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THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION
Jamil GASANLY
D.Sc. (Hist.), professor, Baku State University, deputy of Milli Mejlis (parliament) of the Azerbaijan Republic
(Baku, Azerbaijan).
THE “TURKISH CRISIS” OF THE COLD WAR PERIOD AND THE SOUTH CAUCASIAN REPUBLICS
Part /
Abstract
The author traces the ups and downs of Soviet-Turkish relations during World War II and immediately after it and concentrates on the most important points along this far from easy road. He amply draws on declassified archive documents from the United States, Russia, Armenia, Georgia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan to recreate a true picture of the time when the Turkish crisis was developing into another seat of the Cold
War while the leaders of the Armenian and Georgian Soviet republics acted as obedient tools of and far from passive participants in Stalin’s intrigues as he moved the war of nerves from the Middle East to the Southern Caucasus. The article convincingly demonstrates how Soviet political technologists distorted the picture of a friendly and peaceful country into the image of an enemy in the minds of millions of Soviet citizens.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
Turkey, which learned a bitter lesson in World War I, demonstrated wisdom and caution throughout World War II. Its leaders and diplomats steered the country through the war raging on its borders without losses. It remained neutral and skillfully exploited the great powers’ contradictions,
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which can be described as a foreign policy triumph. The Soviet leaders repeatedly admitted that Turkey’s neutrality helped the allies during the hardest period of the war. American academic Wayne Bowen aptly described Turkey’s position in World War II as that of an allied, even if not fighting, country.1
Late in life Kemal Ataturk warned his successors about the threat from the north; not much later his fears proved justified. During the first months of World War II the Soviet leaders laid their claims against Turkey on the table, which turned this country into an arena of confrontation between the West and the East. Starting in November 1944 the sides drafted several versions of their joint control of the Straits. In March 1945 the 20-year Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality was renounced; Soviet territorial claims against Turkey followed suit; gradually this developed into a war of nerves typical of Stalin’s Cold War period.
Soviet-Turkish Relations during the First Stage of World War II
Turkey was very much alarmed by the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August, 1939; 1 September, 1939, when Germany attacked Poland, was a logical continuation of the document; two days later, on 3 September, in fulfillment of their allied obligations Britain and France declared war on Germany. World War II began.
The bilateral declarations Turkey signed with Britain and France in May and June 1939 and Britain’s guarantees of Turkey’s territorial integrity offered in the first days of the war were hailed by the political community and the public with equal enthusiasm. President of Turkey Ismet Inonu wanted similar Soviet guarantees.2 On 24 September Foreign Minister of Turkey Shukri Sarajoglu went to Moscow for negotiations. On 1 October he was received by Stalin and Molotov; the latter said that the Soviet side had familiarized itself with the draft of the British-French-Turkish nonaggression pact and found it interesting: “We took great pains to study the clauses and found the purpose of the document as a whole vague, namely, it is not clear against whom the pact Turkey concluded with Britain and France is directed. We would like to know the extent to which Turkey is bound by the necessity to carry on talks with both the British and the French and how far it has progressed. Besides, we would like to know the extent to which the Turkish government believes itself bound by the need to sign the pact with the British and the French and whether the pact would be better left unsigned.”3 The Turkish foreign minister replied that the documents stated that they “are not directed against any specific country but, at the same type, are directed against any aggressor.” His detailed answer demanded from the Soviet side an equally specific response. Viacheslav Molotov came forward with: “Against whom will the Soviet-Turkish pact be directed? We cannot sign a pact against Germany and Italy as a German ally; we cannot sign a pact against Bulgaria, which does not threaten Turkey.”4 A. Danilov and A. Pyzhikov, two well-known Russian historians, write with good reason that at that moment it had become clear that with a war raging the So-
1 See: Wayne Bowen, “Turkiye ve ikinci dunya sava§i: “Tarafli fakat sava§mayan ulke,” Turkler, Cilt 16, Ankara, 2002, p. 803.
2 See: A.A. Danilov, A.V. Pyzhikov, Rozhdenie sverkhderzhavy: SSSR v pervye poslevoennye gody, Moscow, 2001, p. 12. For more detail about the Soviet-Turkish relations during the “Turkish Crisis,” see: J.P. Gasanly, SSSR-Turt-sia: ot neytraliteta k kholodnoy voyne (1939-1953), Moscow, 2008, 664 pp.
3 Beseda I. Stalina i V. Molotova s Sh. Sarajoglu. 01.10.1939, Russian State Archives of Socio-Political History (RSASPH), Record group 558, Inventory 11, File 388, sheets 14-15.
4 Ibid., p. 20.
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viet Union was not inclined to give any guarantees to Turkey. Viacheslav Molotov was obviously disinclined to a sign a mutual assistance pact.5
The Turkish foreign minister remained in Moscow until 1б October with little success; the British and French officials who were closely following the Moscow talks became resolved to complete their talks with Turkey (which had started in the spring of 1939) with a British-French-Turkish Mutual Assistance Treaty signed on 19 October in Ankara. The Soviet Union demonstrated due restraint yet declassified diplomatic documents reveal that it was piqued by Turkey’s independent position on many issues. Stalin, who had many interests in Turkey, was convinced that the Turkish question and the fate of Turkey could not be settled without the Soviet Union.
By 1940 Turkey found itself in the very heart of a complicated diplomatic game. In November 1940, during the visit of the Soviet government delegation to Berlin, its head, Molotov, firmly demanded that the Germans should back the Soviet Union’s interests in Turkey; this was mainly associated with the Straits issue but not limited to it. The Soviet foreign minister was empowered to discuss the division of Turkey, obviously between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria. Stalin was convinced that the Straits issue could not be settled peacefully without Soviet pressure on Turkey applied by moving Soviet troops to Bulgaria. On 25 November, 1940 Stalin put his ideas in a nutshell when he said to Georgi Dimitrov, Secretary-General of the Comintern Executive Committee: “We shall push the Turks to Asia. Indeed, what is Turkey? Two million Georgians, a million and a half Armenians, one million Kurds, and so on. There are only six or seven million Turks there.”*5
On 18 June, 1941 Turkish Foreign Minister Shukri Sarajoglu, acting for Turkey, and German Ambassador to Turkey Von Papen, acting for Germany, signed a non-aggression treaty under which the sides pledged to mutually respect their territorial integrity and the inviolability of their national borders and reject any direct or indirect involvement in hostile acts against one another. This treaty did not abrogate Turkey’s obligations to other countries or to Britain as its ally in the first place. The Soviet Union shared the United States’ and Great Britain’s concern about Turkey’s risky step. We should bear in mind, however, that four days before the treaty was signed, the 14 June issue of Pravda newspaper had carried a TASS statement, which said that the Soviet Union and Germany were consistently fulfilling the non-aggression pact and that the rumors about an imminent war were absolutely groundless. A week later, however, on 22 June, 1941, Germany attacked the Soviet Union, which opened a new stage of already raging World War II.
