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30
Igor Kotin,
D. Sc. (Hist.) (St. Petersburg)
ISLAM IN RUSSIA AND PERSPECTIVES
OF CHRISTIAN-MUSLIM INTER-FAITH DIALOGUE
Introduction
In Madeley's framework of church-state relations in Europe, Russia is part of the historic mono-confessional Orthodox culture bloc. Undeniably, from the time of Vladimir the Saint (ninth century A.D.) Orthodox Christianity has been the dominant religion in Russian politics, from Kiev Rus' until the Russian Empire. However, during the same time Russian territorial expansion also brought vast Muslim areas under imperial control. After the 1917 October revolution and the formation of the Soviet Union in 1922 the new communist rulers deprived the Russian Orthodox Church of its privileges as the state religion, exactly for being too closely associated with the Tsarist Empire. Consequently, other religions such as Islam acquired more equality, though it was the equality of the poor and the deprived. The atheist policy of the Soviet government led to the closing of most churches, mosques and temples and induced a considerable secularization of society. Remaining places of worship fell under strict control of the government.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992 brought the independence of former Union republics with a Muslim cultural heritage in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) and Transcaucasia (Azerbaijan) and reduced the proportion of Muslims in the country considerably, when compared with its forerunners: the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire. Still, in the Russian Federation, Muslims remain a significant religious minority and Islam is entering the political arena.
The aim of this paper is to describe the relations between the state and Islam in post-Soviet Russia and the perspectives of inter-faith dialogue by focusing on different political-geographical contexts: the traditional Muslim areas of Tatarstan and Dagestan, and the metropolitan areas of Moscow and St. Petersburg, where Muslims are immigrant communities. Russia's own stand (compared to Western and Central Europe) will be further illustrated by the reaction to the recent "Cartoon issue." We shall start with an overview of the different Muslim communities in Russia and their geographical distribution, followed by a section on central Muslim institutions, regional situation and issues of Muslim concern in relation with Russian society, and perspectives of the inter-faith dialogue.
The Geography of Russian Islam
The major Islamic enclaves in the Russian Federation are located in the Volga-Urals, the North Caucasus, and Central Asia. Russian Muslims are concentrated in the eight autonomous republics of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Adygea, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Ingushetia, Dagestan and Chechnya.
As indicated by the recent census of the Russian Federation (2002) ethnic groups with Muslim heritage constitute 10 percent of Russia's population. 56 ethnic groups, which constitute their identity using Muslim symbols, total 14.3 million out of 145.1 million of Russia's population. This is enough to call Muslims the largest religious minority in the country. It is, however, less than it was popularly assumed by the public and the media, which speak of the Muslim share of Russia's population as 20.0 percent. Further, it was the perception of Russia's Muslims themselves that they constitute at least 20 percent of Russia's population. This figure is certainly an overestimation. However, if we take into account that significant part of
Russia's population is constituted by non-believers, ten percent looks quite significant.
The debates over the census showed the importance of the Muslim identity problem. Before the 2002 population census was carried out, Muslim lobbies raised the question of including "religion" or at least the "Muslim identity" as a census category. The Census organizers rejected this, but in case of the largest ethnic group with Muslim heritage we can see that Islam is becoming the ethno-differentiating factor. While Muslim Tatars are included into the category "Tatar," their co-ethnics with Christian cultural roots chose the category "Kresheni" ("Converted to Christianity" Tatars). For 56 ethnic groups of the Russian Federation, Islam is the religion of their ancestors and it is very much part of their ethnic identity.
Despite a two-fold rise of the Kumyks and Ingushis and a relative rise in numbers of particular ethnic groups, for example, of the Chechens from 899,000 in 1989 to 1,361,000 in 2002, and of the Azeris from 336,000 in 1989 to 621,000 in 2002, it should be said that the largest ethnic groups with Muslim heritage did not rise significantly. For example, the number of Tatars, the largest ethnic group with Muslim heritage, rose only from 5,522,000 to 5,558,000, less than 0.7 percent.
The demographic profile of ethnic groups with Muslim heritage in the Russian Federation varies geographically. This indicates the existence of three major categories of persons with Muslim cultural roots in the country. The first group consists of the people of the Volga region who constitute up to 7 million of Russia's Muslims. Most of them live in the Tatar and the Bashkir republics, where they constitute half of the population. The second group is constituted b the people of the North Caucasus, where more than 30 ethnic groups claim Muslim heritage as a part of their ethnic origin. They account for about
4 million of the population of the Russian Federation. The third group is that of migrants in Russian territory, who are mostly from former Transcaucasia and Central Asia as well as from the North Caucasus, although in western Siberia some Muslims are the so-called Siberian Tatars in Turkic-speaking enclaves who can claim to be descendants of the old Muslim population, who lived there before the Russians came. The third group consists of up to 3 million. In addition, there may be millions of Russian converts to Islam, but we do not have separate statistics for religion. Our estimates are based on ethnic figures. Another important source of our knowledge about Muslims in Russia is a list of mosques registered by the Ministry of Justice. The number of registered mosques shows a large-scale Muslim revival in the Russian Federation.
In contrast to the tendencies of 21-st century Europe, religious revival is typical of Russia, especially among Russia's ethnic Muslims. Islamic revival is seen mostly in the territories of traditional Muslim dominance. The major regions of Islamic revival in the Russian Federation are located in the eight autonomous republics of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Adygea, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Ingushetia, Dagestan and Chechnya. Most Muslims belong to the Hanafi madhab (the juridical school) of Sunni Islam, although Dagestani (except the Nogais) and Chechen Muslims adhere to the Shafii madhab of Sunni Islam. There is also a small Azeri Shia community in Southern Dagestan. Azeri Shias recently became numerous in many big cities of Russia. A large number of the Dagestanis, as well as the Chechens and the Ingushis, profess Sufism - a mystical form of Islam.
