Научная статья на тему 'Nationalism or Radical Islam (Political Realities of Tatarstan)'

Nationalism or Radical Islam (Political Realities of Tatarstan) Текст научной статьи по специальности «Философия, этика, религиоведение»

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Текст научной работы на тему «Nationalism or Radical Islam (Political Realities of Tatarstan)»

in the energy markets. A system of energy partnerships between the Russian Federation and a whole number of leading players on this field, primarily the EU and North Asian countries, could be a worthy practical embodiment of efforts in this sphere.

Non-participation in international conflicts, with few exceptions, enables Russia to come out in the role of an honest mediator between conflicting parties, and first and foremost, in conflicts on the territory of the former U.S.S.R., as well as in the situations around the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea. Besides, Russian participation may be necessary in the Middle East, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Successful mediation requires serious diplomatic efforts, but it also contributes to greater international prestige and influence of this country.

Finally, Russia may become one of the leading countries in the international development of the Arctic region at the present stage. We mean not only the formation of an all-round system of international cooperation in the Arctic, but also the protection of the rights and interests of the indigenous peoples of the Arctic region.

"Povestka dnya novogo presidentstva ", Moscow, Carnegie Center, Moscow, 2012, pp. 9-16.

Yana Amelina,

Political analyst, journalist, section head at the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies NATIONALISM OR RADICAL ISLAM (Political Realities of Tatarstan)

At present the Tatar national movement, which was a serious political force in the 1980s - 1990s, has a stronger Islamic component and a weaker nationalistic one. This is true not only of the Republic of Tatarstan, but of the entire Volga area. It is largely connected with the

internal political processes going on in Tatarstan, particularly, after the change of its leadership, which took place on March 25, 2010. The President M. Shaimiyev, who had been at the head of the republic for about twenty years and was nationally oriented, was replaced by R. Minnikhanov, an efficient technical manager who was not too much carried away by nationality problems.

The foreign factor plays a no small role in the changed alignment of forces in the national field. It can be seen in the growing interest in Tatarstan displayed by the Caucasian radical Islamists, and also by representatives of western information-analytical and intelligence bodies.

The latest tendencies show that the separatist potential of the radical part of the Tatar national movement will go down steadily, but the danger of Islamic radicalism will grow. In this connection the processes going on in the republic should be closely observed by both the government bodies and expert community.

At the end of 2010 - beginning of 2011 among the events which took place in Tatarstan were crimes connected with religious extremism, despite the fact that the republic was distinguished by inter-confessional peace for quite some time. On November 25, 2010, three Islamic militants were killed in Chistopol district of the republic, who tried to assassinate an official of the Center combating extremism at the republican Ministry for the Interior.

The extremists were well armed and belonged to a group of radical Islamists of the Wahhabi and "Hizb-ut-Tahrir" trends (the latter organization is banned in Russia).

On January 13, 2011, the head of the Spiritual board of Muslims of the Republic of Tatarstan, Mufti Gusman Iskhakov announced his "voluntary" retirement. The main reason for retirement was his slow

reaction to the discovery of an armed Islamist underground in the republic.

His resignation was followed by a strained two-month-long election campaign for electing a new mufti. The ideological comrades-in-arms of the killed Islamists and their sympathizers tried to foist a person to their liking to be elected mufti, but failed. On April 13, 2011, the extraordinary congress of Muslims of Tatarstan by the overwhelming majority of votes elected the imam of the Kazan mosque Bulgar Ildus Faizov mufti. He began to expel radical Islamists with extremist views from madrasahs and mosques. This provoked a strong reaction on the Salafite 1 part of the Tatar Islamic community, who accused Mufti Faizov of a "total purge of professional, well-trained and experienced imams." But these accusations did not have the desired result and did not lead to a split of the umma. 2 At the same time these events in the republic have shown that traditional Tatar intellectual "soft Islam" of the Khanafite mazkhab (of the Imam Abu Khanifa school) loses ground to primitive radical fundamentalist versions of Islam. The attempts of intellectuals (among them the former adviser of Tatarstan's President on domestic policy Rafael Khakimov) to present as an alternative to Islamism their own version of Islam-light ("EuroIslam") failed through, inasmuch as they were not understood by the Islamic intelligentsia and rank-and-file Muslim believers.

B.I. Faizov has time and again outlined his views on the aims and tasks facing the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Tatarstan. First of all, he emphasized the need to organize ideological work and the activity of all Tatar mosques and educational establishments in accordance with the charter and rules of the board. "We work by the Koran and Sunna, in line with Abu Khanifa mazkhab," he emphasized at the first press conference after his election as mufti.

