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Muslims are one Ummah, and it is their religious duty to sympathize with their coreligionists.
The Palestinian issue is probably the most important foreign-policy issue for Russian Muslims. They actively welcomed and supported the invitation of the PNA and Hamas leaders to Moscow. At the same time, the Kavkaz-Center website, the news portal of the "Caucasian Emirate", not long ago wrote, in all seriousness, that "the main jihad is now taking place in Chechnya". The Palestinian issue, very important to Muslims around the world, is not at all a top priority for North Caucasian radicals. Moreover, they even criticize Hamas for its moderation and friendship with Moscow.
But these are all opportunistic reactions. Even a cursory analysis shows that domestic politics matters much more to Russian Muslims. Meanwhile, their views of events abroad - now in Syria and earlier in Libya - and of how Moscow should react to them may be opposite. What Muslims, like all Russians, desire most of all is that Russia's foreign policy be reasonable and adequate and contribute to wellbeing (material and spiritual) of every individual.
"Rossiya v globalnoy politike", M, 2012, Vol. 10, N 3, May-June, pp. 109-118.
S. Filatov,
Expert on Islam
POWER AND RELIGION IN THE REPUBLIC OF BASHKORTOSTAN
From Soviet times and right up to 2010 supreme power in the Republic of Bashkortostan belonged to President Murtaza Rakhimov, Bashkir by nationality, who was the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Bashkiria under Soviet rule. Actually, the republic was under the
authoritarian rule, one of the most repressive in all parts of the Russian Federation. The opposition parties in the republic were practically nonexistent. A serious challenge to the regime was thrown only once, when industrial tycoon, Alexander Veremeyenko, put forward his candidature at the presidential election campaign in 2003. However, before the second round of the elections he was forced to remove his candidacy, but this demarche showed that Rakhimov's power was not limitless.
Rakhimov's religious policy was not too repressive and had certain original features. On the one hand, his government rendered certain material assistance to religious organizations and did much to direct their activities into legal channels. In the late 1990s about 130 old buildings were returned and more than 100 new buildings were given over to these organizations. Apart from that, they were granted considerable tax privileges. During the entire period of Rakhimov's rule there was the post of chairman of the Council on religious affairs.
Murtaza Rakhimov always advocated equal, impartial and correct attitude to all confessions. In 1998 the republican Law on freedom of conscience was adopted which declared equality of all religions, without dividing them into "traditional" and "non-traditional." The republican authorities did not oppose missionary activity of the Protestant churches in Bashkortostan.
On the other hand, they were against the presence of religious organizations in educational institutions, government bodies, and their activity in public life.
Despite loyalty and direct material support of "traditional" religions, Murtaza Rakhimov strictly limited their activity, including Islamic organizations. The Muslim clergy had no access to educational institutions and official bodies. Rakhimov feared that the broad participation of religious organizations in various spheres of life in the republic might explode interethnic and social peace.
Islam in Bashkortostan is the religion of its two peoples -Bashkirs and Tatars. Bashkirs are not too religious. There are still heathen survivals among many of them. But the revival of Islam coincided with the process of the national revival of the Bashkir people and the exacerbation of contradictions between the Bashkir and Tatar communities in the republic. During the years of perestroika the number of mosques in the republic increased by more than thirty times over, and new secondary and higher religious institutions were opened.
Nevertheless, the process of religious revival in Bashkortostan was accompanied with serious conflicts within the Islamic community. A major conflict was connected with the contradictions between Talgat Tajuddin, chairman of the Central spiritual board of Muslims and supreme mufti of Russia, and the young Muslim clergy, who were dissatisfied with his policy of compromise toward the Federal Russian authorities. In 1994 the radical opponents of the pro-Russian spiritual board succeeded in removing Tajuddin from power, though temporarily. However, in December of that year he managed to return to his post.
