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Jamil GASANLY
D.Sc. (Hist.), professor at Baku State University, deputy of the Milli Mejlis (parliament) of the Azerbaijan Republic
(Baku, Azerbaijan).
IRANIAN AZERBAIJAN: THE EPICENTER OF A COLD WAR
Abstract
The author based his investigation of a wide range of issues related to the na-tional-liberation movement in South Azerbaijan on a wealth of foreign publications, press reports, and documents (some of them previously unknown) from Azerbaijanian, Russian, American, and Georgian archives, which allowed him to conclude that the Great Pow-
ers’ confrontation over Iranian Azerbaijan replaced the wartime alliance with the Cold War. Stalin’s attempt to use the national-lib-eration movement in the region as a vehicle of his imperialist and expansionist designs developed into a bloody tragedy for people, who in the 20th century alone rebelled four times in an effort to uphold their rights.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
The terms “Iranian Azerbaijan” and “South Azerbaijan” appeared in the historical texts in the early 19th century when Russia’s interest in the area’s Caspian coast first developed into Peter the Great’s Persian March of 1722-1723; later the attempts to expand Russia’s domains beyond the Great Caucasus Mountain Range led to two Russo-Iranian wars. They caused havoc in the Azeri khanates formed after the death of Nadir Shah in 1747; by the early 19th century they had already established themselves as independent states. The Qajar Dynasty that came to power in Iran and Russia’s expansionist Caucasian policies threatened their continued independent existence. Under the Gulistan Peace Treaty of 1813, which ended the first Russo-Iranian war of 1804-1813, the Qajars abandoned their claims to the Karabakh, Ganja, Sheki, and Talysh khanates. The Qajars lost the Second Russo-
Iranian war (1826-1828) too. Under the Turkmanchai Treaty of 1828, Russia established its domination in the Nakhchyvan and Irevan khanates and the Ordubad District. This divided the historical territories of Azerbaijan into North Azerbaijan (to the north of the Arax River), as part of the Russian Empire, and the lands to the south of the Arax that remained in Iran’s possession. This created the terms Russian or North Azerbaijan and Iranian or South Azerbaijan.
The Soviet Union inherited much from czarist Russia: Eastern policy was determined by imperial geostrategic priorities and security and economic issues. In June 1920, the Gilan Soviet Republic fell, which put an end to the frenzied attempts to spread socialist ideas to Iran. On 26 February, 1921, Soviet Russia had to sign a treaty with Iran (which shamelessly copied the British-Russian agreement of 1908); it divided the country into zones of influence; Russia preserved the economic concessions inherited from the previous regime and the right to introduce its troops into Iran’s northern territories (its capital Tehran included) in the “interests of self-defense” in case of a threat from third countries. It was this point that allowed the Soviet Union to bring its troops into Iran in August 1941.
Soviet Troops Enter Iran
It was during the Soviet Union’s “friendship” with Nazi Germany that the Soviet Union planned to occupy Iran or even Sovietize it (at least its northeastern areas), as the archive documents suggest. Moscow was contemplating “re-unification” of Soviet Azerbaijan with Iran’s northwest, which had a predominantly Azeri population (in the fall of 1939 this model was applied to Poland’s annexed eastern parts “re-united” with the Ukrainian S.S.R. and Byelorussian S.S.R.).
Documents found in the archives of the Communist Party and state structures of Azerbaijan, including the archives of the security services, testify that Mir Jafar Bagirov, who headed the republic at that time, regarded the imminent occupation of Azerbaijan as a historic chance to unite Iranian Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijan S.S.R. In September 1941, when talking to the members of a mission dispatched to Iran, he deemed it necessary to point out that the largest Iranian cities (Qazvin, Urmia, Mianeh, Miraga, Tabriz, Ardabil, Salmas, Hoy, Anzali, and others) “were the home of our ancestors. To tell you the truth, Tehran is an ancient Azeri city.”1 In May-June 1941, a mission of 3,816 civilians organized in 52 brigades was set up in the Azerbaijanian Soviet Republic to be sent to South Azerbaijan: it included 82 communist party functionaries; 100 employees of Soviet organizations; 200 officers of secret services; 400 militiamen; 70 officials of the public prosecutor structures; 90 judges; 150 editors and workers of print shops; 245 railway men, and 42 geologists specializing in oil prospecting. Aziz Aliev, Secretary of the C.C. C.P. (B.) of Azerbaijan, was appointed the mission’s head.2
Hitler’s surprise attack of 22 June, 1941 disrupted Stalin’s plans and changed his priorities: survival, rather than annexation and Sovietization of new territories, was at the top of the list. On 25 August, 1941, the Soviet Union and Great Britain occupied Iran under a preliminary agreement. They wanted to remove Iranian Shah Reza Pahlavi, known for his German bias, from power to establish British control over the oilfields in the country’s south and the strategic corridor that connected the two countries, members of the anti-Hitler coalition.
Documents from Baku archives testify that at first the Azerbaijanian leaders, and not only them, remained convinced that “reunification” was still possible. Bagirov even sent a group of secret service officers to Iranian Azerbaijan under Stepan Emel’ianov, head of the state security structures of the
1 Beseda M.J. Bagirova s komandirovannymi v Iran tovarishchami. 12-25 sentiabria 1941 g., State Archives of Political Parties and Public Movements of the Azerbaijan Republic (SAPPPM AR), rec. gr. 1, inv. 162, f. 28, sheet 1.
2 See: Rezervnye spiski po dolzhnostiam rukovodiashchikh rabotnikov partiynykh, gosbezopanosti, narkomvnutde-la i dr. na zagrankomandirovku v Iran. 1941 g., SAPPPM AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 33, sheets 1-269.
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Azerbaijanian S.S.R. His efforts were in vain: there was no unanimous agreement in Moscow on the issue. People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union Viacheslav Molotov probably believed that the policy of “reunification” of Azerbaijan and “flirtation with the Kurdish issue” would contradict the Soviet Union’s new priority, its alliance with Great Britain. The People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the Soviet ambassador consistently promoted the point of view.3 Stalin was of two minds. Encouraged by the successful Soviet counteroffensive on Moscow late in 1941, the general situation on the fronts, and the fact that the United States had joined the anti-Hitler coalition, he was thinking about Soviet postwar expansionist policies and the potential role of the coalition in them. On 9 December, 1941 Georgi Dimitrov, Head of the Comintern Executive Committee, sent the following ciphered message to Stalin, Molotov, Beria, and Malenkov: “A group of Iranian communists and former political prisoners has begun restoring the Communist Party of Iran. They set up an interim bureau, entrusted one of them (Artashes Ovanesian) with the task of maintaining contact with the Comintern Executive Committee and asked us for directives. They also wanted our prompt permission to send their delegate to the Comintern. According to the personnel department of the Comintern Executive Committee and the information supplied by officials of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs, who have contacts with these people, all of these Iranian communists can be described as devoted revolutionaries and pro-Soviet people.
