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Russia capable to contribute to the harmonization of interethnic and inter-confessional relations, as well as to ensure national unity of the Russian Federation.
"Vestnik Rossiiskoi Natsii," Moscow, 2013, No 5, pp. 51-61.
E. Arutyunova, A. Bravin, R. Valiakhmetov,
Political analysts
TATARSTAN: PROCESS OF RE-ISLAMIZATION AND MODERN DEVELOPMENT TRENDS OF MUSLIM IDENTITY
Religious renaissance of the Tatars, taking place in the form of re-Islamization, has traversed an arduous path during the past two decades. In the early 1990s - during the crisis years of Soviet identity and in the conditions of social vacuum in the post-Soviet area the Tatars, just as the greater part of the country's entire population turned to the "original roots of the people," the "faith of the ancestors."
Re-Islamization was going on at the time in the form of ethnic confessionalization, when religion was taken for a part of popular culture, as national tradition, and Muslim identity among the Tatars bore the character of "religious nationalism." That was a period of the beginning of the restoration of the traditional Muslim status of the Tatars and the extensive development of the Muslim sphere of the republic; an ever greater number of Tatars self-identified themselves as Muslims declaring that "they were born Muslims." More mosques were built, more religious functions were arranged at various places - theaters, stadiums, at home, and elsewhere. However, the general level of interest in religion was limited to symbolic and cultural aspects.
The actualization of Muslim identity at the time was regarded not as the growing religious activity of the population and its return to religion, but rather as a growing requirement for stable cultural-civilizatory characteristics in the life of the individual and society.
More mosques were built and opened in the early 1990s against the backdrop of a shortage of educated and skilled enough imams. The main part of the clergy consisted of representatives of the so-called people's Islam. Most of them, especially in villages, did not have an elementary religious education. By the beginning of the 1990s, of 55 imams 41 were older than 60, and only one of them had a theological education of a university level, and eight had a secondary religious education. The imam was the authority for parishioners only in the sphere of performing religious rites. The mass of believers took Islam for a system of rites and an element of ethnonational self-consciousness.
The next stage - the middle and second half of the 1990s - was the period of the strengthening institutionalization of Islam in Tatarstan. The Spiritual Board of Muslims became more authoritative, the number of mosques and religious organizations was growing, and a system of religious education was developing more rapidly. It was at that period that clashes took place between new young imams, some of whom received a religious education abroad, and imams of the older generation oriented mainly to the so-called people's Islam. It was not only a clash between the "traditional" and "new" interpretations of Islam, not only a conflict between "fathers and sons," and between the traditional and the new, but a struggle for the spheres of influence. The ability of theologically educated young imams to explain in a simple language the difficult language of the Koran, give clear and understandable instructions and spiritual orientations to each parishioner, in contrast to the formal and dogmatic approach to Islam
and the Koran of "old" imams, strengthens their positions and increases the number of their adherents. At that period, due to the broadening field of information, greater number of religious means of mass information, the Internet-resources, big flows of religious literature, and wider and more frequent contacts with Muslims abroad during the hajj, studies at foreign educational institutions, etc, Islamic values were becoming more popular, and a new interpretation of Islam emerged. The previous perception of Islam as a popular ethnocultural tradition in the form of various rites was not enough for modern man who began to understand his disaccord with the inner spiritual and moral essence of Islam and its system of social, worldview and religious standards.
At the turn of the 2000s, "normative Islam" became stronger and more influential, and the number of its adherents grew considerably. "New" religiousness became more widespread and characterized by the growing "theologization" of consciousness, especially among urban young people. A new Islamic subculture began to be formed and distinguished by the strict observance of religious precepts and instructions in everyday life, actualization of the socio-ethical image of a Muslim, and active propaganda of Islam. This "new" religiousness was less connected with ethnic interests, feelings and culture.
Certain distance of ethnicity from Islam among modern Tatars was due to a certain lowering of their national and linguistic competence as a result of Russification of society's life and the emergence of a whole stratum of Russian-speaking Tatars who do not know their mother tongue well enough. A definite role in this was also played by powerful migration flows, which broke the traditional national composition of Volga area towns. More and more people from Central Asia and the North Caucasus can now be seen among the parishioners of local mosques. The traditional Tatar language of sermons is more frequently replaced by Russian.
Some Muslim traditionalists believe that these processes are largely due to the Tatar intelligentsia who are more concerned over the reformation of Islam, that is, their efforts are mainly concentrated on the idea to "construct" Islam without namaz, without the necessary prayers. These efforts considerably retard re-Islamization of Tatars who, refusing to perform namaz and leave mosques, which are occupied by their more devout colleagues from the South. These processes are dangerous for the very future of the Tatar nation and its ethnic component. It would be difficult to unite and preserve a people without such consolidation center as mosque.
A new development stage of Islam in the Republic of Tatarstan is connected with the formation of a theological legal sphere. Complex theological problems come to the fore, and polarization of ideas concerning the development of Islam in the Tatar community becomes deeper.