We know that the Muslim population of Moscow is nearly 200,000-250,000, or even more.
The State and Islam:
Central Muslim Institutions
There is no universally recognized hierarchy within the umma, or world Muslim community. Thus the state deals not with a hierarchically organized unity but with the Muslim umma, or the community of the followers of Islam in the country. At the same time the followers of Islam consider Muslims in other countries as their brethren and part of the universal umma. The State-Islam relations always have international aspect. Generally the state is supposed to protect Islam, while Islam prescribes loyalty to the state. It is supposed, however, that the state should be Islamic and Islam should be state religion. Thus theocracy is supposed to be a part of the government system. The traditional division of countries by Muslim ideologists into the Dar al-Islam (country of Islam, where Islamic law dominates), the Dar al-Harb (countries where Islamic forces struggle for domination) and Dar as-Suhl (non-Muslim country in temporary peace with the Muslim world, generally under the protection of Muslim power) does not help much, as the ideology of Islam does not recognize non-Muslim power. In principles, Muslims should either struggle against non-Muslim power or take a refuge in another country where Muslim law operates. In practice, many Muslim territories have experienced non-Muslim rule, where solution has been found in offering Muslims protection and giving them, a sort of governing body, which, being appointed by nonMuslims, can be considered sort of substitute for the Muslim state. This body guarantees the rights of Muslims and also operates as the highest Islamic court.
In the Russian Empire the Dukhovnoye Upravleniye Musulman Rossiiskoi Imperii, the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Russian Empire, was established in 1789. The Dukhovnoye Upravleniye had its headquarters in Orenburg but later moved to Ufa (both in the Volga-
Urals region). The Dukhovnoye Upravleniye was in charge of Muslim religious needs and conveyed a message from the ruling elite of the Empire. Islam was allowed as regional religion, but was not welcomed as the political ideology of the popular masses. In the 1880s under Alexander III, relations between the state and Islam deteriorated as the Tsar allowed the activity of Russian Orthodox Christian missions among Muslims. It should be said, however, that Alexander III also supported Russian Orthodox missionary activity among Roman Catholics and Protestants in the west of the Empire.
The pre-revolutionary decades of the 20th century saw the foundation of Muslim parties and political organization in Russia. The liberal-democratic Party of Tatar Muslims known as Ittifaq-al-Muslimin had its representatives in the state Duma, the first Russia's parliament. Soon the Duma got the Muslim lobby consisting of 30 Muslim deputies. The Muslim lobby later diminished and in 1907 it had only eight members. The brief period of legal political activity of Muslim political groups and parties (1905-1917) gave impetus to separatist feelings among the Muslims everywhere in the Russian Empire, including the Volga-Urals regions.
The break-up of the Russian Empire gave rise to hopes of independence in the Muslim dominated regions. Attempts to establish a Muslim theocratic state were made in the North Caucasus. Azerbaijan saw the establishment of a liberal-democratic government. Muslims in the Volga-Urals region dreamt of the foundation of the Itil-Ural state. These foundations and dreams proved short-lived. By the time of the foundation of the Soviet Union in 1922 all Muslim-populated regions of the former Russian Empire were incorporated into the country controlled by the atheist Bolsheviks (Communists).
The period between 1922 and 1943 saw no concessions for the Muslims, or for any other religious groups, but in 1943 four Spiritual
Boards for Muslims were established in an attempt to counter the effect of Nazi propaganda, which was partly aimed at the Muslims of Russia. Among the established boards were the Dukhovnoye Upravleniye Musulman Evropeiskoi chasti Rossii i Sibiri (The Spiritual Board of Muslims in European Russia and Siberia) and the Spiritual Board of the North Caucasus, based in Makhachkala. The two other boards controlling Muslims on the Transcaucasia and Central Asia are now based abroad. In the 1990s the Spiritual Boards collapsed and separate Muftiyats (Boards) for major regions appeared. As a result the following Muftiyats have been established in the Russian Federation: the Muftiyat of Moscow and Central Russia, the Muftiyat of Tatarstan, the Muftiyat of Bashkortostan, the former Muftiyat of European Russia and Siberia which lost power but was not dissolved. The importance of the Muftiyats depends on their power and influence. In the 1990s several Muftiyats competed for first place in the hierarchy. Among them: the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia and European New Independent States. Its head is Talgat Tajuddin. Its Headquarters are based in Ufa. The Board claims to control nearly half the mosques in Russia. Its importance, however, is diminishing.
The Higher Coordinating Center of Muslims in Russia. The head is Gabdulla Galiulla (now replaced by Nafigulla Ashirov). The headquarters are in Kazan. The Center was organized as the body opposing the Highest Muftiyat. It has proved, however, to be less influential.
The Council of Muslims of Central part of European Russia. The head is Ravil Gainuddin. The headquarters are in Moscow. It seems to be a real rival to the Tajuddin-led Muftiyat. Many mosques and religious organizations show their loyalty to both the Central Spiritual Board and the Council of Mufties.
In the 2000th the situation developed further. The number of Muftiyats grew, but they lost in importance. They became regional organizing centers for traditionalist Muslims in each province (republic or region) where significant numbers of the followers of Islam exist. There are such Muftiyats as the Muftiyat or Dukhovnoye Upravleniye (Spiritual Board) of Muslims of Chechnya, Dagestan, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Perm and Nizhni Novgorod Region, etc., where the Muftiyats are in close relations with the local elite. Some of the Muftiyats also recognize national Muslim organizations, but their local links are more important than the links with the center.
After 1992, several major Muslim political parties or political movements emerged in present-day Russia. These are the "Muslims of Russia," the "Nur" and the All-Russia Union of Muslims." The first party is more popular in the Volga-Urals region and in Moscow, and the third has support in the North Caucasus. However, local ruling elites of "ethnic Muslims" belonging to the mainstream politics generally have more influence than loose all-Russia Muslim parties. It is also against the election law to have religion-based parties in the country. Thus, for the majority of Muslim political activists in Russia regional links with local branches of national parties are again more important that belonging to a religion-based party.
