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Marietta T. Stepanyants,
D. Sc. (Philosophy)
ISLAMIC FACTOR IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA'S PROCESSES OF IDENTIFICATION
The dialogue of cultures is necessary for Russia, first of all, for solving its domestic problems. The people of Russia have to acquire a new collective identity in place of the former and they lost collective identity known as "Soviet people". This is a difficult task, because various ethnic groups in today's Russian Federation strive for their own self-identification, for autonomy, or even for complete sovereignty.
The influence of religion in the identification processes not only affects the "main" religion of Russia. It is equally perceptible (sometimes even to a greater degree) among other religions, and primarily in Islam, the second most widespread religion in Russia after Orthodox Christianity.
Who am "I", and who are "we"? Wherein resides our difference from others, the difference in which we believe, which we value, and towards which we strive? Having unexpectedly ceased to be the "Soviet people," Russian citizens have turned to these questions now that they have discovered the illusory and deceptive nature of much of what they were once taught and forced to believe. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the destruction of the socialist system gave rise not only to a
broad interest in self-identification, but also to perception of its vital importance for each individual and for society as a whole.
In the hierarchy of factors of self-identification, ethnic affiliation is especially significant. Surveys conducted by the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Sociology in 1999 showed that in answer to the question "About whom would you say 'This is us'?", the overwhelming majority of respondents identified themselves with ethnic communities rather than with their regions or the broader Russian Federation. At the same time, these ethnic identities are to a great extent defined by religion, which may be the central characteristic of culture writ large.
The precise number of the followers of Islam in Russia is still unknown. Figures ranging from 12 to 50 million have been cited. If one considers all peoples with traditionally Islamic culture as Muslims, then the higher figure may be justified. However, sociological surveys show that among the Tatars and Bashkirs (two of the most numerous traditionally Muslim peoples), only 45-46 percent claim to be believers and of these only about 11-12 percent observe rituals.
In studying the influence of Islam on identification, one must take into account the doctrinal differences between the two world religions, as well as the difference between the ethnogenesis of the Muslim peoples of Russia and the Russian ethnos instantiated by the state over hundreds of years.
From the very beginning, Islam viewed the state as a religious community. The group of believers that arose in the seventh century at Medina viewed their umma as an organization transcending kinship and tribe, and its creation was the first stage on the path towards establishing a state. In this we find one of the key differences distinguishing Islam from Christianity. Unlike Islam, the emergence of Christianity within the confines of already existing states engendered the independence of the church and its separation from secular power.
The close, often seemingly unbreakable connection between the Russian Orthodox Church and the prerevolutionary Russian state (which some religiously oriented leaders would like to see restored even today) was not at its core doctrinally justified. It appeared as a continuation and a further development of Russia's inherited Byzantine tradition, that is, as a consequence of history, not of religious doctrine. In Islam, by contrast, the identification of religion with the state occurred from the beginning, and so was fundamental.
Mohammed was not only a prophet, a messenger of God, but also organized the unification of diverse Arab tribes into the umma, which soon formed a state: the Caliphate.
The legal foundation of the Muslim state was the Sharia, or the law of God. Gazali, one of the most authoritative Muslim theologians, asserted that Sharia is the foundation, and the government is its defender. If something has no foundation, it can be destroyed and lost. Modern Islamic fundamentalists tirelessly stress this particular feature of Islam. According to Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, "Islam rejects the idea of conflict between the spiritual and the secular that is characteristic of the West... The Christian idea of 'Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's' is absent, because everything belongs to the all-powerful Allah".
Turning this principle of the faith-based community into an absolute has allowed Islam over the course of history to justify the consolidation of ethnically diverse groups within the boundaries of one empire. Therefore, nationalism as an ideology seems irreconcilable with Islam, because nationalism asserts national unity as the foundation of statehood and sees religious communities at the same level as linguistic, economic, territorial, cultural and other communities. From the point of view of Islamic doctrine, nationalism is asabiyya, group
solidarity, and is comparable to the exclusive loyalty to one's tribe characteristics of early Arab society. According to the tradition (sunna), Prophet Mohammed proclaimed that "the man who turns to asabiyya does not belong to our community".