He reminded of the need "to reveal and cut short any manifestations of religious extremism, xenophobia or Islamic phobia." He called on the Muslim mass media to engage in enlightenment activity, including social network, and popularize Tatar religious heritage. He made special emphasis on work among young people and preparation of preachers. The mufti also spoke of the official position of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Tatarstan and said: "We are in solidarity with the state power of the Russian Federation in its policy to create a tolerant society respecting all confessions on its territory. We shall support a constructive dialogue with the authorities on many subjects."

B.I. Faizov's adherence to Khanafite mazkhab, his activity and uncompromising attitude to many problems, his clear-cut program of transformations, the use of modern methods of propaganda (including the Internet resources), his mobility and openness in contacts with rank-and-file Muslims, journalists and representatives of the expert community gave grounds to believe that the umma of Tatarstan was in reliable hands and there would be no "dialogue with the Wahhabites" on which radical Islamists insisted.

On July 19, 2012, an unknown man shot and killed Faizov's deputy V. Yakupov in the morning. An hour later the car driven by B.I. Faizov exploded, and the blast threw him out of it. In a grave condition he was rushed to hospital and operated there and then. When he was discharged from hospital the President of Russia Vladimir Putin decorated him with the Order of Friendship.

The assassination of V. Yakupov and the attempt on the life of B.I. Faizov were, of course, connected with their professional activity. This view was shared by many experts. The head of the Center of regional studies Rais Suleimanov said that Faizov was one of the best representatives of the traditional trend of Islam and was always against

radical Islamists whose number was on an increase in Tatarstan lately. Another expert on religion, R. Silantyev, held the view that these tragic events marked the beginning of a total war against preachers of traditional Islam. He said that two years ago a "Dagestani situation" was practically created in Tatarstan: a terrorist underground emerged and armed clashes began.

The Islamists waging an armed struggle against the Russian state in the North Caucasus call ever more frequently for spreading "jihad" to the Volga area, particularly to Tatarstan. This trend became especially pronounced recently and coincided with qualitative changes in the Tatar Muslim community. Taking into account the presence in the Republic of Tatarstan of quite a few Salafite young Muslims and the gradual strengthening of fundamentalist influence, the threat of emergence of an Islamist underground in Tatarstan is quite real.

In the spring of 2010, the amir and creator of the "Caucasian emirate" (known as "Imarat Kavkaz") Doku Umarov 3 stated: "When we liberate the land of the Caucasus on which our Muslim brothers live, we will liberate other lands occupied by Russia, that is, Astrakhan and the Volga area which are trampled upon by the Russian infidels."

Leaders of the Caucasian jihadists have said similar things more than once. In the middle of 2008 one of the ideologists of Chechen separatism Movladi Udugov said in an interview to a western journal that many Muslims living in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Buryatia, as well as Russians converted to Islam regard Doku Umarov as the legitimate leader of all Muslims in Russia. He added that the leadership of "Imarat Kavkaz" may put concrete battle tasks before them at any time and the Russian authorities were well aware of this.

In November 2010 a special "Idel-Ural" site appeared in the Internet, which included Tatarstan. In one of its publications it was noted that the territory it covers are lands which are not part of "Imarat

Kavkaz" and which are claimed by Muslims waging a sacred liberation struggle against the infidels occupying them. The anonymous authors of this document promise support to all, who raise their voices and, arms in hand, take upon themselves the liberation of these lands from "the worst of creatures" and establishment of Muslim rights and laws on them. These authors call on all Muslims to rally around "Imarat Kavkaz" and its amir, which will become the "center of the Muslim state" after the collapse of Russia. The jihadists regard the whole of Russia (and not only its parts inhabited by Muslims) a land on which a caliphate should be created. And this should be done by force. It is indicative that the "Idel-Ural" site is also registered in the United States.

In March 2011 Doku Umarov again addressed the Muslims of Russia and the Caucasus calling for jihad on all territories of Russia inhabited by Muslims. He said that jihad is the sacred duty of the umma. "Kill the enemies of Allah wherever you are with no exception for peaceful population," he called on them.

On March 10, 2011, the "Idel-Ural" site published an announcement about the beginning of jihad and called on all inhabitants of the region to adopt Islam and submit to the Sharia law. "There should be only one law, the law of Allah on our land. Our aim is to establish this law on the Idel-Ural area. "Brothers and sisters" following the Koran and Sunna were called upon to form independent mobile fighting groups, and those who are not yet ready to "join jihad" should help with their means, information and possibilities, create sites, and collect personal information about officials of the law-enforcement agencies, representatives of the official clergy, etc.

Analyzing the content of the site, experts note that so far its creators devote much more attention to the events in the Middle East and the Caucasus, which are far from Tatarstan and its problems. On

the one hand, this shows that its moderators do not have enough information and knowledge of the real situation in Tatarstan. But on the other, it indicates that the aim of the portal is to draw the Republic of Tatarstan in the common project of creating a global caliphate.

