CC BY
85
Jamil GASANLY
D.Sc. (Hist.), professor at Baku State University, deputy of the Milli Mejlis (parliament) of the Azerbaijan Republic
(Baku, Azerbaijan).
IRANIAN AZERBAIJAN:
THE EPICENTER OF A COLD WAR
(Part it)
Soviet Troops Pulled Out of Iran
Later President Truman insisted that he had extended active assistance to Iran by sending Stalin an “ultimatum.” He first mentioned this at a press conference on 24 April, 1952, only to correct himself later. When asked to publish the document, the American president admitted that there had been no ultimatum and he had used the wrong term. The issue resurfaced much later, in 1979, when Soviet troops entered Afghanistan. In January 1980, Senator Henry Jackson published Truman’s statements in Time under the title “The Good Old Days” and expanded them with a story about how Truman had summoned Soviet Ambassador to the United States Andrei Gromyko to warn him that if the Red Army failed to leave Iran within 48 hours the United States would use its atom bomb.1
So far these statements have remained unsubstantiated: historians have not yet found documentary evidence that the United States put direct military-political pressure on the Soviet Union at the decisive moment. There are no documents in the Soviet archives to clarify Stalin’s reasons for pulling out of Iran. At 01:40 p.m. on 24 March, Stalin and Head of the General Staff of the Soviet Army Alexander Antonov sent Order No. 2167/68 to Commander of the Baku Military District I. Maslennikov and Commander of the 4th Army I. Luchinskiy (copy to M. Bagirov) which said:
“1. Begin withdrawal of all troops, offices, and depots of the 4th Army from Iran to the place of its permanent dislocation on the territory of the Baku Military District.
For the beginning, see Volume 2, Issue 1, 2008.
1 See: Time Magazine, 28 January, 1980, p. 13.
“2. The process should start on 24 March to be completed no later than 30 April-10 May of this year.
“The Kerej garrison should be removed no later than 08.00 p.m. today, 24 March.
“3. The pullout should be well organized and proceed in good order, without undue commotion and haste.
“4. The plan and the order of withdrawal should be reported to the General Staff on 25 March of this year.
“Daily reports about the withdrawal should be submitted by 12.00 a.m.
“Demands for marine transportation should be submitted to the General Staff on 26 March.”2
The documents from the Baku archives suggest that Stalin’s decision on withdrawal was formed immediately after the failed talks with Ghavam in Moscow; it seems that Bagirov knew that much. On 14 March, he met Jafar Pishevari, M.A. Shabustari and Dr. S. Javid to warn them that international developments might force the Soviet Union to abandon Northern Iran. Simultaneously, M. Bagirov sent Stalin a vast report on the state of affairs in the National Army of the Azeris as of 15 March: Moscow obviously wondered whether the Azeris would be able to hold their ground after the Soviet pullout.3
On 25-27 March, 1946, the Azerbaijanian crisis developed into an international issue at a sitting of the U.N. Security Council. On 27 March, Andrei Gromyko left the sitting in protest against James Byrnes’ statement that the Soviet Union was pursuing an imperialist policy in Iran.4 On 28 March, M. Bagirov met Pishevari, Shabustari, and Javid once more to describe to them, on Stalin’s instruction, the situation and advise them not to insist on the status quo in Iranian Azerbaijan. The Soviet leaders had obviously become convinced that it would be wiser to reach an agreement with Ghavam. This left the leaders of the Azerbaijanian Democratic Party depressed. In his report to Stalin, M. Bagi-rov wrote: “They do not trust Ghavam, they know that he will gradually retreat from his promises or even written agreements on the rights of the Azeri people by referring to the Constitution of Iran. They are not afraid of the Iranian armed forces, but are sure that Ghavam will never hesitate to fan a civil war inside Azerbaijan and encourage ethnic slaughter between the Kurds and Azeris through bribes and by relying on reactionary merchants, landowners, and clerics. He will have the Brits on his side. They are convinced that Soviet mediation is the only real guarantee of at least minimum rights for the Azeri people.” Having heard what the Soviet Union had to offer, Jafar Pishevari commented with a great deal of bitterness: “This document brought to mind the Gilan events of 1920. Our revolutionary comrades were deceived and the reactionaries gradually launched repressions against them. Many of them had to emigrate. History will repeat itself.”5 He proved right.