From Desired Neutrality to Unexpected Demands
On 26 June, 1941 Turkey issued a note in which it confirmed its neutrality with respect to Germany and the Soviet Union, which failed to convince Stalin. On 4 July, when talking to the leaders of the Transcaucasian Republic (First Secretary of the C.C. C.P. (B.) of Azerbaijan M.J. Bagirov, First Secretary of the C.C. C.P. (B.) of Georgia K. Charkviani and First Secretary of the C.C. C.P. (B.) of Armenia G. Arutinov), he said: “You are far removed from the front yet your zone is no less dangerous. We cannot rely on Turkey’s neutrality.”7
5 See: A.A. Danilov, A.V. Pyzhikov, op. cit., pp. 12-13.
6 G. Dimitrov, The Diary (9 March 1933-6 February 1949), Sofia, 1997, p. 203 (in Bulgarian); The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933—1949, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2003, p. 137; O.A. Westad, The Global Cold War. Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times, University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 59.
7 Iu. Gor’kov, Gosudarstvenniy Komitet Oborony postanovliaet (1941-1945), Moscow, 2002, p. 230; Kavkaz vyst-oial, Kavkaz pobedil. Veterany vspominaiut, Tbilisi, 1973, pp. 130-131.
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Late in August 1941 Soviet and British troops entered Iran, which stirred up anxiety in Turkey. Two weeks before that, on 10 August, Britain and the Soviet Union issued a joint statement to the effect that they would respect the regime in the Straits and Turkey’s territorial integrity; the same document assured Turkey of help in the event of aggression.8 But as soon as on 25 April, 1942, after discussing the situation, Stalin and General of the Army Ivan Tiulenev, commander of the Transcaucasian military region, agreed to fortify the military district with weapons and hardware as a follow-up to the directive of the Soviet General Staff of 2б April. Soon after that, on 5 May, commanders of the 45th and 4бШ armies were ordered to get ready to enter Turkish territory. This can be described as real preparations of trained armies for action in Turkey.9
In May 1942 the situation on the German-Soviet front began going from bad to worse; the Red Army was bleeding in the Crimea and at Kharkov. This forced the Soviet leaders to put aside their military plans in Turkey for a while. The latter drew adequate conclusions and fortified the areas bordering on the Soviet Union. The Fascists pressing toward the Caucasus forced Turkey to concentrate on defenses. Intelligence of the Transcaucasian Front reported that on 29 July, 1942 there were 4 Turkish corps, 1б infantry contingents, and 2 cavalry corps deployed on the Soviet
border.10
Soviet historiography interpreted this as war preparations; I regret to say that Russian historiography has not yet remedied this. In 1945 Ismet Inonu touched upon the key issues of his country’s domestic and foreign policy and upon its relations with the Soviet Union: “As soon as the war between the Soviets and the Germans broke out we announced that we would remain neutral in this war. On 19 January, 1942 the Soviet Union informed our Foreign Ministry through its ambassador that ‘the Allies found Turkey’s position very useful...’ there was talk that as the Germans moved toward the Volga we were creating difficulties for the Soviets by concentrating our forces on our eastern borders. Late in the summer of 1942 we officially informed the Soviet government that we had concentrated our troops at Trabzond and Hopa taking into account the possibility of a German landing with the aim of striking at the rear of the Caucasian Front. This was why we redeployed our forces. The Soviets responded that out answer satisfied them. It is impossible to offer more convincing proof that during the war we redeployed our forces exclusively against the Axis powers.”11
The declassified correspondence between the top figures of the Allies testifies that there was an agreement to draw Turkey into the war by 1943. On 19 January, 1943 the Brits and Americans who met in Casablanca decided that the Balkan Front was needed to deliver a blow on Germany from the Southern Flank and to open another transportation corridor to Russia. Winston Churchill wrote that Turkey was the key to the entire plan.12
On 30 January-1 February, 1943 in Adana Churchill demanded that Turkey, in obedience to the Ankara Pact, should immediately enter the war and open the Straits. President Inonu retorted: “Turkey remains loyal to the Ankara Pact. It has never thought of disobeying it. In the absence of a well-supplied army with the latest weapons, however, entering the war would lead to an immediate defeat. The Turkish army has no up-to-date weapons and ammunition. If Britain supplies us with everything we need, we shall enter the war.”13 Premier of Turkey Sarajoglu joined the conversation with a com-
8 See: Zaiavlenie sovetskogo pravitel’stva. 10.08.1941 g., Foreign Policy Archives of the Russian Federation (here-inafter_FPA RF), Record group 06, Inventory 9, Folder 69, File 1071, sheet 29.
9 See: Iu. Gor’kov, op. cit., p. 287; A.Iu. Bezugol’ny, “Ni voyny, ni mira. Polozhenie na sovetsko-turetskoy gran-itse i mery sovetskogo rukovodstva po predotvrashcheniu turetskoy ugrozy v pervyi period Velikoy otechestvennoy voy-ny,” Voenno-istoricheskiy arkhiv, No. 5, 2003, pp. 59-60.
10 See: A.Iu. Bezugol’ny, op. cit., p. 62.
11 Posol’stvo SSSR v Turtsii—Narkomindelu SSSR. Rech’ Ismeta Inonu na otkrytii III sessii mejlisa 7-go sozyva. 01.11.1945 g., State Archives of the Republic of Azerbaijan (hereinafter SA RA), Record group 28, Inventory 4, File 47, sheets 6-8.