The emotional calls of the leaders of the Caucasian militants for spreading jihad to the Volga area are reflected in many materials of Islamic propagandists. The author of one of such materials writes the following: "For us such peoples as the Tatars and Bashkirs are of special interest inasmuch as they are quite numerous and believe in Islam. Besides, they had their own statehood earlier with the Sharia as the legislative basis. After their colonization by Russia they put up resistance for a long time, including in the form of jihad."

"As to Tatars, it is possible their active nationalists may turn into mojaheds on the example of Chechnya and other regions of the North Caucasus." This assertion is based on real facts. Indeed, in recent years certain sections of the Tatar national movement (especially its younger members) joined the radical Islamist groups and this could lead to unity between nationalists and fundamentalists, with the latter playing the major role. On the other hand, the leaders and ideologists of the Tatar Islamic community realize the danger which such processes pose to the Tatar nation and recently they began actively to oppose this turn of events, defending the "Tatar mosque" and the national specific features of "Tatar Islam."

Noting that Bashkirs, and especially Tatars, live in various parts of Russia, some of Caucasian ideologists of jihad believe that given appropriate conditions and approach, part of them could form the future underground and a human and resource base "in the struggle for Siberia and the Urals."

"It is very important to use Tatar and Bashkir nationalism in our interests and turn it into jihad," stated the chief ideologist of Doku

Umarov M. Udugov. "For this purpose we need propaganda and information resources in national languages," he went on. "We should also use acts of sabotage on the enemy territory and draw the most active persons into the ranks of mojaheds. National resistance in any forms and manifestations should be coordinated by the underground center. If we spread jihad in the Volga area, it will partially divert Russian forces from the Caucasus."

The cited text is an example of methodological instruction about how the struggle against the infidels should be waged. As a rule, these "instructors" show a good knowledge of the local conditions.

Elaborating his views on jihad in the Volga area and the Urals, the author of another work of this kind says that the next stage after preparations will be the beginning of a guerilla war in urban conditions. Among the concrete objects of the attacks of jihadists will be "economically important elements of the infrastructure and definite persons actively fighting the Islamists.

It can be observed already now how the Tatar national movement is changing and its nationalist component is ousted by the Islamist one, and how jihadist propaganda is intensifying in the Internet forums and social networks.

The jihadists of the Caucasus are trying "to warm up" the situation in Tatarstan, presenting more and more materials to the information medium about the need to switch over to armed resistance to the legitimate authorities. At present there are no grounds to believe that Tatar Muslims will obey these calls. However, if such propaganda continues with the same zeal without opposition, it is quite possible that groups of supporters of "jihad to the victorious end," mainly among young people, will appear in the republic. This, by the way, was well demonstrated by the assassination of a high clergyman

and the attempt on the life of another, of which we have already spoken.

There is no doubt that such situation has been a result of the evolutionary changes in the Tatar national movement, which began to be dominated by radical elements. Their views combine two main ideas: the creation of an independent Tatar state and the extremely negative attitude to the Russian people. For instance, the chairperson of the "Milli Majlis of the Tatar people" (self-proclaimed parliament) F. Bairamova asserts that "the Russian state has been built on the tragedy of the Tatar people, on the Tatar blood, and it exists at the expense of the energy resources pumped out of the bowels of Tatar earth, that Tatars feed the Russian state, etc., etc. She calls for creating an independent Tatar state with a strong national and militant spirit, like the one of Genghiz Khan.

The writer A. Khakim went much further. At the end of 2009 he appealed to the King of Norway Harald V with the request "to consider the possibility of granting my people a place for permanent residence beyond the Arctic Circle, on one of the archipelagos of the Arctic Ocean." The writer thus hopes "to save" at least five thousand of his fellow-compatriots. They will be growing the best roses of the world in special rosaries which they will build there. A. Khakim explained that he addressed this strange request to the King of Norway because his people had been living in close neighborhood with the Russians who were unable to ensure them prosperity and happiness, but only robbed them of their natural wealth and doomed to slow extinction.

Judging by the words and deeds of the radical Tatar nationalists, they are unable to substantiate rationally their claims and complaints presented to the Russian people and the need to create an independent Tatar state. They have become completely marginalized during the past fifteen years. Their ideas of separation of Tatarstan from Russia do not

reflect the wishes and aspirations of the Tatar people and are not supported either by the republican authorities, or its population, or its intelligentsia. Calls for "independence of Tatarstan" can be explained by both the inadequacy of their authors and the attempt of the outside forces to use "Tatar separatism" for the weakening and dismembership of Russia.

The adherents and creators of a real policy have another view. One of the ideologists of the national movement and the director of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of Tatarstan, Rafael Khakimov (right up to March 25, 2008, he held the post of adviser to President M. Shaimiyev on matters of domestic policy) said that "Russia is our land, the territory of the Golden Horde, and we Tatars have no reason and do not want to separate from it." True, he admitted, Moscow pays insufficient attention to the development of federative relations, including financial, economic, scientific and cultural ones.