At first it looked as if the Soviet Union had finally pocketed the oil concession. Talks on the joint Soviet-Iranian oil company had been going ahead since early April 1946 through Soviet Ambassador Sadchikov. On 8 April, the Shah verbally confirmed that the Iranian Cabinet had approved a Soviet-Iranian Oil JV.6 After receiving the first reports from Tehran, M. Bagirov, in turn, informed his people in Tabriz: “We shall be the unrivalled masters of the Soviet-Iranian oil JV and will employ
2 I. Salin i A. Antonov—I. Maslennikovu i A. Luchinskomu. Kopiu M.J. Bagirovu. 24.03.1946 g., State Archives of the Political Parties and Public Movements of the Azerbaijan Republic (SAPPPM AR), rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 112, sheet 39.
3 See: M.J. Bagirov—I. Stalinu. 18.03.1946 g., SAPPPM AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 112, sheets 36-38.
4 See: R. Rossow, “The Battle of Azerbaijan, 1946,” The Middle East Journal, Winter 1956, p. 23; M. McCauley, The Origins of the Cold War. 1941-1949, London, New York, 1995, p. 68; Foreign Relations of the U.S., Vol. VII, 1946, p. 390.
5 M.J. Bagirov i I. Maslennikov—I. Stalinu. 29.03.1946 g., Archives of the National Security Ministry of the AR (NSM AR Archives), f. 301, sheets 427-428.
6 See: Russian State Archives of Contemporary History (RSACH), rec. gr. 05, inv. 30, f. 171, sheet 83.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
several thousand of our people as workers and other employees. We shall obviously prefer Azeris. Ghavam signed a letter in which he pledged to guarantee complete personal freedom and inviolability for all the organizers and movement heads; he pledged not to punish anyone. This is all we could obtain at the first stage; everything that Pishevari gains through his talks with Ghavam for the Azeri people will be even better. Pishevari raised the question of teaching in Azeri in the first three years of primary school—we extorted five years from Ghavam. It is for Pishevari to insist on 6-year training in Azeri. Tell Pishevari not to lose heart. Neither Ghavam nor anyone else is bold enough to move against them. We have to talk to Moscow about the 5 million tumani needed to maintain the army.”7
This was false optimism: Moscow was in fact prepared to abandon Iranian Azerbaijan to Tehran. M. Bagirov instructed his “Tabriz Three” that if the Iranian government refused to subordinate this army to the Iranian General Staff, the army should be disbanded and disarmed. Some of the weap-ons—the same amount that was confiscated in December 1945 when the Iranian garrisons were dis-banded—were to be transferred to official Iranian structures, the rest were to be sent to the Soviet Union. The well-organized fedain (voluntary) units that lived in barracks were to be disbanded with their arms. They were to be preserved as an illegal armed force just in case.8
For obvious reasons the ADP leaders were less enthusiastic than their Soviet patrons. According to M. Bagirov, Pishevari, Shabustari, and Padegan were resolved to leave their high posts in the ADP in view of the coming serious concessions to Ghavam. They argued that they had been responsible for the coup in Azerbaijan, as well as for certain measures that contradicted the Iranian laws, such as division of state- and part of the privately-owned lands, executions of some of the reactionary landowners and other elements; they had sanctioned the use of state funds and property to meet the needs of Azerbaijan without the sanctions of the Iranian government. More than that: when talking to the people they had promised autonomy and failed, therefore the leaders of the democrats planned to convene a CC plenary session as soon as the talks were over to elect new leaders much less involved in the previous activities. They also asked Bagirov whether they could put up armed resistance “if Ghavam refused to talk and tried to move in his forces on the heels of the withdrawing Soviet troops to suppress the democratic movement in Azerbaijan.” The ADP leaders asked for asylum in the Soviet Union for 200 people and their families who had been most actively involved in the struggle against the reactionary elements and Soviet citizenship for some of the members of the democratic movement in Azerbaijan (especially for those who had been deported from Soviet Azerbaijan as Iranian subjects).”9
Stalin’s Personal Letter to Pishevari
By 8 May, 1946, the Soviet Union completed its pullout from Iran while the talks between Pishevari and Ghavam about Azeri autonomy were still going on. Moscow put pressure on Pishevari in an attempt to push him to make concessions in order to avoid the use of force by Tehran. A true revolutionary, Jafar Pishevari refused to become a puppet of the Soviet Union’s “Realpolitik.” Soviet Ambassador Sadchikov regularly informed Moscow about his concern over Pishevari’s frame of mind and conduct: “When asked about his platform at the talks with the Iranians he an-
7 M.J. Bagirov—Ibragimovu, Gasanovu i Atakishievu. April 1946 g., SAPPPM AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 33, sheets 126-127.