“Simultaneously, democratic politician Suleyman Mirza set up in Iran a People’s Party with a democratic program. He has been engaged in the struggle for democracy in Iran for the past 30 years; some of the Iranian communists have been involved in the process.
“We believe that in view of Iran’s special conditions (joint occupation with Great Britain, the demagogical and subversive activities of Hitler sympathizers and their agents, as well as cautious or even hostile sentiments among part of the ruling circles), it is hardly useful to restore the Iranian Communist Party at this time, which has always been nothing more than a small sect. This will merely create further problems and increase suspicion and resentment among the ruling circles; German agents will continue scaring the Iranian bourgeoisie with the threat of the country’s Sovietization. The Brits will begin to treat the Soviet Union, allegedly wishing to Sovietize Iran, with greater suspicion.
“In view of the above it would be unwise to restore the Communist Party today, while the communists should join the People’s Party and continue steering a course toward:
“Democratizing Iran;
“Protecting the interests of the working people;
“Strengthening friendly relations between Iran and the Soviet Union;
“Totally eliminating the secret Fascist network in Iran and suppressing anti-Soviet propaganda.
“The communists should also work toward setting up trade unions and peasant organizations.”4
The next day, after acquainting himself with Dimitrov’s memo, Stalin agreed with his arguments and sanctioned the Iranian People’s Party (Tudeh). To avoid misunderstanding and general unpleasantness in the Soviet Union’s relations with its allies, Stalin curtailed the reunification policy. The Treaty on Alliance between the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and Iran signed on 29 January, 1942 in Tehran proved to be another weighty argument. On 10 February, 1942, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and U.S. President Roosevelt exchanged telegrams: the shah asked the president to be the guarantor
3 See: Kratkaia pamiatnaia zapiska po Iranu. Politichesko-ekonomicheskoe polozhenie i nasha rabota v Irane. Podgotovil sovetnik posol’stva SSSR v Irane S. Sychev. 29 sentiabria 1944 g., State Archives of the Azerbaijan Republic (SA AR), rec. gr. 28, inv. 4, f. 2, sheet 55.
4 Shifrovka G. Dimitrova Stalinu, Molotovu, Beria, Malenkovu. 9 dekabria 1941 g., State Archives of Social-Political History of Russia (SASPHR), rec. gr. 558, inv. 11, f. 66, sheet 43.
of the country’s territorial integrity and independence.5 In March 1942, Moscow recalled the Aliev mission from Iran; by mid-1942, only 84 members of the formerly large Baku mission remained in Iranian Azerbaijan.6
Struggle for Iranian Oil
By the spring of 1944, Stalin returned to the old idea of gaining a foothold in Iran to incorporate the country into the postwar sphere of Soviet influence, Iranian oil being another no less attractive factor. In February 1944, large oil deposits were discovered 20 km to the south of the Soviet border, very near to the Soviet district center of Ordubad, as well as in Gorgan, Tash-Abad and Seminan; the Rasht valley proved to be rich in gas.7 In August 1944, America and Britain organized a bilateral conference that produced a special agreement (signed on 8 August in Washington) which envisaged joint actions in the oil-related sphere. The Soviet diplomats and Soviet intelligence reported from Iran that the British oil companies producing oil in the south of Iran were showing a lively interest in the oil-rich areas in the country’s north next to the Soviet border.8
On 16 August, 1944, Lavrenti Beria sent an analytical report to Stalin and Molotov on the world’s oil reserves and oil production, as well as on the British and American oil-related policies in Iran, their rivalry over the Iranian oil fields, and their determination to keep “any third country,” the Soviet Union in particular, out of Iran. Beria suggested that the Soviet Union “purposefully launch talks with Iran about a concession in North Iran.” He pointed out that “the British, and probably the Americans, are secretly opposing the transfer of North Iran’s oilfields to Soviet use.” Beria believed that the Soviet Union should join the British-American oil talks “to defend the Soviet Union’s interests in the sphere of international oil-related developments.”9
On 6 March, 1944, in the context of another Big Game that was unfolding in Iran, the Soviet leaders revived the Azerbaijanian issue with a decision On Measures Designed to Increase Cultural and Economic Aid to the Population of South Azerbaijan.10
In the fall of the same year, the Soviet Union, which was seeking access to Iranian oil, tried to exert diplomatic pressure, probably counting on the stunning effect of the Soviet victories in the war against Germany and its allies. On 10 September, 1944, a Soviet state commission under Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union Sergey Kavtaradze, two members (N. Baybakov and P. Kumykin) and experts (N. Heydarov, E. Dmitriev, M. Karasev, and N. Kon-radov) arrived in Tehran. The next day they met Prime Minister of Iran Muhammad Said and invited him to sign a concession agreement that said in part: “The government gives the Association the exclusive right to transport oil and other enumerated products on Iranian territory and be engaged in oil refining or in any other purification or refining methods. Oil and these products can be sold both in Iran or be exported beyond the country. The territory of the concession means ... the territory marked on the map signed by both sides and appended to the present treaty as its inalienable part.” The treaty, intended for 60 years, could not be annulled during the first 40 years; the Iranian government could not annul it unilaterally; it could not be amended either by a later law or any other act. Conflict situations should be referred to an ad hoc commission of four members, two
5 See: Kratkaia pamiatnaia zapiska po Iranu. 29 sentiabria 1944 g., SA AR, rec. gr. 28, inv. 4, f. 2, sheet 47.
6 See: Telegramma L. Beria M.J. Bagirovu. 29 marta 1942 g., SAPPPM AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 35, sheets 14-15.
7 See: Spravka ob obsledovanii neftenosnykh rayonov Severnogo Irana (Gorgan, Mazandaran, Gilan). 24 fevralia 1944 g., SAPPPM AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 77, sheets 1, 16; SAPPPM AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 77, sheets 28-29.
8 See: Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation (FPA RF), rec. gr. 06, inv. 6, folder 37, f. 461, sheets 16, 28.