We will consider two major republics in the two regions where the local non-Russian ruling elite has Muslim roots, Tatarstan in the Volga-Urals region, and Dagestan in the North Caucasus.
Tatarstan
Present-day Tatarstan is a relatively-developed region with rich oil and gas reserves, with developed petrochemical industry and urbanized population. Its population is nearly half-Tatar half-Russian, but the political leadership is in the hands of the Tatar elite as a result of
the Soviet nationalities policy in ethnic regions. All main leaders of the Tatar elite are former Soviet bosses who chose to change loyalty towards Islam after the downfall of Communist ideology. In 1990-1992 the Tatarstan leadership, together with the leadership of Chechnya, favored the disintegration of the Russian Federation. In 1992 they refused to sign the Federal Treaty. Instead the Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiyev suggested a redistribution of power between the center and the regions. He demanded that more power and resources be left in the republic than sent to the center. Russia's President B. Yeltsin agreed, so Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, with their rich oil and gas resources, kept a significant share of taxes for themselves and enjoyed relative prosperity, while some other Muslim-populated center-supported republics, particularly Dagestan, suffered from the lack of resources. In February 1994 a power-sharing treaty between Moscow and Kazan was signed, which secured Tatarstan's remaining within the Russian Federation but gave a special status to that republic. The treaty meant an agreement to share power and resources with formal Moscow supremacy. However, recent political changes after Yeltsin, particularly the formation of Federal okrugs (super-regions), which include autonomous republics, may mean the end to the relative autonomy of Tatarstan. Yet, at the moment President Shailiyev is one of the leaders of the pro-Putin party "Edinaya Rossiya" (United Russia), which supports Moscow and enjoys its support as well.
While at the center, Islam is recognized as a traditional religion, at the regional level in Tatarstan Islam is the dominating religion. There is an active Tatar national movement regionally under the leadership of the All-Tatar Public Center (VTOTS), the Party of Ittifaq (Union), Milli Majlis (National Assembly), and the Azatlyk (Freedom) movement in Tatarstan. All these parties and organizations use Muslim slogans and symbols. Tatar national symbols, architecture, and
monuments include Islamic elements. Tatarstan's authorities encourage a faster pace of building mosques, Islamic schools (madrasahs), and other Islamic institutions in comparison with Russian Orthodox construction. For example, in 1986 there were 18 Muslim and 15 Russian Orthodox registered communities with their mosques and churches accordingly. In 1992 the number of Muslim registered communities and churches grew to 89. By 1997 there were 802 registered Muslim communities and mosques and 171 Russian Orthodox communities and churches in Tatarstan.
The federal-regional power-sharing treaty allows local power to control ethno-regional and local components of the school curriculum. Hence, textbooks describing Islam as the main source of culture in Tatarstan have been published since 1992, when President Shaimiyev encouraged the secession of Tatarstan's Islamic authorities from the Federal Islamic structures represented by the Central Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia and European states of the CIS (TSDUMR, formerly DUMES), based in Ufa (Bashkortostan). Tatarstan's leadership has regarded the independent Tatarstan Muftiyat as an important attribute of sovereignty. In February 1998 the Shaimiyev administration organized the election of the President's relative, Gusman-hazret, as the new Mufti of Tatarstan. The Kazan-supported Islamic organizations call themselves Jajidist, or liberal Islamic organizations, claiming the heritage of Tatar Jajidists from the pre-1917 period. The radical revivalists (Salafi or Wahhabi) missionaries are watched by the regional authorities with suspicion. Their presence in the region is considered dangerous, but Kazan is interested in securing monetary investment from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and financial support for the Hajj-goers, controlled by the Salafi missionaries.
The opposition to regional power also uses Islamic slogans. Founded in 1998 by ex-Mufti of Tatarstan, Gabdulla Galiulla, a new
provincial movement "Omet"(Hope) unites the nationalist party (the Ittifaq), communists and some Islamists. The movement, as well as the populist Muslims of Tatarstan movement and the Safi Islam group, revolve around particular personalities and lack public support.
While regional leaders have used Islamic slogans to attract public support in their struggle for power with the center, they sometimes find themselves in an unpleasant situation when they are asked which Islam to support. In August 1992 the Congress of the Imams of Tatarstan elected Gabdulla Galiulla as Mufti of the Kazan-based the Muftiyat of Tatarstan, independent of Ufa-based Supreme Mufti Talgat Tajuddin. In his turn, Mufti Talgat Tajuddin did not recognize this move and supported the formation of the alternative Board (Muftiyat) in Zelenodolsk in 1994. In 1996, Kazan-based Galiulla supported Ravil Gainutdin, the self-proclaimed Mufti of Central European Russia (Moscow), in the creation of another anti-TSDUMR institution - the Council of Muftis of Russia. Tatarstan's President Shaimiyev supported the regionalist movement and in 1998 the Unifying Islamic Congress, organized by the Tatar authorities, legalized the break-up with neighboring Ufa, but appointed another Mufti, pro-Shaimiyev Gusman-hazret. While the Kazan-based Muftiyat claims to control 1,200 Muslim communities in Tatarstan and even a dozen more in the neighboring Perm region, the Ufa Mufti Talgat Tajuddin claims to control 170 Muslim communities in Tatarstan. The Muslim authorities in neighboring Dagestan maintain contacts with all these umbrella organizations.