8 See: M.J. Bagirov i I. Maslennikov. Predlozhenia. Aprel 1946, SAPPPM AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 114, sheets 231-238.
9 Ibidem.
swered that he had no intention of talking since words would amount to nothing.” Pishevari expanded: “It was not my personal desire to come here—I was forced to do this. Why? Why was I humiliated in front of the Azeri people and reactionary Ghavam? I do not like him and do not trust him. He will deceive us and you as well—you will get no oil. All of the Azeri people hate Ghavam and you forced me to meet him. Why? You praised me to the heavens and are now pushing me into an abyss. Why? Have I inflicted any harm on the Soviet Union? I have been serving it all my life. I served my term in prison; today I am here on your insistence and have to sign this infamous agreement. I told Bagirov that I was ready to resign. Others, more compliant, would have come, while I would have left Azerbaijan... In this way I would have preserved my authority and respect of others, whereas now I am left at the mercy of the reactionaries who will arrest us all. I am human, I have a family, I am ill, after all.”10
Jafar Pishevari complained to Sadchikov: “Why are we being forced to retreat: we are not defeated, we have our armed forces. If allowed I shall capture Tehran.” The Soviet ambassador wanted to know the exact numerical strength of Pishevari’s forces. The Iranian answered that there was an Iranian army of 10 thousand and about 15 thousand volunteers. When asked about aircraft and tanks, he answered with bitterness that he had had them, but that they had been taken from him. The ambassador pointed out that this was not enough to capture the capital protected by the far superior governmental forces. Jafar Pishevari responded with: “If we are fated to die, we shall die—freedom is worth it.” Ambassador I. Sadchikov supplied the exact words: “I pointed out that this would be useless carnage and that the reactionaries would destroy those gains that could be preserved and that, more important, an armed clash between the Iranians and Azeris would inevitably cause a new world war because the Allied Control Commission would side with the Iranians and we, with the Azeris. ‘There is no need to side with us,’ exclaimed Pishevari, ‘we shall fight on our own.’ I spent a lot of time trying to explain to him that we had exhausted all our means of support and that war was the only option we could not accept.”11
In public Jafar Pishevari was equally outspoken, which forced Stalin to send him a personal letter in which he wrote, in particular: “It seems to me that you misinterpret the current situation inside Iran and on the international scene. Second. You could have counted on success in your struggle for the revolutionary demands of the Azeri people had the Soviet troops remained in Iran. We could not, however, remain there any longer mainly because their continued presence in Iran undermined the very foundations of our liberation policy in Europe and Asia. The British and the Americans argued that since the Soviet troops remained in Iran the British troops could have extended their presence in Egypt, Syria, Indonesia, and Greece, and the Americans in China, Iceland, and Denmark. We decided to pull out of Iran and China to deprive the British and Americans of this weapon, to invigorate liberation movements in the colonies and put our liberation policy on a more substantial and effective basis. I hope that as a revolutionary you will see that there was no other way.” The Soviet leader also added: “You said that you were praised to the heavens and then pushed into an abyss and humiliated. We cannot but be amazed at these words, if they are true. Indeed, what happened? We resorted to a normal revolutionary subterfuge well-known to all revolutionaries. To ensure a certain minimum of gains in the situation that had taken shape in Iran, the movement needed to gain a certain momentum, surge ahead, away from the minimum demands and threaten the government with unacceptable conditions that might force it to retreat. Under present conditions you would not be able to secure those demands which the Ghavam Cabinet is forced to accept without surging far ahead. This is a law of the revolutionary movement. This is not humiliation. In fact, I find it strange that you think that we could subject you to humiliation. It is the other way round: if you behave reasonably and obtain,
10 Spravka po telegrafnomu soobshcheniu Ashurova iz Tegerana. Mai, 1946 g., NMS AR Archives, f. 402, sheets 173-176.
11 Ibidem.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
with our moral support, the gains that would legalize, on the whole, the present de facto situation in Azerbaijan, both the Azeris and Iran will laud you as the pioneer of the progressive democratic movement in the Middle East.”12
Stalin’s revolutionary hairsplitting served as a smokescreen to conceal his true aims: control over the Black Sea straits and the oil concessions in the north of Iran. We do not know whether Jafar Pishevari fell into the trap, however a personal letter from the “leader of the world proletariat” produced the intended effect. It undermined Pishevari’s resolve. Had Moscow remained on the sidelines, Iran would have been drawn into a protracted and bloody civil war.