Tajuddin's opponents accuse him of immoral behavior, drunkenness, and even drug addiction. But more important are accusations against him concerning his ideological position. Tajuddin declares that Sharia should not be the standard of law, but only the inner law of a Muslim ("Sharia should be in the heart of each Muslim"). He asserts that the many-century stay of Muslims in Russia is not an evil, but a boon for them, and that "the Muslim way of life in Iran or Sudan should not be a sample for us." In his speech at the All-world Russian Assembly in December 1999 he said that "sacred Rus was an important concept for the Russian Muslims, too." Tajuddin adheres to the ecumenical position, calls for rapprochement between all
Abrahamic religions and wishes to strengthen contacts with the Russian Orthodox Church.
Tajuddin's ecumenical orientations and his desire to make Islam more modern objectively reflect the views of a considerable part of the Russian Muslims who received European education and accepted western values.
In the early 1990s the Bashkir imam N. Nigmatullin and the Tatar imam N. Ashirov headed the opposition to Tajuddin. On their initiative a spiritual board of Muslims of the Republic of Bashkortostan was set up headed by Mufti Nigmatullin, with Ashirov as his deputy, in 1992. This new body adopted a more radical theological and political position. It is oriented to the Muslim countries of the Middle East and one of its aims is firmly to establish the Sharia law in public life of the republic. N. Ashirov succeeded in establishing close contacts with Muslim organizations in Middle Eastern countries, and in 1996 he admitted that the board began to receive financial assistance from them.
In the first half of the 1990s the board invited several dozen Muslim teachers from these countries, and Muslim preachers came to work in Bashkortostan.
In contrast to Tajuddin, who is striving for establishing closer ties with the Russian Orthodox Church, the Spiritual board of Muslims of Bashkortostan maintains only formal relations with it initiated by the republican authorities. Tajuddin accuses the board leaders of spreading political and religious extremism, national enmity, and maintaining ties with the Wahhabis. In its turn, the board accused Tajuddin of immoral behavior, servility to the Russian Federation authorities, ecumenism, and even in Freemasonry.
Revival of Islam among the Bashkirs is not independent, but is rather subordinated to national-political aims. Most Muslim clergymen (up to 90 percent) are Tatars, which causes tension and friction.
The nationalist Bashkir parties and movements (the biggest of them is the Bashkir national center "Ural") considered it very important to revive Islam during the first years ofperestroika, as a factor ensuring the preservation and cohesion of the Bashkir ethnos. On the initiative and money of the center the Koran was translated into the Bashkir language in 1994, and a great many religious editions in this language came off the press.
From the latter half of the 1990s the Bashkir national center and other Bashkir national organizations began to lose interest in Islam and became more secular.
In 1992-1994 the Spiritual board of Muslims of Bashkortostan, in the wake of the movements for republican sovereignty and also due to the Bashkir national revival and desire to cleanse Islam from Russian-Soviet influence became more influential and popular and enjoyed greater support of the authorities and public. But the situation began to change gradually.
Tajuddin succeeded in using definite sources in his support and proving his loyalty to the republican authorities. Simultaneously, he consolidated his ties with the Moscow authorities. Besides, he was able to demonstrate to a considerable part of the Tatar community of Bashkortostan that he could be its ethnic leader, at the same time flirting with the Bashkir community.
In 1995 Tajuddin, while holding the post of the supreme mufti, set up the regional Bashkir mufti board in the city of Salavat. However, this initiative failed through and the Salavat board was closed in 1997.
In the latter half of the 1990s the Spiritual board of the Republic of Bashkortostan began to lose its positions and influence. One of the main reasons for this was the radical views and behavior of its head N. Ashirov. His bellicose rhetoric began to frighten the authorities and public. Preachers and teachers from foreign countries caused irritation
not only of the authorities, but also the local population. Foreign preachers and teachers, protecting pure Islam, denounced local religious customs and traditions, and this evoked strong protest of local parishioners. They held several big meetings and demanded that the authorities expel foreign Islamists (and the authorities complied with their demands).
In 1997 N. Ashirov left Bashkortostan, after he managed to create the Spiritual board of Muslims of the Asian part of Russia and took the post of its mufti. His successor Ayub Bibarsov adhered to more moderate positions. He and his supporters maintain official relations with Tajuddin, their rhetoric is milder, but the principal ideological premises and aims remained the same.
