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V. Tishkov. Konflikty i federalism. Federalizm i etnichesky faktopr na Severnom Kavkaze. Obshchaya otsenka situatsii i prirody konfliktov [Conflicts and Federalism. Federalism and Ethnic Factor in the North Caucasus. General Assessment of the Situation and the Nature of Conflicts]. Kazansky federalist, 2002, No 2.
About this see: "Turan": Prichina bunta v Kube — bednost i bezyskhodnost, tsaryashchiye v Azerbaijane [The Cause of Revolt in Kuba - Poverty and Desperation Reigning Supreme in Azerbaijan] // http://panorama.am/ru/ politics/2012/03/05/azerbaijan-guba-turan/
"Vlast," Moscow, N1, 2014, pp. 170-174.
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G. Kovalyov, A. Levchenko, Political analysts, Moscow State University CENTRAL ASIA AND THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: NEW MODEL OF THE U.S. PRESENCE IN THE REGION
On February 25, 2014, it was twenty-five years since the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, after almost ten years of their stay there (from December 27, 1979) with the purpose of maintaining the relations "of brotherhood and revolutionary solidarity" with the People's democratic party of Afghanistan, which was then in power in that country. The Soviet government wanted to protect the southern borders of the U.S.S.R. from penetration of Islamic fundamentalism, which could take place as a result of the activity of the Afghan anti-government opposition coming out under traditionalist Islamic slogans. However, the U.S.S.R. did not achieve stabilization on Afghan soil, which was plunged into the permanent confrontation of the Kabul government and the Tajik-Uzbek Northern alliance with the Pashtun units of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.1 The "Taliban" Islamist movement was fighting against all these groupings; the United States considered this movement as the terrorist threat No 1 in 2001, and its
activity was the cause of the invasion of Afghanistan by NATO and the International coalition of forces within the framework of the antiterrorist operation "Indomitable Freedom."
As is known, by the end of 2014 the U.S. military contingent and troops of the American allies plan to leave Afghan territory on completing their peacekeeping mission in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution of December 20, 2001. To date there are several important questions which will determine the reconfiguration process of the U.S. military presence in the region:
In what way will the United States be able to ensure the further stay of the limited contingent of the NATO forces in Afghanistan necessary for maintaining minimal security and preventing the expansion of the instability zone to neighboring territories?
What are the prospects of the national development of the Afghan state in the conditions of deep antagonism between the secular authorities and the "Taliban" movement, which is strengthening its positions?
How will the weakening of the international peacekeeping forces be reflected on the macroregional situation in Central Asia and the South Caucasus?
How will the withdrawal of the NATO forces from Afghanistan proceed technologically, what infrastructural and technical procedures should be observed during the transportation of military and nonmilitary cargoes from the place of their deployment?
What status will be given to the logistics junctions in the Central Asian and South Caucasian regions?
How will cooperation between NATO and other military-political structures proceed in the conditions of the changing character of international threats and declared transfer to a new stage of the North Atlantic security system without deep-going contradictions?
In order to understand and analyze future transformations of the U.S. presence in the given region it will be necessary to determine the real reasons for and strategic importance of the stay of the NATO military contingent in Afghanistan.
The pretext for the U.S. invasion of the territory of Afghanistan was the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon building on November 11, 2001, which was committed, according to the CIA, by the "Al Qaeda" terrorist organization headed by Osama bin Laden, leader of the World Islamic Union. After the war in the Persian Gulf area in 1990-1991, the Islamist movement has sharply stepped up its activity against the United States regarded as the main enemy of the Islamic values. The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, was a manifestation of the new global tendency of transnational terrorism and the strengthening of civilizational confrontation between different cultural-historical types ready to use force and violence to protect and establish their values.