Prime Minister Ghavam, meanwhile, was engaged in double dealing: he spared no effort to convince the Soviets that they would acquire the oil concession while talking to Murray, the American ambassador in Tehran, about possible oil concessions in Baluchistan for American companies in the hope of drawing the United States onto his side. Archival documents in Baku reveal that the Soviet leaders and Bagirov who knew about Ghavam’s maneuvers hoped that an agreement was still possible. On 21 May, when talking to Pishevari on the phone, Bagirov said that Ghavam was possibly involved in double dealings in an effort to please “us and our so-called friends.” He also said that Ghavam had possibly gone too far and that he would probably be unable to go on with his intrigues and would have, therefore, to remove the mask and “reveal his true political makeup.” “I am convinced,” said Bagirov to Pishevari, “that his personal property and money come first with Ghavam. He loves his wealth more than the Imam, the Prophet, you, or me. He wants to preserve it. Do you understand this? He is not a true socialist and cannot be a socialist, but deep in his soul he is probably close to us. He needs power to preserve his wealth. Being aware that much depends on his neighbor he is forced to reach an agreement. He is not liked, obviously; they have their own people. The Brits took the wife (of the Shah) hostage—this is always done to ease haggling.” He ended the talk with a request: “Do not attack Ghavam; tell people to stop attacking him in the press. Did you hear his radio address on the 18th? There are many newspapers that believe that Ghavam should be supported to allow him to fulfill his promises. He expects help from all countries. We, in turn, should help him too. I ask you to join us for the sake of our brotherhood. You should know that our great and wise leader is daily engaged in these issues personally. Two hours before our talk, on the day I was sick, he personally called me and asked me to instruct you to reach the agreement (with the central government.—J.G. )”13
Stalin’s Intrigues in Iran
During the summer of 1946, the “great and wise leader” stepped up his informal contacts with Shah of Iran Reza Pahlavi, the sworn enemy of Jafar Pishevari and Azerbaijanian autonomy (whom he had planned to remove with the help of Ghavam several months earlier, in March 1946). In July, Moscow received Ashraf Pahlavi, the Shah’s twin sister, who on 3 July met Deputy Foreign Minister Solomon Lozovskiy; on 20 July she was received by Stalin in the presence of Molotov. The talk, during which the guest tried to persuade Stalin to withdraw his support of the Azeri government, which she described as “a puppet state that will worsen the relations between our countries for many
12 Natalia Yegorova who works in the RAS put the letter (kept in the Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation, rec. gr. 6, inv. 7, folder 34, f. 544, sheets 8-9) into academic circulation in Novaia i noveyshaia istoria and in publications by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (see: N.I. Egorova, “‘Iranskiy krizis’ 1945-1946 gg. Po rassekrechennym arkhivnym materialam,” Novaia i noveyshaia istoria, No. 3, 1994; N.I. Yegorova, “The ‘Iran Crisis’ of 1945-46: A View from the Russian Archives,” Working Paper, Cold War International History Project, No. 15, Washington DC, 1996, pp. 23-24; see also: Goftogu, No. 17, 1998, pp. 103-135)
13 Stenograficheskaia zapis peregovorov M.J. Bagirova s S.J. Pishevari po VCh ot 21 maia 1946 g., NSM AR Archives, f. 303, pp. 227-228; 229-230.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
years to come,” lasted for nearly two-and-a-half hours. Ashraf Pahlavi left convinced that Stalin was greatly impressed; later, in her memoirs, she quoted Stalin as saying: “Please convey my best wishes to your brother Shahinshah and tell him that with ten sisters like yourself he should be free from all worries.”14 On 3 August at a reception with the Shah, when her brother thanked the Soviet ambassador for the fantastic reception given his sister in the Soviet Union, he confirmed, in turn, that he was always convinced that the interests of his country demanded friendship with its neighbor, the Soviet Union. In his letter Stalin spoke about the governments; by way of response the Shah deemed it necessary to say what he had never told anyone before, which was that he had personally removed three previous Cabinets (Saed, Sadr and Hakimi). He had managed this despite the war, he said. Now, with the war over, he guaranteed that there would be no governments in Iran able to damage the friendship between the two countries again. According to the Shah, Stalin had allegedly told his sister that he could apply to Stalin directly. The Soviet ambassador offered a diplomatically impeccable answer: he would always be ready to mediate in cases when the Shah deemed it necessary to contact Stalin.15