The former colleague of R. Khakimov, Damir Iskhakov, D. Sc. (Hist.), commenting on the feasibility of Tatarstan's independence, noted that he prefers the idea of his republic's development within the framework of the Russian Federation. "We are Muslims," he said, "we have specific views on many subjects, which are different from those of the Russians. But we want Russia to have many people coexisting with one another, and many cultures, which is the earnest of the country's prosperity."

At present the Tatar national movement formed more than twenty years ago is going through a generation change. But instead of being optimistic, one has to admit that quite a few present-day young nationalists, who at first demonstrated broad views on domestic and political issues, have now shifted to the positions of the separatists of the first post-Soviet years. True, they are not numerous. On the whole,

young people in Tatarstan do not express the desire to support separatist ideas and demonstrate loyalty to the Russian state.

The only politically active mouthpiece of the interests of the young generation of radical Tatar nationalists is the Union of Tatar Young People "Azatlyk" headed by Nail Nabiullin. It organizes meetings, pickets and marches, but very few people take part in them. For instance it was possible to gather not more than one hundred of young nationalists for a meeting devoted to the protection of the Tatar language in April 2011.

Young nationalists are coming out for an independent Tatar state, but the number of active young Islamists is greater, comprising about 1,500 men. However, it can be said for certain that national-separatist ideology, although it enjoys support by a small circle of adherents, has lost battle for the hearts and minds of young people to radical Islamists.

The leaders of the older generation of Tatar nationalists agree with this. They admit that the significance of the national factor will diminish and it will turn into the confessional and spiritual factor. Quantitative changes in the Tatar national movement have grown into qualitative ones during the past 1.5-2 years. And it is not accidental that in the mid-1990s interest in Tatarstan on the part of foreign, primarily western, experts grew markedly, and the number of their visits to the republican capital Kazan with a view to studying the religious and socio-political situation also increased.

Mention could be made of a visit to Kazan of experts of the American Council on foreign policy - an influential expert organization of the Republican party of the United States at the end of 2010. Members of the American delegation were interested in the position of Islam in the Volga area and ethnic and confessional relation in Tatarstan. They expressed concern over the global growth of Islamic radicalism and stressed the need for finding ways to combat this

negative phenomenon, which presents a serious threat to both the United States and Russia.

During meetings with Rafael Khakimov, the rector of the Russian Islamic University Rafik Mukhametshin, representatives of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Tatarstan, and other experts, the guests from America could form an objective idea about the processes going on in the religious sphere of the republic. Practically all experts and clergymen with whom American political analysts met and talked, spoke of the need to fight this phenomenon quite seriously and assessed the situation as quite alarming. Comparing the processes going on in Tatarstan with the situation in other regions of the world, the guests from the United States could not but emphasize that effective recipes for opposing Islamism had not been found.

It was indicative that neither American political figures nor experts on religion showed any interest in the Tatar national movement, being apparently aware that it had no future. Evidently, their open interest in the Islamic problems will be the "direction of the main blow" of the outside forces in the Volga area.

NOTES

1. Salafia - orthodox trend in Islam calling for return to the way of life and faith of the early Muslim community.

2. Muslim community.

3. On June 23, 2010, the United States officially put Doku Umarov on the list of international terrorists, which is aimed at persecuting terrorists and those supporting them and helping commit acts of terror." On May 26, 2011, the joint Russian-American statement on the results of bilateral negotiations at the summit level announced, among other things, that D. Umarov's name was included in the American national program of awards for assistance to justice.

The United States offered an award of up to $5 million for information of his whereabouts. At that time Hillary Clinton recognized the "Kavkaz emirate" a terrorist organization.

4. This organization stated on December 24, 2008, that "Tatarstan was illegitimately and forcibly included in the Russian Federation." It addressed all states of the world and the United Nations Organization with a request to recognize Tatarstan's independence. "For about 456 years the Tatars have been under the domination of Russian colonialists," said the 'Declaration of Independence of Tatarstan.' "We have been forcibly baptized, Russified, mercilessly exploited and physically exterminated. This was a purposeful and constant genocide. In the view of nationalists, the precedent of the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia "gives hope to the Tatar people that Russia might recognize the state sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan." Naturally, this address to the world community had no political consequences.

5. On the Day of memory of the Defenders of Kazan (October 13, 2009) about two hundred people took part in a public meeting.

6. At this meeting people carried posters with openly chauvinistic slogans, like "Russians, pack your suitcases and go back to Russia!" or "If you don't like it here in Tatarstan, go to Dagestan!" or "You don't like us, Tatar nationalists, but we will be replaced by Islamists!" This shows the general trend of the exacerbation of ethno-confessional relations in the republic.

«Moscow», 2012 , No 10, pp. 150-162.

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