Having come across the qualitatively new essence of international relations and threats to stability of the world order, Washington has decided to carry out an anti-terrorist operation against the Talibs on Afghan territory. Having realized the changed character of international threats - mainly, the possibility of making sudden terrorist attacks, disrupting security systems, breaking communication networks, proliferating weapons of mass destruction, and stepping up the activity of transnational criminal elements, the United States has legitimized the right to a symmetrical answer and gained the opportunity to use preventive strikes with a view to protecting its national interests. Further on, such strategy will be implemented with the help of the proliferation of the anti-missile system defending the combat theater and reconfiguration of the NATO military presence near countries with unstable political regimes. At the time the struggle against terrorist
groupings deployed in Afghanistan was largely reactionary and timeserving and was viewed as retaliation for the damage done, as well as the desire of the Americans to have revenge and restore the reputation of a great power with global responsibility. Terrorist actions at the time were interpreted by the world community as encroachment on the U.S. sovereignty.
As a result, Article 5 of the NATO Charter came into force, which said that an armed attack against one or several NATO members in Europe or North America would be regarded as an attack on all members, and a joint action would be taken against the aggressor, including the use of the armed force, with a view to restoring and preserving security in the North Atlantic region. Other NATO members joined the United States in its actions. Besides, Russia also supported the actions of the United States in its operation against the Taliban movement by providing intelligence information and an air corridor for NATO aircraft. Apart from that, Moscow contributed to getting consent from certain republics in the post-Soviet area (Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan) to permit the deployment of U.S. military bases on their territory. This step has demonstrated shortcomings in the foreign-policy strategy of Russia in assessing terrorist threats to international security and possibility to use this circumstance by certain actors of world politics in their geopolitical interests, as well as concerning the character and consequences of the NATO presence in Central Asian and Trans-Caucasian republics, taking into consideration their geographical position and strategic importance in the structure of the energy and resource balance of the world system. In this context, the anti-terrorist operation initiated by the United States as an answer to the damage inflicted on it made it possible to shift strategic interests and attention of Americans to the geopolitically important region of the planet.
The thesis of the need to fight the radical Islamist groupings threatening international security has legitimized the U.S. right to the military-political presence of NATO in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. It also contributed to the formation of new prospects of the U.S. foreign-policy activity and the strengthening of its positions in the Caspian region. In May 2001, Thomas Graham, an employee of the Carnegie Foundation, wrote an article about his country's relations with Russia and interests in the region. He said that an access to the energy resources and prevention of the destabilization of the region bordering on four nuclear powers were matters of extreme importance. Many analysts pointed out that the main aim of the anti-terrorist operation of the United States was to establish control over the energy resources of the Caspian region. Scholars of the Caspian region, S. Zhiltsov and I. Zonn, wrote that "...whereas in the 1990s the United States created its basic positions in the Caspian region, the events of the late 2001 - beginning of 2002 laid the foundations of foreign-policy trends of the next decade."2
For a long time the Caspian region had been in the periphery of world historical development, but in the early 1990s it turned into an arena of the struggle of global players. This region is of principal importance for potential supply of Europe with energy resources, has an advantageous geopolitical position, and forms a "strategic energy ellipse"3, consolidating the existing hydrocarbon potential and the functioning transit routes from the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea. Oil and gas reserves concentrated in the region prompted the United States to recognize the Caspian region a "zone of its strategic interests." In the 1990s the then U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright declared that work on the formation of the future of the region would be one of the crucial tasks to be tackled at present. Oil and gas were considered the basis of national security of America, an important
component of national might, the main factor of the world economy, a reason for wars and conflicts, and the decisive force in international relations.4
The United States begins to establish constructive diplomatic relations with countries of Central Asia and the Trans-Caucasus, broaden the processes of democratization and liberalization of the ruling regimes of the post-Soviet republics and contribute to the building of infrastructures and the strengthening of technical possibilities for mining, prospecting for and transporting energy carriers, as well as increase the integration of security systems of newly-independent states in the Euro-Atlantic structure.
