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It would be naïve to regard this problem as one of Azerbaijani young people only. The low educational level of young people has created broad vistas for all and sundry propaganda of destructive fundamentalist ideas in all republics of the former Soviet Union. It is only the well-thought-out educational policy in all independent states of the CIS that will be able to oppose effectively the unwelcome challenges of the early third millennium.
"Lomonosovskiye chteniya. Vostokovedeniye," Moscow, 2014, pp. 233-236.
Olga Oskina,
Ph. D. (Political sciences), Assistant Professor,
Astrakhan State University
POLITICAL ELITE OF TURKMENISTAN: TRADITIONS
AND PROSPECTS
Turkmenistan is one of the closest and controversial countries, and at the same time commanding attention as an authoritarian state with well-pronounced features of totalitarianism in the post-Soviet area. In the view of OSCE observers, there are no elementary features of democracy and pluralism in Turkmenistan: no election of officials, no freedom of speech, freedom of creating public organizations, no freedom of conscience, no clear-cut division of powers, although all these rights are guaranteed by the present-day Constitution of the country. The atmosphere of persecution and strict control over the activity of each citizen reigns supreme.
At the same time certain international and public organizations speak of Turkmenistan as a state making a successful transition from totalitarianism to democracy. In September 1999 the former president S. Niyazov was awarded the highest prize of the World Academy of
Medicine named after Albert Schweitzer (Poland) for "outstanding contribution to the development of humanistic principles in international relations and activity in the name of the common benefit of the Turkmen people." Speaking at the award ceremony the President of the Academy Kazimierz Imelinski noted that "an atmosphere of creative labor has been created in the country, and its stability and democracy could serve as an example to other countries."
It is difficult not to notice the diametrically opposing character of assessments of Turkmenistan's political system. On the one hand, we face a typical authoritarian state with a one-party system and dominant mono-ideology relying on the forcible apparatus for ruling the country. On the other hand, it is a state which has chosen a model of social development based on the national traditions of its people.
Such controversial picture does not allow us to assess in a simple manner the political system of Turkmenistan. It is necessary to apply an all-round and unbiased analysis of the socio-political situation in the country and its acting political forces in order to find out adequacy of various assessments.
From the very beginning of the independent development of the country its political leadership placed stake on the creation of a certain sacrosanct authority, as well as the evolvement of national idea. According to the idea and plans of the leadership of Turkmenistan, its population should orient itself to the authoritative leader and national idea, and the Turkmen elite should rally around them.
There have been definite reasons which induced the political leadership of Turkmenistan to choose precisely this development vector. From the point of view of contemporary political science, it is not every national or ethnic unit with uniform territory, borders with other countries, and uniform administrative power that can be regarded a state. A state should pass a number of development stages. It should
evolve effective forms of the functioning of administrative bodies and the bureaucratic apparatus, create a uniform socio-cultural area, achieve general civic self-identification, and foster uniform political and legal consciousness among its population. The Turkmen people have never in history had an experience of nationhood, consequently, there have been major problems at the development stage of an independent state with a number of state-formation features.
In a situation when patriarchal social organization, division of socio-cultural area by clans and community, and absence of general civic self-identification and uniform legal consciousness are typical features of society, the decision on the evolvement of a definite national idea, or the creation of the sacrosanct authority capable to rally and orient the people is potentially correct.
Under Saparmurat Niyazov (Turkmenbashi) (in 1985-1991 he was First Secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan, from 1990 to 2006 - President of Turkmenistan) the image of the "ideal leader" of the country began to be formed, which resulted in the emergence of the "personality cult," irremovability of the leader, and ousting of all democratic procedures, such as electivity, control over the activity of the head of state, and the system of checks and balances. In 1994 a referendum prolonged the powers of the president to 2002, and on December 28, 1999, the country's parliament abolished presidential elections altogether and announced S. Niyazov "eternal President of Turkmenistan." Parallel with this, official ideology was evolved named "ideology of Turkmenbashi." Its main premises were of a purely grotesque character: "divine origin of the President, his irreplaceability and eternal stay in power." They were aimed at the total suppression of all initiatives of citizens (especially, political), pluralism of opinions, isolation of the country's population from the surrounding
world (reliance on domestic resources and refusal from experience of developed countries).
