening relations between the countries of the region.
Currently, due to continuing disintegration in the region, the Central Asian countries have been focusing on systemic security. Uzbekistan's withdrawal from the CSTO indicates that Central Asia has divided into two parts. The split has been due to Afghanistan. Tashkent believes that the CSTO is not able to provide protection against external threats from the south. Uzbekistan has also refused to participate in the first two conferences of "The Hearts of Asia" in Istanbul on the ground that the formula 6 plus 3 is the best format for a regional dialogue. Obviously, Uzbekistan continues to distance itself from world powers and regional security organizations, except the SCO. Tashkent's orientation to bilateral relations and rejection of multilateral formats has undermined regional security efforts.
Increasing contradictions between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have also caused concern among Central Asian states. Economic competition between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, ethnic tension between the Afghan elites, and the struggle for water resources have worsened the situation.
The risks connected with disputes over water and energy will complicate any scenario on Afghanistan. Central Asian security is under threat due to the extreme deterioration of the Tajik-Uzbek relations, which has been sparked by fierce competition in Afghanistan's electricity market.
Afghanistan has become an important actor both as a consumer, and a potential opponent on the market of water resources in Central Asia, and it should not be underestimated. The Energy Minister Ismail Khan has spoken of the need to determine Afghanistan's share in the water resources of the Amudarya. Afghanistan has begun to consume water from the Amudarya according to the realization of an irrigation project in Kunduz since 2013.
Regional cooperation
Central Asian countries will be able to influence the situation in Afghanistan after 2014 and their potential should not be ignored. Regional cooperation will increase, having been aimed at the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Nowadays this work is carried on within the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the SCO and other organizations.
All countries in the region are associated with the SCO, either as members or partners in dialogue, or as observers. The program against terrorism has been developed within the framework of the SCO for 2013-2015. Supposed, the observer states, including Afghanistan and Pakistan, will be involved in this activity. The regional antiterrorist structure works. Despite the program and strategies developed by the SCO, Central Asian countries treat them with skepticism, because their implementation has been blocked by the absence of an effective response mechanism to the emerging threats. One of the new forms of cooperation concerning Afghanistan is the so-called Istanbul process, initiated by Afghanistan and Turkey with the participation of neighboring countries. This initiative has been strongly supported by the SCO. Kazakhstan, as an active participant in the project, has
expressed its willingness to hold in 2013 the next meeting of Foreign Ministers of the "Heart of Asia" - members of the Istanbul process.
From the foregoing it follows that:
1. There are no real reasons to believe that the reduction of the West's military presence in Afghanistan significantly worsen the security situation in Central Asian countries, except Tajikistan. Although, the situation in Central Asia will deteriorate along with destabilization in Afghanistan. First, due to the fact that these countries will have to spend more on security.
Secondly, many development projects, including energy and the infrastructure, will be frozen. Unstable Afghanistan remains a barrier to economic development in Central Asia. This is particularly disturbing, as Afghanistan is a growing market for goods from Central Asia and the field of fierce competition between the exporters of electricity from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.
2. The existing programs evolved in Brussels, Washington, Moscow and Beijing to help the governments of Central Asian countries in the sphere of security are not effective and do not reach the goals proclaimed.
3. It is not clear what will happen to Afghanistan's statehood in 2014, when the U.S. and its Western allies formally exonerate themselves with the direct duty to ensure the security of Afghanistan and give it over to the Afghan government, but will not leave the country and the region. This will lead to a sharp decrease in the transparency of the Central Asian countries in the sphere of security and will increase tension in the region.
4. Tajikistan is an exception in Central Asia, i.e. it is the only country, which will depend heavily on the situation in Afghanistan for the following reasons:
(a) the length of the Tajik-Afghan border;
(b) similar language groups in Afghanistan;
(c) reorientation of trade to the South due to transport blockade of Uzbekistan. In 2000, the major importers of Tajik aluminum were the European Union and Russia, in 2010 - China and Turkey. Russia has retained its position as one of the biggest buyers of Tajik cotton. Trade with Afghanistan and China is growing rapidly. All this makes Tajikistan dependent on its southern neighbor;
(d) the need to seek allies in the debate on water and energy issues. We can assume that Tajikistan will cooperate with Afghanistan in the Amudarya water disputes.
Conclusions:
A number of serious problems have emerged in Central Asian countries because of the recent geopolitical changes, related to Afghanistan, These include its own economic opportunities and their protection, tough intraregional competition and the need to participate in a multilateral game between the big actors - the U.S., Russia, China, the European Union, as well as such regional leaders as Iran, Pakistan and India.
Now it is difficult to predict how the Central Asian countries will withstand this test.
"Voprosy bezopasnosti v Tsentralnoi Azii," Institute of World Economy and International Relations, RAS, Moscow, 2013, pp. 77-83.