12 See: W. Churchill, Vtoraia mirovaia voyna. Vospominania. Memuary, Vol. 3, Minsk, 2003, p. 244.
13 R. Qalik, “Turk—Alman ili§kileri (1925-1945),” Turkler, Cilt 16, Ankara, 2002, p. 820.
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ment that Russia’s military victories might turn it into an imperialist state and that his country preferred to treat this threat with caution. To calm down the Turkish public the British premier assured the Turks that if Russia attacked Turkey for no reason, all the international organizations would rise to its defense.14 Churchill, however, failed to convince Turkey to enter the war.
Its involvement in the war, however, loomed prominently at the Allies’ Tehran Conference of 1943. The participants agreed that it might help if Roosevelt and Churchill met with Inonu. Stalin’s comment was sly: “What if Inonu falls ill?” Churchill said to this: “He may well fall ill. If he refuses to come to Cairo to meet me and the president, I am prepared to board a cruiser to go to Adana. He will come there and I shall scare him with what the Turks will think of him if he refuses and please him with what his nation will think of him if he agrees.” The meeting took place on 4-6 December, 1943 in Cairo. In full accordance with what had been decided in Tehran Churchill announced that Turkey should enter the war and informed the Turkish president that British-American aviation would arrive in Turkey on 15 February, 1944. Otherwise, Churchill warned, all relations with Turkey would be ruptured. Ismet Inonu agreed with the Allies in principle yet tried to clarify several points. He warned that if the “allied” Red Army entered the Balkans it would never leave them. The Turkish leaders were more afraid of Soviet than of German imperialism. Winston Churchill explained that the future international organization, by which he meant the U.N., would do everything to move the Russians as far away from Turkey as possible.15
The Soviet Union made equally active efforts to draw Turkey into the war. On 16 July, 1943 Soviet Ambassador to Turkey S. Vinogradov advised Molotov to increase Soviet pressure on Turkey: “Because of the changed international situation neutral Turkey has become an unfavorable factor: it is a barrier that does not allow the Allies to open hostilities in the Balkans.” He suggested that the Allies put pressure on Turkey at the same time in order to use its territory as a springboard for military operations. If Turkey refuses, continued the ambassador, “this will not be completely useless since it will lengthen our list of grievances to be presented to it in due time.”16
Since the spring of 1944 the U.S.S.R. People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs had been accumulating documents on the debatable issues in the Soviet Union’s relations with Turkey. The first of them prepared by A. Fedosov, head of the Department of Middle East, was entitled A Memo on the Existing and Effective Political Treaties and Agreements between the U.S.S.R and Turkey as of 1 January, 1944. Its author supplied the document with a detailed analysis of the Moscow Treaty on Friendship and Brotherhood of16 March, 1921. Later its articles and especially the first addendum related to the northeastern borders of Turkey were radically revised by the Soviets.17
Another document drawn up on 22 April and headed A Memo on the Unresolved Issues between the U.S.S.R. and Turkey as of 15 April, 1944 was even more eloquent. Its 21 pages contain descriptions of each of the “unresolved” issues accompanied by the foreign ministry’s recommendation on how to deal with it. There was not much variety: in each case the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs recommended putting pressure on Turkey.18 Later, these recommendations were used to introduce the Soviet Union’s claims against Turkey.
After driving the Germans out of the Crimea in May 1944, Stalin ordered the local Tartars to be deported from the peninsula. In the context of the worsened relations with Turkey this looked like an effort to clear the Black Sea shores of a potential “fifth column.” Later, in November 1944, the
14 See: W. Churchill, Vtoraia mirovaia voyna, Vol. 3, p. 246.
15 See: H.F. Gursel, Tarih Boyunca Turk—Rus ili§kileri, Istanbul, 1968, p. 218.
16 Rossia i Chernomorskie prolivy (XVIII-XX stoletia), Moscow, 1999, p. 458.
17 See: A. Fedosov, “Spravka o sushestvuiushchikh i deystvuiushchikh politicheskikh dogovorakh i soglasheniakh mezhdu SSSR i Turtsiey po sostoianiiu na 1 ianvaria 1944,” 24.01.1944 g., SA RA, Record group 28, Inventory 4, File 3, sheets 3-6.
18 See: A. Fedosov, V. Kornev, “Spravka po nerazreshennym voprosam mezhdu SSSR i Turtsiey po sostoianiu na 15 aprelia 1944 g.,” 22.04.1944 g., SA RA, Record group 28, Inventory 4, File 3, sheets 7-27.
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Meskheti Turks (who lived along the Turkish border in the Georgian S.S.R.) were also moved away.19 In his memo to Stalin dated 28 November, 1944 Lavrenti Beria wrote: “A large part of this population was related to the people on the other side of the border by kinship ties; they were engaged in illegal trade and were willing to emigrate; Turkish intelligence conscripted spies and bandits from among them.”20
In the summer of 1944 the General Staff of the Soviet Army compiled a map of the Kurdish tribes living in Iran, Iraq, and Armenia along the Turkish borders.21 The very fact that the Soviet General Staff gathered information and mapped it, thus presenting the Turkish Eastern provinces encircled by belligerent Kurdish tribes, speaks volumes about the Soviet Union’s secret intentions with respect to Turkey.
In the fall of 1944 the Soviet Union began working towards a revision of the Montreux Convention regarding the Regime of the Turkish Straits; Stalin and Churchill dedicated much of their time to the issue during the Moscow visit of the British premier in October 1944. Immediately after that the commission for drafting peace treaties and postwar arrangements headed by Maxim Litvinov and the corresponding departments of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs produced a document entitled On the Straits Issue designed to deprive Turkey of its exclusive right to control the Straits. The authors rightly guessed that Turkey would object and that a preliminary agreement with the sides involved (Britain in particular) would be needed to create an atmosphere in which revision would become possible.22 On 17 November, 1944 Stalin, Molotov, Dekanozov, Lozovskiy, and others received a new two-page memo On the Straits Issue.23
Britain and the United States remained cautious. On 8 February, 1945 in Yalta Stalin deemed it necessary to denounce Turkey’s position throughout World War II. He argued that it had meandered among the warring sides and profited from the interests of the victors. Churchill, however, objected that during the war Turkey had remained friendly to the Allies.24 On the penultimate day of the Yalta Conference Stalin informed the Allies about the Soviet position on the Straits, which differed radically from the earlier, and carefully prepared, version. Aware of the Allies’ stand, Stalin was probably unwilling to discuss the still half-baked issue as the war was still going on. He deemed it wise to wait for a better opportunity and offered the following opinion about the Convention: “The treaty is obsolete and has outlived its time. Turkey has the right to close the Straits when it deems it necessary. We should change this without trampling on Turkey’s sovereignty. We could entrust the conference of three ministers, which is two or three months away, to discuss the issue.” Churchill wanted to know if Turkey should be assured that its independence would not be flawed if the United Kingdom and the United States agreed to the Soviet suggestions. Stalin answered that this should be done.25 It was agreed that the allied foreign ministers would discuss the Soviet suggestion with respect to the Montreux Convention at their next meeting in London and report to their governments.