Just as asabiyya had led to inter-tribal conflicts in the past, later Muslim leaders viewed nationalism (manifested as the interests of a particular nation) as a cause of wars in which one nation would attempt to enslave another. They regarded it as an egotistical, immoral, and materialistic philosophy, giving rise to colonialism. "Both in spirit and in general, Islam and nationalism oppose each other", stated Abul Ala Maududi, the founder and spiritual leader of the Islamic fundamentalist organization Jamaat-i-Islami. "The ultimate goal of Islam is a world government in which racial and national prejudices will be eliminated; all of humanity will be joined into one cultural and political system..."
"Anti-nationalism" received its most logical expression in the ideology and movement of pan-Islamism. Pan-Islamism arose at the end of the 19th century, and was associated with Djamal at-Din al-Afghani, who believed that nationalistic ideas prevented Muslims from uniting against their common enemy (colonialism). Afghani challenged this national solidarity with religious one. He and his supporters viewed Islam as a unified ideological platform, capable of uniting the Muslims in battle against the colonial yoke and imparting faith in the possibility of revival.
The idea of Islam's incompatibility with nationalistic ideology was especially popular at the early stages of the national liberation movement, before the peoples of the Muslim world had dared oppose their colonial rulers. The rise of the local bourgeoisie, as well as the strengthening of nationalistic feelings in the former colonies and semi-colonies, led to a gradual turn from pan-Islamism (although in a
transformed state it continues to exist even today). Characterizing the atmosphere that had developed by the 1930s, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote: "The old pan-Islamic ideal has ceased to have any meaning; there was no Caliphate, and every Islamic country, Turkey most of all, was intensely nationalist, caring little for other Islamic peoples. Nationalism was in fact the dominant force in Asia, as elsewhere".
Most strikingly, Islamic ideologues had shifted from one extreme to the other, moving from the complete negation of the idea of "nation" to identifying it with the religious community. The most revealing example in this regard was the formation of Pakistan. A concept of "Muslim nationalism", operating on the assumption that two nations -the Hindoo and the Muslim - existed in India, served as the justification for creating Pakistan.
Russian Muslims present numerous examples of such fluctuating relationships between Islam and nationalism, varying with historical conditions and concrete socio-political situations. But before examining one of these examples, associated with the Tatars, we will note a few general characteristics of the self-identification processes among Russian Muslims in comparison with those typical of Orthodox Russians.
At the individual level, Russians' self-identification includes an Orthodox component because of the need "to find oneself" in the spiritual vacuum created by the destruction of the political and ideological systems founded on communist ideals. Russians turned to Orthodox Christianity hoping to find the meaning of life and moral reference points. At the collective level, the Russian appeal to Orthodoxy came about through a tortuous search for a "national idea" that could serve as the basis of unity, inspiration, and mobilization in solving problems of state reorganization.
At the individual level, the motivations of Russian Muslims in turning to their traditional faith correspond to those of Orthodox Russians. However, for Russian Muslims' identification at the collective and ethnic level is even more significant. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Tatars, Bashkirs, Chechens and other Russian Muslims, as well as other ethnic minorities living in cohesive groups, were able to declare themselves nations; that is, not only cultural, but also political communities. Ethnic groups developed their ideas about statehood and sovereignty in connection with their historical past and status within the Russian Federation (as well as in the Russian Empire and the U.S.S.R.).
The most numerous Muslim people of Russia and the most developed in many respects, are the Tatars. The issue of national identification moved to the center of Tatar social discourse around the second half of the 19th century, which historians characterize as the start of the Tatar ethno-nation's first formative stage. The second stage (from 1905-1907 until the 1920s) witnessed the establishment of the so-called "political" Tatar nation. At that time, three basic ideological directions appeared: Islamism, Turkism, and Tatarism.
Islamic ideologists assert that identification with Muslim faith is a priority for Tatar self-identification. For them the Tatars are a "Muslim nation". They argue their position by citing the history of the Tatars, who come from Volga Bulgaria, a state formed by the Turkic Bulgars in the seventh century near present-day Kazan. The Bulgars converted to Islam in 922.