As noted by S. Zhiltsov and I. Zonn, "the United States believed that control over Afghanistan and the Islamic states of Central Asia gives them the keys to two big oil-producing regions, such as the Middle East and the Caspian basin, which will directly hamper the growing oil ambitions of China."5 However, it was not only rising China that caused apprehension of the United States, it was more important to prevent the restoration of Russian influence in the postSoviet area and the establishment of control over Caspian hydrocarbons. The anti-terrorist operation launched by the Unites States and NATO made it possible, though partly, to realize such intentions by creating a favorable background for the legitimate military presence of Americans on Central Asian and Trans-Caucasian territory.
However, the geopolitical victories of the United States were not accompanied by successes at another front, namely, in the fight of the NATO contingent against the "Taliban" and other Islamist terrorist groupings.
It should be remembered that one of the election promises of the U.S. President Barack Obama was the withdrawal of the American troops from Afghanistan, completion of the NATO international
mission, and help to the Afghan national army in terms of strengthening the country's security. From the beginning of the world financial crisis in 2008, contradictions began to crop up between the allies concerning the growing expenditures on the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan. The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) has prepared a report on "Military Balance of 2012" in which it was noted that the countries which have paid large sums for military operations would be forced to redistribute the military budget for domestic needs.6 The success of the western operation in Afghanistan was in peril, and therefore NATO should rely mainly on diplomacy and coordinated actions.
At the NATO summit in Lisbon in 2010 it was announced that its forces would be withdrawn from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. In December 2011 at a conference in Bonn the international community mapped out the framework of future help to Afghanistan and expressed readiness to take part in the "Decade of Transformations" on Afghan soil from 2015 to 2024. At its summit meeting in Chicago in 2012 the NATO member-states reaffirmed their Lisbon strategy and decided that the main NATO contribution to Afghanistan after 2014 would be training, consultations, and assistance to the Afghan national security forces. NATO has already evolved a plan of implementing these measures, which presupposes a change in the structure of the NATO presence in Afghanistan.
In our view, the main problem lies not so much in the need for the legal backing of this operation (signing of an agreement with the Afghan leadership on security, determining the character of its relations with the United States after the withdrawal of the forces of the international coalition in 2014), as in the future presence of the U.S. military bases on the territory of Afghanistan and the neighboring countries taking part in the system of the counter-terrorist anti-Taliban
operation. The special representative of the Russian Federation at the United Nations, Ambassador Vitali Churkin, has already voiced apprehensions on this score. "If the anti-terrorist mission is fulfilled, the military bases will be preserved in connection with some other task, which is not connected with Afghanistan. If the struggle against terrorism demands continuation, it will be necessary to obtain prolongation of the Security Council mandate. In any case, the remaining military presence should not be used against the interests of Afghanistan's neighbors and other countries of the region... It is important to have a clear-cut temporary and legal framework: attempts to make the presence of alien forces permanent give ground for serious doubts as to its real aims." Vitali Churkin also stated that the future NATO mission to Afghanistan could be organized only after receiving and studying a complete report of the international body on Afghanistan to the UN Security Council on the fulfillment of the current mandate.
The U.S. actions in the Central Asian and the South Caucasian regions in the context of the prospects connected with the withdrawal of the NATO forces from Afghanistan provoke serious questions and make it possible to state that the United States has embarked on the transformation of its model of presence in the region. This model is now based on the new Strategic concept announced at the NATO summit in Chicago in 2012. Among the major premises of this new concept were "clever defense" and "adjoined forces," which will help ensure maximal coordination of defense planning, developing and using the forces and means in accordance with economic effectiveness: the future framework of operations should be oriented to objectively limited financial and economic resources. The rapid reaction forces of NATO, partial change of military-political influence on the economic and political situation in the region, as well as renunciation of permanent military deployment in favor of the flexible and operational
use of military objects jointly with the allies are the embodiment of these standards. This strategy is confirmed by the actions of the United States and the European Union in the Caspian and Central Asian regions.