At the same time, Turkmenistan, just as all former republics of the U.S.S.R. became an arena of acute struggle for power between various elite groupings based on the tribal principle. The modern Turkmen elite is a symbiosis of individual sections, whose formation is determined by the development of the concrete historical situation. These sections are largely congeneric. From the beginning of their formation the Turkmen elite clans changed in the following order: traditional nomadic (tribal), colonial, Soviet nomenklatura, modern elite. Similar situation has been observed in other states of Central Asia. There has been no revolutionary and radical change of elites. The elements of the various types of elites have jointly existed, having been fancifully intertwined to this day.
Several clans have been singled out in Turkmenistan, which contributed (and contribute now) to the formation of the domestic situation and the foreign policy of Turkmenistan at the initial stage of its independence: 1. Kizil-Arvat clan; 2. Mary clan; 3. Balkan clan; 4. Chardzhou clan; 5. Tashauz clan; 6. Akhal clan. Each of these clans was differently represented in the higher echelons of power and was fighting for influence on the supreme leader of the country.
The Kizil-Arvat clan was named by its geographic origin. It was represented by the former head of the cabinet of ministers Khan Ahmedov, minister of consumer goods industry Ashir Atayev, Chair person of the Supreme Soviet of Turkmenistan Rosa Bazarova, as well as many former ministers, and people of science and culture. This clan was the indisputable leader in interclan rivalry for taking important government posts and pursuing its policy within the framework of the state under Turkmenbashi.
The Kizil-Arvat clan has taken the leading positions in the political life of the country for a long time, which was due to its cohesion and influence on other, weaker clans, as well as its consort relations.
The Mary clan (from Mary region) was well represented in the government apparatus, the Academy of Sciences, health protection institutions, and culture.
The Balkan clan took the third position; it was headed by the former member of the Presidential council, deputy premier and minister of oil and gas industry Nazar Soyunov.
The fourth place was taken by the Chardzhou clan. It advanced to the political arena of Turkmenistan as an independent force in the years of the rule of Muhammednazar Gapurov, whose sons Bakhtiyar and Serdar owned large financial means. This clan was also headed by one of the vice premiers of Turkmenistan Jorakuli Babakuliyev, who was in charge of agriculture up to 1994. The clan included numerous representatives of intellectuals and government officials of middle rank.
The Tashauz clan was represented by Rejep Saparov (deputy head of the cabinet of ministers), Hudaiberdy Orazov (President of the Central bank), Sapargeldy Totayev (former governor of Tashauz region), and Yazgeldy Gundogdiyev (governor of Tashauz region). Today this clan is not a real political force capable to consolidate numerous supporters from among the intellectual and leading officials of the country. At the same time, its members hold negotiations with representatives of other clans on the possible consolidation of forces in the future political struggle.
The influence of the Akhal clan was quite great in the government under S. Niyazov. Its representatives controlled most ministries, the attorney general's office, and courts. Such situation could be explained by the fact that S. Niyazov was from the Akhal-
Tekin clan himself, and therefore he gave leading posts at ministries and departments to his fellow-tribesmen. Affiliation to the Akhal-Tekin clan was the reason for getting not only an important post, but also a good salary. However, the former President of Turkmenistan did not allow men from various clans to hold key posts for a long time. Such rotation of personnel created a certain chaos in the echelon of state power, but removed a threat of the emergence of a group of fellow-thinkers capable to oppose the president.