Stalin’s abrupt change of mind was probably prompted by the disagreements between the Iranian government and the U.K. that surfaced in July-August 1946; in the country’s south the wave of unrest among the tribes controlled by the British was mounting by the day. On 18 July, when talking to Ghavam, I. Sadchikov deemed it necessary to ask why the prime minister of Iran had concealed from the public the fact that Britain had moved its men-of-war into the Gulf; he argued that this would have stirred up public opinion throughout the world and prevented similar moves in the future. He also added that this was a gross infringement on Iran’s national sovereignty and an attempt to use military force to wrench political concessions from Iran. Ghavam answered that he had already instructed the Iranian ambassadors in London and Washington and had asked the British ambassador in Tehran to remove the ships from the Gulf. On leaving, the Soviet ambassador repeated that Iran should not accept the fact that Britain treated Iran as one of its colonies. Ghavam promised to think it over.16
Throughout September Ghavam still engaged in his maneuvering among the three great powers, repeatedly threatening to lodge a complaint against Britain with the U.N. Security Council; the American ambassador dissuaded him. Early in October the Iranian prime minister changed his tack: he announced to the ambassador that he would change the political course and move against the leftists, and added that with American economic and financial support he would be moving more resolutely.17
The prime minister was probably inspired by the Shah, who insisted that all Tudeh members be removed from the Cabinet. The American diplomats learned that in a private talk with Ghavam, the Shah said that he “did not believe that the Soviets would invade Iran and, even if this happened, he would be dead set in favor of changes and would go to the U.N. for help to cut short this aggression.” The archives of the Soviet state security structures contain documents that testify that the Shah, the war minister, and the head of the General Staff tried to assassinate Ghavam with the help of the British embassy. One of the relevant documents says: “Recently the Shah secretly met the British ambassador, whom he told that if the British guaranteed their complete support he would be willing to remove Ghavam by his decree. We believe that the plotters will arrest Ghavam after the decree is issued, that is, legally.”18 The later developments showed that in fact the Shah relied on the United States, the
14 Vstrecha F. Molochkova s I. Shafai. 09.07.1946, Foreign Policy Archives RF (FPA RF), rec. gr. 094, inv. 37, folder 357a, f. 4, sheet 36 (see: A. Pahlavi, Faces in a Mirror, Memories from Exile, New York, 1980, pp. 86-87).
15 See: Iz dnevnika I. Sadchikova. Beseda s shakhom Irana Mohammedom Reza Pahlavi. 03.08.1946 g., FPA RF, rec. gr. 094, inv. 37, folder 357a, f. 5, sheets 144-145.
16 See: Iz dnevnika I. Sadchikova. Beseda s premier-ministrom Irana Ghavam es-Saltane. 18.07.1946 g., FPA RF, rec. gr. 094, inv. 37, folder 357a, f. 5, sheets 139-141.
17 See: The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State. 30.09.1946, FRUS, Vol. VII, 1946, p. 518 (see: NSM AR Archives, f. 297, sheets 275-278).
18 The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State. 19-20.10.1946, FRUS, Vol. VII, 1946, pp. 537-538.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
guarantor of his country’s territorial integrity and independence since 1941. On 19 October, Ghavam who badly needed Shah on his side and who wanted to keep his post formed a new Cabinet minus the Tudeh ministers. He, on the other hand, added the portfolios of the ministers of the interior and foreign affairs to his post of prime minister.
What they saw as Ghavam’s perfidy infuriated the Soviet leaders. The Soviet ambassador furiously accused Ghavam of plotting with the Brits. The Soviet special services started gathering compromising materials about Ghavam.19 The Soviet leaders finally realized that the country would never obtain the oil concession; very soon it became clear that Stalin’s “stick and carrot” policy had failed.