It is quite evident that the expected withdrawal of the NATO forces from Afghanistan will change the regional balance of forces. The rapid formation of national flotillas of the countries of the "Caspian Five," continued isolation of Iran, possible transit of military cargoes through the region, and the growing demand for ensuring security of the new transport (pipeline) infrastructure from Azerbaijan toward NATO - all this forms a set of tangible risks. Parallel with the growing tension in the security sphere in the Caspian region, the withdrawal of the NATO forces from Afghanistan will, evidently, contribute to the emergence of new transport routes and logistics junctions in the countries of Central Asia and the Caspian basin.
In this connection the session of the World Economic Forum for a strategic dialogue on the future of the South Caucasus and Central Asia held in Baku on April 7-8, 2013, was quite indicative. Actually, the main aim of the session was to create a new form of cooperation between the elites of the countries of the South Caucasus and Central Asia invited to it. Azerbaijan is to play a special role within its framework. The aim of the forum was to start long-term initiatives and offer definite scenarios for the regions of the South Caucasus and Central Asia. These processes will continue for the next 18 months. The main aim is to reach regional economic integration and examine the unique evolutionary potentials of the region and various alternative scenarios. It was indicative that among the participants in the forum were leading experts from the Johns Hopkins University (the United States) who had worked out the "New Silk Route" concept now used by the U.S. Department of State in implementing its strategy in Central
Asia and Afghanistan. Proceeding from this, one may conclude that despite a multitude of expert assessments showing the loss of interest of Washington in the region of the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, in reality there is going to be but a slight change in the balance of foreign-policy forces.
Thus, it can be assumed that the planned withdrawal of the NATO forces from Afghanistan means a change in the models of the U.S. presence in the region, but not a refusal from this presence. The model connected with the presence of a many-thousand military contingent in Afghanistan and considerable financial expenditures and human losses is going to be replaced by a model of indirect economic influence. The key elements of this model will be export-oriented pipelines (in western and south-eastern directions), on the one hand, and on the other, transport junctions in countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus being created at present, which will be used for the withdrawal of the military forces from Afghanistan. The countries of the region which adhered to many-vector policy previously, but recently became "western-oriented" in their foreign policy will play considerable role within the framework of this model. The strengthening of the regional component in the new model of U.S. influence presupposes more dynamic reaction on the part of the key states of the Caspian region.
Azerbaijan. According to results of 2013, it can be stated that Azerbaijan has increased its pro-western orientation in foreign policy and its intention to broaden cooperation with NATO, including in the matters of ensuring security of the transport infrastructure, but without aggravating its relations with Russia. A visit to Baku by the senior adviser of the U.S. Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks in January 2013 demonstrated the growing mutual interest of the two countries in broader relations. The growing attention of the United States to the
South Caucasian route may be conditioned by the emergence of an additional opportunity for strengthening its military ties with Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. Evidently, Baku receives positively Washington's initiatives. After her visit to Azerbaijan it has become known that president Aliyev has endorsed an agreement on cooperation between the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan and the European command of the United States, according to which the two sides will hold bilateral military consultations at the level of leading experts on planning.
It is indicative that the strategic role of Azerbaijan in the region becomes one of the main subjects to be discussed at various international conferences and forums: there was one in Washington last spring sponsored by the Kennan Institute of the International Woodrow Wilson Scientific Center. Speaking at this conference Nargiz Gurbanova, high official of the Azerbaijan's Embassy in the United States, told the audience about the turning of her country into a regional transport network, and specially mentioned its growing role during the withdrawal of the NATO troops from Afghanistan. The permanent representative of Azerbaijan at NATO Khazar Ibrahim said that official experts from Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey presented to NATO technical and procedural details for the use of the railway line Baku -Tbilisi - Kars for the purpose. In turn, at the Azerbaijani-American Forum "Glance into the Future" held at the end of May 2013, President Ilkham Aliyev of Azerbaijan said that "cooperation in the sphere of security is also very important for the two countries, and I am glad that our cooperation is entering a new stage. We are working together on global security matters. Our soldiers shoulder to shoulder render help and support to Afghanistan. Azerbaijan provides almost 40 percent of transit to Afghanistan and the Northern distribution network is considered one of the most reliable and stable."7
Military security, that is, prevention of conflicts and military clashes, is replaced in public space by energy security, which, naturally, is quite important for any sovereign state, but not sufficient enough for the Caspian and Central Asian regions. As a result, international actors penetrate in the regions pursuing their own geopolitical interests under the guise of various forms of cooperation, be it public-diplomatic, lobbyist, financial, or military assistance. To date NATO de facto has been taking part in providing security for the Baku - Tbilisi - Ceyhan and Baku - Tbilisi - Erzurum pipelines. Suffice it to recall that in January 2014, the NATO General Secretary Anders Fogh Rasmussen and President of Azerbaijan Ilkham Aliyev stated that ensuring security for the gas pipeline between deposits in the Caspian basin and Europe would be one of the crucial directions of further cooperation between NATO and Azerbaijan. Besides, cooperation on Afghanistan calls for continued cooperation between NATO and Azerbaijan on a whole number of programs, for one, within the Program of individual partnership. The two sides will continue interaction in the sphere of reforming the armed forces of Azerbaijan and bringing them to the NATO standards.