In the view of Islamic scholars, one can talk of the three basic groups having an essential influence on the religious situation in Tatarstan: the Khanafites, or defenders of the local traditions of Islam, Sufi-traditionalists and neo-traditionalists, and Salaphites. Apart from them, there are small groups of scholars - modernists/liberals, Sufi of various shades, and representatives of organizations banned in the Russian Federation - Khizb at-Tahrir and Jamaat at-Tablig.
The two first trends (Khanafites-traditionalists and Sufi) are in the group of neo-traditionalists. Their main characteristic is acceptance of the positive value of the local tradition in contrast to western values and unitary Islamic models offered by radical Islamists. The Salaphites represent the ideology of liberation from non-Islamic western influence and from local distortions of the "initially pure" religious ideas of the time of Prophet Mohammed.
The main differences between neo-traditionalists and Salaphites boil down to dogmatic contradictions, rite differences, and ethnical controversies.
The Salaphite / Wahhabi form of Islam becomes widespread in the young people's community, where various views exist side by side -from moderation to radicalism and extremism. While radicalism existed within the framework of Salaphite communities, the local authorities did not have serious grounds for taking any strict measures against them. Certain connivance with them on the part of official Islamic institutions and spiritual boards could be explained by the fact that many present-day muftis have bolstered up their positions at the expense of "Arab" money. Salaphism for them is associated with religious values formed in the full-fledged Muslim society and therefore they can well be a form of Islamic revival in the region.
E. Khojayeva, a popular sociologist, while studying the Islamization process among modern young people, comes to the following conclusion:
"In the conditions of the mass media interpretation of Wahhabi trend as the social ground for radical extremist ideas and terrorism, young believers are forced to exonerate themselves and their faith emphasizing that the word 'Wahhabism' should not exist at all. People should be divided into good and bad. The 'Wahhabi' trend is a current of Islam. This is not a teaching calling for committing evil deeds. It calls for everything useful to man. The word 'Wahhabi' has become the convenient marker to brand all those who disagree with 'real Muslims' and have nothing in common with them."
In general, it is rather difficult to define the ideological essence and trend of religious views of modern young people.
Tatarstan is gradually becoming an arena of clashes between the tolerant Khanafite mazkhab traditional for Tatars and the radical trends
of religious fundamentalism brought in from abroad. In the past several years there have been several acts of terror connected with the activities of extremist groups in the republic. They were mostly members of the international terrorist organization "Khizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami." The peak of religious confrontation was the attempt on the life of the Chairman of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Tatarstan Ildus Faizov and the murder of his deputy Valiulla Yakupov, which took place in Kazan on July 19, 2012. They adhered to the school of the Khanafite mazkhab traditional for Tatars and were resolute opponents of the radical forms of Islam from abroad.
After this tragic event there was an extraordinary meeting of the republican State Council at which the deputy premier of Tatarstan A. Safarov called on all citizens, all religious organizations, local authorities, institutions of civil society, and the mass media to unite in opposition to extremism and terrorism for the sake of peace, tranquility and wellbeing of all Tatars.
Will the form of Islam traditional for Tatars be able to come out in this situation as a restraining factor in the process of radicalization of Islam? In contrast to radical Islamism, the Khanafite mazkhab traditional for Tatars is distinguished by loyalty to the Russian secular state, and respect for other traditional confessions in the Russian Federation.
Thus, the process of re-Islamization of Tatars at the end of the 20th - beginning of the 21st century is of a complex character. The revival of Islam is taking place in two forms - as a popular tradition and as a worldview. The first decade of the post-Soviet period was characterized by ethnic confessionalization based on mutual ties and interdependence of the ethnic and the religious in self-consciousness. The Muslim identity of Tatars had largely an ethno-religious character,
whereas at present the "Muslim self-consciousness" of Tatars is becoming more religious.
"Grazhdanskaya, etnicheskaya i regionalnaya identichnost: vchera, segodnya, zavtra," Moscow, 2013, pp. 119-125.
I. Babich,
Senior research associate, Institute of Ethnology & Anthropology RAS "SOFT ISLAMIC REVOLUTION" IN MODERN ADYGEA
On November 24, 2012, a regular congress of Muslims of Adygea and Krasnodar territory took place in Maikop. The previous congress was held on November 12, 2008. The last congress was a very important one for the revival of Islam in Adygea, because it changed the paradigm of religious life in the republic. There were 177 delegates at the congress. The report was made by the mufti of the Spiritual Board of Muslims N. Emizh, who acquainted all those present with the board's activity and financial position. Among other things, he mentioned the fact that many local people in recent years preferred to go to various sects, but not to mosques, and this was why the Spiritual Board adopted the following decision in 2012: if a member of an Adyge family joins a sect, he and members of his family will not be allowed to be buried at the local Muslim cemetery.
The key event at the congress was the election of a new mufti. During the discussion of the subject two groups were formed: one proposed to vote for the present mufti, N. Emizh, the other wanted to elect a younger one. Thus, the boundary was formed between Muslims of the older and the younger generations. Among candidates to the post of mufti were four men: the present mufti N. Emizh, the imam of the