9 L. Beria I. Stalinu i V. Molotovu. O mirovoy dobyche i zapasakh nefti. O neftianoy politike SShA. 16 avgusta 1944 g., FPA RF, rec. gr. 06, inv. 6, folder 37, f. 461, sheets 16-18.
10 See: SAPPPM AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 84, sheets 3-5.
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from each side. The treaty was expected to come into force after been passed by the Mejlis and signed by the shah.11
This was short of an ultimatum, which Prime Minister Said declined; he restricted himself to promising his Cabinet’s support in the Mejlis. The Soviet delegation, however, received information that Said “was playing an unseemly and dishonorable game by offering full support in words and undermining our offers behind our backs.” Ahmad Ghavam el-Saltaneh, Prime Minister Said’s political opponent, who served as prime minister of Iran in 1942, secretly met one of the commission’s members (People’s Commissar for the Oil Industry of the U.S.S.R. Nikolai Baybakov) to inform him that Said had lied to them and that the Soviet Union would not receive any Iranian oil. The former prime minister hastened to assure the Soviet minister that if he became prime minister, he would go with the Soviet Union’s demands.12 On 25 October, 1944, after spending a fruitless month in Tehran, the commission came back. Two weeks later, the Said Cabinet fell and the prime minister resigned.
The Tehran failure put the Azerbaijani issue back on the Soviet Union’s Iranian agenda. The Soviet representatives and agents operating in Iran organized mass demonstrations of ethnic Azeris in Tehran and Iranian Azerbaijan to bring down the Said Cabinet. On 13 February, 1945, Gasan Gasa-nov, who headed the group of party functionaries from Soviet Azerbaijan in the occupied part of northeastern Iran, sent Bagirov a 67-page-long memo “On South Azerbaijan” that said: “We are very much interested in this because liberation of the peoples of South Azerbaijan will save our brothers from ultimately perishing and open wide vistas for the development of all the Azerbaijani people. We believe that the present international situation is the most opportune moment to realize this task of historic importance.” The author deemed it necessary to warn that “the establishment of a bourgeois-democratic system in Iranian Azerbaijan and placing the stakes on the Azeri deputies in the Mejlis are nothing but fond hopes.” Gasanov further pointed out that “today the most popular slogan in South Azerbaijan is liberation of the Azeris from the Persian yoke, establishment of democratic order, and settlement of the land question.” The document also said: “Liberation of Azerbaijan and the establishment of truly democratic order in it or its unification with Soviet Azerbaijan should be realized through popular revolts. The Allies should be placed before an accomplished fact.” Gasan Gasanov suggested that “a group of executive comrades should be set up in Tabriz who should be closely connected with the group earlier established here and who should receive instructions directly from Baku. To allow these comrades to freely travel to Baku and back to bring information and receive instructions, it would be advisable to list them as military.” He also suggested that “several democratically minded Azeris—editor of the Ajir newspaper Seid Jafar Pishevari, newspaper editor Sheylya-war, teacher Malek, and others should be moved from Tehran to Tabriz.”13 Bagirov and other leaders of the Azerbaijanian S.S.R. agreed with Gasanov.
Moscow’s Decisions and Iranian Azerbaijan
Stalin decided to use the “Azerbaijani card” in the struggle for Iranian oil. On 10 June, 1945, he signed a secret decision On Organizing Soviet Industrial Enterprises in North Iran, which suggested
11 See: Kontsessionny dogovor mezhdu pravitel’stvami Irana i Ob’edineniem “Sovetsko-iranskaia neft.” 1944 g., SAPPPM AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 77, sheets 30-43.
12 See: E. Dmitrov, N. Heydarov—M.J. Bagirovu. 6 noiabria 1944 g., SAPPPM AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 77, sheets
68, 70.
13 Pismo G. Gasanova iz Tavriza M.J. Bagirovu. Spravka o Iuzhnom Azerbaidzhane. 12 fevralia 1945 g., SAPPPM AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 108, sheet 82.
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that branches of industrial enterprises of Soviet Azerbaijan should be set up in Tabriz and other cities.14 Simultaneously the U.S.S.R. State Defense Committee instructed the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., the leaders of Soviet Azerbaijan, the People’s Commissariat for the Oil Industry of the U.S.S.R., and the executives of Azneft to urgently present their suggestions on geological prospecting for oil in the north of Iran. On 21 June, 1945, Stalin signed Decision of the State Defense Committee No. 9168 On Geological Prospecting for Oil in North Iran based on the suggestions. The document said: “A hydrogeological department should be set up within the Azneft Association of the People’s Commissariat for the Oil Industry to start geological prospecting for oil in North Iran. To be able to do this, the head of the People’s Commissariat for the Oil Industry of the U.S.S.R. and Azneft should put together the necessary number of drilling and geological teams staffed with workers of the oil industry and send them as a hydrogeological brigades attached to the headquarters of the Soviet troops in Iran, in the city of Qazvin.”15
Early in July 1945, Secretary of the C.C. C.P.(B.) of Azerbaijan Bagirov was called to Moscow. On 6 July, after looking into the problem and discussing it in detail, the Politburo of C.C. A.U.C.P.(B.) produced a secret document On Organizing a Separatist Movement in South Azerbaijan and Other Provinces of North Iran which stated that preparations for the formation a national-autonomous Azerbaijanian region with extensive rights as part of the Iranian state should be launched. The document presupposed that the separatist movements in the Gilan, Mazandaran, Gorgan, and Khorasan provinces would unfold under the guidance of the Azerbaijanian Democratic Party set up on the basis of the Azerbaijanian branch of the People’s Party of Iran reinforced by separatists from all population strata. The third point of the document dealt with the possibility of drawing the Kurds of North Iran into a separatist movement under the slogan of national autonomy.
It was planned to set up a group of executive party functionaries operating in close cooperation with the Soviet General Consulship in Tabriz to coordinate the separatist movement. M.J. Bagirov and M.T. Yakubov were entrusted with the group’s general guidance. Under point 5 of the document, the C.C. C.P. (B.) of Azerbaijan (Bagirov and Ibragimov) was instructed to start preparations for elections to the Mejlis of the 15th convocation in South Azerbaijan.