Despite this, official persons of Azerbaijan state that their country is not going to allow the deployment of NATO bases on its territory and they understand the risks, which may follow from military-political intrusion of the third forces in the region. Azerbaijan considers it very important to maintain good relations with Russia, as before, and recognizes its leading role as a regional player.
Turkmenistan. That country could become an important link in the chain of transit and logistics junctions created by NATO for the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan. At the end of May 2013 the Ambassador of Afghanistan to NATO Humayun Tandar said that the route of the withdrawal of NATO troops and arms from Afghanistan via
Turkmenistan had been discussed. However, this is a long and difficult route, the Ambassador stated, and he added that he did not know whether Turkmenistan would agree with the transit of arms. The route starts in the north of Afghanistan and passes through Turkmenistan, the Caspian region and Azerbaijan.
To date the question of Turkmenistan's consent to transit of military cargoes still remains open. However, Turkmenistan has expressed its interest in joining the transport project "Baku - Tbilisi -Kars." It would like to take part in the "Central Corridor" which would connect Central Asia with Europe via the Caspian region with the help of the Baku - Tbilisi - Kars railway line.
Kazakhstan. That country could also be included in the process of the withdrawal of the NATO forces from Afghanistan. This is confirmed by statements of certain figures in the political establishment of Kazakhstan. The proposal to offer the Kazakh port Aktau on the Caspian Sea for transit of cargoes from Afghanistan shows that the country realized full well the forthcoming geopolitical transformations.
Moreover, speaking at the above-mentioned World Economic Forum, the first Deputy Premier Bakytjan Sagintayev touched on certain promising fields of cooperation with Central Asian and Caucasian countries. Among other things, he mentioned the transport-logistical potential of Kazakhstan as a region lying along the historical Great Silk Route from East to West. In essence, Sagintayev presented his country as a bridge between East and West. All the more so since Kazakhstan is now implementing transcontinental projects opening new opportunities for it and other states of Central Asia and the Caucasus, which have no access to the sea and are far removed from world markets.
As is known, the Aktau transit port has been functioning since 2009, and more than 15,000 containers have been handled by it,
according to official data, which is a considerable part of military cargoes taken along the Northern transit route. Representatives of Kazakhstan and the United States now discus the question of turning this port into the key transit hub in the structure of the Northern supply network. It will be achieved through expanding the port and increasing the capacity of the airport.
Today, Kazakhstan is trying to position itself as the biggest transport-logistical hub of Central Asia and with this aim in view it is stepping up the development of international routes (projects "Western Europe - Western China" and "Kazakhstan - New Silk Road"). Kazakhstan is situated between several major participants in trade markets - China, Russia, and countries of East and Western Europe. The sea port of Aktau is a component of international transport corridors TRACECA (Transport corridor Europe - Caucasus - Asia) and North - South, which ensure access to ports of the Caspian, Black Sea - Mediterranean and Baltic basins, countries of the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia. Evidently, the port of Aktau is of geostrategic importance for the entire region, and this is why the presence of outside players in it can have a negative effect on the macroregional situation.