19 See: P. Kovanov—TsK KPSS. Sentiabr’ 1957 g., Archives of the President of Georgia (hereinafter APG), Record group 14, Inventory 39, File 219, sheet 1.
20 Stalinskie deportatsii. 1928-1953. Dokumenty, Moscow, 2005, p. 534.
21 See: Gorshkov—M.J. Bagirovu. Dislokatsia turetskoy armii po dannym na 15.05.1944 g., 06.06.1944 g., SAPPPM AR, Record group 1, Inventory 89, File 154, sheet 9.
22 See: M. Litvinov—I. Stalinu, V. Molotovu, V. Dekanozovu, S. Lozovskomu. O perspektivakh i vozmozhnoy baze sovetsko-britanskogo sotrudnichestva. 15.11.1944 g., FRA RF, Record group 06, Inventory 6, Folder 14, File 143, sheet 82.
23 See: M. Litvinov—I. Stalinu, V. Molotovu, V. Dekanozovu, S. Lozovskomu, D. Manuil’skomu, I. Mayskomu i Ya. Suritsu. K voprosu o Prolivakh. 17.11.1944 g., FRA RF, Record group 06, Inventory 9, Folder 14, File 143, sheets 65-66.
24 See: S. Deringil, Denge Oyunu. ikinci Dunya Sava§inda Turkiye’nin Di§ Politikasi, Istanbul, 1994, pp. 249-250.
25 See: Sovetskiy Soyuz na mezhdunarodnykh konferentsiiakh perioda Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny, 1941-1945. Sbornik dokumentov. Vol. 4, Krymskaia konferentsia rukovoditeley trekh soyuznykh derzhav—SSSR, SShA i Velikobritanii (4-11 fevralia 1945 g.), Moscow, 1984, pp. 196-201.
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It should be borne in mind that a decision was made in Yalta to invite only those countries to the UN constituent conference scheduled on 25 April, 1945 that had entered the war against Germany prior to 1 March, 1945. Churchill wanted “to invite Turkey even though,” he said, “this will not be generally approved. Turkey signed an agreement with Britain before the war, at the most dangerous time. He asked: ‘Shouldn’t the Turks be given a chance to repent on their deathbed?’” Stalin answered that Turkey would be invited if it entered the war before the end of February. Roosevelt and Churchill agreed.26
On 20 February, 1945 British Ambassador in Ankara Maurice Peterson met new Foreign Minister of Turkey Hasan Saka and confirmed that according to the decision of the Yalta Conference Turkey would not be invited to San Francisco if it failed to enter the war against Germany and Japan before 1 March. On 23 February, 1945 the Mejlis (parliament) gathered for a special meeting to discuss the government’s suggestion that Turkey should join the war and that it should support the declaration of the United Nations Organization. The parliament passed both decisions.
On 19 March, 1945 the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality of 17 December, 1925 was denounced. On the same day Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov received Ambassador of Turkey to the U.S.S.R. Selim Sarper to assure him that he valued highly the 1925 treaty that had done much to promote friendship between the two countries. He added, however, that World War II had radically changed the international context, which called for a better treaty.27 The “radically changed international context” was mainly a pretext: the treaty expired on 7 November, 1945 (the remaining few months could hardly be important). The denunciation should be interpreted as a threat.
The Soviets suspended Turkey: its government did not know whether the British and Americans were prepared to protect the country against the mounting Soviet pressure or whether it would be left to face “the threat from the north” on its own. Turkey’s future as it entered the new international realities looked vague.
The Soviet Claims: the War of Nerves Begins
Two weeks after the denunciation Selim Sarper returned to Ankara; he came back to Moscow on 24 May, 1945 after nearly two months of consultations and asked for a meeting with Molotov. The two diplomats met on 7 June and spent two hours in a highly charged atmosphere. The Turkish ambassador pointed out that in this room, at this desk, a decision had been made to denounce the 1925 treaty, after which he returned to Turkey but came back to Russia again in the hopes of entering a new treaty. Viacheslav Molotov was tough: “So many changes,” he argued, “made a new treaty a difficult task; the question is: Will the Soviet Union be met halfway on the Straits issue? It should be taken into account that the Soviet Union is naturally very much concerned about its safety after the hard-won war. This is not the only stumbling block,” said Molotov. “There is the 1921 treaty signed under very different conditions. The ambassador knows that under this treaty we sustained territorial losses.” He wanted to know: “Is Turkey prepared to discuss these claims which are of immense importance for Turkey’s better relations with the Soviet Union?”28 Then Molotov pointed out: “If the territorial issue resolved under the Soviet-Turkish treaty to the detriment of the Soviet Union, as well as Armenia and Georgia for that matter, is dealt with properly, this will be instrumental in strengthening friendly re-
26 See: Sovetskiy Soyuz na mezhdunarodnykh konferentsiiakh..., Vol. 4, pp. 263-265.
27 See: FRA RF, Record group 132, Inventory 30, Folder 109, File 7, sheet 1.
28 Iz dnevnika V. Molotova. Priem posla Turetskoi Respubliki S. Sarpera. 07.06.1945 g., FRA RF, Record group 06, Inventory 7, Folder 2, File 31, sheets 2-4.