The change of President of Tatarstan did not cause any change in the relations between the regional authorities and the religious leaders. The relationship is seen as balanced and friendly by both Islam and
Dagestan
Dagestan is another region of Russia with a dominant Muslim population. Dagestan receives more means from the center that it gives in return. Dagestan lacks natural resources and suffers from high unemployment. It is a multinational republic, with 14 main groups, of which several largest ones struggle for power. The biggest group is the Avars (757,000), the Dargins (510,000), the Kumyks (423,000), the Lezgins (412,000), the Laks (157,000), and few others. The Chechens (92,217), Russians (150,054), and Azeris (88,327) are also numerous in the republic. Dagestan has a long history of Islamic dominance since the 8th century A.D. For centuries Islam in the North Caucasus was connected with Sufism. The first Sifis of the Tariqa (Sufi brotherhood) of Abu Bakr Derbendi appeared in Dagestan in the 11th and 12th centuries. The tariqatists attribute supernatural characteristics to the mazars (the graves of Sufi sheikhs and other shrines) and sanction ziyarat (visiting the shrines of well-known sheikhs), which contributed to the isolated existence of local Islam.
The 18th century was the time of the Russian occupation of the territory and local Muslim resistance. From 1785 to 1790 Sheikh Mansur united Chechnya and Dagestan in an anti-Russian political-military union. Between 1824 and 1859 Imam Shamil ruled the Imamat on the territory of Chechnya and Dagestan in resisting the Russian forces. In 1877-1878 the Russian troops defeated the Islamists, and Dagestan was finally incorporated in the Russian Empire. After the turbulent events of 1917, rebellious Dagestanis and Chechens proclaimed a theocratic emirate, which was soon crushed by the Bolsheviks in 1921. In the Soviet period the Avars dominated the political, economic and police bodies in Dagestan. The Avar-dominated Naqshband tariqa colexisted relatively well with the
authorities, and prospered. The local Communist party structures were close to the Naqshband-related structures. In the 1940s, during the period of relative religious liberalization, the Dagestan city of Buinaksk (near Makhachkala) was the venue of the formation of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of the North Caucasus (Muftiyat), in which the leading positions were taken by the Dagestani Islamic elite linked with the Naqshbandis.
Dagestan remained an agrarian republic, strongly dependent on federal subsidies, which helped preserve the clan and Sufi social network in return for the region's formal loyalty to Moscow, The collapse of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of financial support from Moscow resulted in changes of power. It also opened Dagestan's door to foreign Islamic missions. While the struggle for power involves several ethnic groups and remains under control of the Sufi leaders, Salafism (Wahhabism) is gaining support from the unemployed and dispossessed population, especially from the Chechens and the Nogais of Dagestan. The Wahhabis of the region publicly protest against the low standards of morality and the Communist past of the majority of the present-day Muslim clergy. The first Wahhabis turned up in Dagestan in 1988, and soon the republic was the scene of an open military struggle between the Wahhabis and the Sufis over the main Sufi shrines. In 1998 three villages in the Buinaksk district of Dagestan proclaimed themselves Islamic territory under Sharia law. In these circumstances the Dagestani leadership has opted for ruthless political and administrative suppression of Wahhabis. Common hostility united the Dagestani secular political elite and Islamic officialdom, represented by the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Dagestan (SBMD).
The victory over Wahhabis heralded the unity of power and Sufi imams, who quickly proclaimed loyalty to Moscow in exchange for subsidies. Thus, the struggle for power in Dagestan continued between
the Sufi-controlled government and the Saudi-supported Wahhabis. Ethnic movements in Dagestan also use Islamic symbols and slogans, as do political parties. The political parties include the Islamic Renaissance party (IRP), and the Islamic organization Al-Islamiyya, the Supreme Religious Council of the Peoples of the Caucasus, and the regional association of Muslim women, Maslima, plus the Dagestani branches of the All-Russia Union of Muslims and the popular political movement 'Nuf' (Light), which has become the Islamic party of Russia.
One of the most important sources of Wahhabi influence is the annual Hajj. The Wahhabis advocate strict monotheism (tawhid) and oppose tariqatism as a deviation from Islam. The Wahhabis also accuse the Islamic officialdom of corruption, involvement in dirty politics and financial fraud, and fear of open discussion of religious issues. The Wahhabis thus operate as an anti-nomenklatura egalitarian and, to a certain extent, an anti-state force in Dagestan.
Chechnya
In post-Soviet Chechnya, Chechen Naqshbanddis, who had representatives in the major political and economic spheres in Soviet times, distanced themselves from the Chechen radical nationalists under the leadership of General Dudayev. The first Chechen Mufti Muhammad Bashir, a Naqshbandi, refused to back Dudayev in the presidential elections of 1991. The failure of the Chechen nationalists to mobilize the Naqshbandi network for the war of independence facilitated their rapprochement with another Sufi tariqa, the Qadiris, who were much more disadvantaged than the Naqshbandis during the Soviet period. Bekmurza, the elder brother of General Dudayev and the regional leader of the Qadiris, played an important role in forming the alliance. The two Chechen wars resulted in the demise of
the Dudayev regime and his successors. However, Chechnya's new Mufti, Kadyrov Sr., was appointed as the new Chechen leader by Moscow. After his death, his son Ramzan Kadyrov, became the real ruler of Chechnya. This succession heralds the dominance of the Qadiri and other Sufi-related Muslim leaders in Chechnya.
Muslim Population in Russian Metropolitan Cities
In the Volga-Urals region and the North Caucasus Muslims can proclaim Islam as their ethnic religion in the territory. However, in Moscow and St. Petersburg, which both have significant Muslim populations, Muslims are immigrants and they live in a Christian and atheist-dominated environment.