The new President of Turkmenistan Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov (b. 1957 in Akhal region) belongs to the Teke tribe. Under him practically three-quarters of all government officials and nine-tenths of people in the special services are members of this tribe. In modern Turkmenistan affiliation to the Akhaltekin tribe is almost always the reason for receiving an important government post.
After the death of Turkmenbashi, experts have put forward three main scenarios of the development of the situation in the country.
1. Complete break-up with the epoch of Niyazov. This scenario was largely catastrophic. It presupposed popular unrest and even a civil war on the pattern of "color revolutions." However, this scenario was supported by a small number of experts.
2. A "second edition" of Turkmenbashi, accompanied with the repetition of odious characteristics of the regime of unrestricted personal power. This scenario was also supported by few experts.
3. A slow and cautious evolution toward liberalization, similar to that in the U.S.S.R. after Stalin's death, and in China after Mao Zedong. This scenario is the most widespread among experts. They evolved forecasts that the regime would be more oligarchic and more oriented to intra-elite negotiations, where the president would not be a sacral ruler, but would be the first among equals. The regime would evolve into
institutionalized authoritarianism, although the rates of this evolution would be slow enough.
Recent years have shown the tentative nature of such forecasts. The Czech analyst Slavomir Gorak has thoroughly described the evolution in the corridors of powers in Turkmenistan. He noted that its ruling elite, which had taken shape by the time of Niyazov's death, began to change immediately after the elections of the new president. Berdimuhamedov's strong position began to be seen and felt quite soon. Despite the seeming reduction of the powers of the president, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov behaved quite confidently during the first days of office, and let people know that he was not going to depend on his patrons. One of the well-known experts on Central Asia, Alexander Sobyanin, holds the view that "Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov holds the reigns of power quite strongly; influential political rivals have either been expelled from the country or imprisoned, and strong and influential government officials have either promised to serve him or have been dismissed."
Having become President and Turkmenistan's first person, Berdimuhamedov was going to consolidate the regime of personal power rather than to turn to the oligarchic or "tandem" (with Rejepov) rule. In a situation when there are many elite groupings of a similar level without a leader in the political medium of Turkmenistan, conditions could emerge for an unpredicted conflict between elite groupings claiming power. Berdmuhamedov seemed to have understood this. During the formation of a new government he showed that he was well aware of the situation and knew how to choose and appoint the necessary personnel in the Turkmen conditions. The new President surrounds himself with people whom he knows well enough and those who fell in disfavor in Turkmenbashi's time (for example, Jemal Geoklenova and Khadyr Saparliyev, who were the minister of
textile industry, and rector of the Polytechnical institute and later the minister of education). Experts also note that Berdimuhamedov minimized the possibilities of transfer of power to another force. For one thing, by the Constitutional Law the procedure of transfer of power in an event of the death of the president has been changed. Presidential powers go over not to the speaker of parliament, as it was the case, but to the first deputy premier. In other words, the vice premier can be fired at any moment, whereas the speaker, which is formally elected by parliament, can become an independent figure.
Apart from that, expert on Central Asia Vitali Khlyupin also points to the fact that advisers from the entourage of Turkmenistan's President play an important role in the country's domestic and foreign policy. Each authoritarian ruler of the Asian-African type has groups of assistants from other tribes who fulfill important functions. The first concerns his image (communication with the outer world); the second -so-called literary..., to write ideological dummies; the third - to tackle the boss's business dealings in Europe or elsewhere and hide his assets. Because these people are not members of local clans and are outside the local system, they can be trusted, and they will reliably guard the "holy of holies," namely, the purse of the boss, and take care of the most "delicate" business. This is a quite normal practice. Moreover, our leaders often take outlanders as personal bodyguards: they are more loyal.