The same document suggested that fighter groups armed with foreign firearms should be set up to protect the supporters of the Soviet Union, active separatists, members of democratic movements, and party members. This was entrusted to N. Bulganin and M. Bagirov. The five points that followed dealt with cultural propaganda in South Azerbaijan; one of the points mentioned a special fund set up at the C.C. C.P. (B.) of Azerbaijan with a budget of one million convertible rubles intended for funding the separatist movement in South Azerbaijan and the parliamentary elections.16
Upon his return from Moscow, M. Bagirov invited several influential figures from South Azerbaijan for a secret meeting in Baku. His report to Stalin said in part: “After speaking to them we decided to put Mir Jafar Pishevari, a prominent figure highly respected by the democratically minded public and editor of the Tehran Ajir newspaper, at the head of the new Azerbaijanian Democratic Party (ADP), at least for the time being.”17 In later documents Pishevari appeared as Seid Jafar. In his report to Molotov, Beria, and Malenkov, M. Bagirov offered more reasons: “Pishevari was born in South Azerbaijan, he is a former member of the Communist Party and for a long time filled executive Soviet party positions in Soviet Azerbaijan. In 1927, the Comintern sent him to Iran where he was
14 See: Postanovlenie Sovnarkoma SSSR “Ob organizatsii Sovetskikh promyshlennykh predpriiatiy v Severnom Irane. 10.06.1945 g., SAPPPM AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 106, sheets 8-10.
15 Postanovlenie Gosudarstvennogo komiteta oborony “O geologorazvedochnykh rabotakh na neft v Severnom Irane.” 21 iiunia 1945 g., SAPPPM AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 104, sheet 1.
16 See: Reshenie Politburo CC AUCP (B) “O meropriiatiakh po organizatsii separatistskogo dvizhenia v Iuzhnom Azerbaidzhane i drugikh provintsiakh Severnogo Irana. 6 July 1945 g., SAPPPM AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 90, sheets 4-5.
17 Pis’mo M.J. Bagirova I. Stalinu. 6 sentiabria 1945 g., SAPPPM AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 90, sheet 19.
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arrested by the government of Reza Shah and spent 10 years in prison; he was let out in 1941 when the Soviet troops entered Iran.”18
Britain was following the Soviet activities in Iran with mounting concern. In February 1945, in Yalta, Churchill and Eden tried to convince Stalin to jointly withdraw their troops from Iran.19 The Soviet Union could not accept this. In his report dated 8 August, 1945 and intended for the top Soviet leaders, Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Sergey Kavtaradze pointed out that the pull-out would encourage reactionary forces, discourage the democratic organizations, and undermine the Soviet Union’s position in Iran. The diplomat was convinced that it would also slow down oil drilling in North Iran and would threaten the decisions on enlarging the movement for autonomy. He was convinced that the Soviet troops should remain in Iran at all costs.20 On 10 August, the same diplomat suggested that Art 5 of the British-Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1942 be used, under which the Soviet Union had an explicit reason for insisting on its continued presence in Iran until the peace treaties with Germany and Japan were signed. Sergey Kavtaradze concluded his memo with: “As a last resort we should insist that our troops remain in Iran for six months after Japan’s capitulation.”21
Great Britain and the United States had already tried to put pressure on the Soviet Union with respect to Rumania and Bulgaria; they might have used the same approach in Iran as well. Soviet sources informed Moscow that the British were trying to knock together a tribal union in the south (Qashqai, Bakhtiar, and others) to put pressure on the central government. On 6 September, M. Bagi-rov wrote to Stalin: “We ask for your sanction to start counterpropaganda among the southern tribes where the British are working toward a union to detract their attention and the attention of the Iranian government from our steps in the northern provinces.”22
Formation of a National Government
Moscow instructed M. Bagirov to speed up the separation of South Azerbaijan from Iran. On 3 September, 1945, it was announced that the Azerbaijanian Democratic Party (ADP) has been formed. From that time on, Bagirov, in a string of ciphered messages, was keeping Stalin posted about the developments in Iran and specifically in Iranian Azerbaijan. On 8 October, 1945, the C.C. A.U.C.P.(B.), which recognized the situation as serious, deemed it necessary to return to the issue and edited its own earlier decision of 6 July, 1945. The term “separatism” was removed from the text; the main task of the newly formed party was described as “national autonomy of Azerbaijan within the Iranian state.”23
“Separatism” was replaced with “autonomy,” however the main aims remained the same. A group of three (troika) was set up to keep in touch with the Democratic Party of Iranian Azerbaijan and extend all possible assistance to it. The group consisted of M. Ibragimov as head of the group,
18 Pis’mo M.J. Bagirova V. Molotovu, L. Beria, G. Malenkovu. 23 noiabria 1945 g., SAPPPM AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 90, sheet 67.
19 See: Kratkiy obzor sovetsko-iranskikh otnosheniy (1917-1955). Arkhivnoe upravlenia MID SSSR. Iiun 1956 g.,
Russian State Archives of Recent History (RSARH), rec. gr. 5, inv. 30, f. 171, sheet 76.
20 See: S. Kavtaradze, “Po voprosu o vyvode Soiuznykh voysk iz Irana. 8 avgusta 1945 g.,” FPA RF, rec. gr. 0431,
inv. 1, folder 8, f. 50, sheets 12-13.
21 S. Kavtaradze—V. Molotovu. “Po voprosu o vyvode Soiuznykh voysk iz Irana. 17 avgusta 1945 g.,” FPA RF, rec. gr. 0431, inv. 1, folder 8, f. 50, sheet 16.
22 Pis’mo M.J. Bagirova I. Stalinu. 6 sentiabria 1945 g., SAPPPM AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 90, sheets 22-24.
23 Reshenie Politburo TsK VKP (B) “O Iuzhnom Azerbaidzhane i Severnom Kurdistane.” 8 oktiabria 1945 g., SAPPPM AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 95, sheet 208. The complete text is found in SASPHR, rec. gr. 17, inv. 162, f. 37, sheets 152-153.