In 1994 the Muslim population of Moscow was estimated to be about 250,000. Until the break-up of the Soviet Union, Muslim Tatars dominated the Muslim community in Moscow. Now Azeris are also quite numerous. Estimates for 2000 give a figure of 170,000 Tatars in Moscow, while the number of Azeris is 33,000. An increase in the number of mosques in Moscow is a relatively new post-Soviet phenomenon. Before 1994 there was only one registered mosque in Moscow, Jami Masjit. In 1994 the Moscow government returned the historical mosque in Zamoskvorechye to Muslims. In 1997 two more mosques appeared in the city, in Otradnoye and on Poklonnaya Hill. Another Shia mosque in Otradnoye was built by a rich Azeri businessman, and there is a Shia mosque on the premises of the Iranian Embassy in Noviye Cheryomushki. In all, there are eleven mosques in Moscow, and also several unregistered Muslim prayer halls. The Moscow Jami Masjit is traditionally a Tatar-dominated mosque and is often called the Tatar Mosque. The historical mosque in Zamoskvorechye has a significant number of North Caucasian and Arab
parishioners. The mosque in Otradnoye is dominated by Muslims from Nizhni Novgorod region of the Russian Federation.
The St. Petersburg Muslim community is also large and varied. More than one-third of the city's Muslims are Tatar. The Azeris are nearly as numerous as the Tatars, but they are newcomers and Shias, which makes them outsiders among other Muslims. The Azeris have opened their own prayer-house. The main conflict is between the Tatars and the rest of the Sunni community of St. Petersburg, as well as between the "old" established groups and the "Young Muslims." The conflict came to the surface over the opening of a new mosque in St. Petersburg. The city's largest Muslim organization, the Spiritual Muslim Department, accused a rival group, which planned to build a new mosque, of being Wahhabi. The new radical group named Al-Fath, received support from the Moscow-based Union of Muftis of Russia, while the Spiritual Muslim Department asked for support the Ufa-based Central Muftiyat. The municipality of St. Petersburg was also involved in the conflict. The construction of the new mosque was allowed by the City Construction Board and Architectural Committee, but the Spiritual Muslim Department asked the Kalininsky district authorities to stop the construction of the mosque. The conflict also involved personal interests and ambitions. The Mufti of the oldest mosque in the city, Jafar Panchayev, claims control over the local Muslim community and is at loggerheads with its former imam and the leader of Al-Fath, Hafiz Mahmudov. In November 2006 the construction began under control of the newly-formed Dukhovnoye Upravleniye Musulman Sankt Peterburga i Severo-Zapada Rossii (Spiritual Board of Muslims of St. Petersburg and North-West of Russia).
The "Cartoon Issue" and the Reaction
of Muslims in Russia
The publication of cartoons in the Danish Jyllands-Posten, which provoked a heated debate in Europe and a political scandal in the Middle East, had little effect, if any, in Russia due to the strong state control of the mass media. The cartoons published in Jyllands-Posetn in September 2005 provoked a protest in the local Muslim community, which spent several months rousing denunciation of the cartoons, which it considered blasphemous. The reproduction of the cartoon sketches in Norway in December 2005 provoked a wide protest from European Muslims and their brethren in the Middle East. Then Danish Muslims arranged a tour in the Islamic world spreading information about the cartoons published in the Danish newspaper. The cartoons published in the Jyllands-Posten triggered a diplomatic crisis and Europe-wide discussions of the blasphemy issues and freedom of speech. Among the newspapers which entered the fray were the French daily France Soir, Germany's Die Welt, Ialy's Corriere della Serra, and Spain's Catalan daily El Periodico. The reproduced sketches included a portrayal of Mohammed wearing a bomb-shaped turban and as a knife-wielding nomad flanked by two women wrapped in black. Although both the European justification of freedom of speech and the Muslim demand for laws on blasphemy exaggerated the importance of the initial publication, the result was a full-scale political crisis in Denmark and a rise of anti-Danish and anti-European and anti-Western sentiments in the Muslim world.
For the first week after the cartoons were published in Denmark, the Russian media did not comment on the news at all, presenting it as a purely Danish affair. Information concerning the issue was only available on western channels and in foreign-language newspapers. However, the increasingly wide-scale anti-Western hysteria in the Arab
world soon gave momentum to Russian Muslims' demands for anti-blasphemy laws to be introduced in Russia. The Russian news media seem to have received directives on how to deal with these events in Europe. The first newspaper, which dared publish a sketch in relation to the "cartoon issue", the Volgograd-based Gorodskiye vesti, was closed the day after publishing a cartoon showing Jesus Christ, Moses, Mohammed and Buddha saying to fighting villains "We did not teach you this." Another provincial newspaper was in Vologda, which was also closed after reproducing the Volgograd cartoons. Many Russians regarded the eagerness of the authorities to stop any publication critical of such things as a revival of Soviet times. Russian Muslims, however, expressed gratitude to the Russian authorities for their protection of traditional religious values. A news conference convened by Abdul-Vahed Niyazov, the Head of the Islamic Cultural Center of Russia, demonstrated a trend to strengthen the loyalist Muslim forces. Niyazov even tried to use the situation to give an anti-American and antiWestern tint to the event.
Islam now plays an important role in the politics of the Russian Federation, more than in the past. The country can no longer be regarded as an mono-confessional Orthodox state, especially at local and regional levels. Islam can be a key factor in the relations between the state and the church, depending on the ethnic-religious composition of the population involved. In the traditional Muslim regions, such as Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Adygea, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Ingushetia, Dagestan and Chechnya, Islam is not only a protected religion, but also the faith of the ruling elite, compared to the former Soviet Union, religious freedom in general has increased considerably, which has also benefited Islam.
A very different situation exists in metropolitan areas, such as Moscow and St. Petersburg, where Muslims form immigrant
communities comparable to the Muslim communities in West European cities. In these cities Muslim influence on local politics is considerably lower, as a consequence of the high level of secularization and the traditional Orthodox Christian dominance among the religious population. In general the local authorities in metropolitan areas are not willing to allow the construction of mosques. Internal divisions within the Muslim community further complicate the situation. These divisions have ethno-religious character: Wahhabis versus popular Islamists, Tatars versus non-Tatars, old timers versus newcomers. The economic background is also worthy of note. For example, wealthy groups of Muslims which can afford to build their own mosques conflict with poor Muslims who depend on the local municipality.