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lations for a long time to come between the Soviet Union and Turkey.” Selim Sarper disagreed and said that as ambassador he would find it hard to justify this approach to his government. A more indepth discussion of the 1921 treaty, he added, would reveal much that infringed on Turkey’s interests. He was very blunt about it by saying that Turkey did not regard the 1921 treaty as unjust and asked Molotov to leave the territorial issues alone: “We will find it hard to explain to the public. that Turkey offered its hand to the Soviet Union and it took this hand and grabbed several square kilometers of Turkish territory as well.”29
When the Turkish ambassador declined the Soviet Union’s territorial claims and the Soviet foreign minister refused to discuss the treaty, they continued talking about the Straits. Viacheslav Molotov outlined the Soviet position: “The Soviet Union’s security on the Black Sea and the Straits cannot depend merely on Turkey’s will and its real potential, which might turn out to be inadequate.” Molotov wanted to know the extent to which Turkey was prepared to defend Soviet interests in the Black Sea and whether it had enough force to defend the Straits. These mainly rhetorical questions could be translated as: the Straits needed joint defenses. Selim Sarper minced no words: he could not promise a military base in Turkey either in peacetime or during a war. Turkey could defend the Straits on its own. If a treaty of alliance is signed, he said, all other issues can then be discussed.30
On 11 June the Turkish ambassador informed Premier Sarajoglu about his talk with Molotov; the premier obviously hastened to confer with President Inonu. On the same day the Turkish president informed the American ambassador that he was prepared to discuss everything with the Russians that would not undermine his country’s independence and sovereignty. The next morning Shukri Sarajog-lu met American Ambassador Edwin Wilson to inform him about the telegram from Moscow, which, he admitted, was pretty depressing.31
On 18 June, 1945 Molotov and Sarper met for the second time; the Turkish ambassador opened the talks by asking whether the Soviet side was prepared to postpone the discussion of the territorial claims under the 1921 agreement and a Soviet military base in the Straits. Molotov answered that if mutual claims, including the Soviet claims, remained pending, “there will not be much sense in talking about a treaty of alliance. If, however, the Turkish government wants to settle the claims, this will create the basis on which the Soviet government will be prepared to sign a treaty of alliance. When asked whether the territorial and military base issues were on the list of the claims, Viacheslav Molotov answered in the affirmative. Selim Sarper asked Molotov to put these issues aside for a while since otherwise the talks would not be successful; he added that he had been instructed by his government and that Turkey wanted an agreement with the Soviet Union. The Turkish government, said the ambassador, believed that the claims could neither be a subject of discussion nor the starting point of talks. Molotov, in turn, merely repeated that no treaty of alliance was possible unless these two issues were settled.32
The Soviet foreign minister insisted on the territorial claims; he distorted historical facts to accuse the Turkish army of invading Soviet territory and “misbehaving there.” Despite this, Molotov added, the Soviet government helped Turkey to gain its independence at that time. It should not be forgotten that “Turkey capitalized on the situation in the Soviet Union at that time and seized part of the territories of Armenia and Georgia. Even if we forget this, the Armenians and Georgians will not forget this in a hurry. Neither shall we. If the Turkish government wants to settle the issues in the way the Soviet government wants, the territorial issue should be fairly resolved and the injustice toward the Soviet Union should be remedied.”33
29 Ibid., sheets 5-6.
30 See: Ibid., sheets 9-11.
31 The ambassador in Turkey (Wilson) to the Secretary of State. 12.06.1945, FRUS, 1945, Vol. VIII, p. 1234.
32 See: Iz dnevnika V. Molotova. Priem posla Turetskoi Respubliki S. Sarpera. 18.06.1945 g., FRA RF, Record group 06, Inventory 7, Folder 2, File 31, sheet 31.
33 Ibid., sheets 38.
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On 22 June, 1945 Turkish Ambassador Selim Sarper officially declined all the Soviet suggestions; to protect itself and its position Turkey turned first to Britain and then to the United States.34
The Turks promptly informed Britain, their ally, about the Moscow talks and Moscow’s demands, which caused a great deal of amazement in London. On 7 July Archibald Kerr, the British ambassador in Moscow, handed over a note that said that the British government was very much astonished to learn that the Soviet government had formulated certain territorial claims in the course of negotiations and had discussed the Straits issue. The ambassador referred to the Yalta agreement under which the Soviet government was obliged to consult the British and American governments before discussing the Montreux Convention with the Turks while Stalin had promised not to undertake actions that might cripple Turkey’s independence and integrity.35 On 18 June, very much concerned about what the Soviet Union was doing in the Balkans, the British government asked the American government to pay attention to the Soviet policies incompatible with the Yalta decisions and added that on the eve of the Potsdam Conference the two countries needed a consolidated British-American position.
On the eve of the Potsdam Conference when Molotov met British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden to discuss issues related to the conference the British diplomat told Molotov that the Turks had come to see him in London. Molotov said that he knew about it and added that he hoped that the Turks had been objective when talking about the negotiations in Moscow. He also said: “In 1921 the Turks used the Soviet Union’s weakness to take part of Soviet Armenia from it. The Armenians of the Soviet Union feel slighted. For this reason,” explained the Soviet foreign minister, “the Soviet Union raised the question of returning the territories that belong to it by law. As for the Straits issue, the Soviet Union has been saying for some time that the Montreux Convention no longer suited it.” Anthony Eden retorted that the Brits had heard nothing about the Soviet territorial claims against Turkey; they had been aware, however, of the Straits issue. Molotov answered to that that the territorial issue had come to the fore when the Turks invited the Soviet Union to sign a treaty of alliance and wanted to know the Soviet conditions. The Soviet government could not ignore the request. Eden pointed out that the Turks had not accepted the Soviet territorial claims.”36
The Potsdam Conference was opened on 17 July, 1945; three days later, on 20 July, Via-cheslav Molotov responded to the British note of 7 July on the Turkish issues handed over in Moscow. The talk with Eden probably convinced Molotov that the territorial claims against Turkey and the infringement on its sovereignty would be hard to push at the conference. In his response the Soviet foreign minister tried to explain that by entering into talks with the Turkish government the Soviets had not violated any previous agreements with the Allies since it had been the Turks who had invited the Soviet Union to sign a treaty of alliance “that will dwell on the Straits issue.” The Turkish government was informed that “this agreement can be signed only if the question of the Straits, as well as the territories annexed from the Soviet Union and joined to Turkey in 1921, is settled.”37
The Turkish question and the Straits issue were unofficially discussed on 18 July in Potsdam at a dinner. As late as 22 July the question was put on the agenda of the sixth sitting chaired by President Truman.38 The Allies refused to support the Soviet claims against Turkey. For this reason the final
34 See: M. Akgiun, “Chernomorskie prolivy: nezruimye sviazi,” in: Rossiisko-turetskie otnoshenia: istoria, sovre-mennoe sostoianie i perspektivy, Moscow, 2003, p. 59.