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S. Atakishiev, member of the Military Council of the 4th Army, and G. Gasanov. It was decided “to create, in the shortest time possible, armed units formally unrelated to the Democratic Party to actively oppose people and organizations interfering with the development of the autonomy movement in Iranian Azerbaijan, as well as to protect the movement’s most active members. The troika shall function under M. Bagirov’s guidance. The People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the U.S.S.R. (Comrade L.P. Beria) and the Commander of the Baku Military District Comrade Maslennikov shall extend all necessary assistance to Comrade Bagirov.”24
On 4 November, V. Molotov signed a document On Expanding Trade with Iranian Azerbaijan to avert possible worsening of the economic situation in the country’s northeast caused by Tehran’s economic blockade. It was expected that in the 4th quarter of 1945 the Soviet Union’s trade turnover with this area would reach 127.5 million export rials and 89.5 million import rials.25
The Iranian government dispatched troops to Tabriz, while the defense ministry was instructed to invade Azerbaijan at any cost; the operation was stopped at Sharafabad. The tension that finally rose in Iranian Azerbaijan forced People’s Commissar for Defense Nikolay Bulganin and Head of the General Staff General Alexander Antonov to write to Stalin on 20 November: “If we stay away from Iran’s internal affairs, we feel we should not object to the troop movement requested by the Iranian commanders.” Stalin disagreed: he was convinced that the Soviet Union, having rebuffed (as he saw it) the onslaught of Britain and the United States out to revise the Yalta and Potsdam decisions, “should remain firm” on all foreign policy issues. No indecision was permitted in Iran: Alexander Antonov relayed the following order to the commanders of the 4th army deployed in Iran: “All attempts of the Iranian authorities to introduce additional troops into our zone should be cut short; it is for the General Staff of the Red Army to answer to all requests of this sort. You should promptly inform the General Staff of the Soviet Army about any attempt by Iranian troops to enter our zone.”26
By 19 November, 1945, the threats from Tehran notwithstanding, 687 delegates elected to the Azerbaijanian People’s Congress had arrived in Tabriz to take part in rallies and manifestations. S.J. Pishevari addressed the Congress held on 20-21 November with a report On the Current Situation. The Congress adopted a statement of 7 points addressed to the Iranian shah, chairman of the Mejlis, and the prime minister. It was also addressed to all the democratic states of the world and said in part: “We want to inform the world that there is a nation on our planet resolved to defend its rights with all means available. This nation has hoisted the banner of democracy in one of the corners of Asia in the name of its own freedom.”27
Two days later, the National Committee set up by the Azerbaijanian People’s Congress fixed the date (27 November, 1945) of the elections to the Azerbaijanian Milli (National) Mejlis. By 3 December, 1945, the elections were essentially over: 95 deputies out of 100 were elected. For the first time in the history of Iran, women came to the polling stations to vote.
M. Bagirov continued informing Stalin practically non-stop about the unfolding partisan movement in the northeast of Iran28 and waited for an approving nod from Moscow. On 2 December, 1945, he sent the “Kremlin Four” (Stalin, Molotov, Beria, and Malenkov) a draft agenda of the first session of the Azerbaijanian Milli Mejlis. The Baku “troika” and the leaders of the democrats were
24 Ibidem.
25 See: Postanovlenie SNK SSSR “O rasshirenii torgovli s Iranskim Azerbaidzhanom.” 4 noiabria 1945 g., SAPPPM AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 121, sheet 4.
26 Bulganin, Antonov—Stalinu. 20 noiabria 1945 g., SASPHR, rec. gr. 558, inv. 11, f. 99, sheets 2-4; I. Maslennikov—M.J. Bagirovu. 22 noiabria 1945 g., CSAPPPM AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 107, sheet 54.
27 Archives of the National Security Ministry AR (NSM AR Archives), f. 280, sheets 311-314.
28 See: M.J. Bagirov—I. Stalinu, V. Molotovu, L. Beria, G. Malenkovu. 21 noiabria 1945 g., SAPPPM AR, rec. gr.
1, inv. 89, f. 90, sheets 60-62; M.J. Bagirov—I. Stalinu, V. Molotovu, L. Beria, G. Malenkovu. 22 noiabria 1945 g., SAPPPM AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 90, sheet 65; M.J. Bagirov—I. Stalinu, V. Molotovu, L. Beria, G. Malenkovu. 25 noi-
abria 1945 g., SAPPPM AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 90, sheet 78.
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ready to open the session on 10 December, 1945. The C.C. ADP and the National Assembly expected to appoint Pishevari prime minister of the cabinet of 10 ministers. A decision was made to replace the governorship system with ministries. The leaders of the Democratic Party were convinced that if Iran and its troops stayed away from Azerbaijan, the leaders would be able to cope with the local police and gendarmes. Moscow finally answered: “Baku, to Comrade Bagirov... In response to your telephone message No. 339 of 2 December, we are informing you that we can accept the suggestions made by the National Assembly and Central Committee of the Democratic Party. Molotov. 5.XII.45 at 02.55.”29
By 11 December the ADP had established its control in South Azerbaijan. On 12 December, 1945 (21st day of the month of Azer, the year of 1324), the first session of the Azerbaijanian Milli Mejlis was opened after a lot of preparatory activities and consultations with the Soviet political circles. “The 21st day of the month of Azer” became an important event in the life of the Azeri people. Mirza Ali Shabustari was elected chairman of the Mejlis; S.J. Pishevari was appointed prime minister of the newly formed cabinet; Zeynalabidin Giyami was appointed chairman of the Supreme Court, and Firidun Ibrahimi became prosecutor general of Azerbaijan. After forming his cabinet, the new prime minister presented his program; as soon as the national cabinet was formed, vali (governor-general) of Azerbaijan M. Bayat, who had served some time before as prime minister of Iran, left Tabriz. Since early November he had been engaged, without much success, in talks with the ADP leaders. During the week that followed the 21st day of the month of Azer, the Iranian troops stationed in Tabriz and other cities and gendarmes were disarmed. During December the new government established itself in South Azerbaijan.
The Soviet separatist designs caused protests and latent opposition of the Iranian Communists and the Tudeh Party. In its official letter dated September 1945, the C.C. of the People’s Party of Iran to the C.C. A.U.C.P.(B.) warned the Kremlin that “the establishment of the party of democrats and continuation of its policy will tarnish Soviet policy and undermine its popularity even though Soviet policy respects Iran’s territorial integrity. The policy that the Soviet Union has been pursuing in the last two weeks endangers the large-scale popular movement. This policy not merely endangers the movement of the Iranian people, but could also destroy it altogether. If the enemies of the Soviet Union united against it they would have been unable to invent anything more damaging than what is going on.”30 Several days later the Tudeh leaders sent their suggestions to Moscow through their old Comintern channels (through army intelligence) on how a coup in Tehran should be organized and carried out in order to establish a revolutionary-democratic regime across the country. “The People’s Party and trade unions, which have 6,000 supporters in Tehran alone, and several other democratic organizations seeking contacts with the People’s Party can be described as the main force of the coup. Several measures should be taken before the coup to disorganize the government and the top military circles.”31 Moscow sought the opinion of Bagirov and Emel’ianov; the latter declined the plot as unrealizable: he was convinced that there was no one in Tehran ready to head the movement.