Stalin’s Policy Fails in Iranian Azerbaijan
On 24 November, George Allen, the American ambassador in Tehran, informed the Secretary of State: “Today, Ghavam told me that he had finally decided to send security forces into Azerbaijan. He said that if the local government resisted (and he was convinced that this would happen), he would turn to the U.N. Security Council for help. In response to one of my questions he said that mobilization of the armed forces and notification of the officials would take two or three weeks. He planned to go to the Security Council if the fighting began. I pointed out that the Security Council was concerned about the international threats. Ghavam said that he knew this and if hostilities started in Northern Azerbaijan he would inform the Security Council that the situation threatened international peace. I deliberately asked him whether he intended to inform the Supreme Mejlis about these actions designed to restore Iranian sovereignty in Azerbaijan. He answered in the negative and confirmed his intention to go to the Security Council.”20
On 28 November, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union V. Dekanozov sent a ciphered telegram to Baku which reached the Tabriz leaders the same day. It was recommended that protest be raised, through S. Javid, against Ghavam’s intention to move troops into Azerbaijan as contradicting the agreement between the Iranian government and representatives of Azerbaijan and, in particular, Ghavam’s letter of 29 October. The telegram insisted that the leaders of Iranian Azerbaijan warn Ghavam that the population was calling for strict observance of the agreements between the Iranian government and representatives of Iranian Azerbaijan in order to avoid complications; this agreement was to be presented at the next Mejlis sitting for review, as envisaged by the basic agreement of 13 June, 1946. It was also advised that Ghavam be warned that Azerbaijan had enough gendarmes and army units, which, under the agreement, could be headed by commanders appointed by Tehran. The Tabriz people were instructed to invite Ghavam to send a special governmental commission and members of the public and the press to observe the elections in Iranian Azerbaijan. The Tabriz press and radio was advised to follow the above and campaign against the intention of the Iranian government to move troops into Azerbaijan.21 The ciphered telegram contained no offer of effective support.
On 4 December at 07:00 a.m. when preparations had been completed, the Iranian army moved against Azerbaijan. Next evening M. Bagirov urgently asked Stalin by telegram to receive him in connection with the situation in Iranian Azerbaijan.22 The Soviet leader refused to budge—no help
19 See: M. Mustafaev, Osobye zametki, 20.10.1946 g., SAPPPM AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 117, sheets 88-89.
20 The Ambassador in Iran (Allen) to the Secretary of State. 24.11.1946, FRUS, Vol. VII, 1946, p. 547.
21 See: M.J. Bagirov—N. Kulievu. Nemedlenno peredat chetverke (Pishevari, Shabustari, Padeganu i Javidu). 28.11.1946 g., SAPPPM AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 117, sheets 129-130.
22 See: Telegramma M.J. Bagirova—I. Stalinu. 05.12.1946 g., SAPPPM AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 112, sheets 147-152.
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
was extended to the Azeri democrats; it seems that Stalin was merely avoiding direct confrontation with the United States over Iran. On 11 December, Pishevari, Shabustari, Javid, and Padegan received, through Soviet vice-consul N. Kuliev, Stalin’s instruction: “As the prime minister, Ghavam has the formal right to send troops to any part of the country, Azerbaijan being no exception. This means that continued armed resistance is pointless, useless, and unprofitable. You should announce that you have nothing against moving governmental troops into Azerbaijan to maintain order during the elections and argue that you are doing this for the sake of unity of the Iranian people and in the interests of its freedom and independence.”23 Pishevari, who disagreed with the instructions, resigned and left Tabriz amid the rising tension.
The same evening, a huge flow of active party members, army officers, fedain units, and some of the rank-and-file party members began moving toward the Soviet border. By the night of 12 December, large crowds had accumulated at the border checkpoints. On 12 November, M. Bagirov wrote to Stalin: “People panicked when they learned about the telegrams to the Shah and Ghavam and heard the address of the ADP. Members of the democratic movement and some of the activists frightened by the Zenjan slaughter refuse to listen to explanations; they are not merely crowding at our consular office in Tabriz—large groups are accumulating on our borders. The measures taken by the governor general do not help. So far we know that several hundred people, women and children among them, have reached the border in Julfa. One can only guess what will happen in the morning and tomorrow at the other checkpoints (in Astar, Bilyasuvar, and others). Nobody has been let through so far, except for a certain group of families and bodyguards (170 people in all). The situation is far from simple—we should either use arms to scare them away from the border or let them through. I am waiting for your instructions.”24 On M. Bagirov’s suggestion, the Soviet leaders opened the border for a week (from 12 to 19 December), which allowed 5,784 people to cross it.25 Those who arrived after 19 December were sent back and captured by Iranian reactionaries.