35 See: A. Kerr—V. Molotovu. 07.07.1945 g., FRA RF, Record group 06, Inventory 7, Folder 25, File 307, sheet 1.
36 Iz dnevnika V. Molotova. Priem gospodina A. Edena. 16.07.1945 g., FRA RF, Record group 06, Inventory 7, Folder 2, File 31, sheets 75-76.
37 Rossia i Chernomorskie prolivy (XVIII-XX stoletia), p. 471.
38 See: Sovetskiy Soyuz na mezhdunarodnykh konferentsiiakh perioda Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny, 1941-1945. Sbornik dokumentov. Vol. 6, Berlinskaia (Potsdamskaia) konferentsia rukovoditeley trekh soyuznykh derzhav—SSSR, SShA i Velikobritanii (17 iiulia-2 avgusta 1945g.), Moscow, 1984, pp. 134-149 (see also: [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ 20th_century/decade17.asp]).
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protocol of the Berlin conference signed on 1 August only mentioned the Black Sea straits in passing: “The Three Governments recognized that the Convention concluded at Montreux should be revised as failing to meet the present-day conditions. It was agreed that as the next step the matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three Governments and the Turkish Govern-ment.”39 The next day U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes sent the text to American Ambassador in Ankara Edwin Wilson.
Despite their resolution to resolve the Turkish question in Potsdam, the Soviet leaders failed to impose their conception on the Allies. The Soviet demands related to Turkey’s eastern vilayets and a military base in the Straits were declined and not included in the final documents.
The Turkish Crisis and the South Caucasian Republics
In August 1945, after the Potsdam Conference, Armenia and later Georgia drafted their territorial claims against Turkey at the request of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. and presented them to Molotov in the form of extended memos. On 18 August the U.S.S.R. Commissariat for Foreign Affairs was ready with a document entitled On Soviet-Turkish Relations based on the historical-ethnographic memos supplied by the two republics. The new document dwelt on the Straits in detail; it mentioned that on 19 March, 1945 the Soviet Union had unilaterally denounced the 1925 Treaty as “obviously inadequate in the new international situation.” The Soviet side disagreed with Turkish Foreign Minister Saka who, the document said, “had recently announced at a press conference in London that the future of the Dardanelles and the revision of the Turkish-Soviet treaty were two different, totally unconnected, issues. This is not so because any settlement between the U.S.S.R. and Turkey is geared mainly toward two issues: the Straits and the territories Turkey seized and annexed from the Soviet Union after World War I.”40
The document’s first part substantiated the rights in the Straits by stating that the Straits, which belonged to Turkey, were the only way out of the Black Sear into the Mediterranean and other seas and that the Soviet Union exported about half of its goods from the Black Sea and Azov ports. The document pointed out: “The above makes it amply clear that the Black Sea straits are of no less, or greater, importance for our country than, for example, the Suez Canal is for the British Empire or the Panama Canal for the United States. The Straits, as well as the Suez and Panama canals, are located on the territories of third countries. While Great Britain and the U.S. ensured their legal interests in relation to the Suez and Panama canals without much trouble, our country, for historical reasons, has not yet resolved the problem of the Straits in any satisfactory way.”41
The second part entitled The Question of the Territories Seized by Turkey and Annexed from the Transcaucasian Soviet Republics pointed out: “The Armenian and Georgian lands that Turkey seized after World War I are another outstanding issue of Soviet-Turkish relations that should be urgently resolved.” The document said that “the seizure had most grievously injured the vital territorial interests of the Georgian and especially Armenian republics and greatly undermined their strategic security. The total area of the seized lands was estimated at 26 thousand sq km; Armenia lost 20,500 sq km, or about 80 percent of its territory, while Georgia lost 5,500 sq km, or about 8 per-
39 Ibid., p. 444.
40 K sovetsko-turetskim otnosheniyam. 18.08.1945 g., FPA RF, Record group 06, Inventory 7, Folder 47, File 762,
sheets 1-2.
41 Ibid., sheets 3-8.
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cent of the territory of the Georgian S.S.R.” The document said further that after the Soviet victory over Germany the Armenians in the United States and the Middle East were willing to return to Soviet Armenia, their historical homeland. “Today the limited territorial resources of Soviet Armenia can hardly accommodate all the Armenians coming from abroad. Its stony and arid terrain is unsuitable for land tilling.”42 S. Kavtaradze used the document to draft a project for Molotov for dividing the lands were to be taken from Turkey among the Union republics. Of an area of about 26 thousand sq km Armenia could hope for 20,500 sq km and Georgia for 5,500 sq km. The Georgian Commissariat for Foreign Affairs wanted the southern part of the Batumi region and the Artvin, Ardahan, and Olti regions. Kavtaradze planned to give the two latter regions to Armenia.43
This alarmed the Georgians. First Secretary of the C.C. C.P. (B.) of Georgia K. Charkviani discussed this with the republic’s leaders; academic institutions were instructed to compile historical-ethnographic and geographic documents to prove that the southern part of the Batumi region and the Artvin, Ardahan, and Olti regions should belong to the Georgians. After discussing the burning issue with Charkviani, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of Georgia G. Kiknadze first sent a letter to Beria and, early in September 1945, went to Moscow in person. In his letter to Beria he wrote: “According to S. Kavtaradze’s memo, the Ardahan and Olti regions are to be transferred to Armenia.” Kiknadze insisted that “the Georgian S.S.R. should acquire an area of 12,760 sq. km and the Armenian S.S.R. an area of 13,190 sq. km” and informed that “the question has been discussed with K.N. Charkviani.”44
On 4 September, 1945 G. Kiknadze authored another memo of 7 points entitled On the Georgian Territories Annexed by Turkey sent to Molotov, Vyshinskiy, Dekanozov, and Head of the Middle Eastern Department of the U.S.S.R. People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs I. Samylovskiy. Point 1 of the document said: “The Treaty on Friendship and Brotherhood between the R.S.F.S.R. and Turkey of 16 March and a similar treaty between the Transcaucasian republics and Turkey of 13 September, 1921 were signed under stress. The Soviet Transcaucasus lost the southern sector of the former Batumi region and the entire territories of the Artvin, Ardahan, Olti, Kars, and Kagizman regions, as well as the Surmalin district of the former Erivan Gubernia. Point 3 said: “If the issue of restoring the borders of 1878-1918 is resolved the Georgian S.S.R. can claim as part of its territory the southern sector of the former Batumi region and the former Artvin, Ardahan, and Olti regions of a total area of 12,760 sq km.”45
In the fall of 1945 the Armenian leaders raised the question of repatriation of Armenians from abroad once more. In his letter to Stalin dated 27 October, 1945 First Secretary of the C.C. C.P. (B.) of Armenia G. Arutinov wrote that patriotic sentiments were rising among the Armenians abroad, which made it possible to raise the Soviet Union’s influence in the Armenian diaspora. He pointed out that the results would greatly depend on whether we would manage to draw the public and religious organizations in other countries (so far under the influence of the structures hostile to the Soviet Union) to our side.46 In November 1945 G. Arutinov sent another letter to Stalin and Georgy Malenkov about repatriation; it was supplied with a draft decision of the Council of People’s Commissars of the U.S.S.R. drafted in Yerevan that permitted repatriation of Armenians from abroad.47