The fairly adventurous plans of the People’s Party not only contradicted Bagirov’s plans to “reunify” Iranian Azerbaijan; they were also premature. Stalin timed Azerbaijan’s “autonomy” to coincide with the Moscow conference of the foreign ministers of the Big Three. On 14 December, 1945, U.S. State Secretary James Byrnes arrived in Moscow followed, twenty-four hours later, by a British delegation headed by Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin. On 16 December, the ministers met for their
29 Telegramma V. Molotova M.J. Bagirovu, I. Maslennikovu. 5 dekabria 1945 g., SAPPPM AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 90, sheet 137.
30 Pismo I. Iskenderi v TsK VKP (B). 20 oktiabria 1945 g., SASPHR, rec. gr. 17, inv. 128, f. 818, sheets 181-182.
31 Ashurov-Fitinu, kopia: tov. Emel’ianovu dlia doklada t. Starshemu. Politicheskaia obstanovka v Irane i mero-priiatia po razvitiiu demokraticheskogo dvizhenia. 20 dekabria 1945 g., SAPPPM AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 113, sheets 17-19, 29.
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first session. That day Izvestia carried detailed information entitled “Setting up the National Government of Iranian Azerbaijan;” in the evening Moscow Radio broadcast an extensive commentary about the establishment of people’s power in South Azerbaijan; the next day TASS published the Manifesto of the National Government of Iranian Azerbaijan.32
It was then that Stalin, wishing to obtain Byrnes’ consent to remove the Iranian issue from the conference agenda, demanded that his subordinates should act cautiously in Iran.
On 24 December, 1945, M. Bagirov used the services of People’s Commissar of the Interior M. Yakubov and People’s Commissar for Security S. Emel’ianov to forward instructions on strictest secrecy to A. Atakishiev, M. Ibragimov, G. Gasanov, and General Russov responsible for the operations in South Iran. The document ran as follows: “‘Senior’ (M.J. Bagirov.—J.G.) has received information through the military and civilian organizations of Iranian Azerbaijan that our agents have been operating too openly when helping the local comrades. Comrade ‘Senior’ believes it necessary to warn you and your agents to keep in mind that they are working on foreign territory and should act in strictest secrecy. We should also bear in mind that not only the Iranians, but also the British, Americans, Turks, and others are closely watching each step of every Soviet agent. It is totally unacceptable and even damaging in many respects for our comrades to become too openly involved in the developments in Iranian Azerbaijan and give advice and recommendations to the Democratic Party and partisan units. Comrade ‘Senior’ instructs our agents to be very careful and even secretive when working with the local comrades.”33
Having successfully avoided confrontation over the Iranian issue, Stalin described the Moscow conference as a Soviet diplomatic victory. On 23 December, 1945, a week before the conference ended, the leaders of South Azerbaijan (S.J. Pishevari, Mirza Shabustari, S. Padegan, Dr. S. Javid, and M. Biria) submitted their detailed reports and far-reaching suggestions to Secretary of the C.C. C.P.(B.) of Azerbaijan M. Bagirov. They concluded their letter with: “We are convinced that to defend the rights of five million Azeris we should, in full accordance with the current situation, set up an independent democratic republican government in Azerbaijan. We ask you, therefore, to help us and create conditions conducive to the fulfillment of our people’s cherished dream—unification, in the near future, of two fraternal republics. We deem it necessary to point out that the eastern and southern borders of the new republic should run from the port of Anzali (Pahlavi), which remains within the border, through Rasht, Manjil, Qazvin, Hamadan, and Kermanshah to the borders of Iraq, since the population within these borders is predominantly Azeri.”34
In his reply dated 31 December, 1945, M. Bagirov “recommended” that the democratic leaders make their final choice between autonomy and independence, his own preference being crystal clear. Throughout the next three weeks the ADP, under careful coaching from the comrades from Soviet Azerbaijan, was frenziedly engaged in setting up an independent state at the Milli Mejlis sittings. On 16 January, 1946, S.J. Pishevari and other leaders formulated the following points in their reply to Bagirov, who had asked for details:
“1. Our country shall be called the Azerbaijan National Democratic Republic.
“2. This republic shall rely on democratic principles in the full meaning of the word, while its state structures shall be elected through direct, equal, and secret ballot.
“3. A Constituent Assembly, which will determine the country’s future, shall be convened on democratic principles to draft the Fundamental Law (Constitution) of the republic.
32 See: Izvestia, 16 December, 1945; Time, 18 December, 1945.
33 M. Iakubov, S. Emel’ianov—Atakishievu, Ibragimovu, Gasanovu, Russovu. 24 dekabria 1945 g., SAPPPM AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 98, sheet 35.
34 Pishevari, Shabustari, Padegan, Javid, Biria—M.J. Bagirovu. 23 dekabria 1945 g., SAPPPM AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 110, sheets 42-45.
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“4. The Azerbaijan National Democratic Republic shall ensure all citizens freedom of expression, conscience, and religion, which shall be set forth in the Constitution.
“11. Guided by the historical, geographic, and ethnographic specifics of the Azerbaijan National Democratic Republic we are building, we include the following cities in it: Tabriz, Ardabil, Urmia, Miandowab, Maraga, Salmas, Hoy, Marand, Mianeh, Anzali, Maqu, Ahar, Herovabad, Zanjan, Qazvin, and Hamadan. The republic’s borders are outlined in the attached map; the population of the cities, towns, and villages shown on the map is 95 percent Azeri.