It should be noted that Islamic religiousness in Bashkortostan is rather weak, weaker than in any other traditional Islamic region of Russia. The mosques are half empty, there are no intellectuals among Muslim believers, and most of madrasah pupils are those who failed to enroll in any other educational establishment.
Adoption of Christianity (mainly Pentecostal and Evangelical churches) has become a frequent phenomenon among both Bashkirs and Tatars; fewer people adopted Orthodox Christianity and Catholicism. The Islamic leaders and representatives of nationalist organizations express their indignation over this fact, but cannot do anything, all the more so since the authorities do not oppose this.
At the same time the leaders of the Bashkir national movement cultivate specific features of Bashkir spiritual culture and emphasize Islamic religiousness of the nomadic people and their common traits with Kazakhs and Nogais, but not with Tatars.
Conflicts flare up on the wave of the national movement in connection with the numerical preponderance of Tatars among the Muslim clergy. Mention should also be made of sentiments among a
certain part of Bashkir public in favor of forming some specific Bashkir faith on the basis of occultism and Turkic mythology.
In the early 1990 the President of Bashkortostan Murtaza Rakhimov was in a serious conflict with the Moscow authorities on the problem of greater independence of his republic. He used the activity of Bashkir nationalist organizations as a lever of pressure. In 1993 the Constitution of the Republic of Bashkortostan was adopted which proclaimed the "sovereignty" of the republic, and in 1994 a treaty was signed between Bashkortostan and the federal government "on delineation of competence and mutual delegation of powers," which gave broader legitimate rights to the republican authorities going beyond the framework of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. After that the relations between Moscow and Ufa have stabilized. In 2002 the Constitution of Bashkortostan was formally brought in line with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, but it had little impact on the self-consciousness of the Bashkir people and the republican political elite.
Rakhimov's religious policy has always been rather moderate and cautious. Religious organizations in the republic had equal rights and religious minorities were never discriminated. Nevertheless, the sympathies of the authorities have always been quite evident. And the anti-Tatar trend of the Bashkir national movement has always created problems for the republican authorities in their relations with the Tatar community.
Since the mid-1990s the republican authorities and public have displayed growing fear in the face of Islamic fundamentalism and extremism. From 1997 onward the authorities began to expel all foreign preachers and teachers of Islam. In November 1998 six Pakistani citizens were driven out from Ufa "for their anti-Russian statements aimed at fanning national and religious enmity." In August 2002 a big
group of Turkish citizens, who were members of radical Islamic groupings "Suleimanjdi" and "Nurjular," was expelled. They took part in educational work with children fostering the "spirit of pan-Turkism and religious fanaticism" in them.
By the 2000th it became evident that mufti T. Tajuddin succeeded in reestablishing his positions in society, which was largely due to the fact that Murtaza Rakhimov made hajj together with him in 1995. The mufti was especially active during the presidential election campaign in 1997 demonstrating his support to Rakhimov's candidature. Tajuddin was also very active in 1997-1998 when a whole complex of mosque-cum-madrasah "Lale-tyulpan" was being built in Ufa at the expense of the republican budget. The ceremonial opening of the mosque took place at the end of 1998 in the presence of M. Rakhimov and T. Tajuddin, which symbolized unity of the two leaders.
The Rakhimov administration has declared equality of all religious organizations (except the Wahhabi). Its religious policy is keynoted by the desire to foster the feeling of tolerance and wish to cooperate. The authorities are striving to preclude enmity between religious figures and attacks against the clergy in the mass media.
The local authorities in the Republic of Bashkortostan reveal understanding and sympathy toward Muslims and their organizations. It is only the Wahhabis and their followers that are persecuted.
The development of Orthodox Christianity in Bashkortostan is directly connected with the person of the head of the eparchy during post-Soviet time, Archbishop Nikon. The Archbishop of Ufa and Sterlitamak Nikon (N. Vasyukov) has been heading the eparchy since August 1990. He pursues a policy open to all national minorities and is cautious with regard to conversion of Bashkirs and Tatars to Orthodox
Christianity. (It should be noted that there have been quite a few cases of Tatars turning into Orthodox Christians).