Tatar identification with the "Turkish nation", prominent among the Tatar bourgeoisie and among some of the intelligentsia, is meant to separate the Tatars from Muslim peoples more broadly and to emphasize their unique place among them. It is also connected with the rise of movements promoting the unification of Russia's Turkic
peoples, begun by the Crimean Tatar Ismail Gasprinsky. A few ideologists of Turkism (for example Yusif Akchur) have expressed solidarity with pan-Turkism defined as the unification of all Turkic peoples under Turkish leadership. Others (F. Karimi, I. Validi, Kh. Maksudi) argue that the Tatars themselves must unite the Turkic peoples.
The prominent theologian Shigabutdin Maijani played a major role in developing the concept of a "Tatar nation" (Tatarism). He was the first Tatar to address the question of his people's ethnic origin. Marjani insisted on the Bulgar heritage of the Tatars and believed that they should consider not religion but ethnicity as their defining characteristic. "A few (of our tribesmen)", he wrote, "declare that we are not Tatars but Muslims. Poor souls!.. If you are not a Tatar, and not an Arab, a Tajik, or a Nogai, and not a Chinese, a Russian, a Frenchman, a Prussian, and not a German, then who are you?"
Kaium Nasiri then formulated a detailed concept of the "Tatar nation" in his Short Tatar Grammar Explained in Examples (Kazan, 1860). Nasiri established four basic components of Tatar identity: origins ("a people of the Turkish tribe"), common territory ("Tatars living in Siberia, Orenburg, Kazan, and other districts on the right bank of the Volga and in the Astrakhan district"), culture ("their own literature"), and the language ("we usually call the Tatar dialect spoken by the Turkish tribe, the Tatar language").
The relative importance of religion in Tatar self-identification has changed over the course of history, between complete domination and a minimal level. Although in modern Tatarstan one can observe the rebirth of Islamism and Tatarism (and Turkism to a certain extent), a new approach has now appeared: "Tatarstanism". The political elite, in its attempt to gain as much "sovereignty" (independence from the federal center) as possible, must take into account both the ethnic
composition of Tatarstan (according to the 1989 census, the Republic's population was 48 percent Tatar and 43 percent Russian) and Tatarstan's geographic position in the middle of the Russian Federation (making it practically impossible to secede). Wishing to avoid ethnic conflicts, preserve political stability, and simultaneously achieve the maximal independence possible in negotiations with Moscow, the leaders of the Republic proclaimed Tatarstan's sovereignty on August 30, 1990, "in the name of a multinational people", asserting "the inalienable right of the Tatar nation and all peoples of the Republic to self-determination".
But two years later, in the Constitution of the Tatar Republic adopted on November 6, 1992, Kazan had already changed the notion of the "Tatar nation" to that of "the people of Tatarstan". This concept put forward by Rafael Khakimov, the political adviser to the Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiyev (now the director of the Institute of History of the Tatar Academy of Sciences), views the people of Tatarstan as a nation. Khakimov sees Tatarstan's situation as analogous to Switzerland's: a poly-ethnic nation consisting of ethnic groups possessing equal rights. Just as in Switzerland, Tatarstan forms a "poly-ethnic, poly-cultural society operating on the principle of territorial (not ethnic) sovereignty".
Although Tatarstanism has support at the official level, its critics cite public opinion data in the Republic to assert that the "idea of Tatarstanism" has no future, and is merely an ideology promoted by the Republic's ruling party to justify Tatarstan's economic and cultural independence. While not without foundation, judging Tatarstanism's future in this way seems premature. At least two scenarios are possible.
First, the most numerous ethnic group (the Tatars) may aspire to the status of a nation in Tatarstan. Of course, this would complicate
Tatarstan's inter-ethnic relations and, more important, its relations with the federal center, because this option would present the possibility of a subsequent demand for full national self-determination.
But another variant is also possible: the political elite may succeed in convincing the public that a poly-ethnic nation is preferable, especially considering the distribution of power and resources at the republican and federal levels. That which the Norwegian anthropologist T. Eriksen described might come to pass: the nation arises "from the moment when a group of influential people decides that it has to be. In most cases the nation begins as a phenomenon that is given birth to by the elite. Nevertheless, in order to become an effective political instrument this idea must take root at the level of the broad masses".