All this goes to show the readiness of the countries of the Caspian - Central Asian region to grant NATO and the International security forces the already functioning and newly-created transport and logistical junctions as routes for the withdrawal of military and nonmilitary cargoes from Afghanistan. This will contribute to the implementation of the NATO Strategic concept announced at the NATO summit in Chicago in 2012, which presupposes the change of the model of influence in the region of Central Asia and the South Caucasus.
Evidently, Moscow cannot ignore the change of the geopolitical reality on neighboring territories, which, historically, are part of the zone of exclusive influence of the Russian state. If Russia remains
indifferent to these changes, the already existing formats of Eurasian security (Collective Security Treaty Organization) and the planned Eurasian Economic Union may become endangered in the foreseeable future.
Russia is advocating the intensification of a dialogue between Caspian states - members of the CSTO on broader cooperation in ensuring security and stability in the Central Asian and Trans-Caucasian regions. Moscow is ready to contribute to the process of logistic and technical backing of the withdrawal of the NATO military contingent from Afghanistan, but is categorically objects the possible preservation of the NATO bases on these territories. Russia has already been taking necessary measures for protecting the Tajik-Afghan border within the framework of a specially evolved program by the CSTO and participates in creating an infrastructure directly on the territory of Afghanistan. The CSTO military command does not examine a possibility of cooperation with NATO.
Meanwhile, the change in the configuration of the Trans-Atlantic military presence abroad demands that Russia and its allies should be ready for agreed actions and evolve a strategy of reaction to the geopolitical transformations of the world system. Cooperation between CSTO and NATO in mutually acceptable spheres seems quite constructive. This includes exchange of information, opposition to drug trafficking and cyber-threats, counter-terrorist operations, as well as post-conflict world order and long-term interaction in setting up stable government institutions. Such strategy can be applied to working out a joint plan of action in the withdrawal of the NATO forces from Afghanistan and the post-crisis solution of the situation.
At the present moment the situation remains unpredictable and contradictory. It can be said that after the withdrawal of the NATO troops from Afghanistan the neighboring territories may face
deep-going changes and great threats to security. There can be a civil war in Afghanistan, greater criminal activity of narcobarons, and growing drug trafficking along the route Afghanistan - Central Asia -Russia. Besides, NATO may consolidate its military presence on the territory of Central Asia and the South Caucasus while transporting military cargoes from Afghanistan.
Notes
Gulbuddin Khekmatyar, leader of the Islamic party of Afghanistan, former prime minister of Afghanistan (1993-1994, 1996).
S. Zhiltsov, I. Zonn. SShA v pogone za Kaspiyem [The U.S.A. in Pursuit of the Caspian Region]. - Moscow, 2009. - P. 34-38.
G. Kemp. Superblow. Strategy, Politics and the Persian Gulf and Caspian Basin. -Washington, 1997/ - P. 97.
D. Ergin. Dobycha: Vsemirnaya istoriya borby za neft, dengi i vlast [Booty: World History of the Struggle for Oil, Money and Power]. - Moscow, 1999. S. Zhiltsov, I. Zonn. Op. cit. - P. 52.
The Military Balance 2012 // The International Institute for Strategic Studies. URL.:
http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/militarybalance/issues/the-military-balance-
2012-77da
Azerbaijan and the U.S.A. determine the prospects of strategic partnership //Vesti Kavkaza, 2013, May 29. URL: http://vestikavkaza.ru/new/Azerbaijan-i-SSHHA-opredelyayut-perspeltivy-strategicheskogo-partnerstva.html
"Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta: Politicheskiye nauki," series 12, Moscow 2014, N1, pp. 65-79.
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D. Abbasov
"SYRIAN SYNDROME" AMONG AZERBAIJANI YOUNG PEOPLE: FORTUITY OR TREND?
The mass media in Azerbaijan regularly published in 2013, and in the first months of 2014, information about young men who happened to be in Syria, take part in the armed struggle going on there,