42 K sovetsko-turetskim otnosheniyam. 18.08.1945 g., sheets 13-18.
43 See: G. Kiknadze—L. Berii. 04.09.1945 g., FPA RF, Record group 14, Inventory 19, File 209, sheets 49-50.
44 Ibid., sheet 51.
45 G. Kiknadze—V. Molotovu, A. Vyshinskomu, V. Dekanozovu. K voprosu o gruzinskikh territoriiakh, vk-liuchennykh v sostav Turtsii. 04.09.1945 g., APG, Record group 14, Inventory 19, File 209, sheets 54-57.
46 See: G. Arutinov—I. Stalinu. 27.10.1945 g., Central State Archives of the Documents of Socio-Political Organizations of the Republic of Armenia (hereinafter CSADSPO RA), Record group 1, Inventory 034, File 27, sheets 54-56.
47 See: G. Arutinov—I. Stalinu i G. Malenkovu. Noiabr’ 1945 g., CSADSPO RA, Record group 1, Inventory 034, File 27, sheets 73-75.
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On 21 November, 1945 the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party (B.) passed an even longer decision related to the address of the C.C. C.P. (B.) of Armenia that said: “In connection with the return of Armenians to their motherland from abroad the suggestions of the C.C. C.P. (B.) of Armenia should be accepted and the measures drafted in this connection by the Council of People’s Commissars of the U.S.S.R. should be approved.”48 As a follow-up to the Politburo’s decision of 21 November the Council of People’s Commissars of the U.S.S.R. passed a decision On Measures Related to the Question of the Return of Armenians to Soviet Armenia from Abroad. The draft of 6 points, the result ofjoint work with the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., was approved by the Politburo on 22 February, 1946.
In this way Stalin wanted to show his Western allies and the world that he would not retreat from his territorial claims against Turkey and at the same time plant the idea that the lands were needed to settle Armenian repatriates. It was a Soviet propaganda ploy designed to create the impression that the territory of the Armenian S.S.R was too small to house all those wishing to return.
On 1 November, 1945 President Inonu addressed the third session of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey of the seventh convocation with an analysis of the central issues of Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy and of the anti-Turkic slanderous campaign. After clarifying the central issues Ismet Inonu touched upon the accusations that frequently resurfaced in the Soviet press and at the talks between Molotov and Sarper related to the Soviet military deliveries through the Straits during the war.49
The Soviet embassy in Ankara promptly translated Inonu’s speech into Russian and dispatched it to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., which summarized it, in a highly critical vein, for the Soviet leaders. The document entitled Comments on the Speech of President of Turkey Ismet Inonu cast doubts on the thesis that Turkey had stood opposed to the German invasion of the Caucasus and asserted: “This concentration did take place and was of an anti-Soviet nature since it was carried out in anticipation that the Soviet command might have needed part of the Turkish coast and some of the Turkish Black Sea ports close to the Soviet borders in the Caucasus to oppose the Germans. They did not break through to the Caucasus not because the Turkish troops stopped them but because late in 1942 the German troops were routed at Stalingrad.”50
During the first week of December 1945 Turkey lived under pressure; everyone was agitated. Encouraged by Soviet pressure, the leftist press stepped up its communist propaganda. The danger that the Soviets might resort to the Iranian variant was rising by the day. The Soviet troops stationed in Bulgaria were receiving reinforcements; the Turkish political leaders were living on tenterhooks. The fact that the Soviet Transcaucasian republics were also involved brought the danger too close to the border. On 2 December the Soviet press published the decision of the Council of People’s Commissars of the U.S.S.R. of 21 November about repatriation of Armenians to Soviet Armenia from abroad. The Soviet media and Moscow Radio in particular were engaged in openly anti-Turkish propaganda. The communist newspapers Tan and La Turquie were supported by the Yeni dunya newspaper and Gorufler magazine, the very first issues of which made it clear that the Soviet Union was behind them. The public regarded both publications, which started early in December, as ideological justification of the expected Soviet invasion. The article “Freedom in Chains” by Sabiha Sertel known for her leftist views that appeared in the first issue of Gorufler and the totally communist first
48 Zasedanie Politburo TsK VKP(b). Vopros TsK KP(b) Armenii. 21.11.1945 g. RSASPH, Record group 17, Inventory 3, File 1054, sheet 32.
49 See: Posol’stvo SSSR v Turtsii—Narkomindelu SSSR. 01.11.1945 g., SA RA, Record group 28, Inventory 4, File 47, sheets 8-10.
50 V. Kornev, Zamechania po povodu rechi prezidenta Turtsii I. Inonu. Noiabr’ 1945 g., SA RA, Record group 28, Inventory 1, File 47, sheets 21-22.
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issue of Yeni dunya alarmed Turkish society. The protest movement of students from Istanbul University was supported by other patriotic groups who together completely routed the editorial offices and print shops of Tan, La Turquie, Yeni dunya and Gorufler, as well as the Berrak bookstore that sold Soviet books.