On 20 December the Iranian army occupied the entire region; martial courts sentenced hundreds of officers and soldiers of the national Army and fedains to death; within several days over 30 thousand lost their lives.26 Every day scores perished from hunger and cold in prisons; the tortured democrats saw execution as an escape. An occupation regime was finally established. According to the American embassy, the Shah attributed the victory to the fact that the Soviet Union realized that America meant business when it spoke about its willingness to come to the rescue of any U.N. member threatened with aggression. On 16 December at one of the unofficial meetings, the Shah spoke about America’s immense help. The Iranian leaders called the victory in Azerbaijan “the Stalingrad battle” of Western democracy and the “turning point of all world processes against Soviet aggression.”27
On 12 December, the day the democratic movement was defeated in Iranian Azerbaijan, the Foreign Ministry of the U.S.S.R. handed a note to the Iranian government that had nothing to do with the tragedy in Azerbaijan. This note, as the earlier notes of 15 September and 2 and 4 October, dealt with the agreement on the Soviet-Iranian oil JV. The Soviet Government “insisted that the government of Iran should strictly obey and ensure timely execution of the agreement of 4 April, 1946 on setting up a Soviet-Iranian oil JV.” In his response of 18 December, Ghavam, who had long been avoiding any discussion of the issue, protested against the Soviet approach and said that “as soon as all the necessary conditions are ready he will submit the treaty on setting up a Soviet-Iranian oil JV to
23 Telegramma M.J. Bagirova—I. Stalinu. 11.12.1946 g., SAPPPM AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 112, sheet 154; f. 157,
p. 105.
24 Telegramma M.J. Bagirova—I. Stalinu. 12.12.1946 g., SAPPPM AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 112, sheet 156.
25 See: M.J. Bagirov i I. Maslennikov—I. Stalinu. 20.12.1946 g., SAPPPM AR, rec. gr. 1, inv. 89, f. 156, sheet 2.
26 See: Mariam Firuz—TsK KPSS. “Politika Sovetskogo Soiuza v Irane.” 10.10.1956 g., RSACH, rec. gr. 5, inv. 30, f. 171, sheets 122-123.
27 Foreign Relations of the U.S., Vol. VII, 1946, pp. 562-563.
the Mejlis.”28 It looks as if the Soviet leaders merely wanted to save face. Iran’s obvious orientation toward the United States and the intensifying Soviet-American confrontation gradually developing into a cold war deprived the Soviet Union of all its chances to gain access to Iranian oil. In August 1947, Ghavam officially rejected the oil agreement with the Soviet Union and thus fortified his position with the Americans and British. This was the tragic end of the processes that began in 1941 in Iranian Azerbaijan.
C o n c l u s i o n
The Cold War spread from Southern Azerbaijan; this is one of my main conclusions confirmed by archival documents introduced into academic circulation and a comparative analysis of academic writings. The failure of Soviet policy in Iranian Azerbaijan signified the Soviet Union’s first defeat in the Cold War.
Much has changed in Iran since that time: the Islamic revolution of 1978-1979 removed the Pahlavi regime, however the hopes that the Iranian Islamic revolution would settle the problem of the national rights of the people of Iran proved futile. This means that the acute and arduous problem of the fate of the Azeris in Iran will remain on the agenda until it is settled in a reasonable and mutually satisfactory way.
28 Kratkiy obzor sovetsko-iranskikh otnosheniy (1917-1955), Arkhiv upravlenia MID SSSR. 26.06.1956 g., RSACH, rec. gr. 5, inv. 30, f. 171, sheets 83-84.
Kenan ALLAHVERDIEV
Ph.D. (Philos.), associate professor at the Political Science and
Political Administration Department, State Administration Academy under the President of
the Azerbaijan Republic (Baku, Azerbaijan).
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AND ETHNOPOLITICAL SECURITY IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION
Abstract
T
he author has posed himself the task of formatting the key parameters of national development and indicators
of ethnopolitical security in the post-Soviet states; he offers an in-depth analysis of several factors that bring together na-