Experts note a great importance of the clan factor in adopting decisions, especially on internal matters. The backbone of the political and economic elites of Turkmenistan is formed by representatives of Berdimuhamedov's clan - the Akhal-Tekin. They hold up to three quarters of the key posts, including the government and regions, which fact breeds clan and ethnic discontent in the country. Experts also note that inhabitants of various regions and districts and representatives of
different tribes practically do not mix with one another. This aggravates still more interclan contradictions. On the whole, in the view of regional observers, in his policy Berdimuhamedov follows the former president of Kyrgyzstan Kurmanbek Bakiyev, which leads to his greater involvement in clan matters and can contribute to the development of the domestic political situation according to Kyrgyz scenario.
The wide distribution of clan and family relations and the domination of paternalist traditions in relations between few public organizations and the state narrow down democratic foundations and the weak social basis of the political system and regime of Turkmenistan, posing s threat to its future in the conditions of the growing risks of the proliferation of "color revolutions" in the world.
List of literature
1. S. Gorak. Turkmenistan posle Turkmenbashi. K voprosu o transformatsii rezhimov lichnoi vlasti [Turkmenistan after Turkmensbashi. On Transformation of Regimes of Personal Power] // S. Gorak // POLITEX - 2007 - No 3. http://www. politex.info/content/view/382/30
2. A. Grozin. Elity Turkmenistana i tsentralnoaziatskiye klany: obshcheye, osobennoye i trudnosti modernizatsii [The Elites of Turkmenistan and Central Asian Clans: the General, the Special and Difficulties of Modernization] / A. Grozin // PERSPEKTIVY. http://www.perspektivy.info/history/elity_turkmenistana_central-noaziatskiye_klany_obshcheye_osobennoye_i_trudnosti_modernizatsii_2010-12-21.htm
3 Investitsionny potentsial Turkmenistana. Analiz politicheskikh rynkov [Investment Potential of Turkmenistan. Analysis of Political Markets] // Information agency. -http://common.regnum.ru/documents/2011/1405529.pdf; A. Kazantsev. Turkme-niya: prognoz budushchego [Turkmenistan: Forecast for the Future] // http://www.globoscope.ru/content/ articles/948
4. Neitralny Turkmenistan - 15 sentyabrya 1999 [Neutral Turkmenistan - September 15, 1999]. P. 1.
5. N. Saparov. Ob osobennostyakh "Turkmenskoi modeli demokratii" [On Specific Features of the "Turkmen Model of Democracy"] // http://www.ca-c.org/ journal/cac-08-2000/26.saparov.shtml
6. O. Sidorov. Politicheskaya elita Turkmenii: vchera i segodnya [The Political Elite of Turkmenistan: Yesterday and Today] // GAZETA.KZ: http://articles.gazeta.kz/ art.asp?aid=59230
7. A. Sobyanin. ZhZh / http://sobiainnen.livejournal.com/30324html
8. Khronika Turkmenistana [Chronicle of Turkmenistan]: Publication of Turkmen Initiative on Human Rights. - http://www.chrono-tm.org/?id=3007
9. OSCE. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. GAL/55/99. -December 6, 1999. - Warsaw. Poland.
11 Turkmenistan's Clannish Leader // Institute for War & Peace Reporting. - Available at: http://iwpr.net/tk/node/49345
"Kaspiisky region: politika, ekonomika, kultura," Astrakhan, 2014, No 2 (39), pp. 244-249.
N. Kuleshova,
Political analyst, Institute of Asian and African Countries at Moscow State University CERTAIN SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE PARTY-POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN
Just as other Soviet republics, Uzbekistan has taken the road of economic reforms after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R., and begun political transformation of the country.
It should be remembered that in Soviet times political processes in the Soviet republics were largely determined by the Center, however, it was precisely this period that was characterized by the intensive development of clans in Uzbekistan.
Interaction between the Center and the political elite in Uzbekistan in the person of political clans was built on the basis of mutual exchanges of resources and loyalty on the part of the Uzbek population, which contributed to the preservation of stability in the region, and quite satisfied the Center. Experts note that the peak of the hey-day of the clans of the Uzbek Republic was during the "stagnation"