The "Cartoon issue" illustrates the growing sensitivity of the central government regarding the feelings of Muslim citizens. It shows the difference between Russia, on the one hand, and the West and Central Europe concerning the relationship between the state and Islam. The need for inter-faith dialogue between the state and society is increasingly felt by the latter.
History of Relations between Main
Confessions of Russia
Christianity and Islam are the two main confessions in Russia. The history of their relations corresponds to the main stages of Russian history, and vice versa, as each major event in the history of Russia has had some impact on the destiny of the adepts of these two confessions. It is important to remember that although Christianity and Islam have been the dominant religions in Russia, neither religion has held an exclusive monopoly and they have never been united. For this reason, within Christian and Muslim communities today there are numerous
groups with differing notions regarding the importance and prospects of inter-confessional dialogue.
Recent events surrounding the demise of Patriarch Alexey II of Moscow and All Russia have highlighted the profound respect in which eminent Muslims hold the leading Orthodox Christian clerics and the Orthodox community of the country. Yet, the relations between Muslims and Orthodox Christians in Russia can hardly be considered serene. Sometimes serious disagreements arise even in the Inter-religious Council of Russia. One reason for disagreements is the rigorous hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church and the lack of a corresponding hierarchy among Muslims. The non-hierarchical structure of Islam is understood by some as a kind of democracy, while others consider it a disappointing barrier to equality in dialogue and a fact that makes it difficult for ordinary members of the communities to accept formal mutual agreements reached by Orthodox clerics and representatives of Muslims.
While doctrinal differences certainly interfere with serene relations, the main interference is a product of history. In the millennial history of the Russian state Christians and Muslims have fought in opposing armies, but more often, they have fought together against a common external enemy. In internal wars fought within Russia for political and economic goals, Muslims and Christians used religious slogans to bolster up their opposition. Slogans like "the Church in war," and "the Holy war" ("the Jihad of sword"), which do not represent the original ideals of either Christianity or Islam, have been used by various politicians for the political and military mobilization of the religious population, and they have shaped the attitudes of each side toward the other.
It is unwise to idealize the formative stages in the development of either religion, as each one of them pretends to be the only true
exponent of religious knowledge and the only way to salvation. This claim, in which both traditions are equally culpable, presents a serious problem. Many truly believing Christians and Muslims consider the faith of the other an error or delusion, and those who disagree are not "true believers." This disrespectful attitude and the lack of mutual recognition and understanding are by-products of wars waged for political and economic purposes and they drastically interfere with relations between Muslims and Christians today.
At present, circumstances necessitate a change in attitude. The world is suffering a crisis of faith concerning all religions, including Christianity and Islam. The world situation today - the problems of war and peace, the struggle against hunger and poverty, and the need to avoid ecological and nuclear catastrophes - necessitates our transcending the traditional confessional boundaries to join forces and develop common strategies. Here, given the exigency of the situation, the questions of "faith" and the perceived errors perpetuated by adherents of other faiths yield in priority to the issues of restoration of faith among Christians and Muslims accordingly. For Christians and Muslims trust in God is the principal requirement of faith, and passivity in our earthly lives is not an option. These questions along with the questions of the future of Russia can and must be solved together by Russian Christians and Muslims.
The Russian Federation is the legal successor of the Soviet Union, which in turn inherited the major part of the Russian Empire with all its merits and issues, population diversity, and religious and cultural traditions. The Russian Empire was the successor of the Moscovy State, Vladimir and Kievan Rus'. The baptism of the people of Kievan Rus' in 988 A.D. was the most important event which defined the development of Eastern Europe for the next millennium. Hebraic monotheism and Islam were already well established among
the people of the Volga region. Hebraic monotheism was the official religion of the Khazar Kaganate, and Islam was popularized in the Volga region by Arab missionaries and merchants. Prior to the fall of the state of Khazars, Islam became widespread in the Volga region, having been adopted as the official religion of the Volga Bulgars.
Remarkably, the first inter-confessional dialogue in Russia was the legendary dispute that occurred at the court of Prince Vladimir between representatives of Christianity, Islam and Judaism over the future religion of Rus'. Vladimir chose Christianity, the religion of the southern neighbor, the Eastern Roman Empire (Byzantium). Later the schism between Rome and Constantinople, further splits within the Catholic Church, and the emergence of national Protestantism, as well as further divisions among other Protestant denominations (Methodism, Baptism) made the peoples of Eastern Europe define their relations not only in terms of Christianity and Islam, but also in terms of the branches of Christianity. These definitions were dramatically framed in intra-church conflicts, which were sometimes more fierce than conflicts between different faiths. Finally, the schism within the Orthodox Christian Church itself, caused by the reforms of Patriarch Nikon, led to the emergence of the Old Believers, some of whom, (the Nekrasov Cossacks) were employed by the Ottoman Sultan to fight the "Prince of Darkness," who they beheld as the Orthodox Tsar.
The foundation of the Russian Empire by Peter the Great aimed at centralizing power throughout the vast territory of Russia, and this centralization affected the religious communities as well. In 1721, in St. Petersburg, the Holy Synod ministry on Orthodox religion was established. Other religions found themselves under the supervision (far less strict) of the Department on Non-native Religions. Empress Catherine the Great, who was in power several decades later after the
death of Peter the Great, considered herself his successor. Like Peter the Great she took care of public life in Russia, including organizing and supervising the religious life of the country. Catherine the Great emphasized her spiritual kinship with the French philosophers of the Enlightenment and as an enlightened monarch. In 1773 she issued the edict on religious tolerance, which allowed people of Russia the formation of "non-native" communities, notably Muslims and Lutherans, and also the construction of new mosques and Lutheran churches. The title of the epistle to the Holy Synod was especially remarkable: "On tolerance of all faiths and on ban against bishops against taking part in deals concerning different faiths and against building houses of worship for different religions which should be the concern of the secular authorities."