The activity of the Orthodox Christian eparchy in the sphere of religious education is not too successful. There are no religious educational institutions, and the branch of the St. Tikhon University, which had been working in Ufa for several years, was closed in 2008. There are many Orthodox parishes in Bashkortostan, and their number continues to grow. However, the clergy for these parishes are educated and trained in other eparchies. Sunday schools are open in big cities where professional teachers work.
Muslims and Orthodox Christians in Bashkortostan expressed discontent over the policy of the Rakhimov administration aimed at restricting the role of religion in public life. But in the summer of 2010 President Murtaza Rakhimov had to resign. He was replaced by the former manager of the big state-owned company "RusGidro" Rustem Khamitov. His behavior and attitude to religion and political pluralism considerably differ from those of his predecessor. Khamitov is much more tolerant and democratic. Moreover, certain changes have emerged in religious policy. In contrast to Rakhimov, Khamitov not only does not prevent active participation of religion in public life, on the contrary, he welcomes it. Bashkortostan is one of the few regions where religion is directly financed by the state. If a new mosque is built, a Russian Orthodox church is built also. The republican leadership has no prejudice toward Protestants. Interestingly, Bashkir Muslims are more friendly and cooperative with Protestants than Orthodox Christians. The problem of access of religion to general educational school is under consideration. Khamitov's position was a strong impetus to the development of social work (including spiritual) at hospitals, orphanages, etc.
Rakhimov's resignation and the election of the new president of Bashkortostan Rustem Khamitov in July 2010 have resulted in noticeable changes in religious policy in general, and especially in relations with Muslims. President Khamitov often visits mosques and says he is devout Muslim. Religious organizations (including Islamic ones) have now been given more rights and assistance, and at the same time greater control over the activity of Islamic communities has been introduced. This change of policy toward Muslims has been conditioned by the administration of the President of the Russian Federation when the Foundation for supporting Islamic culture and education has been set up. On its initiative and with its support the Islamic higher educational institution "Partner" has been opened in Bashkortostan where future imams are trained.
The district administrations of the republic now have commissions on interconfessional relations dealing with problems and conflicts arising between religious organizations. The authorities do not conceal the fact that the main problem is Wahhabism. Numerous measures have been evolved to combat it. Special educational groups of lecturers have been formed on the basis of the Ufa Pedagogical Institute. Members of these groups travel around the republic preaching traditional Islam and denouncing Wahhabism. The commissions on state-interconfessional relations recommended to organize young people's groups at all levels, because many imams of the old generation often lose respect of the broad public.
In 2011 the compulsory certification of all imams was introduced with a view to precluding extremism. The imams who passed it receive special grants from the Foundation for supporting Islamic culture and education.
Despite all and sundry measures, an aggressive Wahhabi terrorist underground still exists in Bashkortostan. For example, two armed
uprisings took place in the town of Oktyabrsky in 2009 and 2010 staged by mojahed units numbering over 50 men. The republican special force captured a group of militants headed by "Emir Bashkirsky", the leader of the local terrorist underground. His real name was Bashir Pliyev. According to information available to the special service, he has traveled to the North Caucasus where he met the head of the Chechen terrorists Doku Umarov, who appointed him "Emir of Bashkortostan and Samara region."
In early 2011 the construction of a huge Islamic complex began in Ufa. It will include a mosque, Islamic university and offices of Islamic organizations. Its activity will definitely be aimed, among other things, to opposing extremism and terrorism.
"Strany Vostoka: sotsialno-politicheskiye problemy v kontekste globalizatsii". Moscow, 2012, pp. 197-217.
B. Aksyumov,
D. Sc. (Phil.),
D. Lavrinenko,
Cand. Sc. (Pol.)
THE ETHNO-POLITICAL PREREQUISITES
FOR EXTREMISM IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS
For the whole post-Soviet period the North Caucasus (NC) represented a clearly pronounced zone of ethno-political and socio-cultural turbulence. In many sectors of social reality the intensity of conflicts either raises or reduces but remains rather high for the whole time. Thus, at the present time, the re-politicization of ethnicity goes on after the period of the relative de-politicization in the middle of the first decade of the XXI century. One other trend is the continued process of religious rebirth and politicization of religious processes in the region.