Because if its limited independence from the broader Russian situation, the ultimate choice of Tatarstan will depend upon developments in identification processes in other regions. Other republics also have politically pragmatic local elites (and sometimes common-sense public attitudes) interested in solving social problems by constructing a new type of identity to unite ethnic groups sharing single territories, freeing them from inter-ethnic conflicts that would harm everybody involved. A case in point is Dagestan.
Dagestan has 102 ethnic groups, with no one group titular or predominant. Five ethnic groups collectively dominate (Avars, Dargins, Kumyks, Lezghins, and Russians), together comprising two-thirds of the population. The Republic has several religions as well, although Islam is the traditional faith of the overwhelming majority of the population (over 90 percent). Most Dagestani Muslims are adherents of Sufism (a mystical trend of Islam) and various tariqats (Sifi fraternal orders). Clan relations remain influential in the region, as do the norms
and mores of adat (common law), which are most deeply rooted among mountain dwellers.
After the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. and the beginning of reforms, the situation in Dagestan has become extremely complicated. A rising level of tension in inter-ethnic relations was due to the economic recession (driving many people to the edge of poverty) and the rivalry for domination over political institutions and the distribution of state property became very acute.
All kinds of ethno-religious conflicts arose in the republic. They were aggravated by virtual battles between different national groups for living space in their historical lands, territorial conflicts arising because ethnic communities' physical locations did not always coincide with political administrative borders, and conflicts sparked by socioeconomic and geopolitical factors.
The authorities of Dagestan saw a way out of the developing situation in the "introduction of practical means and methods of de-ethnitization". Such path would ultimately lead to the formation of "Dagestani identity" similar to that of the "Tatarstan nation" in that both concepts promote general republican identity. However, there is a substantial difference between them. The poly-ethnic character of the "Tatarstan nation" is intended to minimize the importance of religious affiliation in the identity of Tatarstan's citizens. In Dagestan, in contrast, this de-ethnicization is accompanied by an increasing emphasis on religious identity. Islam unites Dagestani citizens rather than separates them as in Tatarstan.
Islam has historically supported the unity of Dagestan, with the particular features of the Islamic doctrine playing a significant role in the process. Beginning with Prophet Mohammed and his associates, the followers of Islam first politically unified the Arab family groups and tribes, and then representatives of diverse races and ethnic groups.
Although according to official data, only 20 to 25 percent of Dagestani residents are practicing Muslims (those who observe all rules and rites required of Muslims), a significantly greater number identifies itself with Islam and is favorably disposed to political coexistence with other clans and ethnic groups. Dagestani citizens' preferences for Sufism support these beliefs because in contrast to Sunni and Shia religious leaders, Sufis view secular life, including politics, with indifference. For example, the tariqat of Kadiriyya, established in the North Caucasus in the 1860s by Kunta-kazi Kaziyev, acknowledged any political power as lawful (including the Russian tsars), believing that politics affects only external life and thus has no importance for the spiritual life of the Sufi. (It is true that in the 19th century an anti-Russian opposition formed the politically involved tariqat of Nakshbandiyya, but this was ultimately connected with the idiosyncratic personality and ambitions of the Nakshbandiyya imam Shamil.
In the early 1990s, Dagestani political analysts took stock of Islam's integrating power and gave the "renaissance" of Islam a green light: the number of mosques grew considerably (from 27 in 1985 to 1,600 in 2001), Muslim educational institutions expanded (there are now 17 Muslim institutions of higher learning with 44 branches in Dagestan, as well as 132 Muslim secondary schools (madrasah) and 245 elementary madrasahs studying the Koran, and religious literature became widely distributed. However, the calculations and plans of the Dagestani authorities were thwarted by the unforeseen penetration of Islamic fundamentalism (most often called Wahhabism) into Dagestani life. This fundamentalism is distinguished by aggressive interference in politics and rejection of the separation of Islam from the state. It is also characterized by the idealization of early Islam; by irreconcilability with other viewpoints, new information and reforms; by intolerance and
antagonism toward non-Muslims; and by the use of violent, even armed methods to accomplish its goals. Fundamentalism's appearance in Dagestani politics was facilitated both by internal and external factors, most notably, by the events in neighboring Chechnya.