The Istanbul events forced Soviet Ambassador to Turkey S. Vinogradov to promptly contact the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs with a suggestion that the Soviet Union should officially accuse the Turkish government of stirring up fascism, tell the British and the Americans that the “fascist anti-Soviet demonstration in Istanbul might force the Soviet Union to take measures to ensure its security and publish a TASS statement saying that ‘in connection with the fascist anti-Soviet demonstration in Turkey the Soviet government decided to reinforce its garrisons along the Soviet-Turkish border’.” The ambassador also suggested that contacts with the Turks should be discontinued.51
On 7 December, after discussing the Soviet ambassador’s suggestions, the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) sent him a note to be handed to Turkish Foreign Minister Saka.52 On 8 December the note was presented to the Foreign Ministry of Turkey, however the Politburo did not limit itself to this. It subjected Vinogradov to scything criticism: “Your suggestions are completely ill-advised and unacceptable. You should bear in mind that we cannot make official statements to the Turkish government about the rise of fascism in Turkey because this is the Turks’ internal affair. Your suggestion that we should make a declaration to the British and Americans cannot be taken seriously—it is unacceptable. Saber-rattling might be taken for a provocation. Your suggestion that TASS should publish information saying that in connection with the fascist anti-Soviet demonstration in Turkey the Soviet government decided to reinforce its garrisons along the Soviet-Turkish border is flippant and verges on childishness. We equally cannot accept your suggestion that your contacts with the Turks should be discontinued. You should keep your head and should not forward hasty suggestions that might cause political complications for our state. Think it over and try to be more reasonable next time—your responsible position and you post oblige you to do this.”53
Amid the mounting pressure on Turkey the foreign press carried information about the Moscow conference of the three foreign ministers. With heavy hearts the ruling circles and the journalist community of Turkey waited for discussion of the Straits and the eastern vilayets issues. The conference was scheduled for 16 December, 1945; on 14 December the Georgian-language Kommunist newspaper carried a letter by two Georgian academicians, S. Jananshia and N. Berdzenishvili, entitled “On Our Legal Claims against Turkey;” on 20 December the article appeared in Russian in several newspapers (Pravda, Izvestia, and Krasnaia zvezda).
On 24 December Stalin received British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, who resolutely opposed the Soviet claims and expressed his government’s concerns about the reinforcement of Soviet troops along the border with Turkey, the anti-Turkish campaign on the radio and in the press, encouragement of Georgia’s claims on Turkish lands, and about the war of nerves the Soviet Union was waging against Turkey in general. Bevin warned Stalin that he should stop intimidating his country’s ally. Stalin answered that Turkey’s fears were groundless.54
51 See: Ankara, Vinogradovu. Priniato po VCh. 07.12.1945 g., RSASPH, Record group 558, Inventory 11, File 99, sheets 117-118; V. Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev, University of North Carolina Press, 2007, p. 40.
52 See: Ankara, Vinogradovu. Priniato po VCh. 07.12.1945 g., RSASPH, Record group 558, Inventory 11, File 99, sheet 117.
53 Ibid., sheets 117-118;
54 See: A. Sever, Soguk Savaf Kufatmasinda Turkiye, Bati ve Orta Dogu. 1945—1958, Istanbul, 1997, p. 31.
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The letter by the Georgian academicians that appeared on 20 December in several Soviet newspapers invited a stern rebuff from Turkey in particular. On that day the National Assembly discussed the budget of the country’s foreign ministry. General Kazim Karabekir, a deputy from Istanbul who had commanded Turkey’s eastern front at the end of World War I and headed the Turkish delegation at the Kars Conference in September-October 1921, said: “When we signed the friendship treaty with the Russians, the sides, the delegation heads, commanders of the army, politicians, and journalists confirmed, orally and in writing, the following principles: ‘Turkish-Rus-sian enmity dated back to czarism and the Ottoman state. We have buried this enmity forever. The Moscow and Kars treaties should become the tomb of this enmity. We should not revive this dead body.’ Then he rebuffed the Soviet claims: ‘To whom does the Kars region belong? It is Turkic land populated by Turks for centuries that was annexed for a short while by czarism. We never took these lands away from the Russians, we merely returned there twice. During World War I the Russians left these lands for their home; there was neither Russian population nor Russian troops there.’ The general touched upon the presupposition that the 1921 treaties were possible because of Russia’s weakness and pointed out that Russians left the lands around the Kars region under the Kars treaty: ‘By the time the Kars treaty was signed with the participation of representatives of the Federation of the Peoples of the Caucasus and foreign ministers we were not strong at all. Our Eastern Army had already turned to the West along with the heavy artillery and ammunition. The Russians knew this. I should say that had a more vengeful army been in our place the Armenians would have been totally exterminated. They said that their signature under the treaty was their duty and a sign of gratitude’.”55
As a soldier who knew Eastern Anatolia well, Kazim Pasha said: “Owning Kars means being in ambush waiting for a chance to capture Anatolia. Those who own Kars control the roads along the Tiger and Euphrates to the Mediterranean and the Gulf of Basra (Persian Gulf.—J.H.). The Straits are our nation’s throat; we should keep everyone away from it.”56 The Mejlis concluded its sitting with an address to the Turkish army in which it hoped that it would ensure security and defend the country’s independence and integrity with honor.
On 22 December Ankara Radio broadcast a special program about the Soviet claims against Turkey. In response to the threats coming from Moscow Radio, Ankara Radio announced that Turkey did not need the territories of other countries but was prepared to defend its own, therefore, it continued, Turkey was not expecting the Moscow conference to raise the question and play on the nerves of the Turks. “If this is a war of nerves, everyone should know that the Turks in the valleys of Anatolia have strengthened their nerves while fighting for independence and made them as strong as steel.”57
(To be concluded)
55 Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi Tutanak Dergisi. Ardahan Meselesi. TBMM’de. Aralik 1945, pp. 367-370.
56 Ibid., pp. 370-371; D.E. Eremeev, Turtsia v gody Vtoroy mirovoy i “kholodnoy" voyn (1939-1990), Moscow, 2005, pp. 51-52.
57 G. Kiknadze—K. Charkviani. “Otkliki inostrannoy pressy na pismo gruzinskikh akademikov v redaktsiu gazety ‘Kommunist.’” 14.08.1946 g., AGG, Record group 14, Inventory 20, File 253, sheet 66.