In 1800 in Kazan, a publishing house was established that specialized in issuing Muslim religious books. The broader rights of believers heightened their interest in Enlightenment. In the Muslim world, it generated the reform ("judidist") movement, which was largely connected with the activities of Ismail Gasprinsky (1851-1914). From 1888 Gasprinsky issued the newspaper Tarjiman ("Translator"), which was very influential in the sphere of Muslim education in the Crimea, the Volga region, and Turkestan. Gasprinsky issued new textbooks and school curricula and founded the "new-method" schools in the Crimea. Later these schools became widespread throughout the Muslim territories of Russia, as far south as Samarkand and Tashkent and the dependent emirate of Bochara. Due to these progressive schools a new generation of Muslim intellectuals emerged in the first decade and a half of the 20th century. They were educated in the European tradition but retained their Muslim identity.
Under the policy of greater Russification, which characterized the reign of Alexander III, the reform movement became weaker in the
communities of all faiths and the conservative trend strengthened. During the late imperial period the Department of Spiritual Affairs and Foreign Religions took control over all ideological movements regarded hostile to both Orthodox and Muslim subjects of the Russian Empire. During the reign of Nicholas II, efforts to continue the conservative policy of his predecessor and to rely on the most traditional forces among the representatives of all major religions proved unsuccessful. As a result, bowing to popular pressure, Nicholas II made serious concessions to the Old Believers and Protestants and declared freedom of conscience for all subjects by his imperial manifesto.
The 1917 February revolution abolished the autocracy and thus terminated the special status of the Russian Orthodox Church. At the same time the revival of the Patriarchate gave hope for the restoration of the authority of the church during the period when ex-emperor Nicholas II fell into disgrace with the population.
During the "Brezhnev stagnation period" that followed Stalin's despotism and Khrushchev's "voluntarism," a pragmatic approach to the major confessions and to believers prevailed. Many churches, mosques and synagogues remained open for the religious communities and believers could worship freely, but religious propaganda was prohibited: priests, imams and community leaders were under surveillance, and religion became mainly a family affair. Owing to the maintenance of big family and clan links in Central Asia and the Caucasus, these limitations caused Islam to become a largely "ethnic religion." At the same time, Orthodox Christianity lost its links with the majority of the ethnically Russian population, which was generally deprived of family ties and ties to location by the state. In this sense, Orthodox Christianity was more weakened than Islam by Soviet atheism.
The mass revival of Orthodox Christianity began in 1988, when the U.S.S.R. celebrated the millennium of the Baptism of Rus'. By this time the perestroika (renovation) of the economy and the policy of glasnost (openness) in the field of knowledge had borne fruit. People displayed interest in religion, mostly in the faith of their ancestors. Religious organizations grew stronger, the government decided to express legally its attitude toward religion and major confessions. As a result, two laws on religion in Russia were passed, namely, the Federal laws "On Freedom of Worship" (1990) and "on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations" (1997).
The latter law requires cooperation between the government and religious associations, meaning that "the state is to cooperate with and support the charitable activities of religious organizations, as well as the implementation of their socially significant cultural and educational programs and undertakings."
Despite the significant achievements and enormous positive role of the Russian Orthodox Church and Muslim communities, it is important to note their "Achilles' heel," which is their dependence on the central and regional authorities, their tendency to rely on government support, and their hope to get administrative resources. This dependence sometimes makes the Orthodox Church and Muslim communities especially sensitive, and even aggressive, in their relations with their rivals. It concerns particularly the activities of the Roman Catholic Church and the Baptist and Methodist churches.
The recent efforts of the Russian government have created a regime of patronage embracing the four traditional religions, that is, Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Buddhism and Judaism. The problem of Muslim representation on the Russian Inter-religious Council is not simple. The Council was founded by the Central Muslim Spiritual Board of Russia, the Mufti Council of Russia, the Russian Orthodox
Church, the Congress of Jewish Religious Organizations and Associations in Russia, and the Buddhist Traditional Sangha of the Russian Federation. By mutual agreement each confession should have an equal number of representatives. Ideally, this formula is one religion one vote. However, in reality the situation is clouded by the ambiguous position of certain muftis from the North Caucasus and Tatarstan, who have their own independent administrations and no representation on the Inter-religious Council of Russia. There is also the Supreme Muftiate of the CIS headed by Mufti Sheikh-ul-Islam Talgat Tajuddin.
During the term as the Metropolitan of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, the present Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia in an interview to the newspaper NG - Religii said, among other things, that the existing disagreements in the Islamic community of Russia are its internal issues, and the Russian Orthodox Church cannot interfere in the resolution of these issues. On the other hand, the existence within the contemporary umma of different centers of certain importance pretending to represent the interests of the entire Muslim community at the federal level significantly complicates general contacts between the Russian Orthodox Church and Islam. Metropolitan Kirill said he does not think that "for an effective dialogue it is important to unite all Muslims under a common administration. It would be a mistake to suppose that the territorial administration scheme (accepted by the Russian Orthodox Church) is optimal for every confession and to demand organizational unity as an important condition for cooperation between Islamic, Buddhist and Jewish communities. The Islamic umma of Russia is heterogeneous in both its ethnic and religious aspects, and the coexistence of different spiritual centers is quite reasonable as long as there is peace between them."