Islamic fundamentalist ideologues believe in the complete identification of national or ethnic identity with religion. From this belief comes the name of one of the most influential Dagestani fundamentalist movements - "Islamic Nation." This name testifies to its intent to replace the present Dagestani system of national integration with a system based on Sharia, presented as a unified doctrine capable of "destroying in vivo the seeds of discord and mutual hatred".
The fundamentalists throw an open challenge both to secular power and to the Sufi tariqats (indeed, Dagestani Islam is commonly called tariqatism). Recognizing the mutual threat to their power and spiritual influence, the state and tariqatism have now allied to prevent the influx of fundamentalists. The Sufi orders, through their leaders (who even in 1998 were still in direct opposition to the government), have in practice united with the government on the common platform of anti-fundamentalism. In September 1999 a law was adopted "On Banning Wahhabism and Other Extremist Activities in the Republic of Dagestan". This law designated tariqatism as the single legal and historically rooted form of Islam in Dagestan, which in practice represented official government recognition. The tariqatists answered in 2001 by creating an all-Russia political party, the "Islamic Party of Russia" (on the basis of the Sufi-oriented movement "Nur"), which is loyal not only to the Republic, but to the federal government as well.
Comparison of religious influence on the evolution of Russian and Muslim identities in the Russian Federation truly demonstrates that nations are "neither natural nor primordial, but the result of hard constitutive intellectual and political work of elites and the masses".
It is still too early to predict the ultimate results of these developments in Russia. Only one thing is clear: in our time, societal or collective endeavors do not convey authentic religious meanings. Religious identifications beyond the individual level are encouraged more for pragmatic political reasons than to impart the spiritual ideals inherent in religious teachings.
A search for identity inevitably results in division and separation. Just because of that it is said that an "era of identity" is full of sound and fury (see: Zygmunt Bauman, The Individualized Society). The Other starts to be looked as an alien, even as an enemy. There are quite explicable reasons for that. In fact, separation leads to a revision of borders, to a redistribution of lands, fertile plots, natural resources, water resources, access to sea ways, etc. It results in reshuffle of property and political power. The opposing business groups and political parties use a wide arsenal of means to achieve success. Manipulation with cultural, especially religious differences becomes in their hands the most dangerous destructive weapon. Dogmatic interpretation of religious teachings, justification of one's own deeds by God's will, recollection (often far from adequate) of religious fights of the past - all the above-said constitutes the powerful weapon for mass agitation under which people lose control over their words and deeds.
The intellectuals - historians and philosophers, poets and writers, film producers and journalists - play especially significant role in molding confrontation with the Other. People believe in their words more than in political propaganda, trusting them as educated and unselfish persons. Just because of that the responsibility of the intellectuals is of such great importance. There is no other way to put an end to destructiveness and enmity than to redirect the processes of identification to the path of reasonable, well-balanced and constructive cultural dialogue.
Only a dialogue of cultures is capable to put an end to distrust, hostility and hatred by transforming the acquisition of identity into reasonable, well-balanced and constructive venture.
"Miroviye religii v kontekste sovremennoi kultury: noviye perspektivy dialoga i vzaimoponimaniya", St. Petersburg, pp. 36-42.
L. Izilyaeva,
Ph. D. (Political sciences), Bashkir State University (Ufa) ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL SECURITY AS SEEN IN INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF BASHKORTOSTAN
The unity, state integrity and efficiency of the functioning and development of the Russian Federation are determined by the natural-climatic, socio-economic, political and cultural factors of domestic and external character. One of the major parameters determining the country's territorial unity and security is regional processes.
In the present conditions it is the region that is the optimal unit within whose framework the process of adopting crucial decisions on the problem of ensuring security should take place. Today, a national state which earlier used to be the monopoly provider of security is forced to give over a considerable amount of its functions to other political actors. The shift of the center of gravity from the federal level to regional and local ones is not only a reaction of society to the globalization processes, but also a natural scientifically and practically-based process of drawing the political system of power closer to man. A tendency of centralization of management and adoption of decisions is observed in big states, like the Russian Federation. In the conditions of emergency situations when the life of people is at stake, the complex