“12. The map also includes North Kurdistan, the borders with which shall be outlined when defining the state order of North Kurdistan.”35
What happened later confirmed that Stalin was not at all sure of what should be done in the new situation. The Iranian government backed by the United States included the issue of the continued foreign military presence in Iran on the agenda of the session of the U.N. General Assembly that opened on 10 January, 1946 in London. The Soviet leader intended to use the Azeri card to gain an oil concession from Iran; to achieve this he needed a politician prepared to accept this agreement. The man turned up all by himself. On 10 December, 1945, A. Iakubov and Ghavam el-Salt-aneh held a secret meeting at which the Iranian politician informed the Soviet functionary that an unidentified person close to the British embassy had informed him that according to his source inside the embassy Britain was convinced that if Ghavam came to power in Iran Britain’s position in this country would be undermined. The man suggested that Ghavam should personally meet the British ambassador to alleviate his suspicions. At the same meeting Ghavam el-Saltaneh said that on 9 December he met the Iranian prime minister, on his invitation, to discuss the situation in Azerbaijan in detail and that he had tried to dissuade Prime Minister Ebrahim Hakimi from sending troops to Azerbaijan. Ghavam also said that when he came to power he would dissolve the parliament, which was obviously unable to stabilize the situation, and pointed out that his chances of premiership were getting better by the hour.36
Ghavam el-Saltaneh’s Moscow Voyage
On 27 January, 1946, the shah invited Ghavam el-Saltaneh to form a new cabinet; on 19 February the new prime minister arrived in Moscow on an official visit that proved to be long and ended on 7 March. Meeting with Stalin was one of his priorities; on 20 February, he met Molotov to fix the date of his audience with Stalin. The next day he was already talking to Stalin about the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Iran before 2 March and about Azeri separatism. The complete Russian version of the talks remains unpublished, while the Iranian sources and Ghavam’s reminiscences are too biased. He even asked for the Iranian interpreter to be removed and used the services of his Soviet colleague. Russian historians A. Danilov and A. Pyzhikov familiarized themselves with the relevant documents kept in the Archives of the President of the Russian Federation, outlined their general meaning, and quoted several fragments in their books. According to the available bits and pieces, the Soviet side concentrated on the oil concession issue. Under the law the Mejlis passed earlier, this could be discussed only when all foreign troops had been removed from the country.
35 NSM AR Archives, f. 298, sheets 10-13.
36 See: Beseda A. Iakubova s Ghavam el-Saltaneh. 10 dekabria 1945 g., FRA RF, rec. gr. 094, inv. 37, folder 5, f. 357a, sheets 4-6.
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Stalin asked Ghavam the key question: Was it true that he favored a republican regime for Iran? The Iranian answered that there were two roads to this goal: either a Constituent Assembly convened under a plausible pretext or replacing the shah with his son Ahmad Shah. Stalin agreed with this and deemed it necessary to point out that Ghavam might lose his post as soon as the Soviet troops were pulled out, therefore they would remain in Iran to allow Ghavam to fortify his position. According to Danilov and Pyzhikov: “This was a direct promise to extend possible military support to the prime minister had he tried to establish new power in Iran.” Stalin saw it as a way out of the impasse; if the coup carried out with Moscow’s help succeeded, Ghavam would be able to offer the oil concession to the Soviet Union. Ghavam objected: he might be removed, he argued, if the Soviet troops remained in Iran.37
Stalin also wanted to know whether Iranian Azerbaijan had its own defense and foreign ministers. When the Iranian prime minister answered in the affirmative, Stalin offered his own comment: “Well, the Azeris went too far. This is not their autonomy, they should have neither defense minister, nor ministers of foreign trade and foreign affairs.”38 This was a charged comment: Stalin was hinting that he supported Iran’s territorial integrity.
On 23 February, 1946 when the talks were resumed, this time between Ghavam and Molotov, the Iranian stated: “The previous Iranian government pursued an erroneous policy in its relations with the Soviet Union. As the Soviet Union’s friend I am ready to remedy the past mistakes.” Ghavam added that the parliament, the powers of which were to expire two days later, had passed a law that banned oil-related talks while foreign troops remained in the country. According to the Iranian prime minister, the situation was favorable for the new parliamentary elections and the expected victory of his supporters. When asked about the exact date of the elections, Ghavam answered that this must be agreed upon and that no elections were possible while foreign troops remained in the country. Molotov’s contribution was predictable: “In the present situation the troops will not be pulled out.” He also asked about the oil concession. Ghavam answered that in principle he supported the idea and was prepared to discuss the Soviet suggestions when they were presented. In response, Molotov used a map to outline the territory which had already been granted to the U.K. as a concession and asked: “Is everything clear? Are there any doubts?” After studying the map Ghavam agreed that the territory the Soviet Union wanted as a concession was much smaller than that already transferred to the British. The repeated question about the concession drew a repeated answer: “There is no chance of granting the oil concession with the present Mejlis.”39
Molotov then said that he could not understand why Ghavam feared Azerbaijan’s autonomy and offered the Soviet experience with its 16 Union republics and national autonomies as an encouraging example. Ghavam objected that the Soviet Union as a strong state could afford autonomies while Iran was too weak to indulge in granting autonomies. He promised, however, that the Azerbaijani enjumen (local self-administration) would receive broad rights. Molotov asked whether it would amount to actual autonomy; the answer was “Iran can meet Azerbaijan halfway within the Constitution.” The Iranian prime minister pointed out that he personally was not against autonomy and had even outlined a plan for carrying out a regime change in Iran when talking to the generalissimo.40 Molotov continued saying that the Iranian Constitution was a source of evil and offered the Soviet Constitution as an example: the country cherished it, he argued, yet was prepared to amend it. Ghavam answered that this left him no choice: he would have to go back home to relate the oil and Azerbaijani issues to the
37 See: A.A. Danilov, V.V. Pyzhikov, Rozhdenie sverkhderzhavy. SSSR v pervye poslevoennye gody, Moscow, 2001, pp. 27-28.
38 Ibid., p. 27.
39 Iz dnevnika V. Molotova. Priem premier-ministra Irana Ghavam el-Saltaneh. 23 fevralia 1946 g., FRA RF, rec. gr. 094, inv. 37e, folder 362, f. 1, sheets 23-24.
40 Idid., sheets 25-27.
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Mejlis, which would either pass or decline them. In the latter event, he would have to resign. Molotov remained firm: “Ghavam knows better what he should do; to settle the Azerbaijani issue he should formulate specific proposals.” At the door, the Iranian tried another trick: as if suddenly recalling something he turned back and said that the British ambassador had called him several times to ask for an audience and asked for Molotov’s advice. Molotov refused to rise to the bait and said merely: “Why not?”41
Molotov submitted a detailed report to Stalin in which he pointed out that Ghavam had abandoned the idea of a regime change in Iran and establishing a republic, which he had previously come to an agreement about with Stalin. The Soviet leader’s response was, “Dirty swine!” which he wrote on the first page of the report.42 He realized that the talks had reached an impasse.