Contrary to the opinion of some researchers and journalists, Metropolitan Kirill did not see the adoption of Islam by Russians as a
threat: "Every year a few dozen Russians adopt Islam as a result of their spiritual striving or mixed marriages, but today even more ethnic Muslims become Christians for the same reasons. Such cases of changing religion are not a result of some task-oriented activities of the Russian Orthodox Church or the traditional Muslim centers of Russia, and they do not complicate our inter-religious affairs either. For our religions, it is a top-priority task to revive traditional religiousness in its proper place, and it is obvious that strict limitations on mutual proselytism are one of the main conditions for our good-neighborly relations."
As we can see, most prominent representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Muslim community of Russia are not disposed to accentuate their dogmatic differences. It is an ordinary matter for them to remember the common ("Abrahamic") roots of Christianity and Islam and their mutual respect for the personalities of Jesus Christ and Virgin Mary, who are revered in both religions. At the same time, the question of religious symbolism and its interpretation has suddenly become a painful issue and source of tension for a number of Muslim muftis. Particularly, muftis see the so-called anchor crosses, on which the Cross is superimposed over the Crescent as "suppression of the Muslim Crescent by the Christian Cross." There is no need to investigate the origin of the Christian and Muslim symbols closely in this article, but the fallacy of such an interpretation is obvious to all experts. In the Christian tradition, the crescent is the symbol of Our Lady's purity and has in no way any pejorative meaning for Islamic symbols. The power of human fallacy, including religious fallacy, has always been great. There is, for example, a depiction of the sun and the crescent in St. Stephen Cathedral in Vienna. The sun and the crescent stood for the union of the Pope and the Emperor of the Roman Empire. After the unsuccessful siege of Vienna by the Turks and the defeat of
the army of the Grand Vizir, the citizens of Vienna insisted on removing the depiction of the crescent as allegedly the symbol of the power of Islam.
Similarly, certain muftis view Christian symbols, for instance, the depiction of St. George the Dragon-slayer on the Moscow coat of arms as symbolic of the union of the government authorities and the main local religions. In Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, however, the authorities obviously favor Islam and Islamic symbols.
In the Volga region and the North Caucasus Islam is given priority by the authorities who are mainly "ethnic Muslims": Tatars, Bashkirs, Avars, etc. The biggest and richest republic of the "Muslim zone" of the Volga region, Tatarstan, preserves its sacred Orthodox objects, but there are many more mosques built than new churches, which has caused some observers to note "Islamic advancement" there. According to some of them, we are dealing with the clash of civilizations - Christian and Muslim. However, according to the official position of the Tatarstan government, the population in the republic lives in inter-confessional peace and concord, with priority given to the "traditional religions."
Tatarstan undoubtedly has the largest number of mosques. According to the data provided by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, in 2003 there were 971 mosques in the republic. In Dagestan there were 567, in Bashkortostan 405, in the upland republics of the North Caucasus: Kabardino-Balkaria 99, in Karachay-Cherkessia 103, and in Adygea 22. Also, in Orenburg region there were 129 mosques, in Ulyanovsk region 101, and in Samara region 89.
Practical Steps towards Inter-faith Dialogue
Finding ways to resolve disagreements between Orthodox Christians and Muslims is incumbent on leading Orthodox clerics and
prominent representatives of the Muslim community. However, search for solutions also involves the local hierarchs and activists of religious communities. There are positive examples of activities already taking place at a local level. In 2007, in Stavropol Territory Orthodox Christian and Muslim young people organized a summer camp under the motto "The Caucasus Our Common Home." Theophanes the Bishop of Stavropol and Vladikavkaz, noted: "Conflicts are usually rooted in banal ignorance. Often inter-religious and international conflicts occur due to ignorance of cultures and traditions of the other side and inability to find a common language." Summer camps provide an opportunity to draw young people closer together and help them learn to appreciate one another and communicate with one another.
The Russian Orthodox Church and the Muslims of Russia need to develop a more congenial attitude toward atheists, including confirmed atheists, as well as toward representatives of the nonOrthodox Christian churches: Catholics and Protestants, and also Buddhists, Judaists, Shamanists, and also representatives of the new religious movements, among them those who follow Russian paganism and seek to restore the ancient Slav religion. The representatives of all religions need to foster a clear and unswerving attitude toward violence and terror, which today (unlike in previous times) is associated primarily with radical Islamists.
Conclusion
The necessity of inter-faith dialogue in Russia is evident. The key actors in this dialogue are Russian Orthodox Christians and Muslims. The non-religious population is also important though is not necessarily active in this dialogue. The themes of the dialogue are the globally important issues of war and peace, assistance to the victims of wars and natural disasters and cooperation in the most diverse fields,
including education, health protection, and social stability. Discussion of theological questions should be conducted by educated and tolerant experts and should not be exposed to general discussion by representatives of the broad public. The interests of all major communities, including Christians and Muslims, require avoiding or even strongly banning any offense against any religion.
"World Religions in the Context of the Contemporary Culture: New Perspectives of Dialogue and Mutual Understanding",
St. Petersburg, 2011, pp. 44-62.
A. Yunusova,
D.Sc. (Hist.), Director of IEP, Ufimski NC of RAS NATIONAL POLICY AND ETHNIC-CONFESSIONAL PROCESSES IN BASHKORTOSTAN IN THE CONTEXT OF "STRATEGY OF NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE RUSSION FEDERATION TILL 2020"
The international unity in such multinational and poly-confessional country, as Russia, is the most important condition not only for further development and modernization but primarily for existence of the state itself. In post-Soviet Russia the consolidation of spiritual common character of the Russians, side by side with development of national cultures and languages of the peoples of Russia, was indicated as a priority task reflected in "The Conception of the State National Policy of the Russian Federation" (Decree of the President of Russia N 909 of 15.06.1996). It is stipulated in the Decree as follows: the main aims of the state national policy of the Russian Federation consist in ensuring conditions for the social and national-cultural competent development of all peoples of Russia, consolidation of the all-Russian civil and spiritual-moral community on the basis of