Molotov and Ghavam met once more on 25 February at 07:00 p.m., when Molotov presented I. Sadchikov to the Iranian prime minister and informed him that the Soviet government had instructed him to present Ghavam with new compromise alternatives on all three issues under discussion. He said that the Soviet government was firmly resolved to reach a compromise. When talking about the oil concession Molotov said: “The Soviet government is prepared to meet the Iranian government half way and believes that it is possible to replace its request for an oil concession in the northern regions of Iran with a joint Soviet-Iranian society to be involved in oil prospecting, production, and refining in North Iran with 51 percent of the shares belonging to the Soviet side and 49 percent to the Iranian side.” The People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs said the following about the pullout of Soviet troops from Iran: “The Soviet government intends to start pulling out part of the Soviet troops on 2 March from some areas of Iran. As for the rest of the troops, they will remain in Iran for some time on the strength of the Soviet-Iranian treaty of 26 February, 1921. The Soviet troops will be finally evacuated as soon as the Iranian government removes all hostile and discriminatory measures in relation to the Soviet Union, establishes order in North Iran, and restores friendly relations with the Soviet Union.”43
Ghavam responded with a memorandum in which he dismissed the Soviet proposals as unacceptable and continued insisting on his point of view. He wrote that the oil question would be positively resolved to the sides’ mutual satisfaction when the issues related to Azerbaijan and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran had been removed from the agenda. If the Soviet Union agreed to defuse the Azerbaijanian problem and carry out timely withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Iran, it could lay the foundation for cooperation in the economic and oil-related spheres. “As soon as I receive your consent, I shall leave for Tehran. After exchanging opinions with the cabinet, I shall be prepared to continue negotiations with the Soviet ambassador in Tehran. I am deeply convinced that we shall reach the desired results.”44
Negotiations continued through the newly appointed ambassador to Iran Ivan Sadchikov; on 1 March, 1946 he handed Ghavam a memorandum that could be more aptly described as an ultimatum. The Soviet side was still convinced that the Soviet military presence in Iran was much more valuable than the Iranian prime minister’s vague promises. The document said in part: “It should be noted that while granting concessions to other states, the Iranian government denied and continues to deny the U.S.S.R. the right to the oil concession in North Iran. These facts confirm that the Iranian ruling circles are hostile to the U.S.S.R., are prepared to damage its interests, and are threatening the oil-rich areas of Soviet Azerbaijan and Soviet Turkmenistan. The Soviet Union has no choice but to
41 Iz dnevnika V. Molotova. Priem premier-ministra Irana Ghavam el-Saltaneh. 23 fevralia 1946 g., FRA RF, rec. gr. 094, inv. 37e, folder 362, f. 1, sheets 28-32.
42 See: A.A. Danilov, V.V. Pyzhikov, op. cit., p. 28.
43 Iz dnevnika V. Molotova. Priem premier-ministra Irana Ghavam el-Saltaneh, p. 37; Vrucheno V. Molotovym gospodinu Ghavamu. 25 fevralia 1946 g., FRA RF, rec. gr. 094, inv. 37e, Folder 362a, f. 1, sheets 40-42.
44 Vrucheno gospodinom Ghavamom sotrudniku NKID SSSR P. Zudinu. 27 fevralia 1956 g., FRA RF, rec. gr. 094, inv. 37e, folder 362a, f. 1, sheets 43-46.
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remain cautious in relation to the Iranian ruling circles and to postpone the pullout of part of the Soviet troops from North Iran.”45
Ghavam realized that he would be unable to oppose Moscow’s pressure without external support and turned to the Americans. On 4 March, he met Charge d’Affaires ad Interim in Moscow George Kennan. Later the American reported to the U.S. Secretary of State that Ghavam was in a quandary since Moscow refused to meet him halfway. Ghavam told Kennan that he would meet Stalin for the last time later on the same day and would try to return to Tehran the next day, and complained that Stalin had been rude to him. He also informed Kennan that he had sent a note to the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs to protest against the Soviet troops’ continued presence in Iran and asked what the United States could do in this respect. George Kennan read the copy of the note. Ghavam wanted to know what Iran could expect from the United States if it failed to reach an agreement with the Russians.46 On 6 March, George Kennan handed a note to Molotov with a demand to remove the Soviet troops from Iran. As soon as he returned to Tehran Ghavam disbanded the Mejlis and secretly sent an emissary to the American and British embassies to find out what further steps they could suggest and what their governments might do if the Soviet threat became real. The American and British foreign ministers instructed their ambassadors to convince Ghavam that he should complain to the U.N. Security Council.47 He followed this advice. The U.N. Security Council in New York scheduled a discussion for 25 March.
Stalin made a last attempt to put pressure on the Iranian prime minister. On 20 March, when he arrived in Tehran, Ambassador Sadchikov told Ghavam that while in Baku he had learned about his address to the U.N. Security Council and regretted this step very much: he hoped to make his arrival a continuation of the Moscow talks. Ghavam, in turn, pointed out that the Soviet troops’ continued presence in Iran after 2 March hampered his initiative and deprived him of the chance to continue talking to the Soviet Union. The Soviet ambassador reminded the prime minister that during the Moscow talks Iran did nothing to demonstrate its good will toward the Soviet Union. This was particularly true of the oil issue, which especially offended Stalin.48 On 22 March, Ghavam met the American ambassador, who reported to Washington: “Ghavam fears that if the U.N. Security Council condemns the U.S.S.R. and demands withdrawal of the troops, the enraged Russians will raise the tension in Iran by creating new reasons for concern and fears, while the U.N. will be unable to extend adequate support to Iran. As an experienced politician, Ghavam believes that the issue of North Iranian oil should have been settled long ago. He believes that in the future, any Mejlis will ratify a decision on granting a concession to the U.S.S.R. and that this concession is inevitable.”49 In fact, Ghavam was letting the United States know that if Washington refused to extend active assistance to his country he would have to retreat.
(To be concluded in the next issue)
45 Vrucheno gospodinu Ghavamu I.V. Sadchikovym. 1 marta 1946 g., FRA RF, rec. gr. 094, inv. 37e, folder 362a, f. 1, sheets 49-51.
46 See: Foreign Relations of the U.S., Vol. VII, 1946, pp. 337-338.
47 Ibid., p. 360.
48 See: Kratkaia spravka o sovetsko-iranskikh peregovorakh v Moskve i Tegerane v fevrale-aprele 1946 g., FRA RF, rec. gr. 094, inv. 37e, folder 362, f. 1, sheet 5.
49 Foreign Relations of the U.S., Vol. VII, pp. 369-371.
